How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Vergeltungswaffe]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yeah, more like CTGs

Oh, for sure the expectation that there wouldn't be a shooting war poisoned the whole planning process, of that I'm sure.  But I personally believe the assumption of no serious combat was invented to make this war possible.

Senior Officer - "Comrade Putin says he wants to invade Ukraine"

Planning Staff - "Sounds good!  We'll get right on it.  One question, when can we expect full mobilization?"

Senior Officer - "Comrade Putin says we are not to mobilize.  This is to be a 'Special Military Operation' with our standing forces."

Planning Staff - "Ah, OK.  So we're just going to take over the Donbas then?  We can do that."

Senior Officer - "No, Comrade Putin wants a plan to take over all of eastern Ukraine."

Planning Staff - "Without full mobilization?  This is impossible.  We simply don't have the manpower to fight our way to the Dnepr."

Senior Officer - "That will not please Comrade Putin.  Isn't there some way we can do this with our existing forces?"

Planning Staff - "Yes.  If the Ukrainians offer no resistance we should be able to do it no problem."

Senior Officer - "Excellent!  Then it is done.  The Ukrainians will not resist.  Make a plan that is based on this truth."

Planning Staff - "Er, we were joking about the no resistance thing.  Are you just pulling our legs about building an invasion plan based on this assumption?"

Senior Officer - "No joke.  He wants this war and we need a plan to make it happen.  If the only way to make a plan is to presume Ukraine will not fight, then that is what we must do."

Planning Staff - "OK, well, if we divide up our forces and have them drive in small groups all over the place for 3 days then we can do it".

Senior Officer - "Excellent.  Finalize the details of your plan and I will submit it for Comrade Putin's consideration."

Planning Staff - "As you command.  We'll get started on a way to do this.  If we exclude Kyiv we might just have enough forces to make it happen, provide Ukrainians do not shoot at us."

Senior Officer - "Comrade Putin was very specific about taking Kyiv as well as everything east of the Dnepr."

Planning Staff - "What?  Even without any resistance we would need more troops than we have to make that feasible."

Senior Officer - "Not to worry, we have Chechens and police units.  And if absolutely necessary, Syrians and Libyans.  Since you said the Ukrainians won't shoot back they are as good as soldiers."

Planning Staff - "Wait, we didn't say the Ukrainians wouldn't shoot back.  We just said that is the only way to... never mind.  It seems this is what we must do so we'll come up with a plan."

Senior Officer - "Very good then.  Oh, and don't forget that conscripts have to be left at home."

Planning Staff - "Say what?  This definitely isn't going to work."

Senior Officer - "Of course it will.  Comrade Putin knows what he is doing.  He's a master at this sort of thing."

Planning Staff - "As you wish.  We should have a plan ready in about 6 months."

Senior Officer - "Didn't I tell you already?  We're invading next week."

Planning Staff - "Uhmm.... OK?"

Senior Officer - "Good job.  And when you're done get started on a second plan that has our glorious forces going all the way to the Polish border."

Planning Staff - silence

(note, this was not an intercept made by Ukrainian intel, but it does seem plausible, doesn't it?)

Steve

 

Okay, now THAT'S funny.

[Battlefront.com]

42 minutes ago, SeinfeldRules said:

I probably have more questions then observations at this point. I don't think anything fundamentally has changed from previous conflict, even dating back to WW 1. Artillery is still a crucial arm of any modern military and is your only all weather, truly responsive means of shaping the battlefield. Artillery is the King of Battle, even with today's technology. I can't say I've been truly shocked at anything I've seen so far.

Thanks for the follow up post!  My comments here are intended to continue the conversation if you're so inclined.  These are my thoughts as a sim guy trying to figure out what we need to be keeping in mind as we move forward.  Because, as you just said, artillery is such an important part of this battle

I agree that artillery hasn't suddenly transformed itself into something unrecognizable to WW1 artillerymen.  However, from my armchair warrior seat it seems that there has been four major steps (not leaps) forward which have a pretty serious combined effect.  The three are:

1. eyes in the sky (drones) directly controlled by FOs.  This not only improves the responsiveness of aerial recon (i.e. the battery can focus on whatever it wants, including loitering) but also the quantity.  Prior to drones you might have one or two assets up in the air for large sections of frontage.  Inherently limited in quantity, amount of time in the air, and how long they can focus on any one point.  Drones?  Pop one into the air at any time and get exclusive attention, not just to spot something but to spot the rounds.  Line infantry have their own drone capabilities which, with a little more effort, can provide additional eyes.  There's just no way this sort of capability could ever exist without drones.  Too impractical.
2. the observer has the ability to really take a good look at what targets are available and where they are located.  Targeting can be tailored to ensure the best end result.  And this is made even more effective by...
3. aerial observation results are viewed in realtime.  No more passing intel through various hands to get it to the battery.  Nothing gets stale.  If an FO with a drone spots something he knows it is there, for sure.  If that something moves before the tubes are ready to fire, this fact can be communicated to the battery and corrective action taken before a single round is sent on its way.  And of course adjusting fire is now much better than under normal circumstances since generally traditional aerial observers would not be hanging around to adjust.
4. with GPS guidance and (better) laser range finders the FDC can get precise coordinates down to the partial meter.  And not just from a trained and skilled FO, but from anybody with a drone that knows how to determine coordinates.

Combine all these things together and you get vastly more responsive artillery capabilities that can focus on specific targets, keep artillery on them, and do so with great precision.  This means fewer rounds fired for effect and better chance of knocking out the targets.

As you rightly point out, all of this is theoretically possible without drones.  However, drones make it much more practical, much more often, on a much larger scale than without.

What do you think of this assessment?

42 minutes ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Drones have proven to be incredibly useful but I don't see anything revolutionary or fundamentally doctrine-altering with them - aerial observers have been a thing since the Civil War, and artillery battalions during WW2 literally had their own observation planes sometimes - we can just get them closer then ever before without risking a human. You still see a lot of "long range" observation from drones in these strike videos however - so there is definitely a real threat of ADA/EW that is keeping drones at a distance. It's harder then ever before to hide your forces from observation, but I imagine there are a lot of smart people churning away at a practical military answer to the UAV problem, and I think it will have an easier solution then the tank will have dealing with top down attack, fire-and-forget ATGM systems.

