How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

11 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

All that's been mentioned in the news are M60 AVLBs. What is the training cycle for engineering equipment of this sort? Could be more about coordination with all arms than just plug and play there is a bridge. 

Well it ain’t small.  Depends on how they are going to use them but armoured bridges are notoriously finicky regardless.  Driver training is the same as the chassis - maint, operation and manoeuvre have a few quirks but basically are the same as the tank itself, but without a gun of course.  It is launching and trafficking the bridge which takes training, not just the mechanical systems but understanding the limitations of the bridge and then securing it and running a crossing site.  You can get a basic vehicle crew likely trained up in weeks, but the practical stuff of integration within a combat team takes practice and exercises.  

AVLBs can be employ for crossings or breaching ops.  Both have distinct challenges and requirements.  If you abuse the bridge or play fast and lose you can knock the entire system out of battle (the launcher mechanisms on the tank are pretty fussy), so crews really need to know what they are doing before going out live.

This whole thing speaks to all arms assault operations, which is a whole suite of activities.  My bet is the UA is training up units in the backfield to get them ready for an offensive, and we are starting to see more and more specialized equipment being pushed in for that job.

[kevinkin]

I agree. And speaking to those bridge laying AFVs publicly is a message of confidence. Who knows what else is in these packages that is not publicly known. It also appears that Nato training is in general cycling through more and more of the UA. Perhaps, becoming self sustaining with regular rotations soon. 

[dan/california]

51 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well it ain’t small.  Depends on how they are going to use them but armoured bridges are notoriously finicky regardless.  Driver training is the same as the chassis - maint, operation and manoeuvre have a few quirks but basically are the same as the tank itself, but without a gun of course.  It is launching and trafficking the bridge which takes training, not just the mechanical systems but understanding the limitations of the bridge and then securing it and running a crossing site.  You can get a basic vehicle crew likely trained up in weeks, but the practical stuff of integration within a combat team takes practice and exercises.  

AVLBs can be employ for crossings or breaching ops.  Both have distinct challenges and requirements.  If you abuse the bridge or play fast and lose you can knock the entire system out of battle (the launcher mechanisms on the tank are pretty fussy), so crews really need to know what they are doing before going out live.

This whole thing speaks to all arms assault operations, which is a whole suite of activities.  My bet is the UA is training up units in the backfield to get them ready for an offensive, and we are starting to see more and more specialized equipment being pushed in for that job.

Did Ukraine have any of the Soviet versions when this all started? They would still have to learn completely new hardware, But I would think the general awareness of the many things that go wrong when you try to replace a project that takes six months with a massive piece metal that you set down in a few minutes. I can also envision it being very difficult to find soils that would support load in a place with special words for bottomless muck.

[sburke]

4 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Did Ukraine have any of the Soviet versions when this all started? They would still have to learn completely new hardware, But I would think the general awareness of the many things that go wrong when you try to replace a project that takes six months with a massive piece metal that you set down in a few minutes. I can also envision it being very difficult to find soils that would support load in a place with special words for bottomless muck.

wasn't that dude who helped plan the defensive operations against the Russian river disaster kind of "that" dude?

[dan/california]

He would be high on my list if available. Along with people who drove the very biggest farm equipment. Some of that stuff is simultaneously massive and very finicky.

[Rokko]

Now this I found *very* interesting:

If true (that this is really their assessment) it would explain why the Ukrainians keep holding on to Bakhmut despite the enormous costs and risks. I think anyone would deem a 7-1 casualty ratio favourable under such circumstances. Whether this is actually accurate remains to be seen of course.

I have noted several times, though, that the Ukrainians often seem to release drone footage of flights which seem to have served no other purpose than to count mountains of dead Russians. Perhaps their baseline estimates are more accurate than we would think...

Edited March 4, 2023 by Rokko
link formatting

[kevinkin]

For what it's worth:

Today, nuclear deterrence provides the Russian forces with a modern “Ukraine Line.” With the threat of atomic weapons, Russian forces are able to withdraw from campaigns that are failing, reconstitute, and redeploy to other portions of Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have noted that there are more Russian forces currently deployed than were massed last year at the start of the invasion.

