How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[panzermartin]

33 minutes ago, Aragorn2002 said:

One of the reasons why the Reichswehr during and after the Weimar republic was so succesful in raising a generation of brilliant soldiers (not just officiers) and multiply to a mass army in a short period was that they only took the best and brightest in their ranks. That's definitely something to aim for since it pays off big time. The Reichswehr of course didn't have any other choice, but we have. Nowadays this starts with attracting intelligent and ambitious young people. I think one can not take this too seriousely, especially in our high tech society. Pay them well and make sure they have all they need. As the Russians prove now, this is even more important than state of the art equipment. 

Yes Germany was a terrifying example of having scores of educated and highly qualified officers and soldiers with state of the art weaponry but under the orders of an undereducated satanic autocracy. 

Be thankful that your average russian soldier is not that determined and effective! 

 

[DesertFox]

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

12 minutes ago, Erwin said:

I am confused.  Are you saying that it is impossible for Russia to capture Mariupol so we should stop worrying about it. 

Now I'm confused.  I made a point that your incessant posting that this is going to be a long war, despite targeted discussions to challenge this notion, is an annoying distraction.  It's easy to maintain your point of view if you avoid defending it.

And why are you bringing up Mariupol?  Russia will almost certainly capture it unless something much larger changes.  In fact, even with all of Russia's battlefield incompetence I thought they would have already taken it by now.   So what exactly is your point?

12 minutes ago, Erwin said:

Or, are you saying that all the intelligence that you have is better than everyone else's so that you can ignore what other sources eg WSJ - hardly an apologist for Russian behaviour - are saying.  Looking at the small picture - ie about winning all the military battles, but ignoring the large picture implications - like losing the war is what happened in Vietnam. 

Er, that is EXACTLY what I'm saying.  There is a bigger picture out there and it needs to be examined as it is, not as it once was or is imagined to be.  The thing is you're the one that's not examining it.  Instead it seems you're listening to the same sources that have been wrong about this war from day one and are not questioning their grasp of what is really going on in the big picture.

As for the mass media, and I'll include the WSJ stuff I've read, they do not have a good track record for calling this war.  However, that doesn't mean I ignore it.  I take what they have to say and I compare it against what is really going on and my 30+ years of studying war.  Including simulating it as a profession.

12 minutes ago, Erwin said:

What I have been posting about is that there are much larger issues here than what territorial gains Ukraine may or may not be making.  It would be unwise to assume everything we are being told is 100% true by either side.  We keep being told that Russia cannot continue the way it has, and that is agreed.  Russia can change its strategy and is doing so. 

Ironically, you are the one that is missing the much larger issues.  You are convinced that this is going to be a very long war (i.e. years) and yet you have not once engaged in any of the discussion challenging this sort of notion.  Including direct responses to your statements.

12 minutes ago, Erwin said:

At time of writing, Europe is still paying Russia millions to continue buying Russia's oil and gas.  In addition, Russia conspires with China and other nations - among them Iran, India and other middle-east nations which have refused to sanction Russia, to replace the USD as the primary international currency.  That is what the war is about and the major global problem we in the west need to address in order to have any chance of a "win".

We've discussed these points in detail and continue to do so.  What apparently we're missing is your brilliant insights as to why those of us who have concluded Russia can't hack this sort of extended war are wrong.  So once again I'll invite you to put your money where your mouth is, so to speak.  Take up the challenge of showing why Russia can survive this long term.  Since you're so convinced of it, that really isn't too much to ask... is it?

Steve

[dan/california]

It is the irritating super cut up style video, but it looks like what is says it is. Russian ISR and infantry situation have to improve if they want to even attempt to stay in this war. 

[sburke]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

This is exactly what I am talking about.  "No need for us to worry because...Russians suck and we don't"

There are a lot of assumptions here, and I am always cautious around assumptions at times like these.   We do have better C4ISR but spotting and engaging a two man team out at 2+kms is nearly impossible if they don't want to be spotted, we found that out in spades in Iraq and Afghanistan.  We are very spottable at 2+kms.  APS, sure, and so long as every logistic truck and re-fueler has APS, every infantry vehicle and every command vehicle, every artillery piece and every engineering vehicle.  APS is what we have but I am not sure how it performs against a Javelin-like system or a Switchblade and I am pretty sure the Chinese are figuring that one out as I type.

