How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I haven't read it yet, but it is a universal truth that the lower down the Order of Battle you go, the more blame gets directed at the top and the more creative it is.

I think it is true that senior Ukrainian command thought that once they got through the first belt of defenses that they could brush aside the remaining Russian infantry.  There is nothing wrong with this theory as it is standard maneuver doctrine and there's endless of examples of this working throughout history.

The problem with the theory was that Ukraine had what was needed to get through the first belt of defenses with enough intact force to conduct exploitation operations.  One of the reasons this didn't happen is that Russia decided to invest almost everything it had into keeping the most forward positions. 

As for the Excalibur use criticism... this is similar in the US military, especially years ago when the shells were fairly rare.  If you left the decision making to Squad or Platoon leaders they would request one every single time because it is in their interests, right then and there, to make sure the target is destroyed.  Grunts don't have the luxury of thinking ahead days or weeks or months to when there might not be any shells left.  That's what higher level of command does.

Steve

The arrogant assumptions of western equipment superiority kinda ring true.  We did the same thing - ah ha now they have then Leo 2 this war is over because I really love the Leo 2!  Forgetting that our stuff is as allergic to mines and ATGM as anyone else’s.  The only consistent superiority that has been demonstrated is survivability, which is not small but that will not drive the Russian hordes back over the Urals.

[Vanir Ausf B]

27 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

I think that article is about what you can expect when you get opinions of a single company co.

Fair. Some bitterness is understandable.

"Mykola Melnyk was seriously wounded during one of the assaults during the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. A Russian large-caliber gun hit him when he was trying to navigate a Bradley through a minefield and lost his leg. During an attempt to get to the nearest Ukrainian positions, he stepped on anti-personnel mine and fell on another one. Mykola is now slowly recovering, and just recently was able to stand up."

Edited November 18, 2023 by Vanir Ausf B

[Battlefront.com]

12 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Fair. Some bitterness is understandable.

"Mykola Melnyk was seriously wounded during one of the assaults during the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. A Russian large-caliber gun hit him when he was trying to navigate a Bradley through a minefield and lost his leg. During an attempt to get to the nearest Ukrainian positions, he stepped on anti-personnel mine and fell on another one. Mykola is now slowly recovering, and just recently was able to stand up."

Yeah, I've said it several times recently... the big failure on the Ukrainian command was about the density of the minefields.  If they didn't know how dense they were that's bad, but if they did know and didn't think it mattered too much is even worse.

Either way, senior command screwed up big time on this point.  There is no excuse because Ukraine knew it was going to be a tough battle and they had the time to figure out how tough before they started it.

Steve

[Haiduk]

13 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

If they didn't know how dense they were that's bad, but if they did know and didn't think it mattered too much is even worse.

Of course, HQs knew about minefields. Maybe not about all, but as you can see in the head of each armored column was either tank with mine-plow or special minebreaching vehicle. But likley a bat was on sudden attack of heavy armored columns, with minimal but intensive artillery preliminary bombardment. But Russian artilelry wasn't properly supressed and did own work. Also probably weren't supressed forward positions with ATGMs, which in first order took out mineclaening vehicles. Didn't maintained air defense against helicopters (though, their role is mostly demonized, main problems were because of artillery and minefields)

Edited November 18, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Rare video of aftermath of Switchblade600 usage - Russan TOR-M2 was taken out in Zaporizhzhia oblast back to summer south from Kharkove village, 14 km south from Robotyne. Momemt of strike not shown. Spotting was provided by "Shark" UAV

 

 

 

[MikeyD]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

The whole plan of our big counter-offensive was based on a simple thing – Russians see Bradleys, Leopards and they run away.

I recall reading that during the Iraq war Bradleys were sometimes more trouble than they were worth. Because the enemy saw them as 'trophy' targets and they became magnets for incoming fire. If you could use less conspicuous vehicles you would be able to perform the mission while attracting less attention.

[dan/california]

 

[dan/california]

Dmitri is one of maybe three accounts on twitter that are consistently worth your time.

[Lethaface]

On 11/4/2023 at 12:14 PM, Kraft said:

And so Putin and China are affirmed, the west will get tired and throw the towel long before them, despite suffering not a single casualty and mostly dumping expiring cold war storage. 

How depressing, but I guess this solves some information asymetries, namely how much security guarantees of 1994 are worth, about 1.5-2 years of drip-fed and postponed support, we cant risk escalating after all, only god knows which city Putin will nuke if a dozen Taurus are send.

