How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[cyrano01]

11 hours ago, Aragorn2002 said:

Perhaps the Finns could have won the Winter war when the West had supported them as they support Ukraine now. Glad at least that lesson is learned. 

Maybe but the West was a bit busy at the time. Taking on the USSR and Nazi Germany simultaneously might have been a bit tricky.

[Huba]

Just now, Beleg85 said:

We are still in the middle of events, hard to tell if this is not even just first phase. If, in hiper optimistic scenario, this indeed will be a straw that break camel's neck- we can compare it to 1973 and even beyond. Retroactively changing significance of events is massive problem in historiography; let's remember that notning special happenned in AD 476 according to contemporaries.

But that is very different historical discussion.

Well of course, we are talking about what happened up to this point - and this is hardly comparable to what Israelis achieved in the whole conflict. If UA keeps on the offensive, beats Russian in few more regions and ends the war, then by all means let's discuss who is/ was more badass.

23 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Then you look at the Ukrainians, who are basically using mostly Cold War era Soviet T-64BV and T-72 tanks against in general more modern Russian T-90s/T-80s/T-72B3s. The vast majority of the Ukrainian tanks don't even have thermal optics, which is standard on the T-72B3 (and alone already outnumbers the modernised T-64BV 2017s some two to three-fold).

Their air force still uses vintage late 80s/early 90s MiG-29s and Su-34s against Russian Su-35s. They don't even have active radar-homing AAMs. They are also outnumbered too. No, they were operating at VPAF vs. USAF levels of technological disparity.

OTOH, Ukraine has tons of super modern ground lauchned PGMs, and access to vastly superior ISR, both more important than quality of the tanks. I'd take that over better tanks or aircraft (that are neutralized by air defense for both sides). Anyway, as Beleg wrote above, it's hard to compare a short complete war with this prolonged conflict, that still is far from conclusion. Let's see with what Ukrainians will surprise us in upcoming days and weeks.

[sburke]

okay enough of the 1973 parallels.    

 

I don't think this one is behind a paywall, but text below

As Russians Retreat, Putin Is Criticized by Hawks Who Trumpeted His War (msn.com)

 

Quote

 

As Russians Retreat, Putin Is Criticized by Hawks Who Trumpeted His War

As Russian forces hastily retreated in northeastern Ukraine on Saturday in one of their most embarrassing setbacks of the war, President Vladimir V. Putin was at a park in Moscow, presiding over the grand opening of a Ferris wheel.

“It’s very important for people to be able to relax with friends and family,” Mr. Putin intoned.

The split-screen contrast was stunning, even for some of Mr. Putin’s loudest backers. And it underscored a growing rift between the Kremlin and the invasion’s most fervent cheerleaders. For the cheerleaders, Russia’s retreat appeared to confirm their worst fears: that senior Russian officials were so concerned with maintaining a business-as-usual atmosphere back home that they had failed to commit the necessary equipment and personnel to fight a long war against a determined enemy.

“You’re throwing a billion-ruble party,” one pro-Russian blogger wrote in a widely circulated post on Saturday, referring to the Putin-led celebrations in Moscow commemorating the 875th anniversary of the city’s founding. “What is wrong with you? Not at the time of such a horrible failure.”

Even as Moscow celebrated, he wrote, the Russian Army was fighting without enough night vision goggles, flack jackets, first-aid kits or drones. A few hundred miles away, Ukrainian forces retook the Russian military stronghold of Izium, continuing their rapid advance across the northeast and igniting a dramatic new phase in the war.

The outrage from Russian hawks on Saturday showed that even as Mr. Putin had succeeded in eliminating just about all of the liberal and pro-democracy opposition in Russia’s domestic politics, he still faced the risk of discontent from the conservative end of the political spectrum. For the moment, there was little indication that these hawks would turn on Mr. Putin as a result of Ukraine’s seemingly successful counteroffensive; but analysts said that their increasing readiness to criticize the military leadership publicly pointed to simmering discontent within the Russian elite.

“Most of these people are in shock and did not think that this could happen,” Dmitri Kuznets, who analyzes the war for the Russian-language news outlet Meduza, said in a phone interview. “Most of them are, I think, genuinely angry.”