Tactical movement, again I am not sure what that means anymore.  We can spread out in our formations and use the terrain but we would still be spotted and engaged at long range, I am not sure spreading out will matter in this context.  And, again, our LOCs are just as long and vulnerable.

Look, we are not "ok" until we know we are "ok".  And right now we do not know if we are ok.  The Taliban choked out the best the west could send with a whole lot less than what Ukrainian defence brought to bear, took a lot longer but I shudder to think about a western intervention against an asymmetric foe armed with the Chinese equivalents for Javelins/NLAWs (or whatever comes next) and cheap unmanned systems and munitions.

 

couple items/questions

1. US strategy would have been to first establish Air Supremacy.  That has been noted early on as not necessarily being Russian doctrine.  How much do you think that could alter this equation?  The Russians seem to have pretty much walked in blind and still seem to mostly be stumbling around in the dark.  Even target selection info is ridiculously poor.

2 There seems to have been no attempt to shut down Ukrainian communications networks even before Musk tossed in starlink. (Which honestly I am not even sure how much impact that is having as even here in it's commercial application there have been a lot of complaints).  As you have noted information has been a game changer.  That shouldn't be all that surprising in that we live in the information age of big data and machine learning (did I get all the main buzz words in there?).  Russia however seems to have completely conceded the information war.  Ukraine's advantages aren't just in drones - hell they have a web page for your average Ukrainian to dump info onto.  This is orders of magnitude better than any Afghan or Iraqis insurgent had.  How might this conflict have been affected if Russia had in the opening phase of the war targeted Ukraine's information network. (and managed to have a usable secure comms network for their own troops)

3 Boots on the ground? This is kind of the big one that seems to be gotten wrong most of the time.  The political/strategic reasons for actually putting ground forces in is typically flawed from the start.  We (the US) have made this error several times now.  Unrealistic plans for what we hope to achieve (Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan), an unrealistic appraisal of the social political forces in a country (Vietnam) are just a few examples.  Information proliferation is only going to get worse as is disinformation.  How do we get better at deciding NOT putting boots on the ground is the smarter option? Russia's decision to invade Ukraine has clearly been ridiculously flawed, but what it does show is what an unwelcome invading force will face.  NATO being a defense-oriented alliance normally should be on the favorable side of that information advantage. but invoking article 5 for Afghanistan kind of threw that advantage out the window.

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

10 minutes ago, dan/california said:

It is the irritating super cut up style video, but it looks like what is says it is. Russian ISR and infantry situation have to improve if they want to even attempt to stay in this war. 

I say their tactics must change. In modern battlefield you cannot have armor sitting turret up for any longer than it takes to fire 1 or 2 rounds (any other time you are in cover, at most with only gunner optic exposed). Also not advised to peek the same spot twice in a row...

[The_MonkeyKing]

Tanks should be in cover by default, only one tank or so observing (this also rotated) or separate OP or drone. More tanks go to observation positions (only gun sight exposed) to acquire and pre-aim when targets are observed for them in their defined killzones. When they acquire a target they quickly go to "hull down" and fire 1-2 shots.

[sburke]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

@akd @Kinophile

This is not a loss. Just an article about this lt.colonel, chief of field hospital, which could maintain evacuation of 25 wounded soldiers from shelled airfield. Necromancer666 just ironically asks where this can be. 

Probably Chornobaivka

so pull this guy from our list?  Lucky bastard

[sross112]

I think another thing to look at is the difference in combat unit structures between the UA and RA. The BTG's have been gone over pretty good so far in this thread and in general we have compared them to US structures. If you look at the UA brigades it isn't the same. The first thing that you see is that the standard UA mech brigade contains 4 battalions of infantry (3 mech and 1 motorized), a tank battalion and an arty battalion along with service and support elements. This is twice the infantry of the US model and way more than the RA model when considering everything said about their deficiencies in manpower, etc. The airborne, airmobile and motorized UA brigades are lighter with 3 battalions of leg or motorized infantry and no tank battalion.