But I guess it will all be different when the peace is broken some years down the line, regardless of political climate, economic hardship or other wars..

Yes I'm long behind on the thread

However I wanted to react to this. Your perspective in imo the glass half empty variant, explaining a selection of geopolitical level examples from a citizens perspective.

There are more perspectives imo. Not only on explaining the why behind things like Taurus, whether one agrees with the reasoning or not. There are also glass half full perspectives on the geopolitical front.

Just one example I want to lay down: look at WW2 at end of 1940 / 41. Half of Europe was effectively overran and defeated on the battlefield. Things looked very gloom, there was plenty of issues between allied parties. 

Not all is well in Ukraine obviously, there is plenty of issues both in Ukraine as among those supporting Ukraine. One can focus on these issues, but it is only fair to put it into perspective that there actually is wide support for Ukraine. Also, Ukraine was able to defeat most of Russia's large offensives. Both weren't to be taken for granted before Feb '22. Of course that doesn't mean things couldn't have been better or can't be improved; it is imperative to remain vigilant and critical.

But at the same time, it is also imperative to value achieved accomplishments and realize those weren't a certainty; almost nobody predicted the current status quo as favourable for Ukraine as it is now.

Or maybe I just prefer half full glasses

[Battlefront.com]

55 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Of course, HQs knew about minefields. Maybe not about all, but as you can see in the head of each armored column was either tank with mine-plow or special minebreaching vehicle. But likley a bat was on sudden attack of heavy armored columns, with minimal but intensive artillery preliminary bombardment. But Russian artilelry wasn't properly supressed and did own work. Also probably weren't supressed forward positions with ATGMs, which in first order took out mineclaening vehicles. Didn't maintained air defense against helicopters (though, their role is mostly demonized, main problems were because of artillery and minefields)

For sure they knew about the minefields existing.  It is why they coordinated with their allies to get breaching equipment ahead of the counter-offensive.    But it seems they weren't prepared for how dense and wide they were.  The other complications you mentioned made it much worse, however the mine density slowed advances and limited attack vectors too much and Russian artillery/ATGMs were able to concentrate their efforts more effectively than if the minefields had been thinner or less deep.  That and Ukraine (and nobody here) anticipated that Russia would put everything it had into defending the security zone in front of their first line of defenses.

Also, there were some attempts to breach Russian defenses in several other areas that barely made any progress.  Were they diversions or probes that were so unsuccessful that attacks were abandoned?

Steve

[Haiduk]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Also, there were some attempts to breach Russian defenses in several other areas that barely made any progress.  Were they diversions or probes that were so unsuccessful that attacks were abandoned?

Two main strikes were of course on Tokmak and Berdiansk (V.Novosilka salient) and latter some time considered as main, probably to confuse Russsian command, where we will attack with main forces. Other attacks were obviously probes to keep Russians in tense and don't allow them to maneuver free with units. This was Pyatykhatky - Vasylivka direction, some actions around Nesterianka and limited attack on Novopokrovka toward Polohy. 

[Battlefront.com]

ISW's November 16th report had a section on Rybar's founder, Zvinchuk, and what has been going on with Rybar lately in terms of messaging.  I think this explains the tonal shift we've seen in Rybar this year and its decreasing value as an OSINT:

Quote

ISW had observed a significant shift in the style and focus of Rybar’s war coverage since the Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts in fall 2022 during which Russian state propagandists were unable to explain away Russia’s military failures and a deeply unpopular mobilization of 300,000 reservists.[19] Zvinchuk began appearing on Russian state television and the Russian state media began heavily relying on Zvinchuk’s content at this time. Rybar’s coverage since fall 2022 has significantly reduced its criticism of the Russian MoD. This observed content and tonal shift is significant and is likely the result of Putin’s efforts to coopt prominent Russian milbloggers to reestablish Kremlin dominance over the Russian language online information space, carry out information operations against Western audiences, and prevent other influential Russian officials from buying milbloggers’ loyalties. Zvinchuk’s award also likely serves as an effort to incentivize other milbloggers to offer their loyalty to the regime in exchange for accolades and Kremlin recognition.

Nothing really surprising here.  Lots of sources, including ISW, have been reporting on the increasingly effective campaign to influence mil bloggers one way or another (including arrest).