I agree that there's nothing that would qualify as revolutionary or changing doctrine.  Yet.  What I do see is that doctrine does need to change.  If a force is not going to have robust, varied, and plentiful ability to deny drones the ability to do their thing, then it will need to adapt its behavior to try and minimize being spotted while executing current doctrine.  Hiding in trees, for example, doesn't do much to hide from a curious drone operator.  It's akin to trying to hide from thermals at night.  Technically possible, practically not so much.

Now, if a force does acquire the sort of anti-drone capabilities I just described, then existing doctrine can probably remain largely intact.  However, it will need to be augmented by whatever the anti-drone capabilities require to perform their role.  For example, leap frogging the anti-drone protection ahead of units instead of with them.  Coming up with alternative doctrine in the event that anti-drone abilities are curtailed either by losses, malfunctions, etc.

What I'm saying here is that a tank commander might not have to change his doctrinal approach to a specific situation much if he has anti-drone coverage, but if he doesn't he might have to do things very differently in order to stay in the fight.  Regardless, doctrine will likely need to reshaped at higher levels in order to properly integrate new defensive assets effectively.  This might involve modifications to existing doctrine.

42 minutes ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Loitering munitions I'm still not 100% sold on

For the most part loitering munitions seem to be best utilized on high value targets.  I agree with you there.  I also think that Switchblade 300s are not going to do much unless they are available in the thousands (e.g. they become akin to Javelin).  Agree again!  But I disagree on their limitations at the tactical level.

What I've seen in video after video is the ability for loitering munitions to disrupt the enemy's plans.  Smashing the lead tank of a column as it's heading down a constricted path (road, bridge, etc.) can have outsized importance.  Yes, maybe only 1 vehicle out of 13 is left smoking, but if the other 12 are forced to take evasive action you're increasing the chance that a few of them are going to do things like drive into a ditch, get stuck in a patch of mud, smash into each other, etc.  If the column has infantry, they might dismount and getting all those crunchies back into their rolling coffins is time consuming.

Better still, using a loitering munition to disrupt an enemy maneuver in an area with prepped artillery could be quite a good thing for the defender.  BAM... shock to the attacker.  Dismounts disperse, artillery slams into them.  Even if not many casualties result from such a thing, the attack is likely going to be way off its timetable.  Maybe even for the rest of the day.

So I think loitering munitions have a pretty straight forward set of tactical possibilites.  The trick is to get your loitering operators to know when to strike and when to wait for something better.  Having operators go up and just whack the first thing they see is unlikely to produce the sorts of results I just described.

42 minutes ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Armored vehicles seem to be more vulnerable to artillery then commonly believed in the US/NATO. Lots of footage of (what seems to be) destroyed vehicles due to rocket and cannon fire.

Yes, vastly more vulnerable.  This could have a lot to do with the inferior quality of Soviet era equipment (even with ERA), but I suspect NATO type equipment won't fare much better.  The crews and passengers inside, however, probably will survive even if their vehicle is out of action.

42 minutes ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Not seeing much utilization of mortars. Not sure if this is due to a lack of use, improper characterization of OSINT videos, or a function of UKR/RUS TOE lacking a significant amount of mortar tubes?

I think we're just not seeing it in videos as much.  I have seen soldiers on the ground taking what seems to be mortar fire.  Medium sized thumps at wide intervals are most likely medium or heavy mortars rather than artillery.

42 minutes ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces seldom use effective cover and are often lined up in neat rows in the open, instead of utilizing dispersion and tree lines.

Interesting observations, thanks!

42 minutes ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Lack of digital systems aside, the above does stir some questions in my mind on the actual effectiveness and feasibility of true "counterfire" - meaning a howitzer shoots, then immediately has to move to avoid rapid and accurate fires from an opposing artillery unit. I don't think UKR and RUS artillery units are so pig headed or naive to not appreciate the usefulness of emplacing in a tree line - I wonder if the impetus to do so is even there. What I mean by that is: how often are artillery units shooting and then immediately taking fire?

Others seem to be scratching the same part of their head as you on this one.  It seems the majority of fire on artillery positions is not in direct response to it firing.  Seems mostly "oh, we figured out where they are, let's nail 'em".  I say this because most of the hits I've seen on deployed artillery don't appear to be while they are active.  Likewise, lots of video of artillery being hit when not deployed (traveling or temporarily pulled off the road).

Thanks in advance for any thoughts you have on my responses.

Steve

[FancyCat]

Interesting shift. I wouldn't doubt it is maximal legitimately, but also intended to shift goalposts, instead of a likely peace deal with some Ukrainian territory in Russian hands, the middle position becomes more pre-invasion, and the full territory becoming the maximal objective.

 

[chrisl]

33 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

And I'd sort of make the same comment he did, but about EO/IR/Hyperspectral GEO/IMINT.  There's a lot more imaging capability in orbit than one would guess from how little gets released to the press.  Very little of it is Russian.

 

28 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Without consistently effective logistics and comms, UA will not be able to sustain more than localised offensive operations, especially against prepared positions (which I take it as a given that even inexperienced Russians can quickly get decent at, given a will and some time.  Intrenchment, after all, is an art hundreds of years old).

It would be catastrophic for this war to  go static with 20% of Ukrainian territory, especially Kherson, still in Russian hands.

It's probably about time for the aid to include a lot of transport and fuel trucks in addition to all the weapons systems.  Given how UA seems to be able to exploit all the information they're given from many sources, including a lot of their own, they seem to be doing pretty well with comms.  It doesn't mean they can't do better, but they seem to have come pretty close to hitting Gerasimov, which must have taken a lot of fast transmission of information to the right places.