This structure has several advantages over the RA.

1. Being on the defensive they can cover a bigger frontage with their infantry.
2. Their tanks can be massed and used as a Bn sledgehammer when needed and not parceled out.
3. Their supporting fires can be used in mass and not split amongst BTG's.

So overall the UA formations appear to be way more flexible and can mass their combat power easier. Combine that with the overall better ISR and the UA knows when and where to mass that power. Huge advantages.

If we look at all the failings that have been observed about the RA to include poor communications, poor ISR, poor logistics, poor operational planning and poor air superiority we point to the "Russians suck" and leave it at that. Of course this is really easy as you can look at literally everything they have done up to this point and find nothing, NOTHING, to point to and say, "Wow, the RA did a pretty good job at X." But I digress.

If we were to look at the comparative units with different operational assumptions, how do they stack up? Take the BTG's and have them operate under what you would consider normal conditions for supply, communication, etc. Could 3 or 4 BTG's attack a UA mech brigade and succeed? Maybe, but I really don't think so due to the flexibility of the brigade vs the BTG. The brigade retains the ability to shift their heavy mass and support as needed where the BTG is an island to itself. 

I think this is some of what we have seen in the Donbas area. The UA there are predominantly regular forces dug in and defending against repeated assaults and holding. The ISW reports over the past few weeks would state how those forces around Donetsk were repelling multiple assaults every day. This situation should play into the hands of the RA with dug in forces being prime targets for their supporting arms. Yet the result of break throughs and totally smashing the UA line hasn't happened. To me this points to a high degree of inherent flexibility among the UA formations as without it they should be pummeled to death in that situation. 

In conclusion I do believe that the actual force structures of the UA and RA do play a part in what we are seeing. Of course it is hard to tell to what degree when all the negative factors affecting RA performance are present.

[womble]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

And above all else, have the skies above supply routes swarming with drones 24/7.

This is, IMO, also the solution to the long range ATGM threat (or at least a key part of it). It's clear that a 2-man AT team with some shoulder-lauched top-attack munitions is going to be hard to spot from the edge of its kill-zone. Drones, inexpensive quadcopter drones with a camera, are the new recon essential. They're ideal to accompany your recon elements to investigate tree lines and defilades and built up areas before you poke your main force's head up over the skyline you currently hold.

By the same token, counterdrone tech is going to be vital for staying alive in that defilade while your recon drones find the AT teams, since the enemy will be wanting to use their expert arty on your waiting heavy elements, spotted by drones of their own.

Information is going to be... emperor of the battlefield: it'll tell arty (king of the battlefield) and infantry (the queen) where it needs to go...

[Fernando]

At the start of WWI, airplanes had no aerial enemies. An observation plane could observe and photograph enemy forces with impunity. It didn't take long for specialized planes to hunt other planes to appear. I'm sure the same will happen with drones. Sooner or later, efective fighter drones will be developed so the airspace will be much less safe for observation and attack drones.

Edited April 12, 2022 by Fernando

[Haiduk]

@sburke @Kinophile

Yes, pull out, but here new one instead this

Lt.colonel Miras Bashakov, commander of 133th separate guard tank battalion of 138th separate guard motor-rifle brigade, Vyborg district of Leningrad oblast. This brigade is a part of 6th CAA, Western miliatry district. At least one company tactical group of this brigade participated in Debaltsevo operation in 2015.

 

 

Edited April 12, 2022 by Haiduk

[sross112]

38 minutes ago, dan/california said:

It is the irritating super cut up style video, but it looks like what is says it is. Russian ISR and infantry situation have to improve if they want to even attempt to stay in this war. 

It looks like they were trying to go for the BMP with a second shot and it overflew the target. If you look at the video at about 18 seconds you see a second launch just above where the first one came out of the tree line and then it explodes off to the left of the burning tank in the trees. 

Yes they need to get better at protecting their assets. Those shots were less than 500 meters from that tree line. The only excuse would be if the RA LP/OP over there is dead in the foxhole with their throats slit. 