ISW's November 17th report devoted most of its upper section to discussing Ukraine's moves on the left bank of the Dnepr and what it means for Russian defenders.  Ukraine is starting to talk about the operations and claims it has caused about 1 brigade's worth of casualties amongst the many Russian defending units.  Worth reading the full thing.

Steve

[Offshoot]

I don't recall seeing this posted before and there has been a lot of discussion here about AI-controlled drones. This is a turret that uses AI being developed by a Ukrainian company. The AI is for target (personnel) acquisition, identification and tracking and determining firing solutions, so could possibly be incorporated into other platforms as well. The article says, however, that an operator still gives a command to fire so it is not completely autonomous.

https://mil.in.ua/en/news/tgp-turret-with-artificial-intelligence-was-developed-in-ukraine/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04PatGZ1prk

Quote

 

TGP specifications:

*automatic manpower detection: up to 1 km
*target lock-on and tracking: up to 1 km
*hitting a target measuring 2×2 meters at a distance of 1 km
*stabilization of weapons and their alignment along the horizon
*remote control at a distance of up to 100 meters via wire and network operation via Starlink
*additional thermal imaging equipment to detect manpower at night
*autonomy: 7 days without recharging
*turret design is capable of lifting weapons to a height of 30 centimeters for digging and camouflage
*weight: light stationary turret – up to 35 kilograms; module for placement on AFV – 110 kg.

 

 

[Haiduk]

3 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

https://militaryland.net/news/offensive-through-the-eyes-of-a-soldier/

Interesting, about summer offensive.

@Vanir Ausf B

Here is full artilce on Censor in English (but some words translated, alas incorrect, for example machine translation of UKR "posadka" as "landing" instead correct "tree-plant")- Military Land version is VERY shortened and many of interesting details are removed: https://censor.net/en/resonance/3453607/company_commander_of_the_47th_brigade_mykola_melnyk_the_russians_knew_our_routes_of_advance_and_everything

@MikeyD

Here an opinion from this article about Bradleys:

- ... "Bradley" withstood everything. The shell hit the right side, the track assembling was damaged. The armor withstood the debris, but the blast wave tore the wiring in the car... The only time the Bradley could not withstand the impact was the work of helicopters, a week later. The Ka-52 hit the cars, and one Bradley detonated. But there are cases when they did not detonate when they withstood such blows. In principle, it is a very reliable machine. This is not a BMP-2 where the entire crew dies, no. The Bradley may be shot down, but the crew survives. And the engine is always running. The driver-mechanic recovers from a concussion, the engine is running - we drove on.

Yes, chaos. In this chaos, it is important not to lose touch with the senior commander. Because you need artillery, you need current orders. And when this stops happening, when the battalion commander's orders are given to you by a battalion sergeant, it's not very good. Because you didn't hear the order to hand over control to a sergeant. And on the walkie-talkie, you definitely hear that it's not your battalion commander who is talking. Again, it is very important that senior commanders understand what is happening on the battlefield. You know, the control system in '47 was so high that I could see where each of my cars was on my tablet. It helped in management, you understood who was where. And the brigade commander understood who was where, and the battalion commander understood. The only thing they did not understand was what was really happening on the battlefield. And the situation was quite simple: ATGMs in each tree-plant. The Russians knew our routes of advance, and everything flew along these routes – the 152nd, 120th, and Grads... And here you go, where are you going to maneuver? Only back and forth, because everything else is mined. By us. 

Edited November 18, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Situation map of "Promka", SE of Avdiivka

[The_Capt]

The longer I watch this war the more I wonder if it isn’t a microcosm of how the Cold War would have gone down if it had gone hot in the mid 80s.  NATO had invested in C4ISR, precision and technology.  Russia in mass.  Air superiority would have been in doubt and perhaps resulted in mutual denial.  

Assuming the whole thing stayed conventional we could have seen extensive initial Soviet advances but they would have been strung out and logistics lines were stretched and exposed.  Deep Battle would have kicked in and the Soviets would have found themselves over extended.  They may have then buckled and fell back to NATO counter attack until they could assemble massive defensive positions (minefields etc).

The whole thing may have resulted in incremental Soviet gains at insane costs.  Or right back to the start lines after tens of thousand dead and wounded.  West would have gone back to containment and squeezing while the Soviets buckled under the weight of trying to pay for it all.

Of course a whole lot could have happened differently given scope and scale differences but I can’t shake the feeling that there are similarities.

