How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, akd said:

In second half, @1:03 pretty sure a UKR soldier tosses a grenade back right before it detonates.

Actually, two grenades.

For sure this is footage from much earlier in the war, but I've not seen it before.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Here's something from today's ISW report that I hadn't thought of:

Quote

The milblogger added that Russia did not provide the soldiers of its proxy republics with new weapons, despite claiming that Ukrainian forces prepared to attack occupied Donbas areas for a year prior to Russian invasion.

Damn, good point Girkin!  Russia was saying for months (at least) that Ukraine was readying an attack, so why weren't the DLPR forces brought up to strength, fully armed, and trained ahead of this so-called Ukrainian invasion?  Of course the attack was BS, but Putin clearly stated it was a reason for the Special Military Operation so either Putin was lying about the reasons for the war or he was criminally negligent.  Or, from our point of view, both

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Say what you will about Arestovych, but he nailed this one perfectly:

 

[LongLeftFlank]

5 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Interesting coincidences:

- Russians launched own main phase of offensive on 22th of May 2022. This day is 22nd anniversary of Putin's ruling. Putin likes symbolism

- almost simultainosly with offensive, suddenly strong choir of voices on the West raised "Ukraine must make concessions to Russia for the sake of peace / for the sake of avoiding of world food crіsіs"

- Putin's trade "cancel sanctions against Russia for UKrainian ports unblocking"

- EU meeting on 30-31th of May where can be a "battle" for 6th batch of sanctions against pro-Russian lobby

Yes, much as I feared, Putin is working frantically to shift the rules of the game to ones he can play and win. Kobayashi Maru. Having bungled his original plan, he is scrambling to recover, and he may well do it!  He has no choice; it is literally do or die for his regime.

In spite of the tough talk and righteous anger, I believe a cease fire will be inevitable at some point in 2022.

So sorry guys, I'm gonna be a pessimist again here. If nothing else, it forces us to reexamine what underlies our faith in victory.

1.  Sure, by early winter the UA can likely build up enough combined arms ground strength for a massive 1918 offensive to retake these (now refortified) areas. 

But with miltech very clearly favouring defence at this moment (unless that changes!), I also find it entirely possible that Ukraine (under Western pressure) ultimately decides it can't accept the large human and material cost of that offensive. 

However intense and righteous their anger at present, that victory will need to be paid for in their blood, and it won't be easy.

Also, other world crises may well arise by year end that sap foreign attention and funds.

2.  And sure, Russia's army and economy could collapse between now and then, going bankrupt gradually then all at once, starved of beans, bullets and motivated men.... Revolts, mass surrenders, or RA troops simply leaving their trenches and walking home as Saddam's army did in 2002.  I don't think the pain and privation meter is nearly high enough yet for that though. I hear the arguments and the anecdotes, but I can't personally see a disintegration, absent a major military defeat  (i.e. where a full RA CAA army is blasted / routed from its defenses by large scale UA offensive action).

3.  A cease fire that leaves Russia in possession of most of Donbas plus (far more valuable) the Dnepr south bank/land bridge will absolutely be spun at home as a Win and most Russians will shrug and accept it.

This will leave Putin and/or the national-fascist power structure in power in Moscow. Russia will patch up its broken army and economy and regear for its next move (which will surely not be a repeat of 2022, but also won't let its neighbours breathe easy).

4.  Once the guns fall (mainly) silent, there will be zero consensus in the West to sponsor a Ukraine-initiated 'Liberation War'. They will look like 'aggressors' (yes, I know, but that's how it will be spun and lots of people will agree). 

5.  So the Ukraine partition will become 'facts on the ground'. 

I take note of the valid points by @The_Capt about the drain on battered Russia of manning such a long frontier (and resettling/rebuilding a now devastated okrajina with whom? Cossacks and Kadyrov's Chechens?).

But remember, they have no choice but to make that heavy commitment, realign their shredded economy to China and wait for better days to resume their mucking around.

I don't buy Steve's thesis that there will be sustained partisan warfare. That won't force out (brutal) occupying forces by itself, and only so many citizens will risk martyrdom or deportation. Most will merely accept the new reality, as was true in Donetsk and Lukhansk.

6.  Let us also consider the huge drain on Ukraine (40 million souls) of becoming an armed camp for the foreseeable future, manning a long hostile frontier with a huge (Western-armed) standing army.

