How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Lethaface]

30 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

Not disagreeing with the rest of your post, but youre making a big assumption here that there is a difference currently between civilian and military infrastructure in Belgorod. At the end of the day there are real physical limits, either by pipeline, plane, or truck as to how much POL can be brought into the city each day. There is only so much storage available. Throughput is a major issue on a system like this, and IMO its a mistake to assume that Russia has kept a wall between its civilian POL infrastructure and the military needs. Likely every drop of diesel being shipped into Belgorod has been tightly controlled by staff planners most of this year, probably part of last year too. A certain amount goes to the civilian market, a certain amount goes to the military. Even if we conclude that this was a storage facility for specialized products, something that say couldn't be put into a civilian car, it creates a problem. You have to now replace those destroyed stocks, you have less overall storage capacity to do so, AND if the system doesn't have enough slack to cover the (regional) imports they will have to come at the expense of everything else. Maybe the Russians are nice guys, will prioritize protecting the civilian market over the military. Or maybe a whole bunch of civilian stations are about to run dry while the army takes over the remaining capacity. 

All this is to say that I seriously doubt that a line still exists between 'invasion fuel' and 'civilian fuel.' At this point everything is being carefully managed and balanced. Or its not, nobody is watching the store, and youre right. In which case we have yet another explanation for Russia's disastrous supply situation. 

Well at least here over here there is such a thing as 'red' diesel (lower taxed), earmarked for shipping and agriculture tractors among other stuff (not road-going). Then there's stuff like V Power etc etc. Many military diesel engines might have different requirements for the specific properties of the refined product (be it less / more refined).

Anyway I'd expect the military to have separate deals for their fuel supplies, and don't go to the 'pumpstation' to fill up the fuel trucks unless **** really hits the fan. So there might very well be a difference between fuel earmarked for civilian / military use.

 

Edited April 1, 2022 by Lethaface

[Haiduk]

One more video of Stugna-P ambush of TOS-1A (or TZM-T), in this time successful. At least one destroyed

 

[Battlefront.com]

At first the attack on the Russian fuel storage facility was in my mind designed to have an impact on Russian military operations.  But now that I've had some sleep I think that any, if any, effect on military ops would just be a happy side effect of the real purpose.  Which is?

Escalate to descalate

I'm thinking that the raid was Ukraine's way of telling Putin "we've read your playbook and now we are playing your game according to your rules".

This raid puts more pressure on Russia regarding the ongoing negotiations, for sure.  There's already evidence of this:

 

[Combatintman]

22 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

Not disagreeing with the rest of your post, but youre making a big assumption here that there is a difference currently between civilian and military infrastructure in Belgorod. At the end of the day there are real physical limits, either by pipeline, plane, or truck as to how much POL can be brought into the city each day. There is only so much storage available. Throughput is a major issue on a system like this, and IMO its a mistake to assume that Russia has kept a wall between its civilian POL infrastructure and the military needs. Likely every drop of diesel being shipped into Belgorod has been tightly controlled by staff planners most of this year, probably part of last year too. A certain amount goes to the civilian market, a certain amount goes to the military. Even if we conclude that this was a storage facility for specialized products, something that say couldn't be put into a civilian car, it creates a problem. You have to now replace those destroyed stocks, you have less overall storage capacity to do so, AND if the system doesn't have enough slack to cover the (regional) imports they will have to come at the expense of everything else. Maybe the Russians are nice guys, will prioritize protecting the civilian market over the military. Or maybe a whole bunch of civilian stations are about to run dry while the army takes over the remaining capacity. 

All this is to say that I seriously doubt that a line still exists between 'invasion fuel' and 'civilian fuel.' At this point everything is being carefully managed and balanced. Or its not, nobody is watching the store, and youre right. In which case we have yet another explanation for Russia's disastrous supply situation. 

So we're back to the doubt thing - a word I used in my first post in this discourse.  I will concede the possibility of some of the contents of that facility being ring-fenced for military use but this does not stretch to the strike targeting  "invasion fuel" that was asserted to be "sure" to bring whatever major Russian formation is drawing supplies from the Belgorod vicinity to a grinding halt.

[ASL Veteran]

Hitting inside Russia is interesting.  For one thing it would allow Putin to call up reservists and fully mobilize which he was hesitating to do before.  I don't think that it would make Russians more sympathetic to the Ukrainians or cause them to call for peace.  Segments of the Russian population are already calling the withdrawals around Kiev a betrayal of the army in fine WW1 German fashion.  The only thing hitting into Russia does is create a situation where this is now a fight to the death.  The West can't effectively push Ukraine to accept a peace deal and Zelinsky has already said that any deal must be approved by referendum anyway so even if the west tried to push a cease fire it couldn't be accepted.  Ukraine is now fighting for total victory and recovery of all territory previously lost - that's my take away.