[Haiduk]

Panoramic view of part of Krynky bridghead - Korsunskyi forest, road, destroyed houses of Krynky village under glide bomb strikes, further Krynka river, more further Konka river, Didiv Lyman lake in upper left part of island, behind the island - Dnipro river and on far background Tiahynka village, also heavily bombed by Russians

 

Edited November 18, 2023 by Haiduk

[poesel]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Won’t that create an environment even more dangerous for people?  I mean if one can 3-D print a cheap smart missile that can find, track and hit a small UAS through the trees, why would I point it at a UAS and not troops and vehicles? 

Detecting something looking up into the sky is probably much easier than looking down or across the ground. There are also fewer obstacles in the sky, your missile has to avoid.

The amount of explosives you need to kill a UAS is much lower than what you need against vehicles or probably even troops. I guess you would also have a different type of explosion.

If this weapon was available now, both sides would use it, as there is nothing else available against the small copters. In the next war - who knows?

[JonS]

38 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The longer I watch this war the more I wonder if it isn’t a microcosm of how the Cold War would have gone down if it had gone hot in the mid 80s.  NATO had invested in C4ISR, precision and technology.  Russia in mass.  Air superiority would have been in doubt and perhaps resulted in mutual denial.  

Assuming the whole thing stayed conventional we could have seen extensive initial Soviet advances but they would have been strung out and logistics lines were stretched and exposed.  Deep Battle would have kicked in and the Soviets would have found themselves over extended.  They may have then buckled and fell back to NATO counter attack until they could assemble massive defensive positions (minefields etc).

The whole thing may have resulted in incremental Soviet gains at insane costs.  Or right back to the start lines after tens of thousand dead and wounded.  West would have gone back to containment and squeezing while the Soviets buckled under the weight of trying to pay for it all.

Of course a whole lot could have happened differently given scope and scale differences but I can’t shake the feeling that there are similarities.

Are you channelling Clancey, or was he channelling you?

[Rokko]

Sorry for the late reply, I rarely take part in the discussions in this thread due to time constraints and the fast moving nature of things, but didn't wan't to leave this thoughtful response unanswered.

On 11/16/2023 at 5:00 PM, Battlefront.com said:

The Russian counter attacks to regain land were, by all accounts, largely infantry based.  In many cases Ukraine was defending with infantry backed by superior artillery.  AFVs, therefore, are a bad metric to use.

I agree with this somewhat, the fighting in that region over the summer were clearly much less mechanized in nature and I think the (absolute) vehicle loss figures serve as a good indicator for this, as well. And indeed, assuming proportional relationship between vehicle and personell losses is just a guess, but we don't really have any better metric, do we. Every other piece of evidence is, at best anectodal.

On 11/16/2023 at 5:00 PM, Battlefront.com said:

Oh boy, the "absence of evidence indicates the evidence of absence" is a terrible foundation for an argument.  First, Ukraine had a pretty good information blackout in place for the first few months.  We saw very few videos of any sort coming out, so are you suggesting that there was very little fighting going on?  Or was their intense fighting and we just didn't see videos of it?  Definitely the latter, right?  So this concept of evaluating what happened and what didn't goes right out the window.

Also, you forget that many of the accounts coming out of the frontlines, especially early, were coming from Russian sources.  They were the ones talking about all the counter attacks in detail.  The Ukrainian information space largely relied upon them as a starting point, debunking claims when possible.  For example, there was a time when Russians were talking about still controlling Robotyne when video clearly showed Bradleys freely roaming the streets.  Then the Russian accounts changed to "we have a garden shed that is technically still in Robotyne, so our forces still hold!".

I'd say its not so much taking absence of evidence as evidence of absence, but rather saying that there is simply not sufficient evidence backing the rather extraordinary claim that Ukraine somehow did actually really well during their offensive, destroying Russian reserves, inflicting casualties at desirable ratios and almost achieving a breakthrough into the operational rear.  Even if we ignore, that there is very little historical precedent for an attacking side inflicting higher casualties than they themselves suffer during an (failed) offensive against strong fortifications*. Although I suspect you'd be able to find some counter-examples, like Sevastopol 42, Kursk 43 (maybe, not sure) and perhaps some of the PTO island battles pre-Peleliu. But for the case Ukraine's 2023 summer offensive, the nature of the fighting and, ultimately, the fact that it failed I simply to not see this as a likely or plausible possibility. Grinding through mine belts and fortified tree lines for months on end with mainly light infantry, no air support and eventually having to give up after become simply too worn down to continue simply does not speak for any of the above claims.