[dan/california]

5 minutes ago, chrisl said:

And I'd sort of make the same comment he did, but about EO/IR/Hyperspectral GEO/IMINT.  There's a lot more imaging capability in orbit than one would guess from how little gets released to the press.  Very little of it is Russian.

 

It's probably about time for the aid to include a lot of transport and fuel trucks in addition to all the weapons systems.  Given how UA seems to be able to exploit all the information they're given from many sources, including a lot of their own, they seem to be doing pretty well with comms.  It doesn't mean they can't do better, but they seem to have come pretty close to hitting Gerasimov, which must have taken a lot of fast transmission of information to the right places.

Ukraine needs the second coming of the Red Ball Express, badly, and soon.

[Battlefront.com]

14 hours ago, alison said:

Hi all, I am a new account on this forum, but I have been reading this thread every day for the past couple months after getting referred to it from elsewhere. This thread, the daily ISW reports and Perun's videos are my primary sources for keeping track of what's going on in this war and why. Thank you everyone for the great contributions.

Welcome!  Consider this a belated traditional welcoming of a new forum member.  I know how much it takes to get me out of lurking mode on other forums a read (not related to war, I do all that here) so I really appreciate you taking the time to do so.

14 hours ago, alison said:

My account took a couple days to get approved, so this comment is out-of-date relative to the comment I wanted to respond to, but there have been several times the topic of China came up so I thought it would be worth posting anyway. I hope it's still interesting to someone. If not, please scroll past, I don't want to distract too much from the excellent analysis you all are sharing.

The discussion has continually come back to China time and time again.  This is understandable because the US, in particular, has been shifting its strategic focus towards China over the past couple of years.  Obviously quite prematurely!

14 hours ago, alison said:

I don't think it is very helpful to describe China (or any authoritarian country) as merely left wing or right wing, in particular when that statement comes from partisans in a democratic country. All too often there is a cynical incentive to try to associate the policies of the authoritarian regime with opposing political factions in the democratic system. I think it's better to assess the policies on their own.

Yes, and this is a typical paradigm trap that people who view the world through a politics lens constantly fall into.  The similarities between autocratic states is always greater than their differences no matter what the states' supposed ideology might be.  Stated political ideology is still important to take into consideration sometimes, but often it's not.  Culture, however, is vastly more important and not necessarily easily pinned down to political ideology.

14 hours ago, alison said:

Xi has overseen several socially conservative policies - for example broadcast restrictions on media featuring tattoos, piercings, effeminate men, same-sex relations and so on. But this is only part of a larger scale censorship effort that has also seen arrests of local citizen reporters and foreign media not only blocked at the Great Firewall but also pushed out of reporting from inside the country at all. He also spearheaded a popular anti-corruption campaign that coincidentally targeted all the senior party officials that might stand against him. And, of course, he removed term limits and will likely get a third term in the upcoming national congress. These are suspiciously autocratic moves, which is worrying in a country that since Deng has at least made a pretense of winding back the power of figureheads and trying to build more of a loyalty to the party as an abstract entity.

Thank you for putting some more meat on the bones you were responding to.  This is similar to Russia, BTW.  Putin has been the undisputed leader since he took office, however for the early part of his time he was not as much an autocrat as he was the appointed head of a large and diverse oligarchy.  Over time he, like Xi, has cracked down on all forms of possible dissent and/or challenge.  The oligarchy is pretty much there to carry out Putin's will.  I wonder if Xi drew any inspiration from Putin because Putin seems to be ahead of Xi by a few years.

14 hours ago, alison said:

Xi has also allowed a populist rise of nationalism, xenophobia and Islamophobia, and he has put a strong emphasis on increasing national security and modernizing the military. One aspect of this was a revision to the national defense law that expanded the justifications for military actions, and placed more power into a military commission headed up by Xi.

I am glad you mentioned this.  A fairly consistent and important element of an autocracy is a set of clearly defined enemies, both within and external.  These act as the basis for creating a nationalist belief system, which often is transformed into a cult like experience for the citizens.  China seems to have substituted traditional Communist ideology with simplistic nationalism more with each passing year.

14 hours ago, alison said:

On the other hand, in the past few years the party has also strengthened government controls over business. Notably it halted the IPO of Ant Financial, often portrayed overseas as a punishment for Jack Ma (co-founder of Alibaba) commenting on excessive regulation, but more likely just because the party wasn't happy that some of these tech giants are a threat to its power. Since then it has also been using anti-monopoly guidelines and other means to regulate major players in industries such as finance, tech and education. It's also hit several high-profile individuals for tax evasion, and for a brief period the official messaging seemed to be that speculation on real estate and the pursuit of excessive wealth was inappropriate, although that seems to have been tempered somewhat due to the COVID-related economic slowdown.

Again, good parallels here with Russia.  However, this is especially problematic for China since, unlike Russia, the major drivers of its economy are foreign companies that are partnered with Chinese firms.  In the view of capitalist/free market enterprises, excessive regulations prod boardrooms to start instructing executive teams to explore less regulated environments.  Or at least less risky ones.  This is why Putin has single handedly set Russia's economy back at least 15 years with his idiocy.  I can say that many companies in the US are having second thoughts about being so heavily reliant upon China.  Maybe no action today, but it's not good for China that confidence is being shaken.

14 hours ago, alison said:

I think the main thing to take away from Chinese politics under Xi is not to figure out if he represents a version of the left or the right in a democratic country, but to understand that his primary motivation is to ensure that the party retains control over every aspect of society

Yup, and that's what has so many in the West worried about China's future.  Xi is making China less stable and less reliable.  These are not things that produce strong and productive relationships with Western governments and private enterprises.  Russia is currently Exhibit A

14 hours ago, alison said:

On how this affects the war in Ukraine - both the state media apparatus and the prevailing chatter on social media (which is ultimately shaped by what the state chooses not to censor) is solidly in the camp of this war somehow being a result of NATO expansion and American hegemony. I don't think there is an easy way for the party to publicly roll back its support for Putin. The issue will probably just remain in the current limbo, with the party simply claiming to remain neutral or impartial.

Yes, that seems logical. It is also consistent with the higher level discussions I've seen in mainstream media.