[LongLeftFlank]

Summary of US DoD assessment, worth a skim.

I like this map better than most of the others I've seen to date, as it is  honest aboout large zones being contested:

 

Edited April 1, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[sross112]

From what I've read of the 2014 war the RA routinely hit the UA from bases inside Russia and the UA never responded across the border, not even counter battery fire. Would this strike in Belgorod be the first instance of a UA strike across the border?

 

[Battlefront.com]

To you fuel supply grogs... you're all making great points, but you're all missing the big picture.

Ukraine did this to demonstrate to Russia that Ukraine has the power to make things a lot worse for the Putin regime, NOT the military of said regime.  Remember, Putin is framing this whole operation as being necessary to keep Russia safe from Ukraine attacking it (stop laughing!  I can't see you, but I know you are!).  The war is now going into its second month and the bad news at the front is definitely making the rounds within the Russia. 

This move by Ukraine is clearly to emphasize that the war is not only going badly for Russia now, but Ukraine has the ability to make it get a lot worse.  I am sure a primary audience for this message is the ruling elite that are not as blindly obedient to Putin as the general populace. 

Further, I don't think it was a coincidence that Ukraine attacked a clear military target first and then a (probable) civilian target by different means.  And a possible third one being reported now (power lines) conducted by yet another methodology.  The message seems to be "We are Ukrainians.  We are creative people.  We are armed.  We are pissed.  We can hurt you in ways you can't even imagine".

The relative strength of Ukraine's negotiating powers has just gone up considerably.  And each time Ukraine attacks over the border it goes up even more. 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 minutes ago, sross112 said:

From what I've read of the 2014 war the RA routinely hit the UA from bases inside Russia and the UA never responded across the border, not even counter battery fire.

Correct.  Ukraine chose to not respond because they didn't want to give Russia an excuse to invade with more force.  Remember, Russia was still denying it did anything in Donbas at all.

3 minutes ago, sross112 said:

Would this strike in Belgorod be the first instance of a UA strike across the border?

There was an apparent rocket attack on an airport in Belgorod early in the war.  Not much was made out of it by either side.

Steve

[sburke]

1 hour ago, akd said:

@sburke @Kinophile

 

Got it, this is the other guy they mentioned

Lt Colonel Denis Glebov, Deputy Commander of the 11th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade.  We also have this guy

Colonel? Denis Shishov, the commander of the 11th Air Assault Brigade

Pretty dangerous to be a Lt Col in Russian army

 

Edited April 1, 2022 by sburke

[Battlefront.com]

Here's a very, very, very important concept to consider.

The fact that Russia is openly at war with Ukraine (as opposed to Donbas), this means any Ukrainian attack against ANY armed Russian government force or ANY infrastructure usually considered "fair game" is considered acceptable under International Law (not to mention world opinion).

This means Ukraine can shoot its way into Russian territory, cause mayhem, and leave if it so chooses to.  It does NOT have to conduct carefully constructed covert ops with plausible deniability built in.  It can even afford to have a mission or two fail, because that's expected during a war as opposed to a covert action when not at war.

In other words, a Ukrainian SF unit could kill a bunch of Russian border guards, infiltrate into Russian territory, blow something up, then withdraw and it would be perfectly legal.  When the Russians complain about it Ukraine would be able to say "yeah, we did it.  So what?".

And if an op like this fails, the only ramifications are those directly associated with the loss of personnel and potential embarrassment that it didn't succeed.  No international outrage, no sanctions, no having to explain to the Ukrainian people why it tried to do what it did, etc.  Even MORE importantly, Ukraine has no disincentives to avoid another attack.  It only has a disincentive to do another attack that fails.  Which is standard motivation.

This is a big deal and it has nothing to do with how many liters of what type of fuel destined for whomever were blown up.

Steve

[sburke]

22 minutes ago, Combatintman said:

So we're back to the doubt thing - a word I used in my first post in this discourse.  I will concede the possibility of some of the contents of that facility being ring-fenced for military use but this does not stretch to the strike targeting  "invasion fuel" that was asserted to be "sure" to bring whatever major Russian formation is drawing supplies from the Belgorod vicinity to a grinding halt.