This is a pretty common thing we have been seeing in these videos. Like in this one you see armor, bmp and soft vehicles scattered around this village and always close to houses. I'm thinking that most of the RA is choosing to stay in the houses instead of active patrolling or digging into positions in key terrain. Is this for comfort? Are they trying to hide from drones? Poor leadership and situational awareness?

[The_Capt]

5 minutes ago, sburke said:

couple items/questions

1. US strategy would have been to first establish Air Supremacy.  That has been noted early on as not necessarily being Russian doctrine.  How much do you think that could alter this equation?  The Russians seem to have pretty much walked in blind and still seem to mostly be stumbling around in the dark.  Even target selection info is ridiculously poor.

2 There seems to have been no attempt to shut down Ukrainian communications networks even before Musk tossed in starlink. (Which honestly I am not even sure how much impact that is having as even here in it's commercial application there have been a lot of complaints).  As you have noted information has been a game changer.  That shouldn't be all that surprising in that we live in the information age of big data and machine learning (did I get all the main buzz words in there?).  Russia however seems to have completely conceded the information war.  Ukraine's advantages aren't just in drones - hell they have a web page for your average Ukrainian to dump info onto.  This is orders of magnitude better than any Afghan or Iraqis insurgent had.  How might this conflict have been affected if Russia had in the opening phase of the war targeted Ukraine's information network. (and managed to have a usable secure comms network for their own troops)

3 Boots on the ground? This is kind of the big one that seems to be gotten wrong most of the time.  The political/strategic reasons for actually putting ground forces in is typically flawed from the start.  We (the US) have made this error several times now.  Unrealistic plans for what we hope to achieve (Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan), an unrealistic appraisal of the social political forces in a country (Vietnam) are just a few examples.  Information proliferation is only going to get worse as is disinformation.  How do we get better at deciding NOT putting boots on the ground is the smarter option? Russia's decision to invade Ukraine has clearly been ridiculously flawed, but what it does show is what an unwelcome invading force will face.  NATO being a defense-oriented alliance normally should be on the favorable side of that information advantage. but invoking article 5 for Afghanistan kind of threw that advantage out the window.

 

All good questions.

Air Supremacy.  I have been thinking about this, and I am not sure we can do it anymore, particularly in a peer/near-peer environment.  Based on what we have seen you need to establish a pillar of superiority (let alone supremacy) from the surface of the earth to space and sustain it.  If an opponent has modern MANPADs, which can reach up to 23k feet, UAVs of all sorts, and satellites, I think we might have to start thinking the unthinkable, and that is air supremacy is unattainable.  I have no doubt we will spend billions on C-UAV and next-gen SEAD and c-measures but the concept of air supremacy has run headlong into democratization of airpower (and even spacepower is up for grabs).  So how do we operate in an less-than sir supremacy, or even less-than-superiority environment?  This is total heresy in western doctrine.  Whole lot to unpack there.

Information Dominance.  Russia completely failed on this one, which is odd for what was supposed to the Dark Sith Empire of Cyberwarfare.  I don't think they really understood what it was capable of, "so why worry?" type thing - massive Kruger-Dunning whoopsie there.  However, how do you control/deny or shut down the modern information space?  You point to Startlink but there are all sorts of ad hoc networking solutions.  Some have posited that "well we will sweep the atmosphere with our massive EM/EW weaponry and fry their systems...bow before us".  A lot of problems with that, not the least of which is anything pumping out a bunch of EM noise/Microwaves is going to be lit up and hit very quickly. Further, it does nothing for emerging LOS information technology.  So we are at "what can cyber do?" which frankly I am sure a lot of people are asking right now.  As a pre-condition for this war absolute fail but as the technology accelerates we have to be asking ourselves "what happens when we need to do what Russia failed to do?"  Finally, what if our opponents can attack our systems, we could find ourselves as blind as the Russians.  So now we have a competitive information space that is not a "nice to have" it may be more important than air superiority.