7.  Also, a long term Western blank cheque for nonmilitary rebuilding and subsidies is NOT a given. Aid monies will be stolen or wasted, vile factional politics will resume, etc. Zelenskyy doesn't have the personality to become either a Lee Kwan Yew or a caudillo; his hero aura will fade with time, and growing citizen frustration.

With no clear end game, a country can only hang fire as a huge armed camp for so long. Ukraine is not South Korea, and it took the latter 15 years to get off the floor after 1954, with massive US aid (plus large US bases).

8.  Unlike the attractive investment market I could see following a decisive victory where Russia is forced back to the Feb start line (or, at minimum loses the 'land bridge' which menaces Odessa and Dnipro), private foreign investors aren't going to deploy capital in a country where so many key cities lie in Russian artillery range. They will look elsewhere.

CONCLUSIONS:

A.  A summer Ukrainian counteroffensive to retake Kherson and the land bridge, and rout the Russian armies in that zone before they dig in too deeply, remains critical in shaping the postwar fate of both Ukraine and Russia.

B.  Waiting and building up, a la COSSAC/OVERLORD, for winter or 2023 hugely *raises* the cost of victory, it doesn't lower it.  And I think it doesn't end up happening.

IMHO, FWIW. Have at it, Steve et al.

[chuckdyke]

Yes, I agree.

31 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yes, much as I feared, Putin is working frantically to shift the rules of the game to ones he can play and win.

For the Ukraine there's no such a thing as something for nothing. The people who finance their military will decide the war. Their hope Russia will run out of resources before the West does. putin gambles about the democratic countries voting the financiers out. I hope Ukraine will achieve a decisive victory this summer, I am not holding my breath. 

[dan/california]

47 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yes, much as I feared, Putin is working frantically to shift the rules of the game to ones he can play and win. Kobayashi Maru. Having bungled his original plan, he is scrambling to recover, and he may well do it!  He has no choice; it is literally do or die for his regime.

In spite of the tough talk and righteous anger, I believe a cease fire will be inevitable at some point in 2022.

So sorry guys, I'm gonna be a pessimist again here. If nothing else, it forces us to reexamine what underlies our faith in victory.

1.  Sure, by early winter the UA can likely build up enough combined arms ground strength for a massive 1918 offensive to retake these (now refortified) areas. 

But with miltech very clearly favouring defence at this moment (unless that changes!), I also find it entirely possible that Ukraine (under Western pressure) ultimately decides it can't accept the large human and material cost of that offensive. 

However intense and righteous their anger at present, that victory will need to be paid for in their blood, and it won't be easy.

Also, other world crises may well arise by year end that sap foreign attention and funds.

2.  And sure, Russia's army and economy could collapse between now and then, going bankrupt gradually then all at once, starved of beans, bullets and motivated men.... Revolts, mass surrenders, or RA troops simply leaving their trenches and walking home as Saddam's army did in 2002.  I don't think the pain and privation meter is nearly high enough yet for that though. I hear the arguments and the anecdotes, but I can't personally see a disintegration, absent a major military defeat  (i.e. where a full RA CAA army is blasted / routed from its defenses by large scale UA offensive action).

3.  A cease fire that leaves Russia in possession of most of Donbas plus (far more valuable) the Dnepr south bank/land bridge will absolutely be spun at home as a Win and most Russians will shrug and accept it.

This will leave Putin and/or the national-fascist power structure in power in Moscow. Russia will patch up its broken army and economy and regear for its next move (which will surely not be a repeat of 2022, but also won't let its neighbours breathe easy).

4.  Once the guns fall (mainly) silent, there will be zero consensus in the West to sponsor a Ukraine-initiated 'Liberation War'. They will look like 'aggressors' (yes, I know, but that's how it will be spun and lots of people will agree). 

5.  So the Ukraine partition will become 'facts on the ground'. 

I take note of the valid points by @The_Capt about the drain on battered Russia of manning such a long frontier (and resettling/rebuilding a now devastated okrajina with whom? Cossacks and Kadyrov's Chechens?).

But remember, they have no choice but to make that heavy commitment, realign their shredded economy to China and wait for better days to resume their mucking around.

I don't buy Steve's thesis that there will be sustained partisan warfare. That won't force out (brutal) occupying forces by itself, and only so many citizens will risk martyrdom or deportation. Most will merely accept the new reality, as was true in Donetsk and Lukhansk.

