How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, Grigb said:

I support the above but personally I believe that at some point FSB top will try to implement Navalny scenario akin to 1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt to get Western help and minimize territorial losses/preserve control over nukes.  

That is an interesting possibility.  A successful coup might keep things together more than they would otherwise stay together, but I have a feeling that a coup will be messy and someone will decide it's a good time to breakaway.

What does Navalny's think about Kadyrov?

Steve

[mosuri]

Any scuttlebutt on who was taking an ambulance jet flight?

 

[Bulletpoint]

4 minutes ago, mosuri said:

Any scuttlebutt on who was taking an ambulance jet flight?

 

I thought the airspace was closed?

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Specific thought about Russian AT weaponry.

We've remarked many times that it appears that the Bakhmut Human wave attacks seem to lack much beyond small arms and hand grenades.  We've also wondered why we've not seen more Ukrainian vehicles popping their tops to Russian AT weaponry since the war started.  Not even the cheap RPG-7 seems to be employed as it should be.  By that I mean every Russian rifle squad is supposed to have at least one, yet when we see even platoon sized units there's not much evidence of even one in use, not to mention 3 or 4. 

I wonder if Russia sold more of their AT weaponry off to the Syrians and others than they should have and didn't replace them when they had the chance?

Here's an image from a shipment to Yemen that the US Navy intercepted.  Chinese and Russian weapons:

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9558419/US-Navy-seizes-arms-shipment-Arabian-Sea-amid-Yemen-war.html

Steve

Send it all straight to Ukraine!

12 minutes ago, mosuri said:

Any scuttlebutt on who was taking an ambulance jet flight?

 

???????!!

7 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

I thought the airspace was closed?

Exactly, who is important enough to get this ride and not under 97 kinds of sanctions and indictment at the Hague? 

[Bulletpoint]

3 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Exactly, who is important enough to get this ride and not under 97 kinds of sanctions and indictment at the Hague? 

It went from Moscow to Nuremberg of all places:

[dan/california]

 

[akd]

Ukrainians finally prove that sniping TCs in their hatches on the move from KMs away is entirely realistic:

 

[Mattias]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Right, but let's remember here that the Russian pilot was *not* charged with warcrimes.  He was charged with the destruction of civilian infrastructure, just as a domestic criminal would be.  It's a very simple thing... the pilot knowingly destroyed something of monetary value and he has no legal defense for doing so.  Therefore, he should be held accountable in an appropriate judicial setting just like anybody else would be for deliberately causing such damage.

 

Is that really a thing? Aren’t the “laws of war” specifically tailored to avoid the hysterical nit picking that would ensue if war and warriors, where subjected to scrutiny under laws actually based on the assumption of decent human behaviour? I mean, common, what kind of world would that be - were people that in power, big and small, were actually held responsible for every single little trifle?

[Haiduk]

24 minutes ago, mosuri said:

Any scuttlebutt on who was taking an ambulance jet flight?

 

Russian social media say (as RUMINT of course), this is for Russian singer Nikolay Rastorguyev, frontman of "Lyube" group - one of the favorite groups of Putin. Despite own ura-patrotism Rastorguyev already long time lived in "cursed" NATO's Germany. Probably he has even German citizenship. Typical thing for Russian "elite". To hate "spiritualess and hostile" West for plebs, but to live there for their own, store there own money and teach there own children. And of course use achievements of western medicine technologies instead to be treated in "best and most progressive country in the world"

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

That is a very interesting question. I believe Prig with his mouth managed to stir a RU pot. He directly threatened:

• RU generals
• RU local civilian authorities (governors and mayors but also hinted at various smaller officials)
• RU so-called oligarchs and simply rich people

All of these folks (and their subordinates) received a clear message: if Prig gains power, they will very certainly get a hammer to their skulls. So, I believe once Putin is gone the struggle for power would be much more intense with much more actors involved because avoiding power struggle seems to be not an option anymore.

Prig is surrounded by militarily skilled criminals for hire.  What is most likely is someone will simply outbid Prig, by a lot, and Prig will be dead.  We already know these men make a living via murder for money, so it's an easy choice.  

Edited March 6, 2023 by danfrodo

[Seminole]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

At present the United States and its allies can not openly make any references to planning for the Russian Federation breaking apart.  That would be a massive propaganda gift to Putin's regime as that is what he says the West wants. 

It’s not just Putin saying it, you spent the next paragraph pining for it.  We can acknowledge it is a goal in the West, without that being labeled ‘Putin propaganda’, right?

I’m baffled people can see how NATO partitioned Kosovo, can point to the potential ethnic conflicts inside the borders of the Russian federation, but claim that they simply can’t perceive how Moscow could ever feel threatened by NATO.  
 

The ‘duty to protect’ framework is how NATO would justify helping a separatist/insurrection movement.  We’ve seen it before. 
 