Force Sizes/Commitment.  No idea what this might mean.  We have glanced off implications but I suspect force estimates need to be re-visited in planning. As to "not putting boots down" well that is a significant discussion on what Phase 0 means and what options and scene setting can be done in this space years before a conflict happens.  I suspect a lot of people are wondering what political warfare options could have been available to prevent this war because the West has basically left the old Cold War playbook in the outhouse - seriously I have attended numerous conferences where the answer to Russian Hybrid, Chinese Unrestricted/3-Warfares/Systems Warfare is "teamwork".  Considering that Russia has played the nuclear deterrence card and we are really nervous about what that means, I suspect we will not want to go into the next war with strategic options left on the table...the stakes get way too high too fast.  

 

[MikeyD]

Quote

Tanks should be in cover by default

This is the problem with scheduling your war before the leaves have budded. Even in the middle of a dense forest you're not under cover. This would have been a different war for both sides if it had been scheduled for mid-July.

[The_MonkeyKing]

Where is all the French military equipment send to Ukraine?

Or is there any? Sending even less than Germany?

[Battlefront.com]

20 minutes ago, sross112 said:

I think another thing to look at is the difference in combat unit structures between the UA and RA.

Excellent points and definitely in keeping with the theme of not dismissing Russia because they "suck".  Your point towards the end that there's hardly anything, maybe nothing, that one can point to and say the Russians "don't suck" at.  It seems all of their successes have been despite their forces, not because of them.

Your analysis of the Ukrainian structures shows how the Ukrainians have managed to highlight all of Russia's fundamental problems with fighting a war on this scale.  The Ukrainian brigades are set up to withstand more attrition and stay functional compared to the Russians.  I'll take your Donbas example a step further.

All of you put your CM helmets on for this one...

Picture a well defended area by a company of motivated light infantry.  You have a battalion's worth of forces to throw at it, but they kinda suck.  What happens if you attack with a minimal proportion of your force?  I'd expect you'd suffer some serious losses and not do much to the defenses.  Oh, say losing 40 infantry and a 4 of vehicles while causing only a half dozen casualties.  Now say you try this again with another slice of your forces, what do you think will happen?  Same thing, right?  Right.  Now do this a third time, what happens?  Same deal.

Now total all of this up.  Attacker has not gained its objectives.  Friendly losses are now 120 soldiers and 12 vehicles lost compared to 18 defenders.  The losses likely push the attacker's battalion towards combat ineffective.  The defender isn't much better off proportionally, though a defending force has a higher threshold for being made combat ineffective so theoretically it can hold off a similar attack or two.

To fully reconstitute the defender's force requires a platoon be moved up or the equivalent in individual replacements.  To fully reconstitute the attacker's force requires moving an ENTIRE BATTALION into place.  Think about all that is implied here.

And finally...

This shows how difficult it is to fight a battle of attrition if all you can do is nibble away at the defender's strength while at the same time suffering large losses.  Attrition has a funny habit of working two ways.

Steve

[Haiduk]

Commercial drone-bomber of 59th motorized infantry brigade hit enemy armored vehicle

 

[akd]

11 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Where is all the French military equipment send to Ukraine?

Or is there any? Sending even less than Germany?

They have sent man-portable heavy weapons, including Milan, Mistral and Javelin.

[c3k]

14 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

All good questions.

Air Supremacy.  I have been thinking about this, and I am not sure we can do it anymore, particularly in a peer/near-peer environment.  Based on what we have seen you need to establish a pillar of superiority (let alone supremacy) from the surface of the earth to space and sustain it.  If an opponent has modern MANPADs, which can reach up to 23k feet, UAVs of all sorts, and satellites, I think we might have to start thinking the unthinkable, and that is air supremacy is unattainable.  I have no doubt we will spend billions on C-UAV and next-gen SEAD and c-measures but the concept of air supremacy has run headlong into democratization of airpower (and even spacepower is up for grabs).  So how do we operate in an less-than sir supremacy, or even less-than-superiority environment?  This is total heresy in western doctrine.  Whole lot to unpack there.

 

The USAF has pretty much acknowledged that the achieving Air Supremacy in a near-Peer (or higher) conflict will not be possible. (Think WWII, late '44 to '45 over the Western Front when Allied Air Forces could operate with impunity anywhere, anytime.)

Instead, Air Superiority (think Air Supremacy, but time- and location- limited, e.g., control the airspace over Luhansk for 2 hours) is the goal. 