6.  Let us also consider the huge drain on Ukraine (40 million souls) of becoming an armed camp for the foreseeable future, manning a long hostile frontier with a huge (Western-armed) standing army.

7.  Also, a long term Western blank cheque for nonmilitary rebuilding and subsidies is NOT a given. Aid monies will be stolen or wasted, vile factional politics will resume, etc. Zelenskyy doesn't have the personality to become either a Lee Kwan Yew or a caudillo; his hero aura will fade with time, and growing citizen frustration.

With no clear end game, a country can only hang fire as a huge armed camp for so long. Ukraine is not South Korea, and it took the latter 15 years to get off the floor after 1954, with massive US aid (plus large US bases).

8.  Unlike the attractive investment market I could see following a decisive victory where Russia is forced back to the Feb start line (or, at minimum loses the 'land bridge' which menaces Odessa and Dnipro), private foreign investors aren't going to deploy capital in a country where so many key cities lie in Russian artillery range. They will look elsewhere.

CONCLUSIONS:

A.  A summer Ukrainian counteroffensive to retake Kherson and the land bridge, and rout the Russian armies in that zone before they dig in too deeply, remains critical in shaping the postwar fate of both Ukraine and Russia.

B.  Waiting and building up, a la COSSAC/OVERLORD, for winter or 2023 hugely *raises* the cost of victory, it doesn't lower it.  And I think it doesn't end up happening.

IMHO, FWIW. Have at it, Steve et al.

You raise a great many issues I don't think any one has definitive answers to. But there is one CLEAR indicator of whether Ukraines supporting countries are in it to win it, or not. If there are HIMARs MLRS systems a the front in the Donbas in three weeks or less from right now, then NATO is in this thing to win it. If not, they are screwing around looking for. a settlement, or a miracle. HIMARS and better SAMs and the Russians will be lucky to keep Crimea.

Just for reference my definition of winning is 2/24 borders, and NATO and EU membership. I don't think the DPR/LPR, and Crimea are worth paying the butchers bill to acquire a fundamentally unhappy population.

[Battlefront.com]

Having at it

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yes, much as I feared, Putin is working frantically to shift the rules of the game to ones he can play and win. Kobayashi Maru. Having bungled his original plan, he is scrambling to recover, and he may well do it!  He has no choice; it is literally do or die for his regime.

Yes, but do not confuse what Putin tries to do with what he'll get.  This is the same mistake the people who draw all those doomsday red arrows on maps constantly make.  Don't fall into that trap.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

In spite of the tough talk and righteous anger, I believe a cease fire will be inevitable at some point in 2022.

For a cease fire to go into effect Ukraine would have to agree to it.  See previous post, polls, and every Ukrainian government statement since this war started to see what Ukraine's thinking is on this matter.  And no, Ukraine can not be forced into signing a cease fire.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

So sorry guys, I'm gonna be a pessimist again here. If nothing else, it forces us to reexamine what underlies our faith in victory.

1.  Sure, by early winter the UA can likely build up enough combined arms ground strength for a massive 1918 offensive to retake these (now refortified) areas. 

They will have that force available to them long before winter.  They've already had 3 months and that is beyond the minimum needed.  Ukrainian sources are saying June or July for major operations.  So your timeline is off by quite a bit.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

But with miltech very clearly favouring defence at this moment (unless that changes!), I also find it entirely possible that Ukraine (under Western pressure) ultimately decides it can't accept the large human and material cost of that offensive. 

Sure, it is possible.  I don't think it is very likely at all, especially because you're discounting the possibility that Russia is obligated to blink first.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

However intense and righteous their anger at present, that victory will need to be paid for in their blood, and it won't be easy.

Have you read anything stated by the Ukrainians so far?  I mean really read it?  They know that they are signing the death warrant for all of Ukraine if they give up this struggle with a whimper.  This is not a normal dispute, this is a fight to the death motivation.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Also, other world crises may well arise by year end that sap foreign attention and funds.

