How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Carolus said:

UA working hard every day to make the Cap's nightmares real.

What about MY nightmares?  I am the one that has to tell Charles about all this stuff and explain how it works

Steve

[akd]

3 hours ago, Zeleban said:

It's actually Bradley's shooting.

From 0:45, 4 bursts in rapid succession around the Bradley and trench position, followed by another shortly after.  Looks larger than 30mm.

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

As I understand it, this separation was by design, to give Putin (indirectly) true dictatorial powers over the separ forces and citizenry that he could not (at least not until lately) wield over Russian citizens. That's also part of why these 'republics' weren't previously declared part of Russia.

This is all true, however the structure and staffing and training was always under Russia's direct control right from the start.  For the first few years, at least, higher level DLPR officer's positions had a Russian Army "shadow" officer.  This was not only to help train the DLPR officers, but to ensure that the units wouldn't get any funny ideas like actually becoming independent.  I don't know how long this practice lasted, but I suspect it gave way over the years as the DLPR built up their own capacity (with Russian help, of course) to field new officers.

From what I can tell once it became clear the invasion wasn't going to be over quickly the Russian command tried to integrate the DLPR units in "as is".  This didn't work and, in fact, probably backfired because they were often clearly being used as cannon fodder.  There certainly were many "appeal" videos complaining about this in 2022.

Officially the Russian MoD announced the full integration in February of 2023, the better part of a year ago.  Here is ISW's reporting of the announcement:

Quote

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed the formal integration of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR/LNR) militias into the Russian Armed Forces on February 19 in response to growing criticism about reported command changes within the proxy units. The Russian MoD denied reports about the alleged dismissal of officers of the integrated DNR and LNR’s 1st and 2nd Army Corps, likely in response to widespread milblogger and proxy criticisms about the reported dismissal of DNR Militia Spokesman Eduard Basurin on February 17.[9] Basurin discussed his dismissal in a publicized meeting with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin on February 19 in which he stated that such command changes will "harm" proxy commanders and servicemen.[10] Basurin noted that servicemen in occupied Donetsk Oblast trust their commanders and would be demoralized if those commanders were replaced by people they did not know. Basurin stated that it is important to warn about ongoing command changes and questioned who would be defending Russia if the newly integrated proxy units refuse to fight as a result of the Russian professionalization effort.

The decision to reorganize the DNR and LNR militias amid an ongoing offensive likely indicates that the Russian MoD does not fully grasp the scale of the underlying challenges of integrating irregular forces into the professional military, especially during a period of intense combat operations. The DNR and LNR forces are currently fighting in Donbas in support of Russia’s goal to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and such untimely restructuring of the command structure may reduce cohesion within the proxy units and between them and Russian forces. Russian forces have suffered from their own shortcomings in unit cohesion and will likely face greater tensions with the proxy militias that were not trained to professional standards. Proxy elements have also repeatedly complained about receiving unequal treatment from the Kremlin, and Russian mobilized servicemen have recently accused the DNR and LNR formations of abuse and discrimination in turn.[11] This reorganization may upset and demoralize proxy elements that have enjoyed a great deal of independence as irregular militants for nine years and may risk alienating them amidst the offensive for Donbas. Russia needs DNR and LNR units—which have not been historically effective forces—to maintain positions in western Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as conventional Russian troops pursue an offensive on select frontlines in eastern Ukraine.

The restructuring of proxy militias also suggests that the Russian military command is trying to achieve all desired reforms while the Russian MoD has the favor of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian military command may recognize that Russia does not have the combat capability to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the short term and is likely trying to rush through some planned reforms before Putin again becomes disillusioned with the Russian MoD’s inability to secure meaningful advances. The Russian military command may alternatively be deluded about its ability to rapidly and seamlessly complete professionalization objectives to aid the ongoing offensive and may not perceive the problems inherent in conducting a significant military reform while pursuing difficult offensive operations. The Russian MoD has been trying to simultaneously professionalize different aspects of Russian forces by targeting Wagner’s influence, integrating mobilized servicemen into proxy and conventional formations, and introducing personal grooming standards and operational security procedures.[12] These efforts would be logical if Russia had initiated them during peacetime but are a bureaucratic burden that will likely generate further discontent toward the already heavily scrutinized Russian MoD. The Russian military command is embarking on too many drastic changes that will either require time or will cause significant tensions that will hinder their full execution even as it orders its forces to conduct extremely challenging military operations that are likely beyond their capabilities in any event.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2023

The upshot of the ISW report is that even though Russia created, funded, and supplied the DLPR forces since their inception, they remained largely independent of Russian command culture (allegiance).  Some 10 months after the official integration was announced Russia is STILL having difficulties with it.