Only question is whether they’d put the Russians in a situation where they thought nukes were the only way they could avoid ‘losing’ (however defined). 

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

That is an interesting possibility.  A successful coup might keep things together more than they would otherwise stay together, but I have a feeling that a coup will be messy and someone will decide it's a good time to breakaway.

Most likely but unspoken RU cultural trait dictates that to save Russia a lot of territory can be sacrificed. So, if this is the price to pay for preservation of RU state and nukes, they are going to accept it. 

 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

What does Navalny's think about Kadyrov?

An interesting and challenging question to answer. Navalny is a nonviolent, soft nationalist who began his political career battling against the threat of highlanders to the ethnic Russian population. Kadyrov is the embodiment of that threat. Also, Navalny is old enough to recall young Kadyrov's attitude toward Russians. Moreover, Kadyrov's corruption is a continual focus of Navalny's anti-corruption investigations. In theory, Navalny is totally opposed to Kadyrov.

Navalny isn't a fighter in practice. He is a manager. Without the backing of someone strong, he is vulnerable to direct physical coercion into all kinds of political views. One-on-one with Kadyrov, he will be forced to do anything Kadyrov wants. Thus, in the end, Navalny may become an ally of Kadyrov.

Though I am a bit worried about Don health. 

Edited March 6, 2023 by Grigb

[Grigb]

7 hours ago, Butschi said:

By definition, confirmed rumor isn't rumor, or is it?

Depending on how strong confirmation is. If it is not strong enough (like in this case) the information moves from my folder Nothing to my folder Rumor. 

7 hours ago, Butschi said:

Said every yellow press reporter ever. Sorry, couldn't resist.

First you assess the reputation of the source. My reputation is vastly different from the reputation of yellow press reporters.

[Haiduk]

Since Navalnyi has suddenly changed own opinion about Crimea - now he doesn't claim "Crimea is not a sandwich to hand over it there and back again", but "Ukriane have to be restored in 1991 borders" and even ready to pay reparations, many his followers now say that Russian liberals now need to find other leader, who will care about interests of Russians, plundered by Putin's regime, but not interests of other countries (meant Ukraine). 

[sburke]

28 minutes ago, Seminole said:

It’s not just Putin saying it, you spent the next paragraph pining for it.  We can acknowledge it is a goal in the West, without that being labeled ‘Putin propaganda’, right?

I’m baffled people can see how NATO partitioned Kosovo, can point to the potential ethnic conflicts inside the borders of the Russian federation, but claim that they simply can’t perceive how Moscow could ever feel threatened by NATO.  
 

The ‘duty to protect’ framework is how NATO would justify helping a separatist/insurrection movement.  We’ve seen it before. 
 

Only question is whether they’d put the Russians in a situation where they thought nukes were the only way they could avoid ‘losing’ (however defined). 

so cause and effect is a challenge for you? 

Putin - NATO wants to dismantle Russia so I have to wage a war of aggression.

NATO - Putin is ONCE AGAIN launching an unprovoked war of aggression, there has to be a way to resolve this permanently.

You also may want to read more on Kosovo as it seems you have some challenges understanding their situation.  I was fortunate enough to be reading about that from the Kosovo perspective at the time and met some folks from Kosovo while traveling.  Here you go if this helps.

Quote

Following their defeat in the Balkan Wars, the Ottomans ceded Kosovo to Serbia and Montenegro. Both countries joined Yugoslavia after World War I, and following a period of Yugoslav unitarism in the Kingdom, the post-World War II Yugoslav constitution established the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija within the Yugoslav constituent republic of Serbia. Tensions between Kosovo's Albanian and Serb communities simmered through the 20th century and occasionally erupted into major violence, culminating in the Kosovo War of 1998 and 1999, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army, and the establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. Ultimately, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008,[14] 

 

[Butschi]

31 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Depending on how strong confirmation is. If it is not strong enough (like in this case) the information moves from my folder Nothing to my folder Rumor. 

Um... Very fitting definition from Collins Dictionary: an unconfirmed report, story, or statement in general circulation

I'm sorry, but I'll go with the official defintion which is not based on your folders.

31 minutes ago, Grigb said:

First you assess the reputation of the source. My reputation is vastly different from the reputation of yellow press reporters.

This is either very dry humor or a big assumption.

Edited March 6, 2023 by Butschi

[Battlefront.com]

58 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Most likely but unspoken RU cultural trait dictates that to save Russia a lot of territory can be sacrificed. So, if this is the price to pay for preservation of RU state and nukes, they are going to accept it. 

I think it depends on what region breaks away.  If it is too big and motivated, they will have to let it go even if they don't want to.  That fits your definition.  But if it has nukes on its soil?  I don't think they'll be inclined to do so unless there is a very quickly established agreement to hand the nukes over to Russia.