As I've said, the aid will not be cut off entirely.  For sure it will decrease over time, that's a natural thing.  But Ukraine is already over the worst of it and so by the time funding and NEW arms deals start to falter it won't have as much impact as it would have last month or even this month.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

2.  And sure, Russia's army and economy could collapse between now and then, going bankrupt gradually then all at once, starved of beans, bullets and motivated men.... Revolts, mass surrenders, or RA troops simply leaving their trenches and walking home as Saddam's army did in 2002.  I don't think the pain and privation meter is nearly high enough yet for that though. I hear the arguments and the anecdotes, but I can't personally see a disintegration, absent a major military defeat  (i.e. where a full RA CAA army is blasted / routed from its defenses by large scale UA offensive action).

Nobody sees this sort of thing happening until it happens.  So of course you don't see it happening, and neither do I.  What I see is the conditions for it are increasing, not decreasing or stabilizing.  Putin's health (natural and unnatural) will have a huge role to play in all of this, and that's also not predictable.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

3.  A cease fire that leaves Russia in possession of most of Donbas plus (far more valuable) the Dnepr south bank/land bridge will absolutely be spun at home as a Win and most Russians will shrug and accept it.

The general population probably will buy into it, but the ultra nationalists are not going to accept it.  They could push things over the cliff, as extremists have a tendency to do.  In particular, if Putin is deposed and the ultra nationalists get into power they will almost certainly go for full mobilization.  All of the reasons why Putin has feared doing this will then kick into gear.  Who knows what impact that will have, but ask yourself... do you think Putin is the type to be afraid of something that isn't really to be feared?  I certainly don't.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

4.  Once the guns fall (mainly) silent, there will be zero consensus in the West to sponsor a Ukraine-initiated 'Liberation War'. They will look like 'aggressors' (yes, I know, but that's how it will be spun and lots of people will agree).

5.  So the Ukraine partition will become 'facts on the ground'. 

And you just summed up two of the reasons why Ukraine won't agree to a cease fire that would allow for such a thing to happen.  Ukraine knows, right down to the deepest recesses of their souls, that stopping the war without defeating Russia is akin to national suicide.  What in the past 8 years, and in particular the last 3 months, makes you think Ukraine is willing to kill itself?

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

But remember, they have no choice but to make that heavy commitment, realign their shredded economy to China and wait for better days to resume their mucking around.

Which presumes that realigning their economy to be dominated by China is even a likely thing.  I don't see that happening.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I don't buy Steve's thesis that there will be sustained partisan warfare. That won't force out (brutal) occupying forces by itself, and only so many citizens will risk martyrdom or deportation. Most will merely accept the new reality, as was true in Donetsk and Lukhansk.

By that thinking the West's war in Afghanistan wouldn't have happened because the Afghanis would have given up when the Soviets invaded.

The history of occupation shows that the majority do not support insurrection.  That was true for the America's War of Independence against the British Empire.  Roughly 1/3 didn't want to be involved, 1/3rd supported the King, and 1/3rd actively fought to get rid of British rule.  The French Resistance was only a small percentage of the population, as was the case in other Nazi occupied countries.  But those resistance movements made governing extremely difficult and expensive.  If the Allies had been defeated in Normandy and the Soviet Union screwed up into stalemate, Germany would have eventually lost control over the countries it occupied.

So yeah, sorry, history isn't on your side here.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

6.  Let us also consider the huge drain on Ukraine (40 million souls) of becoming an armed camp for the foreseeable future, manning a long hostile frontier with a huge (Western-armed) standing army.

Again, you seem to wave the wand over Russia as if it doesn't have equal or worse problems in this regard.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

7.  Also, a long term Western blank cheque for nonmilitary rebuilding and subsidies is NOT a given. Aid monies will be stolen or wasted, vile factional politics will resume, etc. Zelenskyy doesn't have the personality to become either a Lee Kwan Yew or a caudillo; his hero aura will fade with time, and growing citizen frustration.

With no clear end game, a country can only hang fire as a huge armed camp for so long. Ukraine is not South Korea, and it took the latter 15 years to get off the floor after 1954, with massive US aid (plus large US bases).

This is a long term issue.  The war will be decided before this matters.  It could also be that Ukraine wins the war outright and the checks don't keep coming from the West.  So the two are not directly related to each other.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

8.  Unlike the attractive investment market I could see following a decisive victory where Russia is forced back to the Feb start line (or, at minimum loses the 'land bridge' which menaces Odessa and Dnipro), private foreign investors aren't going to deploy capital in a country where so many key cities lie in Russian artillery range. They will look elsewhere.