BTW, one aspect we do have pretty good evidence off, are the unusually high losses of Russian artillery over the summer and, if I am not mistaken, the seemingly endless stream of videos showing 2S7s getting blown up by GMLRS and others started pretty much right after the offensive kicked off. But why then is there no (or rather so little) drone footage of slaughtered Russian counterattacks? I am not saying, they didn't happen at all, but rather that the Ukrainians probably overstated their significance/frequency and how destructive they were for the Russian forces involved.

Also, regarding Ukraine's (social) media policies and "media blackouts" in particular, I have a hunch that they have been rather pragmatic about it right from the start. When they are spanking the Russians we get lots of videos and when the going gets tough, e.g., during the Russian (early) summer offensive 2022, the early stage Kherson (counter-)offensive and now the big 2023 (UKR) summer offensive, very little gets released. I find this explanation more reasonable than a deliberate media blackout for certain operations that sort of wanes over time.

* Yes, arguments involving historical analogues are also not flawless.

On 11/16/2023 at 5:00 PM, Battlefront.com said:

We've discussed the impracticality of Russia being able to move the bulk of the forces committed to Avdiivka anywhere else because the backbone of the force was DPR and could NOT be deployed anywhere other than Donetsk.

I think I've seen this argument a couple of times here but I'm not sure why this would supposedly be the case. If I am not mistaken the argument was, that DPR guys would somehow mutiny, if they were deployed outside off their little faux-republic? If this is indeed the argument, I find it both highly illogical and refuted by the fact that these guys have been deployed all over the place many times before. D/LNR soldiers were left as expendable rear guard/cannon fodder during the first Kharkiv counter-offensive (the one in spring, when they retook Trostyanets), they manned the front line in Zaphorizia in fall of 2022 (as per Murz IIRC) and at least some of their more regular units (and probably Mobiks as well) bore the initial brunt of the 2023 summer offensive, at least in some places. There were some complaints by D/LNR soldiers rather early in the war about being deployed outside of Donetzk/Luhansk, but when do Russians not complain? And when has it lead to them not wanting to be sent into the meatgrinder?

I also (still) hope that at they will break at some point, eventually, but somehow I doubt that being sent to die outside of their particular region is going to be the catalyst for it. Besides, weren't the D/LNR armies officially integrated into the RuAF and, in fact, their "republics" into the RF? I'd assume this takes the wind out of their pathetic legalistic complaint videos and suffice for a couple of extra months of pointless meat assaults ...

On 11/16/2023 at 5:00 PM, Battlefront.com said:

The other forces used for the offensive came from the nearby sectors in Luhansk.  Transporting them to the south instead would be possible, but would have been much harder and time consuming.  Therefore, again, your metric for assessing is fundamentally unsound because the facts don't support the position you've staked out.

If I am reading you right, this is basically the core of your argument. That UKR was close to achieving a localized collapse (which may be true for all we know) and that moving reserves from Luhansk/Donetzk in a timely manner would have been to difficult to pull of, logistically and/or in C2C terms. Given the institutional culture of lying and general incompetence in the Russian command that could also well be true. But ultimately, I think one only has to presume the tiniest capacity for realistic assessment of the state of their own troops for the Russian command to anticipate any upcoming crumbling of their lines and to move an extra brigade every other week and put the lid on the whole thing. This is different from the rapid fall 2022  (Kharkiv) counter-offensive, when there simply weren't any reserves anywhere and the front had to be thread-bare in many places for them to be able to grind through Donetzk. But that was before mobilization plus a comfy cushion of 20k+ well-paid meatsacks per month to plug whatever gap needs plugging.

[akd]

Claim of 3.8km shot by a Ukrainian sniper:

 

Edited November 19, 2023 by akd

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

Sorry for the late reply, I rarely take part in the discussions in this thread due to time constraints and the fast moving nature of things, but didn't wan't to leave this thoughtful response unanswered.

As the topic is still active (totally relevant to the 47th Mech interview at a minimum) it's worth keeping going with it

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

I agree with this somewhat, the fighting in that region over the summer were clearly much less mechanized in nature and I think the (absolute) vehicle loss figures serve as a good indicator for this, as well. And indeed, assuming proportional relationship between vehicle and personell losses is just a guess, but we don't really have any better metric, do we. Every other piece of evidence is, at best anectodal.

