How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[sburke]

4 minutes ago, Vergeltungswaffe said:

Steve's tipping point is approaching.

Rapidly, I hope.

I'm still staring at the tweet about Gerasimov.  There are just no words for how badly the Russian army is performing.

In the call, you hear the Ukraine-based FSB officer ask his boss if he can talk via the secure Era system.  The boss says Era is not working.

Era is a super expensive cryptophone system that @mod_russia introduced in 2021 with great fanfare. It guaranteed work "in all conditions"

The idiots tried to use the Era cryptophones in Kharkiv, after destroying many 3g cell towers and also replacing others with stingrays. Era needs 3g/4g to communicate. The Russian army is equipped with secure phones that can't work in areas where the Russian army operates.

[LongLeftFlank]

Between the rasputitza and nimble squads of "light infantry" living off the land and bearing shoulder firepower that can infiltrate, flank and kill everything from MBTs to fighter bombers at standoff range, I'd say the above is a pretty good summary.

My prediction remains though that both sides can, and will, play at that game. So while all those strung out Russian BTG columns from Izium to Kiev will be reduced to scrap (like so many French Groupes Mobiles in Indochina), with their crews fleeing home on foot or surrendering, a new Russian-controlled defensive line (frontier) will be drawn along the Dnieper from Kherson to near Zhaporozhe, and thence east across the open steppe to the Donbas rebel 'republics.'  The war of movement will be at an end and this time it will be Russians defending their 'land bridge to Crimea', in a more limited sized war that they are more capable of fighting and sustaining, while negotiating for a cease fire (with Chinese support). Facts on the ground.

... I believe that for all Zelensky's determination not to compromise with the invaders, UA attacks to retake those lost lands will fail badly, in much the same way their enemies did. They will now be facing better trained, organized, motivated and led missile-armed infantry combat groups --VDV, Chechens and various militia units -- who are moreover able to call artillery support from well dug-in firebases to fix and defeat incursions. 

[Whether that is enough of a 'win' for Russia's current rulers -- with or without Putin -- to remain in charge, I will leave to others.  There's already too much politics invading this thread.  If it's try or die, they will try]

TL:DR.  At present, tactical combat appears to favor a nimble, distributed 'open order' defense.  Even shorter, the Javelin (etc.) is king of the battlefield. Thoughts, @The_Capt?

Edited March 8, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Probus]

23 minutes ago, sburke said:

The Russian army is equipped with secure phones that can't work in areas where the Russian army operates.

Lol.

[John Kettler]

23 hours ago, Vet 0369 said:

I call BS on this one. Why would a Russian Woman “plead the fifth?” Does the Russian Constitution have a “fifth” that protects from Self-incrimination?

Maybe she’s trying to say she doesn’t know where she is because she drank a fifth?

Vet 0369,

Believe the answer is straightforward. The Russians love US TV shows, which are readily available through State television or online. Among them are lots of cop, layer, PI, etc. shows, all of which many times talk about about pleading the fifth. The same is also true of movies, but there, the occurrence of the term is minuscule.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Vet 0369]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

Kiev is historical heart of Russia?  So by that reasoning then Zelensky should be president of Russia, and Putin the provincial governor.

Dan, please read up on the history of the region. TL:DR, Kiev was settled by a Swedish tribe that were “asked” by the locals to “save” them from the Slavic rulers. The town eventually became the Principality of Kiev Rus (the name of the Swedish tribe was the Rus) which in time included Moscow. So, in fact, Kiev is the ”Mother” of Russia since Russia, was the name the country took from it’s “Mother.” Here’s a suggestion, Google “History of Ukraine,” and you’ll see how convoluted the truth is for the entire region. Everyone around that region, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, can make the same claim to rule Ukraine as they all did, except not under the same names we know them as today, except Poland has almost always been Poland.

[sburke]

21 minutes ago, John Kettler said:

Vet 0369,

Believe the answer is straightforward. The Russians love US TV shows, which are readily available through State television or online. Among them are lots of cop, layer, PI, etc. shows, all of which many times talk about about pleading the fifth. The same is also true of movies, but there, the occurrence of the term is minuscule.

Regards,

John Kettler

actually, this was answered already.  it was altered for US audience.  It seems the Russians have a 51st clause they refer to.

[Vet 0369]

2 hours ago, DesertFox said:

LOL! It is a little bit more complicated...

