How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

Russian convoy in Luhansk oblast cought some fire

 

[Haiduk]

Stugna-P and Javelin launches of 80th air-assault brigade. Looks like Stugna-P hit Russian TOS-1A, but it's hard to identify

 

[Haiduk]

UKR AA-squad (probably 95th air-assault brigade), armed with Polish "Piorun" MANPAD and driving on Kozak-2M1 armored car. They search Russian UAV in the sky with thermal camera and launch a missile at it with unknown result. Commander says "shot down!", but there is no conformaition.

 

[Harmon Rabb]

Not sure if this channel has been posted here yet but Artur Rehi also known as Estonian soldier does a good job of combining some of the most interesting footage from the war in his videos.

I've seen some of this footage already but some of this stuff was new for me.

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Maj. Sergei Borisenko, 106th Airborne Division

 

[Haiduk]

Rubizhne, probably Corsar ATGM hit Russian truck.

 

[cesmonkey]

Some interesting articles I stumbled across lately:

https://www.businessinsider.com/us-special-ops-vet-training-ukrainians-explains-success-against-russia-2022-5

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/western-advocates-of-appeasement-need-a-crash-course-in-putinology/

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/vladimir-putin-is-running-out-of-options-to-avoid-defeat-in-ukraine/

https://cepa.org/the-kremlin-cannot-negotiate/

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/05/nuclear-deterrent-putin-china/

https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/why-taiwan-cant-copy-ukraines-civil-defense-blueprint/

[Kinophile]

That CEPA article has a great line towards the end:

"Russian foreign policy is a means of legitimizing domestic policy."

[Battlefront.com]

Ah, the retreat of the TD units explains why the Popasna breakthrough expanded more than has been seen in other towns Russia has taken.  The usual thing is they take some ground then get stopped again.  Not as true this time.  More like Izyum's initial push.

When Popasna fell the question was put here as to how much it mattered.  I said not too much, in part because I expected the same sort of containment that has been seen countless other places.  That and strategically Russia has still lost this war no matter what happens.

I still don't view this breakthrough as strategically valuable to the Russians.  They don't have the forces to exploit it, nor do they have the forces necessary to reduce the "pocket" they create.  Now that Ukraine realizes the threat posed by the Popasna breakthrough, I expect they will shift forces around to deal with it.  This might be a setback to things like the counter attack around Izyum and Kharkiv, perhaps moving a unit from the west a little sooner than desired, but I expect Ukraine can meet the challenge.

The end result, I expect, is an accelerated destruction of Russia's forces in the area.  We are now talking about maneuver warfare for both sides, which you'd think is a good ting for Russia but it is not.  Ukraine has had very little incentive/capability to leave its fixed fortifications to go out and attack Russian forces in any meaningful way.  Artillery and small counter attacks only.  When Russia felt an attack was spent they could withdraw a little bit and not worry about Ukrainian forces swamping them.  Russia's own fortifications and established artillery positions helped ensure this.  This is no longer the case. 

When the tips of Russia's spear start to falter, Ukraine now has every incentive to push deep into the Russian staging areas and beyond.  Neither side has a safe place to fall back to, so the side that feels it is most threatened with destruction will be obligated to pull back.  And not just a few hundred meters.

This is a dangerous time for both forces, for sure, but so far Russia has shown it is not very good at coordinating a successful deep penetration against determined opposition.  The attacks in the north, east, and west have all failed.  Even the advances in the south, against minimal Ukrainian resistance, eventually petered out and have not regained momentum.  On the other hand, Russia's track record of losing a lot of forces and having to withdraw is also well established in the north and northeast, as well as the west.

Ultimately, I think this will work out for Ukraine.  But it will be an interesting week or two.

Steve

[sburke]

Russia Official Has Rare Excuse for War Failure: Ukraine's Elite Military (msn.com)

[Armorgunner]

A really interesting story, from a Russian soldier. In one of the 22 so called BTG´s in the Izyum salient. His company had 13 men, after he and his friends arrived.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/5/19/2099028/-Ukraine-Update-A-Russian-volunteer-s-story-lays-waste-to-the-myth-of-the-Russian-BTG

[kraze]

16 minutes ago, sburke said:

Russia Official Has Rare Excuse for War Failure: Ukraine's Elite Military (msn.com)

yeah it's the new thing that every single russian propagandist repeats now, from "pro-putin" to "anti-putin".