The problem with using a metric you know is wrong is that you are likely going to arrive at the wrong conclusion.  Therefore, it is better to come up with a more defendable method for evaluation.  One such example is to recognize that Russia had to move quite a few units from within and from outside of the immediate operational zone.  Most of these were not mech heavy, therefore disproportionally infantry based.  When they lost ground they were likely to leave behind a higher proportion of dead bodies than burnt out vehicles.

It is also important to consider Russia's performance in other battles.  Heavy infantry losses are the hallmark of Russia's war in Ukraine, wouldn't you say?  So why would this battle be an anomaly, especially given all the reports from Russia's side of units being completely chewed up?

Then there's the artillery to consider.  The same type of analysis that shows rough parity in AFV losses shows that Russia lost a huge amount of artillery systems.  Russian commentators screamed about this as it was happening, so I don't doubt it.  Why not use the relative losses in artillery systems as a gauge instead of AFVs, especially considering everybody agrees artillery has been causing the overwhelming casualties in this war?

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

I'd say its not so much taking absence of evidence as evidence of absence, but rather saying that there is simply not sufficient evidence backing the rather extraordinary claim that Ukraine somehow did actually really well during their offensive, destroying Russian reserves, inflicting casualties at desirable ratios and almost achieving a breakthrough into the operational rear.  Even if we ignore, that there is very little historical precedent for an attacking side inflicting higher casualties than they themselves suffer during an (failed) offensive against strong fortifications*. Although I suspect you'd be able to find some counter-examples, like Sevastopol 42, Kursk 43 (maybe, not sure) and perhaps some of the PTO island battles pre-Peleliu. But for the case Ukraine's 2023 summer offensive, the nature of the fighting and, ultimately, the fact that it failed I simply to not see this as a likely or plausible possibility. Grinding through mine belts and fortified tree lines for months on end with mainly light infantry, no air support and eventually having to give up after become simply too worn down to continue simply does not speak for any of the above claims.

It seems the best comparison we have come from Vietnam and WW2 PTO where the defender kept its ground in large part by throwing bodies at the attacker.  There is a different statistical curve to losses because of this.  Standard battlefield ratios you're citing do not apply.

Russia's casualties did not come from Ukraine getting stuck in minebelts, they came from trying to retake lost positions.  Whatever favorable casualty ratio Russia might have had went right out the window when it did that because, as we have seen, Russian attacks are almost always very wasteful in Human lives.  Russia, by its own actions, gave Ukraine the opportunity to keep the kill ratios favorable.

Or do you think Russia's counter attacks maintained favorable casualty rates for their side even though they failed to retake ground?  That would be an absolute first for Russia, would it not?  So if you don't think this is the case, then you must conclude the most likely situation is that Russia suffered far more casualties in the fighting than Ukraine.

IMPORTANT!  This does not mean Ukraine's casualties were small or sustainable.  Hardly.

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

TW, one aspect we do have pretty good evidence off, are the unusually high losses of Russian artillery over the summer and, if I am not mistaken, the seemingly endless stream of videos showing 2S7s getting blown up by GMLRS and others started pretty much right after the offensive kicked off. But why then is there no (or rather so little) drone footage of slaughtered Russian counterattacks? I am not saying, they didn't happen at all, but rather that the Ukrainians probably overstated their significance/frequency and how destructive they were for the Russian forces involved.

You're looking at things in isolation again.  Russian sources were discussing the counter attacks and they were not flattering about their outcomes.  So I suppose the reasons we don't have lots of videos of these battles is because they didn't happen and both the Russians and Ukrainians were making it up.  Or it could be that there are other reasons for the lack of videos, such as it being easier and sexier showing a piece of Russian artillery exploding than it is to see a grainy video in high zoom of a shell blowing up a house with who knows what inside.

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

Also, regarding Ukraine's (social) media policies and "media blackouts" in particular, I have a hunch that they have been rather pragmatic about it right from the start. When they are spanking the Russians we get lots of videos and when the going gets tough, e.g., during the Russian (early) summer offensive 2022, the early stage Kherson (counter-)offensive and now the big 2023 (UKR) summer offensive, very little gets released. I find this explanation more reasonable than a deliberate media blackout for certain operations that sort of wanes over time.

