How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[sburke]

18 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

And one last one before heading off for a nap... Ukraine apparently struck something hard in southern occupied Kherson.  Side note, look at the scars on the Russian's head.  I wonder if he received them from the earlier part of the war (one part of the scar still looks red) or if he had some sort of civilian based accident. 

This got me thinking... aren't we about due for some sort of deep strike from Ukraine?  It's been a while since they have done something that grabbed our attention for several days.  I know they don't owe us anything, but it would be nice to have something to wonder "how did they do that?!?"

I expect the answer is Ukraine is waiting for the Russian offensive to be in full motion before doing something spectacular again.

Steve

Russian forces suffer losses in Kherson Oblast: dozens of dead and wounded taken to military hospital General Staff (yahoo.com)

 

regarding your observations on disruption of Russian intel networks

Netherlands to reduce number of Russian embassy diplomats due to Moscow's attempts to employ spies there (yahoo.com)

[NamEndedAllen]

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/us-officials-believe-china-may-providing-russia-non-lethal-military-as-rcna71336
Feb. 18, 2023, 11:02 AM PST

By Courtney Kube

The US believes China may be providing non-lethal military assistance to Russia for use in Ukraine, according to four US officials familiar with the matter, and the administration is concerned they are considering sending lethal aid.

While China has provided some help to Russia, including parroting Russian disinformation campaigns about the war and promoting Russian false pretexts about the war, this is more tangible assistance for use by Russian troops in Ukraine, according to sources familiar with the matter. 

The officials declined to provide specifics about the non-lethal military assistance, but said it could include gear for the spring offensive like uniforms or even body armor. 

 

[chuckdyke]

If Putin wins in Ukraine, he will point his nuclear missiles at London... writes BILL BROWDER (msn.com)

 

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, sburke said:

Russian forces suffer losses in Kherson Oblast: dozens of dead and wounded taken to military hospital General Staff (yahoo.com)

The article isn't much of anything.  Cripes, read like something an AI bot wrote.  So I don't know how much faith to put in the specific wording of this:
 

"Details: Over the course of 16-17 February, the Air Forces of Ukrainian Defence Forces conducted five air strikes on the clusters of Russian military personnel and equipment, as well as one strike on the position of an anti-aircraft missile system."

Air strikes?  I suppose it's possible, but this would be the first instance I know of where Ukrainian aircraft went into Russian held territory.  Therefore, I'm skeptical and think the cause might have been HIMARS instead.  The village of Kalanchak is just at the edge of current Ukrainian range.

What does sound right is the strike on an AD missile system.  Someone here mentioned the smoke plumes looked to be S300/400 and that seemed right to me as well.

 

3 hours ago, sburke said:

regarding your observations on disruption of Russian intel networks

Netherlands to reduce number of Russian embassy diplomats due to Moscow's attempts to employ spies there (yahoo.com)

Yeah, the article I cited spoke of the Russians apparently being desperate to restock their agents and that means clumsy methods which are expedient but not likely to succeed.  They are probably trying harder elsewhere through more devious means.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

13 hours ago, rocketman said:

 

Interesting system.  I've not come upon this one until now, so thanks for that.

It seems the two major advantages of this system is that the warhead can be optimized for different types of targets, with more of a punch when attacking reinforced concrete targets (2m reinforced concrete penetration is impressive) and it can be retargeted while in flight.  The latter is quite interesting in that the gunner can opt to guide it onto the target manually or have it strike a designated spot on the ground (I presume it doesn't track moving targets).  Certainly that has a lot of value, however it does come a the expense of fire and forget as it guided by wire like TOW, MILAN, and others.

The rest of what this can do is fairly similar to Javelin, except that it isn't shoulder launched.  Making this system more akin to a TOW system rather than Javelin in terms of how it is used.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

As always, some interesting items in ISW's latest report, dated Feb 18.  The first one to mention is at the bottom which involves the Military Unit 1444th from Samara Oblast that released the "appeals" video the other day which we discussed here.  The Russian military had them apologize in front of other Russian forces, then they were shoved into the back of vehicles by military police and taken away to the front.  Seems their message got through to the higher ups loud and clear, which means they had to be made an example of so there won't be more instances like this.