They are losing because they are fighting a civil war. Obviously can't be losing to Ukrainian "untermenschen".

Of course that's also where another failure comes - "same mentality". Our soldiers aren't insane violent looters, rapists and torturers. Maybe that little fact makes the difference.

[akd]

33 minutes ago, Armorgunner said:

A really interesting story, from a Russian soldier. In one of the 22 so called BTG´s in the Izyum salient. His company had 13 men, after he and his friends arrived.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/5/19/2099028/-Ukraine-Update-A-Russian-volunteer-s-story-lays-waste-to-the-myth-of-the-Russian-BTG

This is the account from Victor Shayga, and we have been posting @mdmitri91’s translations from his twitter feed.  He just posted part 3:

https://justpaste.it/4y5en

Here come some mobiks to turn the tide:

 

Edited May 20, 2022 by akd

[Suleyman]

Rather than the fast advance around Popasnaya and Severodonetsk, I’m paying attention to the small RU counter offense in the Kharkiv region. They “recaptured” two towns/villages quick as well. Interesting game plan they have, I wonder what their end plan is? 
 

UA defending around Popasnaya and Severo need to give them a run for their money and inflict damage to insure they cant go much further. I think they can but we’ll see what happens

[dan/california]

5 hours ago, FancyCat said:

A very good thing about the Neptune sinking the Moskva is that Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to sink Russian warships using their own home-grown weaponry, in the same manner towed artillery, soviet-era tanks and AA systems are considered not as escalatory cause they are merely adding to Ukrainian capability and not necessarily new capability/technology, that Russia can point and feasibly denounce with any traction. Any Russian shouting at the top of their lungs at another warship being sunk by a Harpoon, and Ukraine will need to merely point out Russian warships were already reaching the bottom of the sea, nothing "escalatory" about the Harpoons. 

I really think the escalatory issue is overblown. Russia desperately does NOT want to escalate this war. If they DID want to the tens of thousands of Russian troops killed with Nato weapons and ammo are all the justification any dictators propaganda machine could ask for. Not one missile has touched Poland, because the Russians KNOW they would get erased. I don't think the Russians would escalate even if NATO air power was directly committed to the fight in Ukraine. I definitely don't think the Russians are going to escalate over anything less than that.

 

[Cederic]

15 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

the Battle of Britain was much closer fought than was reported at the time

On 7th September 1940 the Luftwaffe attacked London with a force of over 950 aircraft. Scrambled to intercept the raid was 43 Squadron of the Royal Air Force. To quote Stephen Bungay from 'The Most Dangerous Enemy',

"following past practice, three of them climbed in order to hold off the 600 fighters and the other six headed for the 350 bombers."

(thank you for the highly informative post though, lots of interesting inputs from multiple sources)

[Armorgunner]

23 minutes ago, akd said:

This is the account from Victor Shayga we have been posting @mdmitri91’s translations from his twitter feed.  He just posted part 3:

https://justpaste.it/4y5en

Here come some mobiks to turn the tide:

 

Thanks mait 

[LongLeftFlank]

Sorry guys, gonna throw a contrarian bomb again here. Have at it!

... I personally find the quick takes so far to be a little overconfident, even smug, in that British sense (never a good sign).

1. If developments should prove me wrong, e.g. the latest RA push dissolves into chaos  under saturation UA artillery, plus its (usual) logistical c-fk into another bloody 'MARS' debacle (just as their river crossing fiasco became their 'Ozereyka Bay'), then by all means do feel free to gloat.I will be the first to cheer along with you.

2.  But for this observer, a forced evacuation by UA of its 2014 Donbas fortified lines cannot be readily 'spun' as anything but a strategic UA defeat and a desperately needed Russian 'victory'. That is regardless of the cost, whose accounting truly matters only to Moscow, frankly. I take it as given they will eventually start arguing for a cease fire, and "facts on the ground" will matter, a lot. 