Clausewitz’s short treatise on a seemingly obscure conflict in eighteenth-century Russian history imparts lessons for strategists today. First, even in ages that focus on the rules of engagement and laws of war, enemy forces might target civilians in order to distract their opponents and shape the situation to their advantage. Second, logistical problems can hinder a force more than enemy action. Third, the center of gravity may not be military casualties; heavy enemy losses do not always equate victory. Fourth, creating a situation where your home territory is defended from attack enables withdrawal, reconstitution, and redeployment.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/03/02/clausewitzs_analysis_resonates_to_this_day_885101.html

We understand the power of having nukes, the importance of logistics and suicidal nature of Russia when it comes to operations. They are doing the "same old, same old". The UA should forget about the center of gravity and maneuver against Russia's critical vulnerability by finding surprising ways to break Russia's ability to sustain forces in Ukraine. Sort of reminds of the isolation of Normandy and interdiction of German supplies via the air campaign. Like guerrilla warfare but conducted by regular forces on a large scale against irreplaceable targets. 

[LongLeftFlank]

18 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I believe that he is referring to the pretty complex factors at play within force generation.  These are more than a simple target number, which is pretty much entirely quantitative; however, even that has to be taken into account with respect to both attrition and requirements within force employment models - more simply put “how many people are Ukraine losing, compared to how many they need, compared to how many they can produce?”  At least three dynamic “curves” there, and we have not even rolled in the curves for the Russian side of this as we have two systems in competition.  More broadly, there is also demographic and other elements of national power at play - your posts seem to suggest that all Ukraine has to do right now is fight, but that have a lot of other things going on to support that, or simply exists as a society, which all take human capacity - running of government, industry and trade etc. (and it ain’t all “the women folk” who are doing it).

And then there is the qualitative dimension.  On paper Russia is producing tens of thousands of invading troops, but what is that troop quality compared to the fewer Ukrainians (if it is indeed fewer)?  This just scratches the curves of troop specialists and critical enablers.  The UA is not just stamping out infantrymen they have to train up engineers, gunners, medics, logistics, Recce, intelligence, HQ staff of all shapes and a sizes - everyone of these have a “curve” of both production and how “well” they are prepared before they are operational.

And then there is equipment production curves versus losses.  These need to be linked to human force generation as we do need to arm them with something.

And then there is “how much is enough” training?  Is qualitative demand being met, that is a feedback loop from the field that constantly needs to be adjusted.  And then there is the qualitative curves effects on quantitative, and vice versa.  This in it self creates a curve over time in comparison of the RA.

And then there is force integration - how much can the existing system absorb effectively….a lotta curves.

Basically he is suggesting, somewhat sarcastically, that your analysis and assessment was a little shallow, and your deductions/conclusions may need a revisit.  The fact that he can do that in one sentence should suggest that the individual has a level of expertise on the subject, and perhaps is worth considering the point.

Thanks for at least writing a proper reply, but with regard to my point, it isn't really much more responsive than Jon's (which didn't even rise to the level of sophistry).

....You both are effectively talking down:  be still Grasshopper, such things are all far too complex and unknowable (OPSEC), and it is pure alarmism to be bringing it up at all, nuffink to see here. Just put your trust in the All Knowing UA Generalstabs and wait to see what they unleash. Meanwhile, enjoy scrolling another hundred 'Dumb Mobik' Tweets and Western political handwringing, or wev, while we await the Big Push.

 

****

....So one more time, let me restate my hypothesis:

(1)   Based on the vast preponderance of evidence presented in this thread since Feb 2022, the 'correlation of forces' in this war strongly favours the Defence.

With the exceptions in point (4) below, large scale set piece attacks by either side have been pyrrhic, at best eking out positional gains not exploitable and not justified by the costs.

(2)   While at an operational level the Russians are still (stupidly) attacking, with results that continue to support point (1), strategically speaking they are the Defender. 

(3)  To 'win' the war (as defined by themselves), Putin must now Defend most of the lands his army holds until a cease fire is finally declared (a la Korea). That could take years, but Russia doesn't just dissolve away.

(4)  To date, Attackers have retaken territory only when (a) Defenders have vacated it, due to overextending or a supply crisis, or (b) when Defenders were caught in the process of redeploying, as happened in the Izium-Oskil sector in late summer. UA has done brilliantly at seizing these openings, full marks.

(5)  BUT to this day, neither side has solved for large scale Attacks against well-manned,  prepared and supplied Defences.

(6)  Opinions vary as to what Attacking force is required for the modernising UA to solve for this conundrum, at the land bridge or elsewhere.  (Your post, and your priors, lists out some of these and many thanks).

But whether it's combined mech, or jaegers, or combat sappers, or what, overmatching and breaking the Defenders is going to take a large number of additional fresh, well-trained and kitted out troops. The force must suffice to break through, exploit and secure the gains.