The Kremlin, as usual, tried to minimize the setbacks. The defense ministry described the retreat as a decision “to regroup” its troops, even though the ministry said a day earlier that it was moving to reinforce its defensive positions in the region. The authorities in Moscow carried on with their festive weekend, with fireworks and state television showing hundreds lined up to ride the new, 460-foot-tall Ferris wheel.

But online, Russia’s failures were in plain sight — underscoring the startling role that pro-Russian military bloggers on the social network Telegram have played in shaping the narrative of the war. While the Kremlin controls the television airwaves in Russia and has blocked access to Instagram and Facebook, Telegram remains freely accessible and is filled with posts and videos from supporters and opponents of the war alike.

The widely followed pro-war bloggers — some embedded with Russian troops near the front line — amplify the Kremlin’s false message that Russia is fighting “Nazis” and refer to Ukrainians in derogatory and dehumanizing ways. But they are also divulging far more detailed — and, analysts say, accurate — information about the battlefield than the Russian Defense Ministry is, which they say is underestimating the enemy and withholding bad news from the public.

One of the bloggers, Yuri Podolyaka, who is from Ukraine but moved to Сrimea following its annexation in 2014, told his 2.3 million Telegram followers on Friday that if the military continued to play down its battlefield setbacks, Russians would “cease to trust the Ministry of Defense and soon the government as a whole.”

It was the bloggers who first rang alarm bells publicly about a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive in the country’s northeast.

On Aug. 30, a Kremlin spokesman held his regular conference call with journalists and repeated his mantra: The invasion of Ukraine was going “in accordance with the plans.”

The same day, several Russian bloggers were reporting on social media that something was very much not going according to plan. Ukraine was building up forces for a counterattack near the town of Balakliya, they said, and Russia did not appear in position to defend against it.

“Hello, hello, anybody home?” one asked. “Are we ready to fend off an attack in this direction?”

Days later, it became apparent that the answer was no. Ukrainian forces overran Russia’s thin defenses in Balakliya and other nearby towns in northeastern Ukraine. By this weekend, some analysts estimated that the territory retaken by Ukraine amounted to about 1,000 square miles, a potential turning point in what had become a war of attrition this summer.

“It’s time to punish the commanders who allowed these kinds of things,” Maksim Fomin, a pro-Russian blogger from eastern Ukraine, said in a video published on Friday, claiming that Russian forces did not even try to resist as Ukraine’s military swept forward this week.

Some of the bloggers are embedded with military units and work for state-run or pro-Kremlin media outlets, preparing reports for television while providing more detail on their Telegram accounts. Others appear to operate more independently, relying on personal connections for access near the front line and adding their bank details to their Telegram posts to solicit donations.

Mr. Kuznets, a former Russian war correspondent himself, said that Russian military officials appeared to tolerate the presence of war bloggers despite their occasional criticism, in part because they agreed with the bloggers’ hawkish, imperialist views. And the bloggers play a crucial role in spreading the pro-Russian message on social media, where their audience includes both Russians and Ukrainians.

Still, among some bloggers, the anger over the Russian military’s mistakes reached a fever pitch on Saturday. One called Russia’s retreat a “catastrophe,” while others said that it had left the residents who collaborated with Russian forces at the mercy of Ukrainian troops — potentially undermining the credibility of the occupying authorities all across the territory that Russia still holds.

And while the Kremlin still maintains that the invasion is merely a “special military operation,” several bloggers insisted on Saturday that Russia was, in fact, fighting a full-fledged war — not just against Ukraine, but against a united West that is backing Kyiv.

The stunned fury reflects how some analysts believe many in the Russian elite view the war: a campaign rife with incompetence, conducted on the cheap, that can only be won if Mr. Putin mobilizes the nation onto a war footing and declares a draft.

“I am sure that they reflect the opinion of their sources and the people they know and work with,” Mr. Kuznets said. “I think the biggest group among these people believes that it is necessary to fight harder and carry out a mobilization.”

Both Western and Russian analysts said that Mr. Putin would need a draft to sharply expand the size of his invading force. But he appears determined to resist such a measure, which could shatter the passivity with which much of the Russian public has treated the war. In August, 48 percent of Russians told the independent pollster Levada that they were paying little or no attention to the events in Ukraine.