14 hours ago, alison said:

On what it portends for Taiwan - it's definitely useful for the party to study and learn from this war, but I don't think it will have an impact on its timeline for taking Taiwan.

I am glad to have your opinion on this.  Not just because it is inline with my own (that's a bonus!), but because I would like to wake up each morning only have to spend my time monitoring one world altering war instead of two.

14 hours ago, alison said:

Anyway, back to my lurking hole, and thanks again for the fantastic thread.

You are very welcome and thank you for your contribution.  I am sure we'll come back to it from time to time going forward.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

This video was posted a few weeks ago.  I don't think I posted it here, but maybe I did.  It is an excellent series of interviews with a TD unit (partisans, really) that fought Russians in the Kyiv region and eventually helped liberate Makariv, which is apparently where most of the units members are from.  Towards the end they are asked if the relationship with Russia can be repaired after this war.  The answer was maybe in a few hundred years.

Closed Caption in English:

 

[SeinfeldRules]

 

 

An excellent piece on an Ukrainian artillery unit, videos like this make me miss being a commander. The first several minutes are what really caught my eye, and I'll share some artillery minded observations with you.

First, this is obviously a direct contradiction to my previous claim that most units I see are in the open! I think that's still the case but highlights that drone footage isn't necessarily the ground truth of what is happening - maybe we aren't seeing the videos of artillery in treelines being hit because the UAVs aren't finding them. More on this later however.

Second, it seems that the officer, who I am assuming is the Battery Commander, is the primary person responsible for fire direction. This is a very European way of doing things, and is not really a surprise. The American military (to my knowledge) is one of the few militaries that has a dedicated fire direction section with its own officer that computes firing data. Of note, the American style FDC was "invented" during the interwar period, and allowed a single FDC to control multiple batteries or even battalion. There are stories during World War II of an entire American Corps worth of artillery conducting Time on Target missions. This is contrasted with other nation's FDCs, who had difficulty massing batteries on dynamic targets due to the decentralized nature of battery level fire control. History notes aside, observe that he is using a tablet and phone for what I assume is the calculation of firing data. Presumably this would be the GIS ARTA app discussed early, used to compute a technical firing solution to lay the howitzers. The actual computation of data is not hard, with enough time and patience I could take the American firing tables for a howitzer and put it all in a spreadsheet that spits out an answer as well. A pretty robust solution on the Ukrainian side.

Howitzers begin firing at about 30 seconds in. They are firing off the traditional optical fire control systems, and at 40 seconds in you can see the gunner looking through his pantel (panoramic telescope) to re-lay the howitzer after firing. Note that is highly unlikely that he is receiving new firing data as the narration later on suggests. I have yet to meet a howitzer crew, fire direction crew, or observer team that could accurately and rapidly re-direct fire on a maneuvering vehicle and have it land directly on top. I think this was a nice coincidence that was emphasized in editing to create a better narrative. A little example of the power of video editing that can lead to incorrect conclusions for those not in the know.

I'll take this opportunity to segue briefly into my previous comments about howitzers having to remain close together. One of the most crucial aspects of achieving effective indirect fire is accurate location and direction for the firing unit. Every howitzer in a firing unit needs to be facing the same direction, accurate down to the miliradian. It greatly simplifies firing data calculation, as you only need the data for one howitzer as opposed to 4 or 6 or 8 - all the other howitzers, since they are pointed in the same direction and generally in the same area, can fire that same data. The close you are to your "base piece", the more accurate the fire. So how do they get all the howitzers pointed in the same direction? Enter the aiming circle:

If it looks like a theodolite used by engineers for surveying, you aren't far off, the concept is the same. Through math, multiple rotating dials, and lots of shouting, the aiming circle operator relays direction to each howitzer until every gun is pointed in the same direction. A key part of this step is the pantel that I mentioned earlier, which is how each howitzer references the aiming circle for proper direction. If you firing is spread out in a tree line, or over a great distance, the ability for each howitzer to see the aiming circle with their pantel can be lost. This greatly complicates laying the battery. Additionally, units spread out or in odd formations reduces the accuracy of your barrage - remember, each gun is firing the same data, regardless of their position! Now, with modern computing technology, the ability to calculate firing data for each individual gun can be trivial - assuming you know the location of each gun, down to a 10m or 1m radius. In a GPS degraded environment, that can be quite difficult and time consuming. It's much easier to have everyone located together in a formation that can see the aiming circle and in close proximity to your base howitzer. Then you only need the location of one howitzer.

How do digital systems change this? Well, in a digital system like the Paladin and M777, each howitzer has a GPS and inertial navigation system that accurately tracks the location, but also the direction. The requirement to be laid by the aiming circle goes away, assuming your equipment is working, as the howitzer ALWAYS knows which direction it is pointing. Laying the battery and executing fire missions become simple tasks. You can have howitzers spread out over a kilometer and calculate firing data for each one at the press of a button. The reality is of course more complicated however, and the aiming circle and our "manual" methods still have a role even with fully digital howitzers, but I don't think I will get into that here for a variety of reasons.

Moving on from my not so brief segue, one more point I would like to highlight - at the end of their mission, they all jump into bunker, as a precaution against Russian counter battery that never comes. They have obviously made the decision that taking cover is preferable to displacement - a notion that goes against a lot of Western doctrine. And their cover is not overly complex - enlarged foxholes with trees to stop shrapnel. I suspect the reason we see videos with "abandoned" howitzers sitting in fields reflects exactly the situation illustrated in the video - crew live in bunkers in the treeline and occupy howitzers only when firing. If your howitzers are out in the open, they will be going for that, not you! Again, not something you'll see in a lot of Western doctrine or training. Still, I suspect the level of counterfire doesn't justify the time or effort required to conduct rapid displacements of artillery on a routine basis.

For counterfire I think a lot of what we could be seeing would be probably be described as cross-cueing of intelligence assets in the American military - firefinder radars pickup an enemy battery, but instead of unmasking your own artillery to conduct immediate counterfire, you send a UAV to confirm target location and disposition - greatly enhancing your ability to bring effective fires down on the enemy.

