How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

I can't escape the feeling that some of the "lessons" we are seeing are artifacts of this war's peculiarities and may not be transferable to other conflicts, even near-peer. Is it that mass doesn't work or is it that you can't mass without denuding vast swaths of frontage, as the Russians are discovering to their chagrin.

One can hope

This is a very good point.  I am not sure either to be honest.  Some phenomena will be unique to this war; however, some will be part of larger trends - figuring out which is which will be very difficult.

So lets put Ukraine down and move to a peer fight between say US-led west and a large well funded unnamed Asian country.  Keeping the conversation on hardware - I suspect we will see some of the things we have seen in Ukraine on steroids:

- ISR.  Both sides with a column of ISR capability that goes from space to underwater, and thru cyberspace.  This is backed up by an integrated architecture of human/AI pairing that can keep up with the ISR feeds in real-time.  So what?  Surprise is not a thing until someone's ISR is eroded to the point that they actually have blind spots.

- Unmanned.  Both sides are going to field unmanned systems very broadly.  UAVs are going to be layered from the squad to just below space.  UASs will be capable of ISR, however, they will also be autonomous enough to conduct hunter-killer swarm missions.  Very small UAS armed with precision weapons, or self-loitering munitions - the line between will blur capable of swarming and overcoming C-UAS systems.  We would also very likely see UAS v UAS warfare, something we have not seen in this one at all.  UGS will come online and we will see mixed units of manned and unmanned ground systems.  UGS will be out front, manned systems back.  Like UAS, UGS capable of precision strike and ground based self-loitering munitions will come into play - minefields with legs.

- Massed Precision.  The vast majority of weapons on the battlefield will be "smart".  Designed toward 1-weapon = 1-kill, many able to self-target on the fly. Combined with integrated ISR bubbles, this means that any concentrations within the friendly ISR bubble will be seen and killed, most likely over-the-horizon.  Logistics will remain the most vulnerable part of any military system.

- Deep Strike.  Massed precision with very long ranges.  There will be counter-system development but the physics of some of this deep strike technology will be very challenging to counter in the near-mid term. This, again, combined with ISR will mean that each side can see out to hundreds of kms, and hit single vehicles with a single munition. 

Ok, there is likely more, but lets just take these 4...so what?

Land warfare will evolve - how? Is the question.  Some think it will go the way of naval warfare with a heavy core surrounded by a cloud of ISR and unmanned systems.  A land warfare BG will now engage over the horizon first in an ISR/Unmanned edge war until one sides cloud starts to collapse, then more traditional systems will close in and conduct the finish.  The biggest weakness of this approach is logistics: how does one protect logistics lines that stretch hundreds of kms from being seen and hit? 

The other end of the spectrum is to completely disperse and go as light as possible - all lethal cloud, no steel core.  Gives advantages of much harder to see and hit - ISR is getting powerful but spotting a human is still much harder than a hot large vehicle, same will apply to small dispersed unmanned.  Also has a major advantage of a much smaller logistics tail.  Disadvantage, and question mark, is how will it fair against a cloud-armed heavy core?  If the clouds collide and a non-core force manages to defeat the steel-core cloud, will it have enough power to defeat the steel core, or at that point can Deep Strike precision do the job? 

Upscaling into formations, the most likely answer will be a mix of cores.  Some will be "Light Dispersed" - no core beyond some C2 - thru to "Heavy" having traditional steel in the middle that can still move and hit while bringing protection.  Management of Light - Hybrids - Heavy within a larger formation cloud will be the challenge and the roles of each of these capabilities are up for grabs. In the end we might wind up with an optimized one-size but we will have to go through a series of evolutions first.

To my mind Massed Precision+ Deep Strike+ ISR is a wild card combination. It already looks like it can replace elements of airpower out to around 500km with next gen systems.  There is no viable technological counter to a HIMARs-like system, or very long ranged artillery, except "don't be seen or stand next to (but not too close) to a higher priority target".  The ability to beat counter-systems are just too high when the munition is coming in at Mach 2.5 (e.g. smart submunitions). 