Kyiv - History | Britannica

Excellent link! It explains the quagmire of histories very well. Here’s one for ya.

[Erwin]

1 hour ago, DesertFox said:

I know and I am with you and the Ukranians. To get some good understanding about Ukraine and where they come from historically (20th century) I can recommend this book. Maybe a little eyeopener to some why they and the russians dont exactly love each other.

Amazon.com: Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin: 9780465031474: Snyder, Timothy: Bücher

Xnt book and BG of current situation.  Tried to alert folks to it some time ago  - hope this gets the book more attention.

[Erwin]

26 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

...except Poland has almost always been Poland.

In 1795, Poland's territory was completely partitioned among the Kingdom of Prussia, the Russian Empire, and Austria. Poland regained its independence as the Second Polish Republic in 1918 after World War I, but lost it in World War II through occupation by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

[The_Capt]

23 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Thoughts, @The_Capt?

Well no idea where it will end, too many really dynamic variables at this point.  I am more at the “what should we be looking for?” stage, which is only slightly ahead of the “what are we looking at?”.

I am not sure the Russians can take all of Eastern Ukraine, that is a lot of ground and all of it filled with well armed resistance.  If this is going to turn into a defensive infantry war then the manpower bill goes up because now one has limited ability to maneuver.  I think the Russians will dig in at some point (re: something to watch for), at which point the Ukrainians should conduct offensive operations carefully.  They would probably be best to stick to the hybrid model that is working for them and hit Russian logistics and supply lines as opposed to try to re-take ground.  Russians could try the same game but the Ukrainians actually do control their ground including popular support of civilians all armed with cellphones.

I am not convinced we will see a big siege of Kyiv at this rate but that is also not definite.  The Russians ability to supply such a siege is the main question, next to whether they can actually surround and close off the city. But if they do it will likely last for weeks if not months as no cordon is 100 percent and west and south of Kyiv the siege-ers will also become besieged themselves as behind them is all Ukrainian held territory.

After this is all over I think many observer militaries will spend a lot of time unpacking this one.  Have we seen a shift to dominant defensive warfare?  Is armor in trouble?  Did social media just go from observer to combatant?  How much was incompetence and how much real?  One thing is clear though, well motivated, well armed, well trained light infantry connected to each other and an ISR network are stalling a heavy mech force and may be crushing them.  This totally screws with doctrine and why so many experts are kinda saying “Well Ukraine is doing well but Russia is still going to crush them”, because I suspect they are using old metrics of so many tanks and firepower.  But what they are missing, in my opinion, is the level of dislocation that is occurring as a result of Ukrainian hybrid approach.  In simpler terms all those tanks, hardware and troops are not useful if they cannot bring that combat power to bear.  And right now a combination of ATGM lethality and deep strikes by the Ukrainian forces seem to be fragmenting the Russian mass. However the Russians may be dislocating themselves as well.  This is like watching someone try and win a fight by sawing off their limbs and throwing them at an opponent.

This thing could end tomorrow and it will still go down as a master class in how not to invade another nation.
 

 

[John Kettler]

On 3/6/2022 at 7:26 PM, danfrodo said:

definitely a lot of signs of desperation on russian side.  Civilian trucks being hauled in, maybe just grabbed from their russian owners by military?  that should anger the populace. 

Russian still has huge numbers it can bring in, but if they are truck-jacking their own people that's an  interesting sign.

danfrodo,

The transliterated term is auto colona, which I believe translates as auto column. It does indeed consist of MT taken from the civilians, much like the UK STUFT (Ships Taken Up From Trade) works. In the latter case, though, the Royal Navy has signed agreements already done and merely awaiting the next time. the call goes out. In the former case, it's entirely possible no compensation is given, though.

The commandeered civilian vehicles as a transport adjunct used to concern me as a Soviet threat Analyst, but I read one of Sovorov's/Rezun's books in which he described an alert in which his unit received its "battle technology", in the form of a rabble of claptrap civilian vehicles in dire mechanical shape. So the Soviets carefully hid this sign of their weakness under the trees so US satellites couldn't image them, but also put up military tents on a vast scale in plain sight, leaving western leaders looking at a huge troop buildup, or so they thought! These vehicles on the train look to be in pretty good shape, but they could be pieces of junk under the hood, in the drive train, etc. Even if they are in good shape, they're not likely to be very good for military use, especially if heavily loaded and operating on muddy rutted roads, let alone covered in debris and cratered. Civilian vehicles seldom have run flat tires, either and hardly ever have the ability to adjust tire pressure on the fly, a common feature in wheeled military vehicles. This directly affect what kinds of terrain can be  negotiated successfully.