What I found most interesting is how Russia seems to have a knack of deliberately harming its own war efforts.  The first part is Russia not paying its volunteers (BARS in particular) what was promised.  All kinds of clever ways of squirming out of it, such as not providing paperwork proving they went into combat.  This isn't very smart as the word will get out and certainly those who did their stint and didn't get paid are not likely to volunteer for another contract.  Even with all the financial difficulties the Russian government faces, surely the cost of paying these guys isn't a big deal, so why deliberately piss off experienced soldiers?

The other self inflicted wound is going to be interesting to see unfold.  As part of integrating DLPR forces into Russian MoD control they are purging the top leadership.  While I'm not suggesting this is necessarily unwarranted or without some benefits, the rank and file of these units are still very "provincially" minded.  Having Russians assuming staff positions that were formerly held by Ukrainian turncoats is no doubt going to be problematic.  It remains to be seen how thoroughly the purges will be.  Maybe Khodakovsky will have some problems with an elevator, experience difficulties at a cafe, or have his car attacked.  Because I'm not sure he will go quietly if he is relieved of command.

Steve

[Kinophile]

While RUS is further grinding down its "elite"  (read, above AFRF average training with good equipment) units in strategically useless (but operationally useful)  assaults on Bahkmut,  the ZSU is building fresh Line units with excellent training and superb equipment into a strategically critical operational reserve. 

One force is throwing a lot of its best infantry into a meat grinder,  the other army is forming the core of a new model army. 

Six months from now Bahkmut won't matter and will have no effect on the course of the war, while six months from now the ZSU will be in full swing of NATOization of its fighting units, indeed its entire operational posture and formatting. 

RUS Army is fighting for short term gain.  UKR is holding off that gain while building for long term quality.

Edited February 19, 2023 by Donaudampfschifffahrtsgese

[LongLeftFlank]

47 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

As always, some interesting items in ISW's latest report, dated Feb 18.  The first one to mention is at the bottom which involves the Military Unit 1444th from Samara Oblast that released the "appeals" video the other day which we discussed here.  The Russian military had them apologize in front of other Russian forces, then they were shoved into the back of vehicles by military police and taken away to the front.  Seems their message got through to the higher ups loud and clear, which means they had to be made an example of so there won't be more instances like this.

Be nice if the UA could track them to their new sector and broadcast surrender instructions.  Frag your minders and come in, boys. Follow the drone to the yellow taped zone, stack your arms and await instructions.

I'm sure the average Ukrainian grunt isn't in a hospitable mood, but a PW is basically a KIA for all intents and purposes (until swapped).

[fireship4]

'A Critique of Realism' (using John Mearsheimer as an exemplar of the school) posted by Kraut:

Quote

 

 

[Yet]

13 hours ago, The_Capt said:

In reality if Plan A was to defeat through Dislocation - which all the parts you list are really components thereof; plan B was to fall back on Attrition.  Not a terrible idea but...

 ~~~~~

Last point - strategy should never be relative.  It cannot be a "good strategy from our point of view" as the sole metric of good or bad.  Strategies must have a universal objective component, they have to take into account reality.  If they fail to do that then they really are not a strategy at all, they are a wishlist. 

good post again The_Capt! 

in terms of strategies, plan A was in my eyes decapitation: Run to Kyiv shock and awe, bring in some spetsnaz and roll over the apparatus. 

plan B to dislocate, and plan C attrition.

and yeah a strategy should never be 'relative' ofcourse, but it can only be as good as your assessment of: your own capabilities, your opponents capabilities, the situation and the reaction of 3th parties.

These assessments proved to be ehhh. p*sspoor

like making a checkers-strategy without knowing: only half of your stones can move; your opponent plays chess; the opponent is backed by friends that wont keep silent and keep putting stuff on the board.

so yes, there was a plan A, B (and C), but based on bad assessments.  Not only the troops  but also the strategies were build for another war and RU doesnt seem to be able to improve its assessments.

... which makes The_Capt being right again... 

[Pete Wenman]

“reports indicating something like ‘general counteroffensive’ of the ZSU in the Bakhmut area”

Tom Cooper has thoughts

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-19-february-2023-bakhmut-c282d043b148

 

[womble]

2 minutes ago, Pete Wenman said:

“reports indicating something like ‘general counteroffensive’ of the ZSU in the Bakhmut area”

Tom Cooper has thoughts

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-19-february-2023-bakhmut-c282d043b148

 

More indications of UKR successfully degrading (attriting) the RU artillery park.

[LongLeftFlank]

Interesting OSINT 

 

 

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Yet said:

good post again The_Capt! 

in terms of strategies, plan A was in my eyes decapitation: Run to Kyiv shock and awe, bring in some spetsnaz and roll over the apparatus. 

plan B to dislocate, and plan C attrition.

and yeah a strategy should never be 'relative' ofcourse, but it can only be as good as your assessment of: your own capabilities, your opponents capabilities, the situation and the reaction of 3th parties.

These assessments proved to be ehhh. p*sspoor

like making a checkers-strategy without knowing: only half of your stones can move; your opponent plays chess; the opponent is backed by friends that wont keep silent and keep putting stuff on the board.

so yes, there was a plan A, B (and C), but based on bad assessments.  Not only the troops  but also the strategies were build for another war and RU doesnt seem to be able to improve its assessments.

... which makes The_Capt being right again... 

Interestingly I think the step the Russians missed was the same one that a lot of western mainstream analysts kinda glossed over at the start of this war, and is near and dear to just about everyone on this forum - the war game.

In military planning this is a major step/exercise (in fact we do it at least twice).  In strategic planning it is normally done through a series of operational war games and results summed, but you can do a version of opposed strategies.

In the war gaming phase one takes a plan and smashes it up against an opponents counter-plan.  What a lot of students miss is that it is not about winning, it is about completely acid washing your concepts.  War games are not supposed to be fun, they are supposed to brutalize your planning before your opponent does it for real on the battlefield.  Until you see every flaw and hole in your plan, you cannot fully understand the risks.

You can even do this for non-linear campaigning, but it is trickier.  One has to re-think the war game for emergent phenomena, and here a bottom up micro-sampling based approach may work better.  However even for top-down - and here I think a lot of western experts made this mistake - one can see macro-masking leading to significant poor assumptions.  This just underlines how hard a discipline this is to carry out when you are really trying.  

As far as I can tell Russia did not war game this out.  When the boss has a habit of having people who disagree with him thrown out windows, it is pretty hard to get honest assessments of holes in his plan. This is a planning environment of lethal group think which is just a perfect recipe for progressive unreality.  

But for a few dozen copies of CMBS and Putin not being a gamer, a war was lost.

[Beleg85]

 

[The_Capt]

15 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

 

So no magic rabbits.  Well I am not sure if dumb mass is dead, but they are calling the family to the bedside based on this war.

[Harmon Rabb]

It's Sunday, you know what that means!

Perun takes a break from discussing the more technical aspects of the war in his new video. This video is a special treat to those interested in the geopolitical side of things, and getting some historical context about this war.

Edited February 19, 2023 by Harmon Rabb

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Interestingly I think the step the Russians missed was the same one that a lot of western mainstream analysts kinda glossed over at the start of this war, and is near and dear to just about everyone on this forum - the war game.

...

As far as I can tell Russia did not war game this out.  When the boss has a habit of having people who disagree with him thrown out windows, it is pretty hard to get honest assessments of holes in his plan. This is a planning environment of lethal group think which is just a perfect recipe for progressive unreality. 

Yup.  There is no purpose conducting a wargame if the outcome the boss wants is baked into it from the start.  However, in this case there was not only no wargaming, there war plan was largely drawn up at the last minute and wasn't communicated to pretty much anybody until the war was about to start.