They might, but one place they won't be looking is Russia.  So again, don't wave the magic wand over Russia when you talk about things like this.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

CONCLUSIONS:

A.  A summer Ukrainian counteroffensive to retake Kherson and the land bridge, and rout the Russian armies in that zone before they dig in too deeply, remains critical in shaping the postwar fate of both Ukraine and Russia.

B.  Waiting and building up, a la COSSAC/OVERLORD, for winter or 2023 hugely *raises* the cost of victory, it doesn't lower it.  And I think it doesn't end up happening.

I agree with this and by the looks of it so does the Ukrainian government.  Fortunately, it looks like they feel that summer is practical.  I don't see why it wouldn't be.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Politico article about Poland's calling out of Germany for not fulfilling it's agreement to send Leopards to replace Soviet type tanks shipped to Ukraine:

https://www.politico.eu/article/polish-president-accuses-germany-of-breaching-promises-on-ukraine-related-tank-deliveries/

The interesting bit in here is I finally saw a number for how many tanks Poland moved into Ukraine -> 240.

This is one of the reasons I am saying that Ukraine is already over the hump in terms of rearming itself.  According to Oryx, Ukraine has lost a total of 177 tanks (including some that were recovered) and captured 244 (54 are listed as "abandoned", so I presume not usable).  If we do simple math, Ukraine 36% more tanks than when it started the war.  What's more, the Polish and many of the Russian tanks are better than the tanks Ukraine lost.

The Polish tanks alone are enough to outfit 5 tank battalions and have some left in reserve.  That's more than enough to outfit an entire Tank Brigade.

We'll see if Ukraine can get more tanks, but I think they've got enough to do what they need to do this summer with what they already have.

Steve

[Kraft]

Why would it be necessary to launch a major offensive on strong holds?

I do not think Russia has the capabilities to replace its daily losses for long if we are already down to 60s tanks and Mosin Nagants for rear elements, sailors fighting in frontline etc

There will be a point where RuAF reservists will have to be called upon, this is not sustainable for Russia but a relatively small price for the west to simply sustain Ukraines existence as a state that fights back by bringing in what is needed for survival and arming it with weapons that trade favorably.

With current losses I do not see the RuAF making it through to winter but maybe someone more knowledgable can correct me here, estimates of Russian equiptment & personal vary but if T62s are being called in numbers, that tells me T90Ms are not being replaced right now, if they still exist  

The only way for this to end will be when the west decides to stop its support.

This is however against the main interest of many nations and with increased independence from Russia prices and economic hurt will tip more and more in favor of EU/US, which is already spreading most of the hurt over all its economic power. 

We are talking about minor growth corrections while Russias economy is on lifeline support with supplies running dry.

Most importantly US election is far enough away that a russian puppet like Trump would not be a factor in the wars outcome and Biden can bankroll his defence industry to produce whatever blows up Russians best.

Which is why I think status quo of hardly moving frontline favors Ukraine.

Edited May 26, 2022 by Kraft

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

But with miltech very clearly favouring defence at this moment (unless that changes!), I also find it entirely possible that Ukraine (under Western pressure) ultimately decides it can't accept the large human and material cost of that offensive. 

Others have already poked at the other points reasonably well, but I think you're already wrong here.  Miltech favors the one who has it, and right now it's the defenders.  When UA counterattacks and RU is defending, it will be the attackers who have it. 

Russia doesn't have or have any way to get the sensors, electronics, and aerospace assets that are currently helping make the UA defense so effective.  RU may have started out with more UAVs, than UA, but a commercial DSLR doesn't give you the same capability as a modern purpose-built set of VNIR sensors, satellite nav, and laser guides if you want to drop rounds directly through the tops of vehicles from 15+ km away.  You also need those kinds of sensors and electonics to make things like NLAWs and Javelins as effective as they are.

RU also doesn't have the capability to create a broad encrypted comm network anymore - they have essentially no semiconductor industry of their own and China is largely prohibited from giving them anything modern, under penalty of semiconductor fabs moving from Shenzhen to Columbus.  