For sure neither side likes to show off failure, but you are still not thinking about the obvious reason why we don't have tons of videos of Russian infantry dying... because it is DIFFICULT to capture on video by comparison to vehicles blowing up.  Even the PoV videos from 3rd Assault Brigade, which has a prolific media presence, is only scratching the surface of the fighting there.

I can't stress this enough... anecdotal videos released on social media can only help reinforce a point that is otherwise established by a variety of other information.  The infamous videos of the failed 47th armored breaches is a great example.  The videos definitely told us something real, but at the same time Ukraine was breaching Russian defenses in several other spots without similar losses.  The Russians tried hard to distort the videos of this specific Ukrainian tactical defeat as if it was happening everywhere.

What I'm saying is if your main counter to my arguments is the lack of videos... well, we'll just have to agree to disagree because I don't agree with your methodology.

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

I think I've seen this argument a couple of times here but I'm not sure why this would supposedly be the case. If I am not mistaken the argument was, that DPR guys would somehow mutiny, if they were deployed outside off their little faux-republic? If this is indeed the argument, I find it both highly illogical and refuted by the fact that these guys have been deployed all over the place many times before. D/LNR soldiers were left as expendable rear guard/cannon fodder during the first Kharkiv counter-offensive (the one in spring, when they retook Trostyanets), they manned the front line in Zaphorizia in fall of 2022 (as per Murz IIRC) and at least some of their more regular units (and probably Mobiks as well) bore the initial brunt of the 2023 summer offensive, at least in some places. There were some complaints by D/LNR soldiers rather early in the war about being deployed outside of Donetzk/Luhansk, but when do Russians not complain? And when has it lead to them not wanting to be sent into the meatgrinder.

The push back from DPR units, in particular, to fighting outside of Donetsk was cited as a reason for Russia finally pulling the trigger and forcing them into the official Russian command structure.  By all accounts that didn't go very well and the current state of affairs is that Russia isn't going to push the matter any further.  The units are, still, by and large territorial defense units.

As for DPR units being deployed outside of Donetsk, there are definitely cases where relatively small sized units (battalions) were moved there.  But wholesale brigades?  I challenge you to find any example of this happening.  I don't think you will find any and there's a host of very good, and very real, practical reasons why not.

The bottomline is the weight of evidence is that the rebuilt DPR units that participated in the Avdiivka offensive were not available for use outside of Donetsk.  Therefore, any arguments built upon the presumption that they could have been falls apart.

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

If I am reading you right, this is basically the core of your argument. That UKR was close to achieving a localized collapse (which may be true for all we know) and that moving reserves from Luhansk/Donetzk in a timely manner would have been to difficult to pull of, logistically and/or in C2C terms. Given the institutional culture of lying and general incompetence in the Russian command that could also well be true. But ultimately, I think one only has to presume the tiniest capacity for realistic assessment of the state of their own troops for the Russian command to anticipate any upcoming crumbling of their lines and to move an extra brigade every other week and put the lid on the whole thing. This is different from the rapid fall 2022  (Kharkiv) counter-offensive, when there simply weren't any reserves anywhere and the front had to be thread-bare in many places for them to be able to grind through Donetzk. But that was before mobilization plus a comfy cushion of 20k+ well-paid meatsacks per month to plug whatever gap needs plugging.

The Kharkiv counter-offensive was a wakeup call for Russia.  They drained their forces of resources in order to keep their positions on the right bank of the Dnepr.  When Ukraine struck Russia simply couldn't respond faster than Ukraine could advance.  However, Ukraine's own lack of reserves caused the attack to stall out once Russia did manage to throw enough bodies into a newly formed line.

Unlike last summer, this time Ukraine pretty much put all of its eggs in one basket because anything less than that would have made a big gain in the south unrealistic before the battle even started.  The decision to try for a big gain in one spot meant it didn't have any spare forces/resources to take advantage of thinned Russian lines elsewhere.  That includes Bakhmut, which was a generally successful second effort.  Only now are we seeing some signs of Ukraine being able to exploit opportunities in the form of positions on the left bank of the Dnepr.

Steve

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, poesel said:

Detecting something looking up into the sky is probably much easier than looking down or across the ground. There are also fewer obstacles in the sky, your missile has to avoid.

The amount of explosives you need to kill a UAS is much lower than what you need against vehicles or probably even troops. I guess you would also have a different type of explosion.