Regards,

John Kettler 

[danfrodo]

28 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

Dan, please read up on the history of the region. TL:DR, Kiev was settled by a Swedish tribe that were “asked” by the locals to “save” them from the Slavic rulers. The town eventually became the Principality of Kiev Rus (the name of the Swedish tribe was the Rus) which in time included Moscow. So, in fact, Kiev is the ”Mother” of Russia since Russia, was the name the country took from it’s “Mother.” Here’s a suggestion, Google “History of Ukraine,” and you’ll see how convoluted the truth is for the entire region. Everyone around that region, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, can make the same claim to rule Ukraine as they all did, except not under the same names we know them as today, except Poland has almost always been Poland.

That's kinda my point.  Anyone can make a claim to Ukraine, and it's all totally irrelevant to what's happening now because it's all just a pretense for a violent land grab.  F-ing Mongolia once ruled Ukraine also.  None of this matters.  I am not some dumbf-k just off the turnip truck.  My point is that this is all completely and utterly beside the point.  The vast majority of Ukraine doesn't want Russian rule, and are willing to risk death to avoid it.  Putin initiated a violent overthrow of 30-year established Ukrainian sovereignity, and what happend 70, 100, or 400 years is all just piss in the wind relative to that.

[dan/california]

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well no idea where it will end, too many really dynamic variables at this point.  I am more at the “what should we be looking for?” stage, which is only slightly ahead of the “what are we looking at?”.

I am not sure the Russians can take all of Eastern Ukraine, that is a lot of ground and all of it filled with well armed resistance.  If this is going to turn into a defensive infantry war then the manpower bill goes up because now one has limited ability to maneuver.  I think the Russians will dig in at some point (re: something to watch for), at which point the Ukrainians should conduct offensive operations carefully.  They would probably be best to stick to the hybrid model that is working for them and hit Russian logistics and supply lines as opposed to try to re-take ground.  Russians could try the same game but the Ukrainians actually do control their ground including popular support of civilians all armed with cellphones.

I am not convinced we will see a big siege of Kyiv at this rate but that is also not definite.  The Russians ability to supply such a siege is the main question, next to whether they can actually surround and close off the city. But if they do it will likely last for weeks if not months as no cordon is 100 percent and west and south of Kyiv the siege-ers will also become besieged themselves as behind them is all Ukrainian held territory.

After this is all over I think many observer militaries will spend a lot of time unpacking this one.  Have we seen a shift to dominant defensive warfare?  Is armor in trouble?  Did social media just go from observer to combatant?  How much was incompetence and how much real?  One thing is clear though, well motivated, well armed, well trained light infantry connected to each other and an ISR network are stalling a heavy mech force and may be crushing them.  This totally screws with doctrine and why so many experts are kinda saying “Well Ukraine is doing well but Russia is still going to crush them”, because I suspect they are using old metrics of so many tanks and firepower.  But what they are missing, in my opinion, is the level of dislocation that is occurring as a result of Ukrainian hybrid approach.  In simpler terms all those tanks, hardware and troops are not useful if they cannot bring that combat power to bear.  And right now a combination of ATGM lethality and deep strikes by the Ukrainian forces seem to be fragmenting the Russian mass. However the Russians may be dislocating themselves as well.  This is like watching someone try and win a fight by sawing off their limbs and throwing them at an opponent.

This thing could end tomorrow and it will still go down as a master class in how not to invade another nation.
 

 

The_Capt, when you get the time, which I din't expect to be any time soon, can you go over what this implies for Taiwan. Assuming they had tactical missiles on hand in the same general proportion. 

[danfrodo]

Meanwhile, today England invaded Normandy since it had always been an integral part of the kingdom of england until illegally usurped by the perfidious French.

Bunch of technicality foolishness that is nothing but pretext for conquest.  

[Vet 0369]

6 minutes ago, Erwin said:

In 1795, Poland's territory was completely partitioned among the Kingdom of Prussia, the Russian Empire, and Austria. Poland regained its independence as the Second Polish Republic in 1918 after World War I, but lost it in World War II through occupation by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

Yes, thank you for this. This is why I specifically said “has almost always been Poland!”