Add to this long range self-loitering/self-targeting swarms of unmanned systems of all types and the battlefield is going to get a lot more lethal, at much longer ranges - to the point that all of our current capability will need a re-think.

Finally, none of this accounts for software warfare - information/cyber, human effects etc. And this war has been mind blowing on how far the needle has moved in those directions. 

[Taranis]

"A tank destroyed during clashes between Ukrainians and Russians, in the Kharkiv region, September 10, 2022, JUAN BARRETO / AFP"

*BMP-3

[The_MonkeyKing]

Russia also abandoning it positions around Kharkov the city

Edited September 11, 2022 by The_MonkeyKing

[Beleg85]

15 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Russia also abandoning it positions around Kharkov the city

Ukrainians recon is basically already in the "apex" most northern corner of UA-RU border.

 

Now there is an issue of what is happening in northern Donbas area, near Sevedonetsk and Lysychansk. We only hear rumours supported by several dubious videos that claim "something" is happening there. If indeed some groups inflitrated throught forests so far, I doubt they will have now the advatnage of surprise- Russia is starting to slowly buckling their pants. I hope Ukrainains will catch to this tempo and will not throw their soldiers on Russian positions.

 

Thread about mood in Russia, worth reading:

 

Edited September 11, 2022 by Beleg85

[The_Capt]

26 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

The title is not the key message. However, the nature of proxy war is.

 "Simply put, there’s little reason for Western leaders to encourage Moscow and Kyiv to negotiate an end to the war if they’re convinced that prolonging the conflict will help “bleed” Russia."

This does not really track.  Sure, there is an element of Russian erosion, and it plays well to the conspiracy crowd; however, the risks are simply too high.  We are a couple mistakes away from WWIII right now.  It is not likely, so long as we are being rational but human error is a real thing right along with irrational.  Everyday this war drags on is another high-risk dice roll and all those in power in the West know it - this is why the fear-narrative is "this war will never end". 

Then there is the collapsed Russia problem.  We have bounced this one around a lot here but I have yet to hear one coherent theory as to what we are going to do about a collapsed Russia and its 6000 nuclear weapons.  We have "who cares, let em burn", which is insane because 6000 f#cking loose nuclear weapons.  And we have "it will be ok, it was in the 90s"...talk about hope as the option. Conditions in the 90s were pretty different.  I have also heard "the nukes will be controlled based on where they are stored now"...thing about collapse, it makes "safe" anything really hard.  Non-state actors get involved, rogue new semi-states etc, all with a possibility of being armed like a superpower...sure that sounds fun.

No, the best case is a rough but stable transition to a new set of a$$holes in charge we can at least count on not to invade anyone for a few decades, keep a grip on the nukes and the country, and then we risk manage the rest...and we are back to hope.  We spend trillions on defence and the Ukraine - making it a nasty well armed member of the western club, the one we threaten Russia with for a century.  All the while we try and manage whatever the Chinese are doing as we re-write the global order.

None of that works well for a very long drawn out war with a fragile former-super power, no the west wants a short one that stops those damned dice from rolling every morning.

37 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Hope is not a plan.

That line plays very well in military circles...right up to the strategic line.  Then when one starts to mingle with political reality you quickly learning that hope is very often the only plan, and everyone works very hard for the best-hope scenario.  The reason is that once you begin to encounter factors that are completely out of your control, the best one can do is build the best hope one can.  For example, Canadian security is entirely built on hope - we hope the US will protect us, and remain the biggest guy in the room.  We have no plan to for this, there can't be one as we cannot control the US, at best we can try to influence.  However, that influence is also hopeful as we cannot guarantee it in any way shape or form.

With respect to Russia, we are very much at the hope stage.  We are pouring support into Ukraine, hoping they will win.  We are putting as much pressure on Russia as we can, hoping it will induce change.  Russian regime change/political change, that is the biggest hope-campaign of them all.  Considering that the Russian people will have to decide the outcome, trying to build a plan for that is not a plan, it is a hallucination.  We can try to influence (there is that word again) and some of that influence can be quite direct. But we cannot make a plan for it, or at least one that will work with any accuracy.