As a result, analysts say, Mr. Putin faces no good options. Escalating a war whose domestic support may turn out to be superficial could stir domestic unrest, while continuing retreats on the battlefield could spur a backlash from hawks who have bought into the Kremlin narrative that Russia is fighting “Nazis” for its very survival.

Ever since Russia retreated in April from its attempt to capture Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s goals in the war have been unclear, disorienting Mr. Putin’s supporters, said Rob Lee, a military analyst at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

“The Ukrainians’ war effort is obvious, it’s understandable, whereas on the Russian side, it was always a question of: What is Russia doing?” Mr. Lee said in a phone interview. “The goals aren’t clear, and how they achieve those goals isn’t clear. If you’re fighting a war and you’re not sure what the ultimate goal is, you’re going to be quite frustrated about that.”

 

 

[Calamine Waffles]

3 minutes ago, Huba said:

OTOH, Ukraine has tons of super modern ground lauchned PGMs, and access to vastly superior ISR, both more important than quality of the tanks. I'd take that over better tanks or aircraft (that are neutralized by air defense for both sides). Anyway, as Beleg wrote above, it's hard to compare a short complete war with this prolonged conflict, that still is far from conclusion. Let's see with what Ukrainians will surprise us in upcoming days and weeks.

Yeah, big shocker that Ukraine has those in 2022. As if Israel wouldn't have them if Yom Kippur happened today (if not better), a country that the US is willing to sell F-35s to.

Edited September 11, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[keas66]

Can we move on from the whole IDF versus   ZSU comparison ?

Although I thought it would have been interesting if Israel had sent a few Merkava 4's to the ZSU -  just for a test !

[pintere]

7 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

I mean it's not a good comparison because the IDF and Heyl Ha'avir were much better trained and equipped forces, to levels that the ZSU could have only dreamed of in February 2022. The Egyptian offensive also faltered because their hand was forced by Assad's failure in the Golan Heights, which forced them to attack in an unprepared beyond their main objectives. The Israelis also benefited immensely from the US strategic airlift of material during Operation Nickel Grass (including tanks and other heavy weapons in numbers Ukraine wishes they had).

Remember, the Ukrainians have been operating at both a technological and numerical disadvantage throughout this war. They were also not on a fully mobilised footing on February 24. The Israelis "only" really had the problem of being outnumbered and caught by surprise.

Rather than escalate further I’ll just acknowledge that both sides did very well given the circumstances . Maybe I’ll change my mind once the ashes have settled and a more thorough analysis can be made.

[Huba]

Just now, Calamine Waffles said:

Yeah, big shocker that Ukraine has those in 2022. As if Israel wouldn't have them if Yom Kippur happened today (if not better), a country that the US is willing to sell F-35s to.

What I'm hinting at is that overall Ukraine has technical superiority over Russia in most types of equipment, with the exception of AFVs and aircraft (which are mostly irrelevant to the bigger picture). RU has a lot more stuff though, same as Israel's opponents had.

Anyway, let's end this offtopic, or we're gonna suffer the consequences

[Beleg85]

@Battlefront.com should like it:

 

[Calamine Waffles]

Just now, Huba said:

What I'm hinting at is that overall Ukraine has technical superiority over Russia in most types of equipment, with the exception of AFVs and aircraft (which are mostly irrelevant to the bigger picture). RU has a lot more stuff though, same as Israel's opponents had.

Anyway, let's end this offtopic, or we're gonna suffer the consequences

I would respectfully disagree on both, but I will not press the issue.

[danfrodo]

New rule for the next 24 hours: if we're going to make battle comparisons they have to be from LOTR.

[akd]

Okay, Bilbo v. Trolls.

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Simcoe said:

Depends on what you define as "light" forces. I don't see how this offensive happens without tanks to provide direct fire on heavily defended positions. Rolling up on lightly defended positions with humvees does not prove the death of tanks.

So the part where I specifically said “this is not about the death of the tank” didn’t stick?  Unfortunately we cannot even try to have a conversation on this without someone making it about that; this tells me that something is up and everyone knows it.