The whole point of bringing this up is to support the argument I've been making that the DPR forces fighting in Avdiivka were not practically available for fighting outside of the immediate Donetsk territory.

This is an interesting situation for wargaming.  Sometimes there are constraints on doing what is militarily optimal.  In this case, the DLPR units are inherently territorial.  Mindset as well as logistics.  As much as Russia might want to transfer DLPR units to wherever they need them to be doesn't mean that they can.

Steve

[Kinophile]

 

[Kinophile]

David D always interesting, sometimes over positive. This is interesting from a OSINT deduction POV -  on the surface it's a RUS TG post from 810th praising it's medics,  scouts in Zaporizhzhia. But it reveals in its praise what they are dealing with,  ie crumbling units,  unattended wounded,  discarded weapons indicating flight,  etc. 

The 810th is now, I believe,  on the Kherson front?  Can't be in great shape... 

[Kinophile]

UKR using Drone mothership to drop off a group of FPV drones closer to  AO. 

How long before thus used against the BSF, or at large scale for next UKR offensive.. 

[Kinophile]

Zelensky upgrading the ZSUs medical leadership. 

 

[Zeleban]

10 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Zelensky upgrading the ZSUs medical leadership. 

 

Yes, for more than six months, frontline doctors have been criticizing the leadership of the ZSU medical forces. Mainly for poor organizational skills, supplies of low-quality tourniquets to the troops, a ban on blood transfusions to doctors without medical education (medics on the front line mostly do not have a medical education)

[dan/california]

6 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

1. Topo. There was also a clip of the infamous slag heap but I can't find it now.

Source: https://nitter.net/Pouletvolant3

****

2.  Yup, as we suspected, the Ukes are hitting Ivan where it hurts, drawing out his last(?) mobile forces to the very end of their tether then hitting them at full stretch.

Would love to see more of this, induced via special Psyops units in places where the front is more porous and less heavily mined.

3. 

4.  Look at the intensity of the mortar fire (?) around the evac zone! 82mm Vasilek or CBUs?

 

Holy bleep that is intense. Glory to Ukraine!

[Carolus]

"We will continue to support them to be in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table when the time comes."

I am really interested to see the security guarantees an agreement might get. Because if you don't want a Minsk 3, someone in the West will have to throw lot of weight behind the clauses that deal with breaking the agreement.

My pet theory is still that there won't be any negotiations in the classic sense. They will just let things in Ukraine run its course and then shovel sand on it like a cat does with feces while getting new trade agreements with Putin's successor.

My second pet theory is that no one cares or thinks about the consequences, and we will get a widely celebrated Minsk 3 and then everyone will act extremely shocked and surprised when the Russians bomb Kyiv again in 5 years. Would be just in time for the ca. 700.000 deported Ukrainian children to have finished their training in the Russian Army.

Edited November 20, 2023 by Carolus

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Rokko said:

I am pretty sure most if not all of these instances involve abandoned (damaged) tanks.

Some of these implications still apply, though. Russian tank crews are quite probably more skittish on average due to the well known propensity of their tanks to incinerate their occupants alive and are therefore more likely to abandon their tanks even in case of non-critical damage or hits.

Another big implication: Used to be that you had to expand another (or even more) expensive ATGM or tank round to deliver a kill shot, or else your enemy would come in at night and tow the tank back for repairs. Now, all you need is a cheap drone and a hand grenade to reliably and consistently cause write-offs of multi-million dollar war machines.

Seen enough videos of grenades being dropped on heads through hatches to think there is more at play here.  good point an battlefield coup de grace though.  The smart thing is to wait until the RRR team comes forward and then kill them too.

It is a matter of time until someone sticks a sight on a UAS and slaves an ATGM to it.

[Carolus]

 

Russian Tochka-U launchers + up to 200 missiles from Armenia to Ukraine, through American mediation.

[JonS]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

 

How long before thus used against the BSF, or at large scale for next UKR offensive

The counter-tactic to this is obvious; just capture one of the baby drones then get Will Smith to fly it back into the mothership.