I always go with: X+Y=Z, solve for X.  That is the strategic political problem.  You can't solve for it.  All you can pull from this is what you know - the relationships between X,Y, and Z.  So that when Y and Z eventually pull out of the fog, we can finally see what X is - if you aren't doing that, and it is incredibly hard, you are at X,Y,Z, solve for X.

[Elmar Bijlsma]

19 minutes ago, Taranis said:

"A tank destroyed during clashes between Ukrainians and Russians, in the Kharkiv region, September 10, 2022, JUAN BARRETO / AFP"

*BMP-3

Oof, not a lot left of the hull, if that's it in the rear.

It's almost like stuffing an IFV with 100mm shell was a bad idea or something.

[LongLeftFlank]

Adam Tooze (one of the finest strategic / macro thinkers around today IMHO) is firmly in Ukraine's corner, but he has been deeply worried about the Ukrainian economy.

https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-149-success-on-the-battlefield

• Prewar, Ukraine was a middle-income country with a poor track record of growth. But it was also a post-Soviet society... a quarter of the population receives old-age pensions.... severe poverty below US$5.5 per person per day was rare. 
• Ukraine’s public spending on wages and salaries surged, including for emergency medical personnel and first responders. Transfers and social protection spending increased.
• The international community has been providing c. $1.5bn a month to support Ukraine’s budgetary needs, which is significant, but far short of Kyiv’s needs.
• In August inflation in Ukraine reached 23 percent.
• Kyiv is now guestimating that [GDP] contraction for the year as a whole will be in the order of 33 percent. 
• In March, the Russian attack engulfed 10 oblasts and the city of Kyiv, which together account for more than 55% of prewar GDP.
• Today, the fighting continues in regions which account for c. 30% of prewar GDP.
• Kyiv has a recovery plan that stretches to 2032 and involves spending on reconstruction and modernization totaling $750 billion.
• Over 6.8 million Ukrainian residents have left the country, a large majority of them women and children.
• An estimated 6.6 million people are internally displaced, though fewer than in the previous month.
• Access to critical services such as clean water, food, sanitation, and electricity [is impaired for] 17.7 million.
• Ukraine’s winter season starts on October 15.

 

[Beleg85]

9 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Adam Tooze (one of the finest strategic / macro thinkers around today IMHO) is firmly in Ukraine's corner, but he has been deeply worried about the Ukrainian economy.

Yup also worth reading, but I noticed one thought absent from his part- that war economy is very different from normal one, so poverty levels are felt differently by population as well. Which is crucial in this context.

It is again worth to follow this reporter on Twitter, now he is back in Ukraine and already in Kharkiv oblast (photos by himself). Note Russian wrecks are still smoldering:

 

Edited September 11, 2022 by Beleg85

[Pete Wenman]

 

So what happens when the Uka starts to reach the russian border. The general belief is they will not cross it in force, or for any period of time, but how do they defend it. The length of the border will bleed them dry if they try and defend everywhere along its length. If putin does not concede how do they deal with the likelihood of ongoing incursions. 

I guess the question is what does Ukraine do next if/once it has expelled russia ?

 

 

[Grigb]

I was off line for several hours. Probably you already know the news - according to RU reports RU MOD decided to reconfigure frontline aka abandon Kharkiv region completely. New claimed RU frontline is along the border.

[UPDATE] Clarification - by Kharkov region I mean Northen direction. At Eastern direction RU claim frontline is along Oskil. RU claims they blocked all UKR crossings.

Edited September 11, 2022 by Grigb

[Calamine Waffles]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Now you are just being silly.  Shock is still needed and something has to move the attacking forces over distances.  IFVs do that job quite effectively.

Apparently the Ukrainians don't think they are good enough because the pictorial evidence shows they assigned tanks in support of the IFVs that they're using.