RU may be a space power on paper, but they've been unable to exploit their launch capability (propellant in tubes without bombs), largely due to their lack of VLSI.  They're basically 40 years behind in sensors and electronics.  They have two aging ground imaging satellites that may or may not still work.  They have no space based SAR and too little control of the sky to use airborne SAR in the unlikely event they have it. They have their own satellite nav with GLONASS, but can't even equip their own vehicles with RU-made ground stations - they depend on western COTS units.  And the west is capable of injecting error into the signals over Russia and Ukraine.  The lack of space obs and ELINT capability makes RU largely blind to anything they don't have human eyes on, and the lack of secure comm means that UA both knows what RU is doing and knows what RU knows about what UA is doing.  

They're really good at putting propellant in tubes with a bomb on the front. But even their high precision stuff isn't all that high precision, and they're likely to have a hard time making more of it as they run out.

 

58 minutes ago, dan/california said:

You raise a great many issues I don't think any one has definitive answers to. But there is one CLEAR indicator of whether Ukraines supporting countries are in it to win it, or not. If there are HIMARs MLRS systems a the front in the Donbas in three weeks or less from right now, then NATO is in this thing to win it. If not, they are screwing around looking for. a settlement, or a miracle. HIMARS and better SAMs and the Russians will be lucky to keep Crimea.

Just for reference my definition of winning is 2/24 borders, and NATO and EU membership. I don't think the DPR/LPR, and Crimea are worth paying the butchers bill to acquire a fundamentally unhappy population.

And Poland might be about to ensure that Ukraine gets HIMARs.  I suspect Poland will be in it to the end - they've been there before and every Pole knows that but for NATO membership, they'd probably be next on the list.  And while the stuff the US is supplying is more than rounding error in the military budget, it's also all being used for exactly what it was originally designed for.  And most of the money isn't going to Ukraine, it's going to Raytheon, Lockheed, Northrop Grumman, L3Harris, Teledyne, etc, and I'm sure they're loving it and would be happy to resupply the US with the very latest to replace the stuff that's being shipped off to the Black Sea and their lobbyists and marketing people are no doubt encouraging long term support of Ukraine.

[Battlefront.com]

Interesting video for you folks who like learning how Ukraine is handling their artillery.  Closed Caption option in English is available:

 

[dan/california]

11 minutes ago, chrisl said:

Others have already poked at the other points reasonably well, but I think you're already wrong here.  Miltech favors the one who has it, and right now it's the defenders.  When UA counterattacks and RU is defending, it will be the attackers who have it. 

Russia doesn't have or have any way to get the sensors, electronics, and aerospace assets that are currently helping make the UA defense so effective.  RU may have started out with more UAVs, than UA, but a commercial DSLR doesn't give you the same capability as a modern purpose-built set of VNIR sensors, satellite nav, and laser guides if you want to drop rounds directly through the tops of vehicles from 15+ km away.  You also need those kinds of sensors and electonics to make things like NLAWs and Javelins as effective as they are.

RU also doesn't have the capability to create a broad encrypted comm network anymore - they have essentially no semiconductor industry of their own and China is largely prohibited from giving them anything modern, under penalty of semiconductor fabs moving from Shenzhen to Columbus.  

RU may be a space power on paper, but they've been unable to exploit their launch capability (propellant in tubes without bombs), largely due to their lack of VLSI.  They're basically 40 years behind in sensors and electronics.  They have two aging ground imaging satellites that may or may not still work.  They have no space based SAR and too little control of the sky to use airborne SAR in the unlikely event they have it. They have their own satellite nav with GLONASS, but can't even equip their own vehicles with RU-made ground stations - they depend on western COTS units.  And the west is capable of injecting error into the signals over Russia and Ukraine.  The lack of space obs and ELINT capability makes RU largely blind to anything they don't have human eyes on, and the lack of secure comm means that UA both knows what RU is doing and knows what RU knows about what UA is doing.  

They're really good at putting propellant in tubes with a bomb on the front. But even their high precision stuff isn't all that high precision, and they're likely to have a hard time making more of it as they run out.

 

And Poland might be about to ensure that Ukraine gets HIMARs.  I suspect Poland will be in it to the end - they've been there before and every Pole knows that but for NATO membership, they'd probably be next on the list.  And while the stuff the US is supplying is more than rounding error in the military budget, it's also all being used for exactly what it was originally designed for.  And most of the money isn't going to Ukraine, it's going to Raytheon, Lockheed, Northrop Grumman, L3Harris, Teledyne, etc, and I'm sure they're loving it and would be happy to resupply the US with the very latest to replace the stuff that's being shipped off to the Black Sea and their lobbyists and marketing people are no doubt encouraging long term support of Ukraine.