[The_Capt]

1 minute ago, JonS said:

The counter-tactic to this is obvious; just capture one of the baby drones then get Will Smith to fly it back into the mothership.

Nice.  Totally shuts out Jeff Goldblum 

[Rokko]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Seen enough videos of grenades being dropped on heads through hatches to think there is more at play here.  good point an battlefield coup de grace though.  The smart thing is to wait until the RRR team comes forward and then kill them too.

It is a matter of time until someone sticks a sight on a UAS and slaves an ATGM to it.

Can't say I've seen any videos showing grenades dropped through hatches of obviously crewed vehicles with the exception of a couple of FPV drones being flown into the rear hatches of BMP, but neither is my memory perfect, nor have I seen every drone video ever.

Anyways, I wanted to use this opportunity to re-post my favorite video of this kind (sorry for the silly commentary):

 

[Vanir Ausf B]

1 hour ago, Carolus said:

 

Russian Tochka-U launchers + up to 200 missiles from Armenia to Ukraine, through American mediation.

This is a very strange time for Armenia to be disarming itself. I'd wait for confirmation.

[LongLeftFlank]

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

Anyways, I wanted to use this opportunity to re-post my favorite video of this kind

 

I'm your huckleberry (hound).

Edited November 20, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[dan/california]

 

[Fenris]

Interesting.  Lachlan Murdoch (who's just taken over the reins at Fox) has just arrived in Kyiv.

https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/very-important-signal-zelensky-welcomes-fox-news-chief-lachlan-murdoch-s-visit-to-kyiv-20231121-p5elhn.html

Hopefully signals a more helpful tone on Fox in the US.

[dan/california]

Bad, if true.

[Carolus]

49 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Bad, if true.

People are saying these are truly rusted (next to the legal problems like the ownership being now with the scrap company, not the government).

But let's not kid ourselves. This is not a failure in capability. It never was. It's worse. This is a failure in will. Not of Americans, but of us all. 

Edited November 20, 2023 by Carolus

[Battlefront.com]

9 minutes ago, Carolus said:

People are saying these are truly rusted (next to the legal problems like the ownership being now with the scrap company, not the government).

But let's not kid ourselves. This is not a failure in capability. It never was. It's worse. This is a failure in will. Not of Americans, but of us all. 

Yeah, usually when I see something like this my first thought is "yeah, well, I'm sure it is more complicated than Random X Account thinks it is".

My guess is these vehicles have been STRIPPED CLEAN of anything usable long ago.  Whatever is left was deemed not worth salvaging.  Therefore, to get these over to Ukraine would have to be rebuilt from the ground up.  Which gets us to our capability problems that require large commitments of will that nobody (in particular the Republicans in the House) seem at all interested in doing.

Note that this doesn't excuse why Brads that have been set aside for refurbishment and/or foreign sales aren't being sent to Ukraine.  What I'm saying is these are not the ones to send.

Steve

[sburke]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Note that this doesn't excuse why Brads that have been set aside for refurbishment and/or foreign sales aren't being sent to Ukraine.  What I'm saying is these are not the ones to send.

Steve

So you are saying these aren't the droids.....

[Kinophile]

 

 

[Vet 0369]

On 11/17/2023 at 10:29 AM, cesmonkey said:

I wonder what's the minimum amount of a F-16 you need to have in order for the rest of the plane to be replaced by spare parts?
The serial number of the aircraft?  

DOD Aims to Ensure Availability of Spare Parts to Sustain Ukraine-Bound F-16s
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3591267/dod-aims-to-ensure-availability-of-spare-parts-to-sustain-ukraine-bound-f-16s/

I don’t believe that the U.S. Military identifies any specific part of an aircraft as the “serial number,” unlike the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). To the best of my 50+ year-old memory, at least for Naval Aviation aircraft, each individual critical component that required tracking had a serial number (SN) which was then tracked on the Bureau Number (BuNum) of an aircraft. That way, we could cannibalize parts from one aircraft , and install it on another aircraft where that SN would then be tracked on that new BuNum. So the BuNum was actually more of a production number than an actual aircraft. The FAA ties the aircraft SN to the data plate that is (usually) riveted to the airframe. One can actually recover a data plate from an aircraft that has crashed and melted into a puddle of aluminum, except the data plate, and physically “rebuild” that aircraft around that data plate as long as one follows all the applicable FAA regulations.