Quote

These are specialized weapons that appear to be in very short supply on the Russian side.  VERY short.  On the other hand, Ukrainians are swimming in Javelins and NLAWs. 

Are they, though? We see the Ukrainians repeatedly capturing stocks of Kornet and Fagot/Gaboy ATGMs. They may be short now, but they certainly weren't at the start of the war.

Quote

Plus, a Kornet is more closely akin to Ukraine's Stugna, not a Javelin.  Javelin is in a class of its own.

Yes. But both are capable of defeating modern armour, which is what matters for this argument.

Quote

Because tanks are still needed on today's battlefield as their logical replacements (UGVs) are not yet available.  So you go with what you can get.

So, why were you bringing up UGVs in the first place as tank replacements in this context? Which nation fields UGVs or is prospectively fielding UGVs that can replace tanks in the near future?

Quote

I was speaking to the logistics costs and support issues you seem to be ignorant of.

You also seem to not understand why the Stryker Brigade came about in the first place. Hint... tanks are expensive and f'all difficult to get into a fight on short notice.

Sure, but why are we comparing the logistics and support issues of a tank to that of a platform only built to resist 14.5 mm heavy machine gun fire that is going to be extremely vulnerable to even IFV autocannons and that lacks the firepower of a tank? 

Would not a more fair comparison be for example between Centauro and C1 Ariete, or the Japanese Type 16 and the Type 10? Why do these two nations persist in maintaining (very expensive) tanks when they have developed some of the most capable wheeled combat vehicle platforms out there?

Quote

There were no defenses around Kyiv or Kharkiv where Russia deployed the bulk of its forces.  They got slaughtered by light infantry.

You were talking about their failure to break through at Donbas.

As I recall, the eastern prong of the Russian Kyiv offensive was stopped at Chernihiv. I wonder who was fighting there? Oh, that's right, it was the 1 OTBr, one of the best tank units in the entire ZSU.

Which unit was it that destroyed the 4th Guards Tank Division at Trostianets, thus ? The 93 OMBr. What does their unit use?

Quote

In the process, the 93rd met the Russian 4th Guards Tank Division in the town of Trostianets, 50 miles north of Kharkiv. The 93rd’s troopers in their BMP and BTR fighting vehicles, packing Javelin anti-tank missiles and supported by T-80 tanks and off-the-shelf drones, mauled the Russian division.

Apparently tanks are so useless to them that they've started using captured Russian T-80BVs and T-80BVMs just to show how useless they are.


 

Quote

As for the Donbas, the problem is that if you blow a hole in the enemy's defenses with tanks and artillery, then what?  Artillery doesn't advance and tanks without infantry to protect them are sitting ducks.  So, what good is all that mass if it doesn't take the ground you need to take?

This is a strawman. At no point was I claiming that tanks are the single most important factor for success. I merely said that they play an important role in securing a breakthrough that can then be exploited. The Ukrainian forces involved in  the fight have themselves have said so.

[Taranis]

14 minutes ago, Pete Wenman said:

 

So what happens when the Uka starts to reach the russian border. The general belief is they will not cross it in force, or for any period of time, but how do they defend it. The length of the border will bleed them dry if they try and defend everywhere along its length. If putin does not concede how do they deal with the likelihood of ongoing incursions. 

I guess the question is what does Ukraine do next if/once it has expelled russia ?

 

 

I think it will happen as with the other parts further north of the country which are already on the border with Russia or Belarus. I don't think they will attempt any major attacks on Russian soil (except maybe diversions or raids). Taking the border will allow them to be on a defensive position which they intend to hold indefinitely and this will therefore allow them to entrench themselves massively (like the Germans during WW1 when the French were not building hard because for them it was temporary). The defense will mobilize far fewer troops than the attack and will allow the organization of powerful reserves, part of which will have a defensive role in counterattack and the other part will be able to support the offensives of other sectors.
There will be the threat of Russian artillery, but nothing prevents the Ukrainians from launching bomber, helicopter and artillery raids as soon as Russia gathers too many forces in the area. Just my opinion.