The Poles really have been outstanding in this whole thing from literally hour #2. That , and it pains me say this, Boris Johnson's NLAWS, bought Ukraine enough time for the "rest of the West" to realize Ukraine wasn't folding, and get involved.

[Battlefront.com]

All Ukraine needs to continue fighting indefinitely is the support of the US and Poland.  Everything else is icing on the cake, and for sure there will be a lot of icing for a long time.  Germany, France, and Hungary could cut their support to zero and it wouldn't affect the outcome in any meaningful way.

Steve

[SeinfeldRules]

40 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Interesting video for you folks who like learning how Ukraine is handling their artillery.  Closed Caption option in English is available:

 

Some points I found relevant:

It seemed the commander was doing his own observing and calls for fire. This is contrary to a lot of Western Doctrine, where artillery units are a delivery service to support a maneuver unit’s request for fire. Here there doesn’t seem to be any “land owner” that’s dictating fire. 

They talk about their observation platforms, and that they can only use it when wind and Russian EW allow it. Wind and it’s ability to limit UAV operation is often overlooked. They also said it started to become unstable the higher they got in altitude, and was harder to observe fire. 

There didn’t seem to be a sense of danger or urgency when it came to moving or shooting the howitzers - must be a relatively quiet part of the front with limited counter battery. 

One of the crew chiefs talks about firing 150 rounds in a day and I got the impression that was a busy day for him. Can give an idea of the volume of fires executed by specific units. 

Edited May 26, 2022 by SeinfeldRules

[LongLeftFlank]

34 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The Poles really have been outstanding in this whole thing from literally hour #2. 

The Poles are delighted not to be hosting a massive European land war just for once.

But yes, now that the Poles are rid of their apatrid feudal nobility, and with the Germans remaining good neighbours, Poland has a real chance to step up postwar as an Eastern European leader.

Poland + Ukraine + (in time) Belarus creates a potentially powerful economic zone of over 100 million people, well equipped with all resources (human and otherwise) save oil. The river basins also look like they will suffer less acutely from climate change than other areas of the planet. I am going out over my skis again here, but the basic 'carrying capacity' of the land seems very good.  And  that's going to matter over time.

And the peoples seem compatible: socially conservative, stubborn, hands-on and individualistic (forgive me for stereotyping).

Politically, a new 'Commonwealth' could form a potent counterweight, both to Moscow and to French-German 'hegemony' within the EU.

[chuckdyke]

32 minutes ago, SeinfeldRules said:

It seemed the commander was doing his own observing and calls for fire.

Could it be because he is familiar with the terrain and gives landmarks as reference points? He wouldn't bypass the support unit just be the eyes for him.

[chuckdyke]

2 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Politically, a new 'Commonwealth' could form a potent counterweight, both to Moscow and to French-German 'hegemony' within the EU.

A new Warsaw pact without Russia. A few people start to think along these lines. Already Eastern Europe thinks Western Europe is too liberal. 

[kraze]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Say what you will about Arestovych, but he nailed this one perfectly:

 

Nothing unites us like a bunch of guys, that just sent another dozen bil $ to Russia, telling us that we must quickly give up, calmly load ourselves into trains to concentration camps somewhere in Siberia, while leaving our homes for "liberators" to live in - so that business can go on as usual and a face of tzar of war criminals looks attractive.

[Holien]

Just made me smile, the Germans acting quickly...

 

[chuckdyke]

6 minutes ago, Holien said:

ust made me smile, the Germans acting quickly...

 

Schneckekrieg. 

[chrisl]

Schneckenschreck

[Huba]

52 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

The Poles are delighted not to be hosting a massive European land war just for once.

But yes, now that the Poles are rid of their apatrid feudal nobility, and with the Germans remaining good neighbours, Poland has a real chance to step up postwar as an Eastern European leader.

Poland + Ukraine + (in time) Belarus creates a potentially powerful economic zone of over 100 million people, well equipped with all resources (human and otherwise) save oil. The river basins also look like they will suffer less acutely from climate change than other areas of the planet. I am going out over my skis again here, but the basic 'carrying capacity' of the land seems very good.  And  that's going to matter over time.

And the peoples seem compatible: socially conservative, stubborn, hands-on and individualistic (forgive me for stereotyping).