(7)  The number of required troops is open to much debate, but seems to be in the nature of 40,000 - 65,000 (3 divisions + support)?

....and I am very open to your (or anyone else's) views, or credible links, on that topic. 

[And ok, fine, it isn't just a raw Number X = Success! it's quality, skillsets, deployments, all the other factors, as you duly note. But it sure as hell isn't ZERO, i.e. about the same number as fighting now, just better and moar techie].

(8)  It also seems to me that in spite of OPSEC, the Ukrainians are having some difficulties generating that offensive capable force, of whatever size. Hence, 'behind the curve' (and no, I'm not about to write a trig function for those who  claim ignorance of this idiom).

....Evidence remains anecdotal, fine. Hell, we're just a bunch of gamers reading twitter and reading the tea leaves.

But since the UA is struggling to hold Bakhmut (I don't buy that they're yielding it willingly) and (anecdotally) throwing in raw recruits, it signals to me that that their new army is still a long way from being ready to disembowel Wagner, 76th VDV or the Russian naval infantry, even though all these units now seem ripe for a counterpunch.

So let's say we find ourselves slipping back to May or June. And it turns out the Russians have, e.g. amassed 10,000 Chinese Lancets and another 10,000 NLAW/Jav knockoffs, in addition to all their other defensive works, with time to train mobiks in their use.

How does the Big Push go then?

Edited March 4, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Baneman]

4 hours ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Boris Johnson interested in applying for post of NATO Secretary-General (euroweeklynews.com)

That Boris Johnson is everywhere.

Be afraid Putin be very afraid! 

It may just be me, but I think that NATO would want someone competent.

[chuckdyke]

26 minutes ago, Baneman said:

It may just be me, but I think that NATO would want someone competent.

Just the man for the job. No Action Talk Only.

 

[TheVulture]

35 minutes ago, Baneman said:

It may just be me, but I think that NATO would want someone competent.

Putin, on the other hand, world probably be quite pleased at the concept of Boris Johnson as NATO secretary general.

[cesmonkey]

U.S. intel on China considering lethal aid for Putin's war was gleaned from Russian officials
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/us-intel-china-considering-lethal-aid-putins-war-was-gleaned-russian-o-rcna72994

Quote

Initial U.S. intelligence suggesting that China is considering supplying lethal aid to Russia for its war in Ukraine was gleaned from Russian government officials, according to one current and one former U.S. official familiar with the intelligence.

U.S. officials then spent weeks corroborating the information from other sources of intelligence, the current and former officials said, and with allies who also brought additional streams of information.

The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence matters.

 

[Degsy]

Podcast - The Russian Volunteer Corps

An interview with Michael Colborne, the head of the Bellingcat Monitoring Project, about the RVC, its leader Denis Nikitin, and the recent cross border raid. The time stamps are:-

(3:56) What is the Russian Volunteer Corps and who is Denis Nikitin?

(13:49) What is Denis Nikitin’s ideology?

(20:19) The ties between the Russian Volunteer Corps and Ukraine’s Armed Forces

(24:23) Previous border incursions into the Bryansk region

(30:57) Probably not a Russian false flag

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Thanks for at least writing a proper reply, but that response isn't really much more substantive than Jon's (which didn't even rise to the level of sophistry).

....You both are effectively talking down:  be still Grasshopper, such things are all far too complex and unknowable (OPSEC), and it is pure alarmism to be bringing it up at all, nuffink to see here. Just put your trust in the All Knowing UA Generalstabs and wait to see what they unleash. Meanwhile, enjoy scrolling another hundred 'Dumb Mobik' Tweets and Western political handwringing, or wev, while we await the Big Push.

 

****

....So one more time, let me restate my hypothesis:

(1)   Based on the vast preponderance of evidence presented in this thread since Feb 2022, the 'correlation of forces' in this war strongly favours the Defence.

With the exceptions in point (4) below, large scale set piece attacks by either side have been pyrrhic, at best eking out positional gains not exploitable and not justified by the costs.

(2)   While at an operational level the Russians are still (stupidly) attacking, with results that continue to support point (1), strategically speaking they are the Defender. 

(3)  To 'win' the war (as defined by themselves), Putin must now Defend most of the lands his army holds until a cease fire is finally declared (a la Korea). That could take years, but Russia doesn't just dissolve away.

(4)  To date, Attackers have retaken territory only when (a) Defenders have vacated it, due to overextending or a supply crisis, or (b) when Defenders were caught in the process of redeploying, as happened in the Izium-Oskil sector in late summer. UA has done brilliantly at seizing these openings, full marks.