If this weapon was available now, both sides would use it, as there is nothing else available against the small copters. In the next war - who knows?

I suspect it may drive tac UAS lower but these things are already able to hug tree lines.  I mean we are talking about detecting something the size of a small bird while moving with much more agility than one.  And we are talking about a lot of them.

We are watching UAS killing tanks with repurposed DPICM rounds.  The shaped charges on those have about a half pound charge with with likely quarter pound NEQ (about 150 g).   What makes them deadly in UA hands is they can target specific parts of the vehicle (like an open hatch).  So NEQ is kinda a red herring because that missile can likely easily carry enough to damage or even kill a vehicle.  It’s guidance to find and hit a small UAS - and we are talking this generations set of UAS, not then next one - is extremely precise so again…why waste it on freakin UAS when you can just kill the forces the UAS is designed to support?  If I have 50 of those missiles, that is 50 dead vehicles or soldiers.  I mean sure go ahead and hit the UAS but those thing being fired at me is what I worry more about as opposed to UAS.

Current ATGM technology can already spot signatures on the ground (eg self loitering, Javelin).  That tech on a small cheap missile that can hit a UAS would be a nightmare for ground forces…and naval for that matter.  I am not sure people get how hard it is to spot and engage a small target like that effectively.  And again, if you could solve for it then whatever you introduce will be absolutely deadly to everything on the battlefield.  UAS will be an after thought if one is facing a smart-missile swarm with the abilities they would need to hit a UAS.

Now you could just go for a kinetic collision kill and skip the explosives to take out the UAS but a small warhead like that could fly up a tanks tailpipe, so why not put a charge on it?  In reality this is a multi-purpose missile nightmare if it ever came to full fruition.  It is like an effective CRAM, if you could do that to the level required nothing above ground would be safe.

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, JonS said:

Are you channelling Clancey, or was he channelling you?

I was 14 when Hunt For Red October came out so pretty sure it is me that is channeling.  Just noticing some similarities in asymmetries and wondering how that would have gone down.

[dan/california]

23 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I suspect it may drive tac UAS lower but these things are already able to hug tree lines.  I mean we are talking about detecting something the size of a small bird while moving with much more agility than one.  And we are talking about a lot of them.

We are watching UAS killing tanks with repurposed DPICM rounds.  The shaped charges on those have about a half pound charge with with likely quarter pound NEQ (about 150 g).   What makes them deadly in UA hands is they can target specific parts of the vehicle (like an open hatch).  So NEQ is kinda a red herring because that missile can likely easily carry enough to damage or even kill a vehicle.  It’s guidance to find and hit a small UAS - and we are talking this generations set of UAS, not then next one - is extremely precise so again…why waste it on freakin UAS when you can just kill the forces the UAS is designed to support?  If I have 50 of those missiles, that is 50 dead vehicles or soldiers.  I mean sure go ahead and hit the UAS but those thing being fired at me is what I worry more about as opposed to UAS.

Current ATGM technology can already spot signatures on the ground (eg self loitering, Javelin).  That tech on a small cheap missile that can hit a UAS would be a nightmare for ground forces…and naval for that matter.  I am not sure people get how hard it is to spot and engage a small target like that effectively.  And again, if you could solve for it then whatever you introduce will be absolutely deadly to everything on the battlefield.  UAS will be an after thought if one is facing a smart-missile swarm with the abilities they would need to hit a UAS.

Now you could just go for a kinetic collision kill and skip the explosives to take out the UAS but a small warhead like that could fly up a tanks tailpipe, so why not put a charge on it?  In reality this is a multi-purpose missile nightmare if it ever came to full fruition.  It is like an effective CRAM, if you could do that to the level required nothing above ground would be safe.

The thing that doesn't get discussed enough is the exact mechanism that makes UAS so hard to target. Almost all previous generations of military radar use a doppler effect filter to render the mass of signals that comes back to the receiver intelligible. To rephrase, the radar ignores everything that is not going 200mph/300 kph. For 70 plus years after WW2 this was generally valid assumption. UAVS defeat this simple trick by being small and slow, the slow part is important. I assume everyone in the radar business is frantically trying to teach their systems to use some sort of AI based systems to use some other combination of signals. But as Steve has discussed at length, if the solution cost tens of millions, and you  need thousands of them, you haven't actually solved the problem.

Edited November 19, 2023 by dan/california