Ironically, the Soviets had one of the most dramatic successes with wargaming in military history.  In 1940 they did a massive and honest assessment of how to deal with Nazi Germany.  It was through these games that the Soviets learned that the Germans were likely too strong to attack and also too strong to hold at the border.  Instead, the Soviets adopted an incredibly well thought out defense-in-depth strategy coordinated with mobilizing forces and industry.  The frontier forces were written off before the war began, which is why they were armed with the oldest stuff in the Soviet arsenal while the 2nd line of defense got all the good stuff in hand with the 3rd line getting all the newly produced stuff.  It was a brilliant plan and it worked (barely), all because the Soviet leadership appreciated the value of wargaming.

Putin should have checked his history books a bit more before this war.  Thankfully he didn't.

Steve

[Halmbarte]

9 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup.  There is no purpose conducting a wargame if the outcome the boss wants is baked into it from the start.  However, in this case there was not only no wargaming, there war plan was largely drawn up at the last minute and wasn't communicated to pretty much anybody until the war was about to start.

Ironically, the Soviets had one of the most dramatic successes with wargaming in military history.  In 1940 they did a massive and honest assessment of how to deal with Nazi Germany.  It was through these games that the Soviets learned that the Germans were likely too strong to attack and also too strong to hold at the border.  Instead, the Soviets adopted an incredibly well thought out defense-in-depth strategy coordinated with mobilizing forces and industry.  The frontier forces were written off before the war began, which is why they were armed with the oldest stuff in the Soviet arsenal while the 2nd line of defense got all the good stuff in hand with the 3rd line getting all the newly produced stuff.  It was a brilliant plan and it worked (barely), all because the Soviet leadership appreciated the value of wargaming.

Putin should have checked his history books a bit more before this war.  Thankfully he didn't.

Steve

"they did a massive and honest assessment"

Who got to tell Stalin the outcome & how long did they live afterwards? 

"Soviets adopted an incredibly well thought out defense-in-depth strategy"

The incredibly well thought out strategy of multiple massive counter attacks against a superior opponent that resulted in the death or capture of millions of soldiers? 

H

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

27 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So no magic rabbits.

What a shock!

It seems Kaufman and the Pentagon also think the offensive started weeks ago, not just limited shaping attacks but full on offensive.  Kudos to us for calling that correctly several weeks ago.

Kaufman is also appears to have dropped any notion of Russians having rabbits, or perhaps even hats.  This Winter is incredibly wasteful of resources (particularly artillery) and is consuming their mobilized reserves for likely little gain.  They will go into the Spring weaker and likely unable to conduct a large scale offensive.  He pointed out that some within the Russian hierarchy probably wanted to wait until Summer for an offensive for this very reason.  But Putin wants things done now, so that is the overriding rationale strategy is tied to.

Another point that Kaufman makes that we've discussed already is that the Russian offensive has already forestalled any offensive action by Ukraine this Winter and most likely Spring as well.  Friendly losses and strain on logistics makes any sort of large scale offensive very unlikely until this Summer.

Lastly, Kaufman speaks about the manpower balance as being potentially problematic for Ukraine.  I agree it makes things more difficult (less crappy enemy to kill is certainly preferable to more crappy enemy to kill), but the quality difference gap is widening.  Ukraine is also forming new units that will be available in 2023, so Russia will either need to do another mobilization or it will once again return to being overmatched by Ukraine.

I heard an interview yesterday on BBC Radio with Ukraine's new Deputy Defense Minister (at least I think it was Oleksandr Pavlyuk) gave an answer to the quantity question that could have come straight out of this thread.  He said that Ukraine is not concerned about how much Russia has of this or that because Ukraine's strategy is to build a force of superior quality that relies upon ISR and PGMs to shape the battlefield deep in the rear.  He said that their concept was to kill and disrupt Russia's forces before they even get to the frontlines.  Yup, he said ISR and PGM explicitly, two acronyms we love here in this thread

Steve

[scarletto]

Its quite interesting how things have changed in the Ukraine Aid wise over the year. I did two tours so to speak, operating out of Poland and delivering Aid and taking Refugees back last year. Fairly easy except for the shelling and firefights lol. Tried to go out this year and whilst i call last year the wild west year, they are more structured. Finding it hard to even get on a Aid unit now, and was going to join my friend in Kiev, but become more expensive. Plus at 65 my wife says i am a bit to old. I remind her my friends 63 and carries a AK without any problem. Plus i do miss Ukrainian food. 

[Battlefront.com]

43 minutes ago, Halmbarte said:

"they did a massive and honest assessment"

Who got to tell Stalin the outcome & how long did they live afterwards? 

Zhukov was the one that played the German side.  I am sure the staff was very, very, very careful about how they presented their findings to Stalin, but keep in mind the Soviet forces had just lost the Winter War.  Badly.  Stalin was likely more receptive to their assessment than he would have been if the Winter War hadn't happened.