[Battlefront.com]

Just uploaded video featuring 93rd Mech Brigade and TD units in the Kramatorsk area:

 

[SeinfeldRules]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

eyes in the sky (drones) directly controlled by FOs.  This not only improves the responsiveness of aerial recon (i.e. the battery can focus on whatever it wants, including loitering) but also the quantity.  Prior to drones you might have one or two assets up in the air for large sections of frontage.  Inherently limited in quantity, amount of time in the air, and how long they can focus on any one point.  Drones?  Pop one into the air at any time and get exclusive attention, not just to spot something but to spot the rounds.  Line infantry have their own drone capabilities which, with a little more effort, can provide additional eyes.  There's just no way this sort of capability could ever exist without drones.  Too impractical.

I'm going to respond to the rest of this post tomorrow but I can't help but address this one immediately because it's one of my favorite little known facts about artillery in World War II, and I would like to share it with the group: the US military made extensive use of light aircraft as forward observers, working directly with ground troops and FA battalions. They were more numerous then you would think! What's old is new again.

Below is an excerpt from the hefty, 394 page Center of Military History book on the history of US Air Forward Observers:

"Originally, the headquarters batteries of each division artillery headquarters, field artillery brigade, field artillery group, and gun and howitzer battalion in the Army contained air sections... The number of air sections in a division depended on the number of firing battalions organic to it. A standard triangular infantry division had 5 sections, a total of 10 aircraft, 1 section in the division artillery headquarters, 1 in each of the 3 105mm battalions operating in a direct support role, and 1 section in the 155mm battalion providing general support."

This equates to each infantry regiment receiving a section of two spotter aircraft from the FA battalion supporting them... and more importantly, to put this into perspective, this aligns very closely to the amount of UAVs (RQ-7 Shadows) found in a modern Brigade Combat Team. Won't count Ravens into those because those things aren't even close to being capable fire support platforms, and I would argue the same about quadcopters. Great for observing effect but limited in their ability to actually conduct proper targeting.

Edited May 10, 2022 by SeinfeldRules

[chuckdyke]

Preplanning should extend for longer than 15 minutes. Soviets were probably blasting away for a few hours during the start of an offensive. 

[G.I. Joe]

15 hours ago, alison said:

Hi all, I am a new account on this forum, but I have been reading this thread every day for the past couple months after getting referred to it from elsewhere. This thread, the daily ISW reports and Perun's videos are my primary sources for keeping track of what's going on in this war and why. Thank you everyone for the great contributions.

My account took a couple days to get approved, so this comment is out-of-date relative to the comment I wanted to respond to, but there have been several times the topic of China came up so I thought it would be worth posting anyway. I hope it's still interesting to someone. If not, please scroll past, I don't want to distract too much from the excellent analysis you all are sharing.

This is an area where I have a personal interest and some first-hand experience, having lived in China for several years.

I don't think it is very helpful to describe China (or any authoritarian country) as merely left wing or right wing, in particular when that statement comes from partisans in a democratic country. All too often there is a cynical incentive to try to associate the policies of the authoritarian regime with opposing political factions in the democratic system. I think it's better to assess the policies on their own.

Xi has overseen several socially conservative policies - for example broadcast restrictions on media featuring tattoos, piercings, effeminate men, same-sex relations and so on. But this is only part of a larger scale censorship effort that has also seen arrests of local citizen reporters and foreign media not only blocked at the Great Firewall but also pushed out of reporting from inside the country at all. He also spearheaded a popular anti-corruption campaign that coincidentally targeted all the senior party officials that might stand against him. And, of course, he removed term limits and will likely get a third term in the upcoming national congress. These are suspiciously autocratic moves, which is worrying in a country that since Deng has at least made a pretense of winding back the power of figureheads and trying to build more of a loyalty to the party as an abstract entity.

Xi has also allowed a populist rise of nationalism, xenophobia and Islamophobia, and he has put a strong emphasis on increasing national security and modernizing the military. One aspect of this was a revision to the national defense law that expanded the justifications for military actions, and placed more power into a military commission headed up by Xi.

On the other hand, in the past few years the party has also strengthened government controls over business. Notably it halted the IPO of Ant Financial, often portrayed overseas as a punishment for Jack Ma (co-founder of Alibaba) commenting on excessive regulation, but more likely just because the party wasn't happy that some of these tech giants are a threat to its power. Since then it has also been using anti-monopoly guidelines and other means to regulate major players in industries such as finance, tech and education. It's also hit several high-profile individuals for tax evasion, and for a brief period the official messaging seemed to be that speculation on real estate and the pursuit of excessive wealth was inappropriate, although that seems to have been tempered somewhat due to the COVID-related economic slowdown.

But a key point running through all of these policies is this: 党政军民学，东西南北中，党是领导一切的 - government, military, society and education - east, west, south, north and center - the party leads everything. And who leads the party? Recently the phrase "with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core" has become more common in the state media. This political structure isn't comparable to democratic countries where there is no singular authority and it's normal to have spirited and open debates on the issues.

I think the main thing to take away from Chinese politics under Xi is not to figure out if he represents a version of the left or the right in a democratic country, but to understand that his primary motivation is to ensure that the party retains control over every aspect of society. All policies are designed with that goal in mind. In my opinion Xi does have generally nationalist and socially conservative views, but I think he is also mindful that wealth inequality can lead to unrest and the downfall of the party, and that would be the ultimate sin.

TLDR: what Steve said

On how this affects the war in Ukraine - both the state media apparatus and the prevailing chatter on social media (which is ultimately shaped by what the state chooses not to censor) is solidly in the camp of this war somehow being a result of NATO expansion and American hegemony. I don't think there is an easy way for the party to publicly roll back its support for Putin. The issue will probably just remain in the current limbo, with the party simply claiming to remain neutral or impartial.