More than likely you are correct.  it warmed (see what I did there) my heart to think that it might be fuel for the Izium offensive.   I think you and Steve are more on target.  this is sort of Ukraine's version of the Doolittle raid.

[LongLeftFlank]

More Stugna hits, including non 'guncam' footage of the reloading of the launcher itself.

 

[akd]

Something appears to be methodically destroying all these Russian vehicles with high precision:

 

[Rokko]

I saw a BBC report on the fate of the 331st Guard Airborne Regiment earlier today, quantifying some of their losses via Russian social media. Seems to confirm the view that a good portion of Russian airborne forces are pretty much combat ineffective by now.

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, akd said:

Something appears to be methodically destroying all these Russian vehicles with high precision:

 

This seems to be the precursor to "swarm" attacks by UAVs.  The ability to systematically destroy a concentrated enemy force before it is able to react to it is the stuff that keeps a lot of military planners up late at night.

Interesting to think of what exactly this is right now.  Switchblades already in play?

Steve

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Everyone is hung up about small gradations in what will or won't trigger Putin. I think this is totally wrong unless NATO cuts Ukrainian support to the point they have to take a bad deal immediately. As long as Ukraine is winning Putin is getting more desperate. He has staked his regimes prestige, and probably its survival on winning this war. If he loses it he IS going to be desperate. All the hemming and hawing about giving the Ukrainians this system but not that one just moves the moment WHEN Putin gets desperate back and forth. What I have not seen is any reason to think that Putin desperate later is going to be any different from Putin desperate sooner. Later just lets him wreck even more of Ukraine and create even more refugees, thus I am for absolutely maximal support for the Ukrainians.

Ok, I know what is being said at many levels on "what we think about what Putin is thinking" and it plays well in political theatre, but any professional military assessment is going to be very concerned with what the other side is thinking, why they are thinking it, and how they keep thinking it.  The only exception is a war of extermination where your opponents frameworks are completely irrelevant because you are aiming to completely erase them from the books.  Neither side in this war is at that level, in fact that level is very rare - think Mongols.

This is also much bigger than "Putin".  For all we know he is already in favour of WMDs to "solve this" and it is the domestic response, linked to military response that is keeping him in check - despite the noise, he is not a god-king - and sustained attacks on Russian homeland, especially when a missile goes off course and hits a school, is strategically risky.  I say "risky" because obviously there are benefits in sending a message but potential costs as well...all war is negotiation as well.

"Maximal support for Ukraine" - no, because that would include us attacking Russia directly up to and including nuclear weapons.  I am all for Ukraine an this one but we are not "all in" on this one.  One needs only go online and read the predictions of a full nuclear exchange and you can see why.  We may even be "all in" as a proxy war, for the most part (e.g.  I don't think we will be sending WMDs to Ukraine) but direct confrontation with between two nuclear states has only occurred a few times since we opened that box and every time it was like a barfight when someone pulls out a gun...a "whoa" moment.

Finally, this is not about "Putin desperate", he is already there.  This is about "Russians desperate" and any realistic assessment of this thing needs to separate those two concepts.  Go check the history books on what happens when the Russian's get desperate, nothing good.  The strategy being employed here is "poison-perogy-to-induce-vomiting", not to destroy Russia in fire and righteousness.  

Edited April 1, 2022 by The_Capt

[LongLeftFlank]

27 minutes ago, akd said:

Something appears to be methodically destroying all these Russian vehicles with high precision:

 

Holy heck, this is the systematic destruction of half a RA mech company!

And the destructor may not even be UA divisional artillery assets like Pion or even 152s.

It might well be squads of strong well-trained blokes like in this clip, lugging 122mm heavy mortars into the woods and launching drone-guided smart rounds.

Do the job, then pack up and move. How the heck do you counter that kind of nimble heavy firepower.

This is beyond 'partisans with panzerfausts'. This is pack howitzers sans mules! Viet Minh overmatching the French CEFEO.

 

Edited April 1, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[sburke]

Not sure if this is behind a paywall.  Article is about Belarusians fighting in Ukraine

 

Many of them have joined the “Kastus Kalinouski Battalion,” named after the leader of Belarus’s insurrection against Russia in the 1860s. It is made up of Belarusians taking advantage of Ukraine’s wartime decision to allow foreigners to serve in the ranks of its armed forces, though not as officers. A dozen recruits interviewed by The Washington Post described their sense of common cause between Ukraine and Belarus’s pro-democracy movements.