Doctrinally, that should also encompass the use of UAVs by allied forces and the denial of such use to enemy forces.

Easy to write up on a piece of paper, much harder to actually practice.

 

14 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Information Dominance.  Russia completely failed on this one, which is odd for what was supposed to the Dark Sith Empire of Cyberwarfare.  I don't think they really understood what it was capable of, "so why worry?" type thing - massive Kruger-Dunning whoopsie there.  However, how do you control/deny or shut down the modern information space?  You point to Startlink but there are all sorts of ad hoc networking solutions.  Some have posited that "well we will sweep the atmosphere with our massive EM/EW weaponry and fry their systems...bow before us".  A lot of problems with that, not the least of which is anything pumping out a bunch of EM noise/Microwaves is going to be lit up and hit very quickly. Further, it does nothing for emerging LOS information technology.  So we are at "what can cyber do?" which frankly I am sure a lot of people are asking right now.  As a pre-condition for this war absolute fail but as the technology accelerates we have to be asking ourselves "what happens when we need to do what Russia failed to do?"  Finally, what if our opponents can attack our systems, we could find ourselves as blind as the Russians.  So now we have a competitive information space that is not a "nice to have" it may be more important than air superiority.

^^^

The prevalence of distributed comms, with independent unit operations aligned towards a common goal, are the huge disruptors in the current war...and UA is winning that Information fight. Remember, information dominance (which includes communications) is always a two-way channel.

The idea of drone swarms is great...until you realize the difficulties inherent in having dozens/hundreds of nodes in the same space. It needs to be solved in a robust and redundant manner.

 

14 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Force Sizes/Commitment.  No idea what this might mean.  We have glanced off implications but I suspect force estimates need to be re-visited in planning. As to "not putting boots down" well that is a significant discussion on what Phase 0 means and what options and scene setting can be done in this space years before a conflict happens.  I suspect a lot of people are wondering what political warfare options could have been available to prevent this war because the West has basically left the old Cold War playbook in the outhouse - seriously I have attended numerous conferences where the answer to Russian Hybrid, Chinese Unrestricted/3-Warfares/Systems Warfare is "teamwork".  Considering that Russia has played the nuclear deterrence card and we are really nervous about what that means, I suspect we will not want to go into the next war with strategic options left on the table...the stakes get way too high too fast.  

 

 

[hm_stanley]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

To fully reconstitute the defender's force requires a platoon be moved up or the equivalent in individual replacements.  To fully reconstitute the attacker's force requires moving an ENTIRE BATTALION into place.  Think about all that is implied here

And you haven't even talked about the ability of the said attacker (Russa) to be able to do this (mechanics wise).  

They have lost precious access to western technical goods that make up those "replacements" and the Russian Federation has nothing analogous to western military reservists to pull fast replacement infantry.  They are literally in a hole they cannot dig themselves out of.

If what I've read about the CNC of the Russian Military is true, the organization is so vertical it requires you to tilt your head sideways to read their command structure.  This new guy, Aleksandr Dvornikov, has seen combat in a theater where he had total air dominance, ample supply and the cream of the crop unit wise - why would he approach this mess any different?  He won't, he will blunder his way through, inheriting a disorganized, misinformed and disinterested military that seems hell bent on killing itself.

[sross112]

9 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Commercial drone-bomber of 59th motorized infantry brigade hit enemy armored vehicle

 

I do believe these are my favorite weapon system of this war. The commercial drones fitted with re-purposed old anti tank grenades is just awesome!! Love the ingenuity and the instance of the RA losing expensive equipment to a cheap grenade that was probably manufactured in Russia. 

[akd]

Gotta catch ‘em all:

 

Even him:

 

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, sross112 said:

I do believe these are my favorite weapon system of this war.

Not mine.  How many terrorist groups, domestic and foreign, are out there doing the same thing right now.  This is depressing because they won't be possible to stop except (maybe) in high priority areas.

But other than that, I also think they are pretty cool

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, akd said:

Gotta catch ‘em all:

 

Even him:

 

First video made me a little queasy from the camera work, but the follow up picture fixed that!  Fat load of good all those billions are doing him now.

I'm going to be very interested in hearing about how he was captured.  Very.

Steve