On what it portends for Taiwan - it's definitely useful for the party to study and learn from this war, but I don't think it will have an impact on its timeline for taking Taiwan. The party has enough problems with zero-COVID and a teetering economy right now - I don't think it is in a position to fast-track any actions. I suspect we might see some more signaling after Xi is confirmed for a third term (second half of this year) and then after the 2024 presidential election in Taiwan, which is likely to be the first where 18-20 year olds can vote (referendum on that later this year). Either way, it's interesting to see how the party has built up the mythology of Taiwan as a wayward little brother who is temporarily misguided and will someday return to the fold. That has benefits in that it creates popular support for "unification", but it might also make a full-blown invasion unpopular. Annexation is surely off the table now, after the PR disaster of Hong Kong 2019. A naval blockade is often suggested as a way to strangle the island, but that might only strengthen its people's resolve. I think if the party is to succeed in its designs on Taiwan, it will need Putin's failed "take the capital in 3 days" strategy to actually work. I would be very interested in a wargame that tackles this scenario.

Anyway, back to my lurking hole, and thanks again for the fantastic thread.

Welcome, and thanks for a very interesting and informative read.

Definitely agree that a linear left-right model is an oversimplification, both in democracies and in authoritarian systems...I have seen political ideology quizzes that score on about a dozen different axes. (And yes, any time I hear something like "Hitler was a socialist!" or "Stalin was really a fascist!", I feel I can make a pretty good guess about the leanings of the person saying it...)

If China were to attempt to invade Taiwan, the air/sea battle would be crucial. If you're interested in a relevant wargame, Command: Modern Operations might fit the bill. Unlike the old version (Command: Modern Air and Naval Operations, aka CMANO for short), it does also model land units, but I can't say how well (I own a copy, but haven't had time to play it yet). There are definitely plenty of near-future scenarios related to China, Taiwanese units are also in the database and it does come with a scenario editor. I do recall Der Zeitgeist (pretty sure that's who it was) mentioning in this thread that the AI is very basic if you're playing against the computer, though.

Agree that a blockade would probably just galvanize Taiwan. As for a full-on invasion, I am cautiously optimistic that it may remain too risky for long enough for China to shift back to a more reformist trajectory (i.e. Xi to leave office) before anyone decides to actually go for it. The most logical approach, I would guess, would probably be to start with an air and naval campaign to destroy the ROC Air Force and Navy first, but the political incentive for a quick victory you mentioned might mitigate against an option that a) takes time, and b) runs the risk of being defeated in a 21st Century version of the Battle of Britain without even launching the invasion. Taiwan's air force and navy are smaller than China's, but their capabilities are very impressive...an effort to launch an invasion on day one and do a thunder run into Taipei could easily end in the fleet getting sunk on the way or losing enough transports to turn the landing into a "make Dieppe look like D-Day"-level disaster (Bay of Pigs, anyone?)

I'm definitely not saying Taiwan would win, or even would probably do so, but that they definitely could and hopefully the CCP and PLA leadership are rational enough to know that...

Just my off-the-cuff take, worth exactly what you paid for it...

Edited May 10, 2022 by G.I. Joe
Adding important qualification

[Battlefront.com]

23 minutes ago, SeinfeldRules said:

I'm going to respond to the rest of this post tomorrow but I can't help but address this one immediately because it's one of my favorite little known facts about artillery in World War II, and I would like to share it with the group: the US military made extensive use of light aircraft as forward observers, working directly with ground troops and FA battalions. They were more numerous then you would think! What's old is new again.

Below is an excerpt from the hefty, 394 page Center of Military History book on the history of US Air Forward Observers:

"Originally, the headquarters batteries of each division artillery headquarters, field artillery brigade, field artillery group, and gun and howitzer battalion in the Army contained air sections... The number of air sections in a division depended on the number of firing battalions organic to it. A standard triangular infantry division had 5 sections, a total of 10 aircraft, 1 section in the division artillery headquarters, 1 in each of the 3 105mm battalions operating in a direct support role, and 1 section in the 155mm battalion providing general support."

This equates to each infantry regiment receiving a section of two spotter aircraft from the FA battalion supporting them... and more importantly, to put this into perspective, this aligns very closely to the amount of UAVs (RQ-7 Shadows) found in a modern Brigade Combat Team. Won't count Ravens into those because those things aren't even close to being capable fire support platforms, and I would argue the same about quadcopters. Great for observing effect but limited in their ability to actually conduct proper targeting.

I'm headed off to bed (finally), but thanks for some late night thoughts to nap upon.  At one point I had to take a very, very deep dive into the WW2 artillery capabilities of the Germans, Soviets, British, and Americans (along with their historical progression).  A lot of it is dusty, but the US' unique aerial spotting/observing capability is definitely not forgotten.  The memoirs of Germans who fought against the Americans universally commented (with great disgust) at how effective American artillery was.  I have no doubt that spotter planes had a lot to do with that.  Very effective C2 being the other one.

I'm curious to know why you think that a quadcopter isn't sufficient for a battery to perform a fire mission in the sort of environment we have going on now.  Obviously range from the operator and length of time in the air are two important considerations for larger scale artillery actions, especially preemptive ones.

However, the 3-4km range quadcopters seems to be quite adequate for close in tactical support by the D-30s and Grads that Ukraine is heavily dependent upon at the moment.  3-4km range from an FO close to the front would allow the guns to be decently behind the front and still able to hit what is spotted.  In fact, the range of a quadcopter is greater than the range of something like the TOS MLRS.  Why would such situations benefit or require RQ-7 type UAVs?

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

1.  Not 'often overlooked' here lol!

2. FWIW. This gent does good analysis of fire maps to ID hot spots but less sure of his strategic-operational chops:

3.  I'll see your Cossacks and raise you...

 

 

Edited May 10, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[LongLeftFlank]

5 hours ago, SeinfeldRules said:

I probably have more questions then observations at this point. I don't think anything fundamentally has changed from previous conflict, even dating back to WW 1. Artillery is still a crucial arm of any modern military and is your only all weather, truly responsive means of shaping the battlefield. Artillery is the King of Battle, even with today's technology. I can't say I've been truly shocked at anything I've seen so far.