According to US congress: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R44968.pdf

Light forces are:

“Light IBCTs are primarily foot-mobile forces. Light IBCTs can move by foot, vehicle, or air (either air landed or by helicopter). While IBCTs have light- and medium-wheeled vehicles for transport, there are not enough vehicles to transport all or even a significant portion of the IBCT’s infantry assets in a single movement.”

So basically infantry with limited transport that is designed to carry the to the fight but not into the fight.  They lack organic heavy armour as well.

Based on this post: 

 

It looks like the UA is employing Light/Med in a hybrid similar to what was tried and abandoned in the 80s.

Right now I am not sure how the tanks played a role in this offensive.  We have a bunch of possible reports:

-Initial shell cracking and then Light has been pushing out doing the exploit.

-In support, Light infiltrates and attrits, heavy is called up to finish off hard points.

-I have seen one map where it looks like heavy is handling the shoulders while lighter stuff does the breakthrough/breakout.

-What is happening/going to happen at Kherson?  The dynamic on that op is different.  I suspect the RA are going to collapse there too but the road to that collapse is quite different than what we saw in Kharkiv - or is it?

I think it is safe to say at this point there was not a lot of heavy in this last push.  We are not seeing a lot of heavy formations or units in play here, at least not one would expect for a frontage coming up on 100kms on some maps.  Now why that is could be because the UA knew they did not need them as this part of the RA line was already weak.  Or they didn’t have them and took a risk.  It does look like the UA just pulled off a historic offensive that retook 3000 sq kms with a pretty modest force that was mostly wheeled and light in nature.  We know heavy was in the game but not how we normally think about it.

 We also know that the RA has put up almost zero heavy response as a c-attack.  Is that because the HIMAR campaign hit RA logistics so hard that they are out of gas?  Is losing 1-2k MBTs making RA nervous to pull out armor? - we had reports they were using them as direct fire sniping but no heavy formation responses.  In fact RA heavy has not been in this fight since Mar as things devolved into an infantry arty war in the Donbas.  Does the combination of hi resolution ISR, deep strike and modern ATGM nulled RA armor?

Dunno.  This could be an isolated phenomenon on this single operation but one can see some trends, the main one being that UA use of mass does not conform to our thinking on it, in defence or offence and neither does the RA’s.  For example, the role of Light forces is normally to project rapidly to a key operational objective, and then have medium/heavy link up.  Not be the primary force capability in a breakout - reason being is that Light cannot survive the heavy enemy c-attack…until now, I guess.  Nor is Light supposed to be doing the heavy lifting in defence, it can hold but lacks the organic heavy combat power to c-attack.  We have seen exactly this in this war, why?  Because the UA does not have enough heavy capability.  So rather than giving up, they simply wrote a new doctrine…and it is working….so far…in these cases.

 However, war is not over yet and we do not have all the facts.  So fewer tanks in play does not mean the “death of the tank” nor does a few photos or 45sec snippets of them point to a shining renormalization.  

At this point I think heavy military mass is in trouble and will be forced to evolve.  It is in trouble because 1) it is becoming impossible to hide on the modern ISR battlefield, 2) it is logistically too vulnerable, the RA has demonstrated that for about 6 months and 3) Given the enhancements in range, precision and lethality of smaller, lighter and cheaper weapons systems/capability the use of heavy mass as the primary vehicle for annihilation-dislocation or attrition based warfare is going to need a rethink.  We have not even seen what unmanned can fully do, nor what current or near-next gen weapon systems can do (remember almost everything we gave the UA is last-gen).  And we haven’t even gotten into force generation, projection and management savings going lighter may provide.

So we will see.  The trends towards smaller, lighter, smarter and more deadly capability integrated with ubiquitous ISR are changing warfare.  Up until this week I was concerned that we may have entered a WW1 era of Defensive primacy, and the jury is still out, but the events of this week show that offence is still very real - we might just need to rethink the conditions by which it happens.

I will say that the “precision-mass” debate is pretty much been definitively answered, that ship has sailed.  As has the “UAVs are a fad” narrative.  I guess the next question will be how that precision is protected, projected and positioned on the next battlefield?