I also wonder about the Russian psyche in regards to Siberia.  In the event of a breakup this would probably be the most difficult region to keep under Russian control, but I have to wonder if Russia would try hard to do it just because it is Siberia.

That said, the 1990 breakup of the Soviet Union was largely peaceful because Russians felt they had what they needed short term and could bide their time to reverse things later on.  That's what Putin's primary mission has been for the last 20 years.

58 minutes ago, Grigb said:

 

An interesting and challenging question to answer. Navalny is a nonviolent, soft nationalist who began his political career battling against the threat of highlanders to the ethnic Russian population. Kadyrov is the embodiment of that threat. Also, Navalny is old enough to recall young Kadyrov's attitude toward Russians. Moreover, Kadyrov's corruption is a continual focus of Navalny's anti-corruption investigations. In theory, Navalny is totally opposed to Kadyrov.

Navalny isn't a fighter in practice. He is a manager. Without the backing of someone strong, he is vulnerable to direct physical coercion into all kinds of political views. One-on-one with Kadyrov, he will be forced to do anything Kadyrov wants. Thus, in the end, Navalny may become an ally of Kadyrov.

Thanks for that.  I was thinking that Navalny (or someone similar) would have to be pragmatic about Kadyrov *or* be prepared for Chechnya (and most of the Caucuses) to leave Russia's direct control.  Er, not that Chechnya is in fact controlled by Moscow now.

58 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Though I am a bit worried about Don health. 

Yeah, the latest round of speculating on the health of key players has raised some questions about Kadyrov.  The loss of Kadyrov has the potential to change everything.

Steve

[Tux]

1 hour ago, Seminole said:

It’s not just Putin saying it, you spent the next paragraph pining for it.  We can acknowledge it is a goal in the West, without that being labeled ‘Putin propaganda’, right?

I’m baffled people can see how NATO partitioned Kosovo, can point to the potential ethnic conflicts inside the borders of the Russian federation, but claim that they simply can’t perceive how Moscow could ever feel threatened by NATO.  
 

The ‘duty to protect’ framework is how NATO would justify helping a separatist/insurrection movement.  We’ve seen it before. 
 

Only question is whether they’d put the Russians in a situation where they thought nukes were the only way they could avoid ‘losing’ (however defined). 

Are you being deliberately disingenuous to make a point or do you honestly think discussions about the ways in which Russia might split apart were common before this war started?

Russia started a war. People on this board (amongst others) have assessed that as having been a bad idea and don’t think that Russia can win. The question is then raised: “what does Russia losing actually look like?” and a conversation follows which considers, among other things, what lines it might fracture along, if it fractures.

The only way in which it can be considered to be “a goal in the West” is if it is adjudged to be the least bad option.  Kind of like how driving into a tree might become a “goal” if the alternative is to go over a cliff edge.

If Putin or Russians in general are truly afraid of westerners having that conversation then they should stop smashing their country’s future against the Ukrainian army and focus on making the Russian Federation into.. just.. *any* kind of good neighbour.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Mattias said:

Is that really a thing? Aren’t the “laws of war” specifically tailored to avoid the hysterical nit picking that would ensue if war and warriors, where subjected to scrutiny under laws actually based on the assumption of decent human behaviour?

The Russian pilot violated the "laws of war" within an inherently illegal war.  Legally speaking, he has nothing protecting him from prosecution and punishment.

1 hour ago, Mattias said:

I mean, common, what kind of world would that be - were people that in power, big and small, were actually held responsible for every single little trifle?

A better and just world?

The legal aspects of warfare have been evolving for thousands of years.  I don't think we've reached the end of that evolution.

Steve

[BletchleyGeek]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Haven’t we been here before?  Back at Severodonetsk were we not told at length how Russia had reframed this war in their favour?  And back then the RA still had massive artillery in play, now their indirect fires appear in trouble.

Regardless, we got the same stories of the UA bleeding out and “behind the curve”…and then Kharkiv and Kherson happened.

Here we are again. I am almost at the point that I am thinking this is a blue disinformation op aimed at getting the RA to keep pushing (and dying) at Bakhmut in order to weaken the line elsewhere.  The reported Russian losses are staggering and unlike the poorly mobilized infantry, all those vehicles and equipment are not things the RA has a “bottomless sea” of within its inventory.

UA is going to take losses and frankly it is in their best interests to look desperate - just keeping that big win slightly out of reach while the RA continues to bleed out.

Here is an actual metric of the UA bleeding out: when they stop sending thousands of troops to western training centres.  Once we can no longer load Ukrainians on these course streams because there are none left willing or able to fight, we know that the UA is actually in trouble.  That or some sort of RA break through.