All of my observations are based off OSINT videos - I imagine most of the US military's observations of the conflict are still close hold at higher levels due to the sensitivity of collecting in an active conflict.

Drones have proven to be incredibly useful but I don't see anything revolutionary or fundamentally doctrine-altering with them - aerial observers have been a thing since the Civil War, and artillery battalions during WW2 literally had their own observation planes sometimes - we can just get them closer then ever before without risking a human. You still see a lot of "long range" observation from drones in these strike videos however - so there is definitely a real threat of ADA/EW that is keeping drones at a distance. It's harder then ever before to hide your forces from observation, but I imagine there are a lot of smart people churning away at a practical military answer to the UAV problem, and I think it will have an easier solution then the tank will have dealing with top down attack, fire-and-forget ATGM systems.

Loitering munitions I'm still not 100% sold on - probably useful for high value targets (radar, ADA, command posts), but seem hard to utilize at a more tactical level.  Honestly, it seems like a complex solution to a problem that isn't terribly hard to solve with more conventional and flexible fires. The Switchblade 300 is seriously unimpressive to me, a glorified flying grenade. Great for taking out an ISIS leader in the middle of a crowd, not so impactful in a war where individual casualties are a given and virtually meaningless in a tactical or operational sense. I don't think the Switchblade 300 is going to single-handedly stop a town from being lost. Would LOVE to see an actual statistical analysis on the effectiveness of loitering munitions, that isn't all buzz words and "ooooh scary kamikaze drones!!"

Armored vehicles seem to be more vulnerable to artillery then commonly believed in the US/NATO. Lots of footage of (what seems to be) destroyed vehicles due to rocket and cannon fire.

Not seeing much utilization of mortars. Not sure if this is due to a lack of use, improper characterization of OSINT videos, or a function of UKR/RUS TOE lacking a significant amount of mortar tubes?

Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces seldom use effective cover and are often lined up in neat rows in the open, instead of utilizing dispersion and tree lines. I think this is mainly a function of the manual nature of most of their artillery, which requires howitzers to be somewhat closer and more orderly for a variety of technical reasons I won't get in to (unless you would like me to). This is in contract to the digital, self-locating, self-laying howitzers the US military has, which have a more robust ability to "roam". Of note, the M777s we gifted to Ukraine do not seem to have this self-locating capability, as the two videos I've seen of the howitzers operating in Ukraine showed them lacking these digital systems. These may be the Canadian howitzers though. Will be following that one closely.

Lack of digital systems aside, the above does stir some questions in my mind on the actual effectiveness and feasibility of true "counterfire" - meaning a howitzer shoots, then immediately has to move to avoid rapid and accurate fires from an opposing artillery unit. I don't think UKR and RUS artillery units are so pig headed or naive to not appreciate the usefulness of emplacing in a tree line - I wonder if the impetus to do so is even there. What I mean by that is: how often are artillery units shooting and then immediately taking fire? I don't see many videos of fires being directed on artillery units actively engaged in shooting, displacing, or even moving between firing points. In fact, in most videos of fire against an artillery battery, I don't see any people at all! Just the howitzers. And videos I've seen of artillery units firing don't seem to have a terrible sense of urgency on the need to displace immediately, which raises even more questions for me on why that would be the case. Again, would LOVE to do a deep dive into counterfire procedures during this conflict, and the effectiveness of firefinder radars and whether we truly need to "shoot and scoot" after every mission to stay alive. From my limited view of things, I'm just not seeing the same counterfire fight our doctrine envisions us fighting - but maybe that's just due to the nature of what videos are actually released versus what is happening... would love to know the actual ground truth there.S

Super interesting thanks. I don't have any domain knowledge to add here, but this feed is worth checking. 'Dan' tries to geolocate the bang bangs and put them in context rather than just posting ooh ahh vids.

 

Izyum is the linchpin.  And clearly the UA big guns are voting that way. Something is getting, if you'll forgive the technical jargon, effing plastered.

 

 

Edited May 10, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[LongLeftFlank]

Meanwhile, up at strat level...

Horowitz's take on the likely end game, mainly stuff we all know here:

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/05/09/five-ways-the-war-in-ukraine-could-end-view

“Wars begin when you will, but they do not end when you please,” Machiavelli observed....

There is a more “prudent” course of action for Putin, one that I think is more likely than “doubling down” given the risks involved...Russia could try to simply “lock in” the territory it already secured, and “dig its heels”....

The World Bank recently predicted that the Ukrainian economy would shrink by 45%. By contrast, the highest estimate suggests the Russian economy will contract by 15%. This would not be the first time Russia... turns active conflict into a frozen one for lack of a better solution.... A frozen conflict has one key advantage for Russia: It may well help it demobilise the West. As the fighting becomes more sporadic, media attention may shift away to other crises....

Ukrainian victory would likely come from the attrition suffered by Russian forces, either due to exhausting offensives, or the need to maintain control over increasingly rebellious areas. Ukrainian forces have been quite effective at hitting Russia with limited but painful counter-offensives, taking advantage of a Russian penchant for large-scale offensives and reliance on poorly defended supply lines.

The fog of war is still thick, but I would argue that [victory] is the only realistic and positive “end-game” for the West. Giving Putin an “exit ramp” out of the conflict will only work once Russia’s defeat in Ukraine is clear, and not a second before.

Edited May 10, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[The_MonkeyKing]

 

interesting thread on the Ukrainian artillery control solutions.

Edited May 10, 2022 by The_MonkeyKing

[LongLeftFlank]

4 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

 

interesting thread on the Ukrainian artillery control solutions.

I think this was pasted a few pages ago mate. Plus, on all topics unrelated to tyres, Telenko is, in the lingo of my teenager: 'suss'

Edited May 10, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Haiduk]

6 hours ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Not seeing much utilization of mortars. Not sure if this is due to a lack of use, improper characterization of OSINT videos, or a function of UKR/RUS TOE lacking a significant amount of mortar tubes?