[Huba]

11 minutes ago, Pete Wenman said:

 

So what happens when the Uka starts to reach the russian border. The general belief is they will not cross it in force, or for any period of time, but how do they defend it. The length of the border will bleed them dry if they try and defend everywhere along its length. If putin does not concede how do they deal with the likelihood of ongoing incursions. 

I guess the question is what does Ukraine do next if/once it has expelled russia ?

 

 

I was wondering abut that durin retreat from Kyiv. I think it will be the same as with previously liberated borders, i. e. a bit of shelling and skirmishing, but both sides refraining from major actions. Seems to be the unwritten rule beneficial to both sides. 

[kevinkin]

56 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

hope is very often the only plan

I suppose its semantics, but you can hope your active planning (instead of watching the world goes by) produces positive results for you and your allies. Sometimes its just trying to imagine what a positive endgame would look like. In chess, players imagine the board 5 or 10 moves ahead and hope their opponent does not throw in an unexpected move. But just moving your king back and forth accomplishes nothing. In chess and geopolitics there are certain patterns that tend to work in your favor even when all possible information is unavailable nor variables accounted for. It may make no sense hoping for a political change in the short term. Too many unknowns. But effective military planning using top notch weapons is more tangible and might put an end to the hot war quicker than waiting for the Russian people to rise up. There are articles that worry about losing a generation of Ukrainians to endless conflict. 

Edited September 11, 2022 by kevinkin

[LongLeftFlank]

11 minutes ago, Huba said:

I was wondering abut that durin retreat from Kyiv. I think it will be the same as with previously liberated borders, i. e. a bit of shelling and skirmishing, but both sides refraining from major actions. Seems to be the unwritten rule beneficial to both sides. 

Tit for tat.  If they shell a military target or arguably defence plant or logistical target from across the border, HIMARs a similar target in Belgorod oblast.  And counterbattery fire, of course.

But if they persist in poorly aimed terror shelling of downtowns.... well then, I hope the good citizens of Belogorod and various other towns mind spending a winter without electricity, treated water, sewerage, etc.  Oh, and their rail lines are going down too.  Maybe a few bridges too.

Put the blast back in Oblast.

Enjoy your 19th century life, b*tchez....

Edited September 11, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Huba]

!!! 

 

[Letter from Prague]

31 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Apparently the Ukrainians don't think they are good enough because the pictorial evidence shows they assigned tanks in support of the IFVs that they're using.

The Ukranians are fighting with what they have available at the moment.

As I understand it, the discussion of death of tank is not about "tanks are so useless we're going to say no to free tanks" but about "when equipping / upgrading new formation, would I rather have 1 abrams or 2 himars for the same money" or even better "is it better to have 20 abrams or 10 abrams 20 himars"?

[The_MonkeyKing]

"According to information from the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the USA is now considering also supplying western main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers to the Ukraine."

M2 Bradley would be a no brainer.

But I dream of couple brigades worth of personal getting flown to nevada for training while complete equipment for couple of armored brigades start getting shipped to UKR-POL border

[Letter from Prague]

18 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Tit for tat.  If they shell a military target or arguably defence plant or logistical target from across the border, HIMARs a similar target in Belgorod oblast.  And counterbattery fire, of course.

But if they persist in poorly aimed terror shelling of downtowns.... well then, I hope the good citizens of Belogorod and various other towns mind spending a winter without electricity, treated water, sewerage, etc.  Oh, and their rail lines are going down too.  Maybe a few bridges too.

Enjoy your 19th century life, b*tchez....

Yeah, I saw some twitter thread where some online orcs or tankies were suggesting that to win the war, Russia just needs to start destroying Ukrainian power plants and water sources etc, and I thought "guys, do you realize Grom-2 can probably hit Moscow, right?"

But HIMARS and other Western stuff is probably forbidden from striking into Russia, so I would expect Russia to exploit that.

[poesel]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Then there is the collapsed Russia problem.  We have bounced this one around a lot here but I have yet to hear one coherent theory as to what we are going to do about a collapsed Russia and its 6000 nuclear weapons. 