One year one I think it is clear that Michael K. (and other like-minded people, like Rob Lee) is concerned about reaching for conclusions prematurely. That's his job: to think out of the box and try to seek out the black swan. In particular, his concern is that the Russian ability to win this war is discounted prematurely due to the "Winter War"-like experience of Feb-April 2022. There were lots of comparisons out there with the first part of the Finnish-Soviet war of 1939 and 1940. Interestingly, those analogies seemed to forget how the war ended: with the defeat of the Finnish forces, crushed by the material superiority of the Red Army. He has been quite consistent for the time that I have been following him and reading his stuff. And now he's gone to check things by himself (how close to the heat I don't know, but I think we are in agreement that hands-on experience on a topic has intrinsic value).

 

Certainly, the Ukrainians are very good at selling the story that they are in trouble, and use this for maskirovka to misdirect the Russian Army (and also out of necessity, as otherwise, it would be even more difficult for them to get the equipment and ammunition that they do _desperately_ need, like mortars). 

My thoughts about how hard things may be for the Ukrainian army follow from a very simple mathematical model which has been adopted by NATO war planning for a very long time. If you have blue suffering 1% losses per day, and red 10% losses per day, as long as Red has the ability to replenish the ranks, it won't be long until Blue casualties are also catastrophic (e.g. like losing 20% of fighting personnel, which I think is a heuristic used to determine loss of combat effectiveness). Then there is the tactical psychology angle in all this: the more casualties a well-trained, close-knit force suffers, the less willing it will be to come under fire. Inserting well-trained replacements into those formations (in the style of the US Army in 1944-45) is generally deemed to be a bad policy, so the alternative is to pull out entire formations and let them reconstitute.

There is a breaking point for everyone, and I think that making the question re: Bakhmut is valid. It is good to quote Nathaniel Greene regarding Bunker Hill "I wish I could sell them another hill at this price", but like also happened to the Continental Army later in Brooklyn, the roles of "buyer" and "seller" of hills can be traded inadvertently with pretty bad results.

I do think though, that drawing further inferences about what this means for hypothetical Spring counter-offensives treads on thin ice.

 

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, Mattias said:

Is that really a thing? Aren’t the “laws of war” specifically tailored to avoid the hysterical nit picking that would ensue if war and warriors, where subjected to scrutiny under laws actually based on the assumption of decent human behaviour? I mean, common, what kind of world would that be - were people that in power, big and small, were actually held responsible for every single little trifle?

AFAIK no war was declared.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Seminole said:

It’s not just Putin saying it, you spent the next paragraph pining for it.  We can acknowledge it is a goal in the West, without that being labeled ‘Putin propaganda’, right?

Except that it is absolutely NOT the goal of the West.  A broken apart Russia makes national security headaches go from major to migraine overnight.  Trade and diplomacy become nightmares.  International criminal accountability (e.g. hacker havens) becomes vastly worse.  Humanitarian disasters are almost assured.  China will likely come away from it stronger.  Etc.

Nope, the West does NOT want Russia to break apart.  What it wants is for Putin and his ilk to be removed from power by someone that isn't as bad.

1 hour ago, Seminole said:

I’m baffled people can see how NATO partitioned Kosovo, can point to the potential ethnic conflicts inside the borders of the Russian federation, but claim that they simply can’t perceive how Moscow could ever feel threatened by NATO.  
 

Ugh, this again.  Of course Russia is threatened by NATO, just like a serial rapist and murder is threatened by the police.  It's pretty straight forward.

1 hour ago, Seminole said:

Only question is whether they’d put the Russians in a situation where they thought nukes were the only way they could avoid ‘losing’ (however defined). 

We've discussed this way too many times.  Short of it is this is exactly why the West does not want Russia to break apart.

Steve

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The Russian pilot violated the "laws of war" within an inherently illegal war.  Legally speaking, he has nothing protecting him from prosecution and punishment.

A better and just world?

The legal aspects of warfare have been evolving for thousands of years.  I don't think we've reached the end of that evolution.

Steve

Two points

1) Putin's silliness with calling this disaster a "Special Military Operation" instead of a war probably makes every Russian in Ukraines legal situation worse. The pilot may be a case in point.

2) The Ukrainians haven't shot him or anything. So it is likely as not he will get rolled into the prisoner exchange that will be part of whatever treaty/armistice ends this thing. After all he is only accused of a property crime. 

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, akd said:

Ukrainians finally prove that sniping TCs in their hatches on the move from KMs away is entirely realistic:

 

That's NUTS

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

One year one I think it is clear that Michael K. (and other like-minded people, like Rob Lee) is concerned about reaching for conclusions prematurely. That's his job: to think out of the box and try to seek out the black swan.

Sure, but Kofman has been chasing shadows of things that don't exist.  His credibility is quite low as he's been wrong about this war pretty consistently since before and after the invasion.  He's not stupid or ill informed, not at all, but he does seem to be predisposed to thinking Russia is far more capable than it really is.

Steve