[BletchleyGeek]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

is the level of dislocation that is occurring as a result of Ukrainian hybrid approach.  In simpler terms all those tanks, hardware and troops are not useful if they cannot bring that combat power to bear.  And right now a combination of ATGM lethality and deep strikes by the Ukrainian forces seem to be fragmenting the Russian mass. However the Russians may be dislocating themselves as well.

This @The_Capt you should totally getting a Twitter account and put up a picture of you in a dapper suit and see if you can get some nice gigs as resident military pundit as well

Regarding the Russian forces digging along their land bridge, I see that unlikely unless they advance all the way to the Dnepr. It's like 150 kilometers of a country much like northern France between Enerhodar and Volnokhava. That's a lot of trenches, positions and mines... The German army used 20+ divisions in roughly the same area to contain the Red Army in late summer 1943 and they failed, having to fall back to the Dnepr and abandon a substantial force in the Crime to its own devices.

[LongLeftFlank]

1 minute ago, dan/california said:

The_Capt, when you get the time, which I din't expect to be any time soon, can you go over what this implies for Taiwan. Assuming they had tactical missiles on hand in the same general proportion. 

Please, no. There are Taiwan threads. This thread is already stuffed with tangents. 

[LongLeftFlank]

5 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Regarding the Russian forces digging along their land bridge, I see that unlikely unless they advance all the way to the Dnepr. It's like 150 kilometers of a country much like northern France between Enerhodar and Volnokhava. That's a lot of trenches, positions and mines... The German army used 20+ divisions in roughly the same area to contain the Red Army in late summer 1943 and they failed, having to fall back to the Dnepr and abandon a substantial force in the Crime to its own devices.

Correct geo footprint, sure, but badly flawed analogy IMHO with regards to the road net, the size of the armies engaged (and at war over 2 years already and both fully mobilized for total war) and the technologies available to them.

This would be more like a Vietnam war environment IMHO, with the Russians not entrenching along continuous belted lines but in various hedgehogs and firebases whose primary mission is to support infantry combat groups.

Edited March 8, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[danfrodo]

1 minute ago, BletchleyGeek said:

This @The_Capt you should totally getting a Twitter account and put up a picture of you in a dapper suit and see if you can get some nice gigs as resident military pundit as well

Regarding the Russian forces digging along their land bridge, I see that unlikely unless they advance all the way to the Dnepr. It's like 150 kilometers of a country much like northern France between Enerhodar and Volnokhava. That's a lot of trenches, positions and mines... The German army used 20+ divisions in roughly the same area to contain the Red Army in late summer 1943 and they failed, having to fall back to the Dnepr and abandon a substantial force in the Crime to its own devices.

That's a very interesting point.  How would russia hold this long stretch of terrain w hostile population, possibly partisans hitting their supply lines (made of trucks stolen from russian small businesses).   UA could cut the land bridge of the overstretched and under supplied front.

[Sequoia]

 

5 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Please, no. There are Taiwan threads. This thread is already stuffed with tangents. 

 

Stuffed with some other stuff too, but mostly informative.

[Battlefront.com]

45 minutes ago, Vergeltungswaffe said:

Steve's tipping point is approaching.

Rapidly, I hope.

I hope as well.

OK, back to some pontificating.

The estimated losses of 10k KIA and 30k WIA sound very plausible, but let's even say it's off by a factor of 2 and we have 5k and 15k respectively for a total of 20k out of a force of about 180k.  That's 11% reduction in forces.

Somewhere in and around the first couple of days of the war I pointed out that what units suffer the losses matters more than the numbers themselves.  For example...

Losing an entire tank company with 100% crews dead results in 30 KIA.  So let's see what 30 KIA difference can make in a BTG:

• 10 Tanks + crews
• 3 AFV/IFV + crews + dismounts
• 15 logistics trucks + crews

Now let's look at how that relates to relative contribution to the fighting capacity of BTG:

• 100% of tanks
• 10% of rifle strength
• 70% of logistics (worse, it could be 100% of fuel as there's only about 5 tankers in total)

Not all 30 KIAs are equal, are they?  Nope!  So the casualty figures don't tell us the full story about how the total number affects total combat effectiveness.  But we can guess based on the smashed trucks that logistics have been hit harder proportional to everything else. 