3. As of today, all the handwavy confident theories and Twitter anecdata we keep sharing here (me included!) from 2-3 echelons up seem to amount to 'the Russian is finished.' or 'just kick in the door and the whole rotten structure caves in'. Saying it just don't make it so, any more than it did for the original theorist in question.  And believe you me, I've been deeply immersed in those theories since Day One, and patiently waiting for them to show up in force!

5.  So, show us, please! those systemic 'imminent collapse' theories in train, today, on the ground. Today! Not in some vague future halcyon period that happens, umm, over the summer once the UA finally gluts itself with NATO armaments and knowhow, while entire RA units actually mutiny or defect en masse (not just anecdotally), and huge banners and crowds preaching 'Peace Bread and Land' appear in Red Square.

6.  This is a tactical wargaming board. It looks very much to me like the Russians have just turned the tables, operationally if not yet tactically. By finally 'securing' Donbas plus the land bridge, in the very way they said they would do back in March, once it became clear their Czechoslovakia putsch to take the whole country had explosively s&&t the bed....

7.  Meanwhile the UA, for all our fond hopes and armchair projecting, shows no sign yet of being able to mount counterattacks above local/ battalion scale, sustained for about 3 days march (on foot!). Such 18th century tactics will simply not suffice to recover the 20% of their territory in Russian hands today, once those bastards dig in. Yes, there is no question they will figure it out, this particular 'tech' predates gunpowder. And Russians are historically masters at this art. 

8.  I am an amateur in military matters, but I am also a businessman with 25 years experience in emerging markets (many of them 'frontier', which is to say, distressed). If the above situation 'congeals' into a cease fire, it will leave Ukraine as a devastated and impoverished no-mans land, far worse off than 2014. Bloodlands 2022. Not a bulwark or entrepot for modern Europe. No private capital will dare to invest there. Ukraine might as well reach an arrangement with Putin at that point.

...And because they realise, as I do, that we can still lose this war.

[/Gauntlet thrown.]

Edited May 20, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Cederic]

5 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I really think the escalatory issue is overblown. Russia desperately does NOT want to escalate this war. If they DID want to the tens of thousands of Russian troops killed with Nato weapons and ammo are all the justification any dictators propaganda machine could ask for. Not one missile has touched Poland, because the Russians KNOW they would get erased. I don't think the Russians would escalate even if NATO air power was directly committed to the fight in Ukraine. I definitely don't think the Russians are going to escalate over anything less than that.

 

A joke I saw a week ago elsewhere.

Russian mother calls her son, finds out he's in Ukraine.

"Why are you there?" she asks.

"It's a special military operation."

"A war? Will you be ok?"

"No mother, a special military operation. It's a proxy war between Russia and NATO, not a real war."

"Oh, that's good to hear," she says, "how's it going?"

"Well," he replies, "so far we've had 20,000 casualties, lost 1200 tanks and several thousand other armoured and military vehicles, had a cruiser sank and lost most of our officers."

"Oh," said his mother, "That doesn't sound too promising. How is NATO doing?"

"They haven't turned up yet."

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Sorry guys, gonna throw a contrarian bomb again here. Have at it!

... I personally find the quick takes so far to be a little overconfident, even smug, in that British sense (never a good sign).

1. If developments should prove me wrong, e.g. the latest RA push dissolves into chaos  under saturation UA artillery, plus its (usual) logistical c-fk into another bloody 'MARS' debacle (just as their river crossing fiasco became their 'Ozereyka Bay'), then by all means do feel free to gloat.I will be the first to cheer along with you.

2.  But for this observer, a forced evacuation by UA of its 2014 Donbas fortified lines cannot be readily 'spun' as anything but a strategic UA defeat and a desperately needed Russian 'victory'. That is regardless of the cost, whose accounting truly matters only to Moscow, frankly. I take it as given they will eventually start arguing for a cease fire, and "facts on the ground" will matter, a lot. 

3. As of today, all the handwavy confident theories and Twitter anecdata we keep sharing here (me included!) from 2-3 echelons up seem to amount to 'the Russian is finished.' or 'just kick in the door and the whole rotten structure caves in'. Saying it just don't make it so, any more than it did for the original theorist in question.  And believe you me, I've been deeply immersed in those theories since Day One, and patiently waiting for them to show up in force!