Good ole capitalism to the rescue: 'we' will buy them - not to own, but to destroy. Payment may be actual money or a nice treaty or whatever a post-war Russia needs (hint: a lot, very desperately).

13 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Tit for tat.  If they shell a military target or arguably defence plant or logistical target from across the border, HIMARs a similar target in Belgorod oblast.  And counterbattery fire, of course.

What he said, plus: the Ukrainians can shoot a lot farther into Russia than vice versa. And they have the better intel.

[Letter from Prague]

3 minutes ago, poesel said:

Good ole capitalism to the rescue: 'we' will buy them - not to own, but to destroy. Payment may be actual money or a nice treaty or whatever a post-war Russia needs (hint: a lot, very desperately).

Maybe crowdsourcing would work. GoFundNuke. People already crowdsourced Ukraine some TB2s, after all.

[The_MonkeyKing]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Then there is the collapsed Russia problem.  We have bounced this one around a lot here but I have yet to hear one coherent theory as to what we are going to do about a collapsed Russia and its 6000 nuclear weapons.  We have "who cares, let em burn", which is insane because 6000 f#cking loose nuclear weapons.  And we have "it will be ok, it was in the 90s"...talk about hope as the option. Conditions in the 90s were pretty different.  I have also heard "the nukes will be controlled based on where they are stored now"...thing about collapse, it makes "safe" anything really hard.  Non-state actors get involved, rogue new semi-states etc, all with a possibility of being armed like a superpower...sure that sounds fun.

We here in Finland think along the lines only thing worse than strong Russia is a weak collapsing Russia. Dodged that bullet in the 90's.

Totally defeated Russia would be Somalia with nukes. Happening with 150mil people and largest country on earth.

That would be a very unpleasant neighbor indeed

[Haiduk]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think they are theoretically around 1500, which is three battalions at around 400 each plus recon and other support personnel.  It seems these units were up to full strength when the war started, but that could be wrong.

Detachment (battalion) of Spetsnaz is not equal to motor-rifle battalion. I don't know about current Russian Spetsnaz structure, but in late USSR time typical Spetsnaz brigade had three detacments in 164 men each. Among detachment there were three company in 42 men each (some had 58) and special radio equipment company in 32 men + 6 men HQ. Currently Russian SpN detachments got some suport units, but probably "combat core" remained with the same personnel number  

Edited September 11, 2022 by Haiduk

[Maquisard manqué]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

To be honest the simplest answer to most of these points has been staring us in the face this entire war - precision indirect fires.  I have seen no heavy assaults on RA strong points but we have seen a near endless stream of precision strikes on everything.

If a hybrid light infantry force meets a strong point - one that ISR somehow missed - the answer so far seems “call in Excalibur”.  If indirect is becoming so precise, why drag a bunch of heavy metal along?  Add to this indirect fire ranges are getting really long.  Steve makes a good counter-factual analogy, here is a pro-factual; what if the UA had 400 HIMARs systems?  Each light Bn had a battery on call…do I need to bring steel to strongpoint now?

Not thought/seen that comparison before… So what is the relative cost and logistics or maintenance tail requirement for precision indirect fire vs armour?

Can armour be realistically defended against such weapons through inbuilt systems? Or would it require combined arms to resist precise indirect fire (as has been discussed here already)?

[Harmon Rabb]

19 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

"According to information from the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the USA is now considering also supplying western main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers to the Ukraine."

M2 Bradley would be a no brainer.

But I dream of couple brigades worth of personal getting flown to nevada for training while complete equipment for couple of armored brigades start getting shipped to UKR-POL border

Really hoping this is true. I know @Haiduk mentioned that Ukrainian servicemen have good opinions of M113s and with the way they have been fighting UKR should have no problem using M2s effectively.

I also think that more western made vehicles would help increase morale among Ukrainian servicemen as it would remind them that the west really does have their back in this war.

Edited September 11, 2022 by Harmon Rabb