Also, it wasn't that the staff said "we will lose a war with Germany", they instead said "we can win a war with Germany if we adopt this plan".

43 minutes ago, Halmbarte said:

"Soviets adopted an incredibly well thought out defense-in-depth strategy"

The incredibly well thought out strategy of multiple massive counter attacks against a superior opponent that resulted in the death or capture of millions of soldiers? 

Absolutely.  The General Staff realized the quality of those troops was low and Germany was going to slice them to pieces.  Sacrificing them was a deliberate part of the overall strategy.  The border forces were intended to stall and attrit the Germans long enough to build up new forces, with new equipment (in particular tanks and artillery), and counter attack from positions of strength.

The strategy almost didn't work because the sacrificial forces at the front didn't stall the Germans or cause them as many casualties as they had expected.  This meant the second line of defense had to be committed earlier than expected in areas not anticipated.  The Germans, therefore, chewed up a good chunk of what the Soviets thought they would have for a counter attack.  However, the second line performed better than the first line and the Germans were already overextended, so it was enough.

In a way the massive losses experienced in the Summer of 1941 emphasized how perceptive the Soviet General Staff was about the real world value of those forces.  If they had instead believed them to be capable military formations, and based their strategy upon that, it is very possible that the Soviet Union would have fallen in 1941.

I highly recommend reading anything by David Glanz on the subject.  This one in particular is relevant:

   Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (1998) ISBN 0-7006-0879-6

However, the author that really showed me the Cold War stereotypes needed to be reexamined was a 1984 book by Brian Fugate:

     Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 ISBN 0891411976

I read Fugate's book when it came out and it completely dispelled the Cold War myths that had been built up around both the German and the Soviet sides of the war.

Steve

[edit] - I poked around and found what looks to be a good article on the wargames, though I only skimmed it.  Seems it is mostly aimed at trashing Zhukov, which is appropriate!  They were in January 1941, so not 1940.  Here is the link:

https://codoh.com/library/document/marshal-zhukov-a-career-built-on-corpses/en/

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, scarletto said:

Its quite interesting how things have changed in the Ukraine Aid wise over the year. I did two tours so to speak, operating out of Poland and delivering Aid and taking Refugees back last year. Fairly easy except for the shelling and firefights lol. Tried to go out this year and whilst i call last year the wild west year, they are more structured. Finding it hard to even get on a Aid unit now, and was going to join my friend in Kiev, but become more expensive. Plus at 65 my wife says i am a bit to old. I remind her my friends 63 and carries a AK without any problem. Plus i do miss Ukrainian food. 

Thanks for checking in with us again.  Good to hear that they've got things more organized that they don't need a bunch of old farts pissing off their wives to keep the aid flowing   I'm not Ukrainian, but what you did for them is deeply appreciated by someone who was only able to contribute money and morale support.

Steve

[kevinkin]

https://www.army-technology.com/features/russias-military-planners-in-ukraine-muddled-by-anachronism/

“We can be absolutely certain that Ukraine has prepared a defence in depth and that it’s probably concentrating its armoured units in formations as counterattack forces. 

“And indeed, I imagine the Ukrainian command would let a serious Russian offensive advance into that territory, inflicting attrition with artillery fire and anti-tank fire, and would then use its armour to deliver decisive counterattacks before going over to the counter-offensive.

“I’m pretty certain that, if the Russian command is applying its own military doctrine, it will be seeking to do the same.” 

Might just become a 100% political call and who blinks first? 

By springtime, political factors will imperil both sides to engage, with the earliest attacker benefiting from military first-mover advantages but exposed to counterattacks by defender’s artillery and armour. “I’m certain both sides are pressing to do this.

“Now, providing that Ukrainian allies can supply sufficient ammunition and equipment,” says Barry, “political and battlefield leadership, as well as western weapons, may well give Ukraine tactical advantage. But it’s not clear to me that Kiev has enough combat power to rapidly eject Russian forces.” 

The question of Ukraine’s capacity to resist attritional attacks lays at the centre of any outlook over the nation’s prospects for victory. Henry Boyd, research fellow for defence and military analysis at the IISS has looked extensively at reports of manpower capability across the duration of the conflict and find that attrition, “certainly for the next year” should not be a limiting factor for the Ukrainian forces’ capability, “but it is one that they will have to bear in mind in terms of their ability to spend blood and treasure.”

So Ukraine has to resist the temptation to strike first to not expend manpower in a offensive that might not have the weight right now to carry the day. Better to let the RA do what it does worse, move on the open battlefield. 

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/19/opinion/america-ukraine-war-russia.html

 

Quote

Yet the outcome of the war is simply too important — to America as well as Ukraine — to allow our support to falter. On the war’s anniversary it’s time for a concerted effort to persuade Americans of a single idea: We should support Ukraine as much as it takes, as long as it takes, until the Russian military suffers a decisive, unmistakable defeat.

The whole editorial is outstanding. Now write your Congressperson/MP AGAIN.