 

Belarus batallion fights in Ukraine for 'both countries' freedom' - The Washington Post

Edited April 1, 2022 by sburke

[danfrodo]

My oh my, what a lot of excitement over my night, Ukraine day. 

1.  fuel depot strike:  looks like the ammo depot explosion last week might not have been an accident.  And Putin might use this as a provocation for escalation except that he could just make something up if he wants to escalate.  Plus it seems so far that it's more embarrassing for him to publicize this than it is useful to him for propaganda.

2.  Armored vehicles being sent to Ukraine:  so maybe we're past the whole foolishness of sending 'defensive' weapons only.  Hopefully the floodgates will open for tanks, planes, helos.

3.  What does Izyum retreat mean?  Is it just a tactical withdrawal because holding that salient was not longer worth it and freed up forces for use elsewhere?  Or is it a defeat?

4.  we've seen a very large number of destroyed russian vehicles last few days.  This has got to seriously impact their offensive capabilities.

5.  and looks like there's some russian troops who missed the chance to escape from Kyiv areas.  Warms my heart. 

[Vanir Ausf B]

31 minutes ago, akd said:

Something appears to be methodically destroying all these Russian vehicles with high precision:

 

It looks like the one at 1:08 missed. But it may have been close enough.

[Haiduk]

48 minutes ago, sross112 said:

From what I've read of the 2014 war the RA routinely hit the UA from bases inside Russia and the UA never responded across the border, not even counter battery fire. Would this strike in Belgorod be the first instance of a UA strike across the border?

 

No, recently, on the 25th of February we attacked Millerovo airfield either with Tochka-U or with drone - one Su-30SM was burnt (we claimed two, but only one confirmed with photo), also there were losses in airfield personnel

[sburke]

NYT article.  their assessment 

A first contingent of soldiers has already arrived in Russia for military training before heading to Ukraine, according to a Western diplomat and a Damascus-based ally of the Syrian government. It includes at least 300 soldiers from a Syrian army division that has worked closely with Russian officers who went to Syria to support Mr. al-Assad during the war.

 

Syrian Mercenaries Deploy to Russia en Route to Ukrainian Battlefields (msn.com)

[Battlefront.com]

24 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Do the job, then pack up and move. How the heck do you counter that kind of nimble heavy firepower.

This is beyond 'partisans with panzerfausts'. This is pack howitzers sans mules!

I can tell you that this has been anticipated for some time now.  Up until recently drones have been used as "lone wolf" assets where a single drone does double duty for both recon and/or attack (either with its own munitions or to direct targeting by others).  What we have not seen until this war is the expansion of drones to the extent that multiple can be used concurrently.  Doing this opens up all kinds of opportunities.

One OR MORE drone/s can monitor a larger battle space as an operational situational awareness functions.  They can keep an eye on who is where, what is moving in/out of the area, determine targeting priorities, and so on.  The eye/s in the sky can be a room full of soldiers each with their own duties.  I think we've seen this already.  But here is where it gets interesting.  Really interesting.

Picture an ad hoc control center (office building, abandoned school, warehouse, whatever).  Ideally each room has a single drone team, including a leader.  Another room acts as the command post for the operation and has a larger team with one soldier tasked with communicating to a single drone team.  If separate rooms aren't available that could be made to work, but there is going to be a lot of chatter so it gets complicated when there's a lot of people in one space without noise policing in place.

The overall commander looks at the SA information coming in and makes decisions about what to do, including gathering further information.  He can then task each drone to handle specific targets, but have them hold their fire until there's enough drones positioned to attack.  When the timing seems to be optimal, the commander gives the order and each drone operator goes in for the attack (if it is an offensive drone) and the enemy suffers accordingly.

Alternatively, if the drones in the swarm are not attack types then the overall commander determines the order in which they communicate targeting information to the FDC.  "Drone 1, go!" and it communicates directly with FDC to get fire for effect.  When the FDC confirms round outbound then it's "Drone 2, go!" and the process repeats until all the operation is over.

The common element here is that you have a 1:1 relationship between a drone and a target with someone able to control the battle with separate SA capabilities.  No peering over shoulders necessary.

The result is a significant sized enemy force can be destroyed within a minute or two.  Confirmed.  And anybody that gets away will be spotted and can be targeted by the assets now freed up from their initial targets.

So... want to talk about the role of tanks on the battlefield again?

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

41 minutes ago, akd said:

Something appears to be methodically destroying all these Russian vehicles with high precision:

 

 

Edited April 1, 2022 by LongLeftFlank