 

Edited September 11, 2022 by The_Capt

[dan/california]

Well, these orcs are too stupid live...

EDIT: I have deep suspicion they have VERY guilty consciences. 

Edited September 11, 2022 by dan/california

[sburke]

11 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So the part where I specifically said “this is not about the death of the tank” didn’t stick?  Unfortunately we cannot even try to have a conversation on this without someone making it about that; this tells me that something is up and everyone knows it.

According to US congress: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R44968.pdf

Light forces are:

“Light IBCTs are primarily foot-mobile forces. Light IBCTs can move by foot, vehicle, or air (either air landed or by helicopter). While IBCTs have light- and medium-wheeled vehicles for transport, there are not enough vehicles to transport all or even a significant portion of the IBCT’s infantry assets in a single movement.”

So basically infantry with limited transport that is designed to carry the to the fight but not into the fight.  They lack organic heavy armour as well.

Based on this post: 

 

It looks like the UA is employing Light/Med in a hybrid similar to what was tried and abandoned in the 80s.

Right now I am not sure how the tanks played a role in this offensive.  We have a bunch of possible reports:

-Initial shell cracking and then Light has been pushing out doing the exploit.

-In support, Light infiltrates and attrits, heavy is called up to finish off hard points.

-I have seen one map where it looks like heavy is handling the shoulders while lighter stuff does the breakthrough/breakout.

-What is happening/going to happen at Kherson?  The dynamic on that op is different.  I suspect the RA are going to collapse there too but the road to that collapse is quite different than what we saw in Kharkiv - or is it?

I think it is safe to say at this point there was not a lot of heavy in this last push.  We are not seeing a lot of heavy formations or units in play here, at least not one would expect for a frontage coming up on 100kms on some maps.  Now why that is could be because the UA knew they did not need them as this part of the RA line was already weak.  Or they didn’t have them and took a risk.  It does look like the UA just pulled off a historic offensive that retook 3000 sq kms with a pretty modest force that was mostly wheeled and light in nature.  We know heavy was in the game but not how we normally think about it.

 We also know that the RA has put up almost zero heavy response as a c-attack.  Is that because the HIMAR campaign hit RA logistics so hard that they are out of gas?  Is losing 1-2k MBTs making RA nervous to pull out armor? - we had reports they were using them as direct fire sniping but no heavy formation responses.  In fact RA heavy has not been in this fight since Mar as things devolved into an infantry arty war in the Donbas.  Does the combination of hi resolution ISR, deep strike and modern ATGM nulled RA armor?

Dunno.  This could be an isolated phenomenon on this single operation but one can see some trends, the main one being that UA use of mass does not conform to our thinking on it, in defence or offence and neither does the RA’s.  For example, the role of Light forces is normally to project rapidly to a key operational objective, and then have medium/heavy link up.  Not be the primary force capability in a breakout - reason being is that Light cannot survive the heavy enemy c-attack…until now, I guess.  Nor is Light supposed to be doing the heavy lifting in defence, it can hold but lacks the organic heavy combat power to c-attack.  We have seen exactly this in this war, why?  Because the UA does not have enough heavy capability.  So rather than giving up, they simply wrote a new doctrine…and it is working….so far…in these cases.

 However, war is not over yet and we do not have all the facts.  So fewer tanks in play does not mean the “death of the tank” nor does a few photos or 45sec snippets of them point to a shining renormalization.  

At this point I think heavy military mass is in trouble and will be forced to evolve.  It is in trouble because 1) it is becoming impossible to hide on the modern ISR battlefield, 2) it is logistically too vulnerable, the RA has demonstrated that for about 6 months and 3) Given the enhancements in range, precision and lethality of smaller, lighter and cheaper weapons systems/capability the use of heavy mass as the primary vehicle for annihilation-dislocation or attrition based warfare is going to need a rethink.  We have not even seen what unmanned can fully do, nor what current or near-next gen weapon systems can do (remember almost everything we gave the UA is last-gen).  And we haven’t even gotten into force generation, projection and management savings going lighter may provide.

So we will see.  The trends towards smaller, lighter, smarter and more deadly capability integrated with ubiquitous ISR are changing warfare.  Up until this week I was concerned that we may have entered a WW1 era of Defensive primacy, and the jury is still out, but the events of this week show that offence is still very real - we might just need to rethink the conditions by which it happens.