Mortars actively use both sides. Mortar was a main weapon of UKR infantry during position warfare 2016-2022. So, many our mortar crews became real "snipers", especially having such systems like GIS Arta and other.

Also many of strikes on the videos with burning Russian vehicles this is a work of 120 mm nortars, not howitzers.

About 

6 hours ago, SeinfeldRules said:

And videos I've seen of artillery units firing don't seem to have a terrible sense of urgency on the need to displace immediately

All depends from sitaution. On more calm directions artillery can stay on positions more time and shot more rounds, than in hotter places. I've already posted here different tellings about our artillery work - no one UKR unit winds a such kilomentrage per day like artillerists, which continously change positions, trying to avoid eyes of Orlans in the sky 

[Haiduk]

11 hours ago, dan/california said:

Trent's thread is not entirely coherent, but I am willing to believe the Ukr have committed to a next generation force wide target allocation system. Anybody else seen anything mere organized on this in English?

GIS Arta is relatively old application, but had many upgrades and still use to this time. But much more units already use new more universal Kropyva battlefield information system.

Telenko writes about GIS ARTA can't work, because Russians jammed our SATCOM equipment. I doubt this is true as mass phenomena, I never read about this in our "frontline twitters", that there is big problems with targeting via such applications. Maybe Russians could interfere GPS navigation in some places, but not satellite communication. Though I know about problems with using of battalion-level SATCOM kits. But I don't know either GIS ARTA uses own satellite (in 2015 it name was classified) or it uses VIASAT satellite of SSZ battalion SATCOM equipment, whose satellite name is known from open sources and can be really interferred %) 

Kropyva system can use for communication both sattelite and digital radio cahannels.

Edited May 10, 2022 by Haiduk

[TheVulture]

Parking accident near Ruska Lozova north of Karhkiv.  As per the twitter thread, the van and BMP numbered '571'  were photographed there on 27th Feb in the snow, but no-one has apparently bothered to recover them in the 2+ months since then. The second BMP appears to be a new addition...

 

 

[Ultradave]

11 hours ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Trying to compare a COIN oriented environment to the modern LSCO fight is ignorant,

First thing I thought when I read that. The situation in Ukraine is an entirely different environment. 

Dave

[Grey_Fox]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Others seem to be scratching the same part of their head as you on this one.  It seems the majority of fire on artillery positions is not in direct response to it firing.  Seems mostly "oh, we figured out where they are, let's nail 'em".  I say this because most of the hits I've seen on deployed artillery don't appear to be while they are active.  Likewise, lots of video of artillery being hit when not deployed (traveling or temporarily pulled off the road).

There may be an explanation for this. Ukraine is leveraging uninterrupted to the Starlink satellite network plus some smartphone apps to coordinate artillery strikes firing from individual guns across the front, and seem to have shown an ability to do so within 30 seconds of the call for fire. The guns are widely dispersed and fire only a couple of shells at a time, so there isn't really anything for counterbattery radar to find.

This Twitter thread goes into it, and granted while there is a fair bit of hyperbole it may be indicative of reality:

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1523791050313433088

Edited May 10, 2022 by Grey_Fox

[billbindc]

4 hours ago, G.I. Joe said:

Welcome, and thanks for a very interesting and informative read.

Definitely agree that a linear left-right model is an oversimplification, both in democracies and in authoritarian systems...I have seen political ideology quizzes that score on about a dozen different axes. (And yes, any time I hear something like "Hitler was a socialist!" or "Stalin was really a fascist!", I feel I can make a pretty good guess about the leanings of the person saying it...)

If China were to attempt to invade Taiwan, the air/sea battle would be crucial. If you're interested in a relevant wargame, Command: Modern Operations might fit the bill. Unlike the old version (Command: Modern Air and Naval Operations, aka CMANO for short), it does also model land units, but I can't say how well (I own a copy, but haven't had time to play it yet). There are definitely plenty of near-future scenarios related to China, Taiwanese units are also in the database and it does come with a scenario editor. I do recall Der Zeitgeist (pretty sure that's who it was) mentioning in this thread that the AI is very basic if you're playing against the computer, though.

Agree that a blockade would probably just galvanize Taiwan. As for a full-on invasion, I am cautiously optimistic that it may remain too risky for long enough for China to shift back to a more reformist trajectory (i.e. Xi to leave office) before anyone decides to actually go for it. The most logical approach, I would guess, would probably be to start with an air and naval campaign to destroy the ROC Air Force and Navy first, but the political incentive for a quick victory you mentioned might mitigate against an option that a) takes time, and b) runs the risk of being defeated in a 21st Century version of the Battle of Britain without even launching the invasion. Taiwan's air force and navy are smaller than China's, but their capabilities are very impressive...an effort to launch an invasion on day one and do a thunder run into Taipei could easily end in the fleet getting sunk on the way or losing enough transports to turn the landing into a "make Dieppe look like D-Day"-level disaster (Bay of Pigs, anyone?)

I'm definitely not saying Taiwan would win, or even would probably do so, but that they definitely could and hopefully the CCP and PLA leadership are rational enough to know that...

Just my off-the-cuff take, worth exactly what you paid for it...

Worth mentioning that any Chinese blockade of Taiwan will likely result in a similar blockade of oil flows to the Chinese economy. 

 

[Ultradave]

8 hours ago, SeinfeldRules said:

From my limited view of things, I'm just not seeing the same counterfire fight our doctrine envisions us fighting - but maybe that's just due to the nature of what videos are actually released versus what is happening... would love to know the actual ground truth there.

Same here. I've mentioned a couple times about the apparent lack of effective counter-battery fire, or expectation of it. Even as far back as the early 80s we expected most of our missions to be fired from hip shoots, in order to avoid the expected quick counter-battery response of Soviet artillery. I'm starting to wonder now if we over estimated capabilities even back then.

On paper, there should be enough Russian artillery for them to effectively fire at Ukrainian artillery position and provide effective ground support, but it doesn't seem to be happening. And not just because we may not be getting reports, but videos of Ukrainian artillery do not appear to be in a "ready to bug out" mode, as you point out.

Dave