A single MBT has a big projection of power on whatever tactical situation it is in, but a single fuel truck can determine if an entire company's worth of tanks have any power at all.  If I'm a tactical commander worried about one battle I'd rather lose a fuel truck than a MBT.  But if I'm an operational commander, I'd be pretty nervous about losing too many fuel trucks because the loss of each one has a multiplying effect that goes way beyond any one particular battle.

Which brings me back to my point I made when this whole mess started.  At what point does Ukraine need to get to before, statistically, the operational freedom of action of the Russian force is degraded to the point that it can not carry out its mission any more than the Germans could take Antwerp in The Battle of the Bulge?  Nobody knows in part because what is taken out of action is almost as important as how much. 

I'd say taking 20% of the invasion force out of action is probably the tipping point from a technical standpoint.  If we take Ukraine's casualty figures at face value, they hit that number yesterday.  If we halve the number they could see it sometime this week (remember, attacker casualties tend to increase when mobility decreases).

Low morale, poor communications, lack of confidence in leadership, incentives from Ukraine to surrender, etc. can take whatever the technical tipping point is and lower it significantly.  With that in mind, if 11% is the casualty count now, Ukraine might not need to rack up another 9% to hit the tipping point.  Might already have hit it.

Steve

 

[dan/california]

10 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

This @The_Capt you should totally getting a Twitter account and put up a picture of you in a dapper suit and see if you can get some nice gigs as resident military pundit as well

Regarding the Russian forces digging along their land bridge, I see that unlikely unless they advance all the way to the Dnepr. It's like 150 kilometers of a country much like northern France between Enerhodar and Volnokhava. That's a lot of trenches, positions and mines... The German army used 20+ divisions in roughly the same area to contain the Red Army in late summer 1943 and they failed, having to fall back to the Dnepr and abandon a substantial force in the Crime to its own devices.

Zhukov would have every officer above the level of captain shot for screwing something up this badly. 

[BletchleyGeek]

8 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

This would be more like a Vietnam war environment IMHO, with the Russians not entrenching along continuous belted lines but in various hedgehogs and firebases whose primary mission is to support infantry combat groups.

The first and most distinctive feature of the wars in Vietnam was its terrain: hilly and densely forested. I can't see those characteristics there. What you describe in terms of defence - with the obvious technological differences - is pretty much what the Germans used in WW2 in the Eastern Front (and lots of mines).

EDIT: sorry, the terrain and the skill of NLF and NVA forces to take advantage of it.

Edited March 8, 2022 by BletchleyGeek

[BletchleyGeek]

4 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Zhukov would have every officer above the level of captain shot for screwing something up this badly. 

Hmmm, I don't know man. I reckon that Zhukov was very much the type that @The_Capt describes  as "cutting your limbs and throw them at the enemy". The Berlin campaign (and Operation Mars before that) don't strike me as "masterworks of the operational art of war". 

Edited March 8, 2022 by BletchleyGeek

[LongLeftFlank]

17 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

The first and most distinctive feature of the wars in Vietnam was its terrain: hilly and densely forested. I can't see those characteristics there. What you describe in terms of defence - with the obvious technological differences - is pretty much what the Germans used in WW2 in the Eastern Front (and lots of mines).

Sorry if I am not clear.

The analogy is neither to the VN terrain nor their political situation. It is to the the US/ARVN strategy of establishing firebases in contested areas in order to support search and destroy ops by mobile forces.  Same tactics used in parts of A'stan.

...But I don't think analogies are helping either of us at this point.

I'd rather stick to the topic of, would *today's* Russian Army be able to set up and sustain/support such a defense and how might *today's* Ukrainian Army overcome it at an acceptable cost?

My contention is that a stalemate would eventually equal a Russian 'win', however pyrrhic. In time the world would prevail on the Ukrainians to accept a cease fire.

Also, @The_Capt, I have never thought taking everything east of the Dniepr including the densely populated Kharkov-Kremenchug corridor, was any more feasible than seizing the whole country.  I'm talking about the southern areas only that they mostly already 'hold', from Izium south -- the rest of the Donbas, plus the wedge between the Dniepr delta, Crimea and the Sea of Azov (Crimea's 'land bridge')

Edited March 8, 2022 by LongLeftFlank