I will say that the “precision-mass” debate is pretty much been definitively answered, that ship has sailed.  As has the “UAVs are a fad” narrative.  I guess the next question will be how that precision is protected, projected and positioned on the next battlefield?

 

The one item I think we can all agree on is UA opsec has been spectacular.  We know very little about the UA tactical structure and if they are actually distributing small packets of armor to back up their spearheads.   Also there was at least one post by Russians of an armor counterattack that just simply got shot to hell by AT weapons and possibly arty.  (typically it sounds like they didn't have infantry support.)

One possibility  (and this thought comes from an earlier post by LLF of a drone recon of a Russian position) It may be (and very likely) that UA had reconned the Russian defenses in depth and knew there wasn't much in the way of armor facing this area.

One other thought - it seems UA forces are quite used to taking on enemy armor with just AT weapons.  I suspect that is not the case with Russians especially all the new cannon fodder that has been pushed forward.  Just a few tanks could make all the difference there.

[LongLeftFlank]

Tree burst

So how many new mech brigades will the UA be able to fit out using this haul? 

Old school sneak-and-peek bazooka shot.

 

Edited September 11, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[MikeyD]

The Yom Kippur analogy works both ways, though. A successful deep breakthrough that outruns its logistics net (and pre-assault planning) is in great peril from a concerted counter-attack. This was basically the NATO Cold War strategy. 1) DON'T LOSE OUTRIGHT. 2) take back what you lost once the opponent has exhausted themselves. The takeaway is the more successful Ukraine is today the more vulnerable they become tomorrow. At this point we're relying heavily on Russia's inability to put together a proper response.

Edited September 11, 2022 by MikeyD

[LongLeftFlank]

Pls. send moar HIMARS / PzH / Krabs!

Love, 

@The_Capt is dead right, precision arty is the new tactical airpower! at least for the moment.

Especially when this is what the actual Tacair is reduced to. Aerial version of 'spray and pray'

****

... the Twitterverse version of 'when will BFC do CM:PTO?'

Edited September 11, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Calamine Waffles]

15 minutes ago, MikeyD said:

The Yom Kippur analogy works both ways, though. A successful deep breakthrough that outruns its logistics net (and pre-assault planning) is in great peril from a concerted counter-attack. This was basically the NATO Cold War strategy. 1) DON'T LOSE OUTRIGHT. 2) take back what you lost once the opponent has exhausted themselves. The takeaway is the more successful Ukraine is today the more vulnerable they become tomorrow. At this point we're relying heavily on Russia's inability to put together a proper response.

So, with what resources and from where will this proper response come from?

[sburke]

5 hours ago, akd said:

@sburke @Kinophile

For the list:

Captured Lt. Col. Artem Khelemendik (correct spelling?), Chief of Supply Base? ( @Haiduk @Grigb?), 79th MRR, 18th MRD:

 

Captured, dead or ran away without papers (?) Lt. Col. Sergey Deev, battalion commander, 49th Machine-Gun Artillery Regiment, 18th Machine-Gun Artillery Division:

 

I had the first guy from a post Haiduk put up.  As to the other guy - I may need to add a new section.  

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

@Battlefront.com should like it:

 

Of course I like it   Sburke's repost of that article is also something that makes me smile!  The report very succinctly stated what we've been talking about since regime change was first brought up.  I know I brought it up around the 3 day of the war, but maybe it was mentioned earlier   The point I'm talking about is that Putin pretty successfully silenced the voices of the liberals and even moderates.  Part of what allowed him to do that was enabling the bully nationalists to run roughshod over the rest of the populace.  They supported riot police beating peaceful protesters.  They would physically accost people on the street that didn't seem patriotic enough.  They took their message of Russian nationalism abroad.  They certainly made their presence felt with Ukriane in 2013 and after.  Now they are quickly turning on Putin because, let's face it, he's a fraud nationalist.  He's in it for the money and power far more than Russia's national interests.

Way back at the beginning of this war I said there were two precursors that were likely necessary for Putin to face a serious challenge; a general lack of confidence in his leadership and an undisputed military catastrophe.  I believe we have both in place now, though I think we're not quite there yet.