Politically, a new 'Commonwealth' could form a potent counterweight, both to Moscow and to French-German 'hegemony' within the EU.

Ha ha, you made me laugh! I believe it was Churchill who said that you can't have a proper war in Europe without Polish territory - let's hope he was wrong!

48 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

A new Warsaw pact without Russia. A few people start to think along these lines. Already Eastern Europe thinks Western Europe is too liberal. 

I'd be careful trying to apply the american liberal/ conservative distinction to Eastern Europe (at least to Poland of which I feel entitled to an opinion  ) The whole social conservatism is something that is more being shoved down people's throats by our bleep bleep bleeping government than something people actually want. Hell, when gov approved the anti-abortion laws here, rioting people actually sprayed on churches and John Paul II statues - something unheard since ever in this country. The pendulum is already swinging in another direction in the polls, and the incoming financial crisis will probably sweep the current ruling party off the table, and boy will they fall hard.

Still, at least as far as international politics are concerned, it won't make any impact. Polish only parliamentary left party renounced any "Tankie" connections on D+1 and is as anti-Russian (anti-authoritarian really) as anyone else. The far right was and is quite Putinist though, but they got basically cancelled to the point media are ignoring their press conferences. 

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The Polish tanks alone are enough to outfit 5 tank battalions and have some left in reserve.  That's more than enough to outfit an entire Tank Brigade

If anybody missed that, UA officially raised the new, 5th Tank Brigade around a week ago, equipped with Polish T-72s, Dutch YPR-765 and AFAIR towed Giatsint-B guns. It is dislocated in Kherson region according to https://uawardata.com/

 

 

Edited May 26, 2022 by Huba

[Huba]

Also, more 155mm guns already in Ukraine:

Edit:

And for a change, something generally very uplifting coming from the EU (the whole article gives details about resolution to be announced on upcoming EU summit - no talk about ceasefire, support with arms deliveries, EU candidate status to be announced on next summit)  :

 

Edited May 26, 2022 by Huba

[SteelRain]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Politico article about Poland's calling out of Germany for not fulfilling it's agreement to send Leopards to replace Soviet type tanks shipped to Ukraine:

https://www.politico.eu/article/polish-president-accuses-germany-of-breaching-promises-on-ukraine-related-tank-deliveries/

The interesting bit in here is I finally saw a number for how many tanks Poland moved into Ukraine -> 240.

This is one of the reasons I am saying that Ukraine is already over the hump in terms of rearming itself.  According to Oryx, Ukraine has lost a total of 177 tanks (including some that were recovered) and captured 244 (54 are listed as "abandoned", so I presume not usable).  If we do simple math, Ukraine 36% more tanks than when it started the war.  What's more, the Polish and many of the Russian tanks are better than the tanks Ukraine lost.

The Polish tanks alone are enough to outfit 5 tank battalions and have some left in reserve.  That's more than enough to outfit an entire Tank Brigade.

We'll see if Ukraine can get more tanks, but I think they've got enough to do what they need to do this summer with what they already have.

Steve

LOL, what was Mr Duda thinking? As much as I hate the German inaction, why would Mr Duda assume that Germany would deliver hundreds of modern Leopards without proper negotiation? Is he really that naive or did he just saw a cheap way to get rid of scrape metal, get praised for supporting Ukraine and have hundreds of new tanks? 
Such behavior also plays into the cards of Ivan.

[Huba]

Just now, SteelRain said:

LOL, what was Mr Duda thinking? As much as I hate the German inaction, why would Mr Duda assume that Germany would deliver hundreds of modern Leopards without proper negotiation? Is he really that naive or did he just saw a cheap way to get rid of scrape metal, get praised for supporting Ukraine and have hundreds of new tanks? 
Such behavior also plays into the cards of Ivan.

We discussed this several pages ago - the conflict was first reported by German media, quite critical about their own gov stance. It is really hard to tell what was the initial agreement vs what is reported now. Quite probably Polish gov is just doing some German bashing cause it's easy political points - OTOH, Germans making promises and then Scholzing around is also quite probable.

 

In other news, Polish MoD signed a Letter of Request for 500 (!!!) HIMARS launchers ( 80 batteries). It is a crazy number, I'll be happy to hear some comments about what's really going on - it is enough for Polish, Ukrainian and Baltic armies, and then some.