5.  So, show us, please! those systemic 'imminent collapse' theories in train, today, on the ground. Today! Not in some vague future halcyon period that happens, umm, over the summer once the UA finally gluts itself with NATO armaments and knowhow, while entire RA units actually mutiny or defect en masse (not just anecdotally), and huge banners and crowds preaching 'Peace Bread and Land' appear in Red Square.

6.  This is a tactical wargaming board. It looks very much to me like the Russians have just turned the tables, operationally if not yet tactically. By finally 'securing' Donbas plus the land bridge, in the very way they said they would do back in March, once it became clear their Czechoslovakia putsch to take the whole country had explosively s&&t the bed....

7.  Meanwhile the UA, for all our fond hopes and armchair projecting, shows no sign yet of being able to mount counterattacks above local/ battalion scale, sustained for about 3 days march (on foot!). Such 18th century tactics will simply not suffice to recover the 20% of their territory in Russian hands today, once those bastards dig in. Yes, there is no question they will figure it out, this particular 'tech' predates gunpowder. And Russians are historically masters at this art. 

8.  I am an amateur in military matters, but I am also a businessman with 25 years experience in emerging markets (many of them 'frontier', which is to say, distressed). If the above situation 'congeals' into a cease fire, it will leave Ukraine as a devastated and impoverished no-mans land, far worse off than 2014. Bloodlands 2022. Not a bulwark or entrepot for modern Europe. No private capital will dare to invest there. Ukraine might as well reach an arrangement with Putin at that point.

...And because they understand, as I do, that we can still lose this war.

[/Gauntlet thrown.]

There may have been some premature celebration in the last week or so. But I REALLY don't think the Russians finding a less than great territorial defense unit holding a small piece of the front, and advancing a few miles is going to change the course of the war. If it happens over and over again that is a different story. The Ukr command has shown an amazing ability to adapt so far. And some portion of that forty billion might show up Federal Express if it needs too.

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Maj. Valentin Ivanov, unit unknown

Col. Evgeny Gerasimenko, Rosgvardiya 12th Separate Spetsnaz Detachment "Ural"

 

Edited May 20, 2022 by akd

[Aragorn2002]

9 minutes ago, akd said:

@sburke @Kinophile

Maj. Valentin Ivanov, unit unknown

Col. Evgeny Gerasimenko, GRU Spetsnaz

Maj. Anatoly Myagkov, unit unknown

 

Another one bites the dust.

[sburke]

11 minutes ago, akd said:

@sburke @Kinophile

Maj. Valentin Ivanov, unit unknown

Col. Evgeny Gerasimenko, GRU Spetsnaz

Maj. Anatoly Myagkov, unit unknown

 

I think Haiduk posted that last guy with the following info - Mayor Anatoliy Miagkov, last mention of his service - 12th separate special force detachment 

[Suleyman]

I just seen a video of a tank heavy large convoy heading to the Donbas front, company of T-80BVs (12) plus a couple BMP-2 platoons and a lot of infantry with their truck carriers and MTLBs. 

Edited May 20, 2022 by Suleyman

[Homo_Ferricus]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

2.  But for this observer, a forced evacuation by UA of its 2014 Donbas fortified lines cannot be readily 'spun' as anything but a strategic UA defeat and a desperately needed Russian 'victory'. That is regardless of the cost, whose accounting truly matters only to Moscow, frankly. I take it as given they will eventually start arguing for a cease fire, and "facts on the ground" will matter

I agree. Shocking that some would say that this is an insignificant development--if it were Russian lines that were broken in this manner, I suspect the same people would say "case closed, they're done." UA are not invulnerable to falling apart after intense pressure from multiple fronts and GLOCs under serious threat. Clearly, there are at least SOME issues with manpower, equipment/weapons, leadership and the confidence of the troops.

Let's not forget that the majority of forces in Mariupol are now freeing up--whatever condition they may be in.

Another reliable channel insists that the 40th and 58th brigade are nearby and can plug the gaps or maybe even counterattack. And the Bakmut road is not the ONLY supply route. Still, the threat level for UA forces in and around Severodonetsk just rose from a balmy orange to ruby red.