What I think is happening right now in the Kremlin is a bunch of people quietly and carefully discussing how bad the situation is for the ruling elites.  I don't know of any critical mass has been reached yet, but I doubt the discussions today are the first of their kind since February.  Still, I think they might be waiting for things to get worse before acting.  The worse things get, the safer it is to act. 

As conditions deteriorate the conspirators are more likely to find someone willing to look the other way, or even join, as the conspiracy expands.  People who last year would have quickly turned in someone for such talk will today be more likely to at least wait and see how things pan out.  Someone who goes to an authority to report a conspirator might find that that person is also in on it.  Not reporting is perhaps safer than reporting.  Especially if one thinks the conspiracy has a decent chance of success.  One doesn't have to be super smart to think that the new regime might retaliate against "snitchers".

We're still very much in the tea leaves here, for sure, however I do feel confident that the existing quiet talk of replacing Putin is already growing louder.  It would be completely contrary to historical precedent for it to be otherwise.

Steve

[Vet 0369]

6 hours ago, akd said:

Muscovites celebrate the liberation of Kharkiv Oblast:

 

Did Ukraine blow up an ammo dump in Moscow too? Looks just likes the ones in Ukraine!

[LongLeftFlank]

For those doubting the 50k RU loss figure.

 

 

[dan/california]

19 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

For those doubting the 50k RU loss figure.

 

 

Anybody got a guess of their full strength numbers? Is this 20% or half, or is this unit too hush hush for us to know that?

Edited September 11, 2022 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think it is safe to say at this point there was not a lot of heavy in this last push.  

I'd like to take this point and turn it around a bit.

What if we magically took tanks out of Ukraine's attack, would it be going as well as it is with tanks?  I suspect it would in Kharkiv for sure.  Why do I think that?  Because Russia simply doesn't have enough infantry to hold up an attacking Ukrainian formation.  From what we can tell Ukraine is SWARMING into these areas.  What is a bunch of defending tanks going to do about that?  Retreat or die, that's what.  So Ukraine doesn't need tanks to defeat Russia's tanks.  How do we know this?  February through March of this war for starters! 

OK, so what about Kherson.  I suspect tanks are more important there because the Russians have a higher density of better quality forces fighting from reinforced positions.  But would tanks be as important to Ukraine if the Russians had Javelins?  Probably not because they would lose them faster than they could make gains or keep those gains.  How do we know this?  Once again, February through March of this war.

Now, how would Kharkiv go for the Ukrainians if they had more tanks?  Does anybody here think they would be taking even more ground faster with a lot more machines that break down frequently and require huge logistical support?  I sure don't.

Finally, would Kherson be going better for Ukraine if it had more infantry?  Perhaps not at first, but I think it's probable that it could sustain the attack longer and hasten securing ground after breakthroughs if they swapped out all their tanks for the equivalent logistical and monetary quantity of infantry.

To summarize... I don't think Kharkiv would be going any better with more tanks, I don't think it would do significantly worse with less.  In Kherson I expect that initially Ukraine would do better with at least the tanks it has, though not sure more would be all that helpful.  However, Kherson with more infantry would likely benefit over the duration of the battle, if not right now.  Therefore, I don't tanks are the future of at least this sort of warfare (i.e. temperate environment between roughly equal opponents).

I'll throw another thing out there.  Would Ukraine be doing better with a huge fleet of BTR-4s rather than a few squadrons of T-64s?  Or how about no changes in IFV/AFV counts, but a massive quantity of heavily armed UGVs instead of tanks?  I suspect that Ukraine would be doing even better.  It's not just quantity over quality, but quantity of the right thing over quality of the wrong thing.

Lastly, let's remember that many military historians credit the Soviet Union's amazing advances in 1944 not to the T-34 but to the Studebaker 6x6.  One can argue that the Soviets might not have done worse with less tanks, but would have done worse with less trucks.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

When snark is all you've got left:

1. Girkin (via Dmitri):

2. Halal buffet boy:

3. Game over man!!!!

4.  What airforce doing?

 

 

Edited September 11, 2022 by LongLeftFlank