(5)  BUT to this day, neither side has solved for large scale Attacks against well-manned,  prepared and supplied Defences.

(6)  Opinions vary as to what Attacking force is required for the modernising UA to solve for this conundrum, at the land bridge or elsewhere. But whether it's combined mech, or jaegers, or combat sappers, or what, overmatching and breaking the Defenders is going to take a large number of additional fresh, well-trained and kitted out troops. The force must suffice to break through, exploit and secure the gains.

(7)  The number of required troops is open to much debate, but seems to be in the nature of 40,000 - 65,000 (3 divisions + support)?

....and I am very open to your (or anyone else's) views, or credible links, on that topic.

(8)  It also seems to me that in spite of OPSEC, the Ukrainians are having some difficulties generating that level of force. Hence, 'behind the curve' (and no, I'm not about to write a trig function for those who  claim ignorance of this idiom).

....Evidence remains anecdotal, fine. Hell, we're just a bunch of gamers reading twitter and reading the tea leaves.

But since the UA is struggling to hold Bakhmut (I don't buy that they're yielding it willingly), it signals to me that that their new army is still a long way from being ready to disembowel Wagner, 76th VDV or the Russian naval infantry, even though all these units now seem ripe for a counterpunch.

So let's say we find ourselves slipping back to May or June. And it turns out the Russians have, e.g. amassed 10,000 Chinese Lancets and another 10,000 NLAW/Jav knockoffs, in addition to all their other defensive works, with time to train mobiks in their use.

How does the Big Push go then?

I have to disagree on a bunch of that.

#1) I'm not so sure that defense is strongly favored.  Ukraine wasn't prepared to fight a static defense and had to give up a lot of territory early to trade for time.  If defense were heavily favored, Russia wouldn't have made the initial gains that it did.  When Ukraine has been on deliberate offense (Kyiv, Kharkiv, then Kherson) they've made rapid gains.  What they didn't do in any of those is attack head on.

#4) "Ukraine has done brilliantly at seizing these openings" is incorrect.  They've done brilliantly at creating those openings.  As I pointed out in #1 - Ukraine had to trade a lot of distance for time and to let Russia overextend itself in order to make the counterattack in Kyiv work.  They played that defense and counterattack to their strengths and took advantage of weaknesses of the RA (which were visible to the combination of UA, babushkanet, and NATO ISR).  They used all that ISR to devastate the column headed for Kyiv, leading to the "gesture of goodwill".  They used that ISR plus NATO materiel to create a situation around Kharkiv that Russia was forced to retreat from to avoid collapse.  They did it in parallel around Kherson to avoid getting drawn into a slow and brutal urban fight.  I suspect they're doing it again while Russia bashes its head against Bakhmut, and we'll probably see the effects when the ground gets solid again.

#5) Ukraine has solved for large scale attacks against prepared defenses.  The answer is "don't".  It's more effective for them to corrode the Russian logistics train and keep pushing the supply depots further and further back as longer range weapons come in from NATO.  The NYT thing I linked to had an indirect statement that indicated that UA CB capability has forced RU artillery back far enough that the UA supply route into Bakhmut isn't under RU fire control, despite the extent of the RU pincers (as an aside, I don't think RU has succeeded yet in any attempt to close a pincer of any size since Feb 2022)

#6) I think it's pronounced "ISR plus action at a distance", and maybe spelled "GLSDB+ATACMS".  It provides the equivalent action at a distance of a western air force, at the penalty of slightly less response speed and flexibility than you'd get with NATO style air supremacy.  Air support is really just a flavor of very long range artillery.

#7 & #8) I don't think we have evidence of difficulties of UA force generation other than them not throwing masses into frontal attacks. And that's something we've already seen that they don't really do.  They are feeding reinforcements into Bakhmut at possibly a fairly high cost because they're getting sufficient information to convince them that the relative cost is much, much higher for RU.  Aside from the body count videos, they also can get complementary information through various forms of ISR to verify the impact to the RU forces.

It's really hard to say Ukraine is "struggling to hold Bakhmut".  It's got essentially no strategic value as a geographical location to occupy.  They aren't struggling to hold it.  They're staying there because the see a long term advantage to the effect it's having in RU forces.  RU started working on it in what, August?  And they've gained how many kms at what price?  

I doubt that China is supplying 10k lancets, and it's even less likely that they'd supply as many NLAW/Jav knockoffs (which are going to be kind of sad for lack of IR detectors). I can (and sometimes do) buy a lot of cheap chinese electronics, but cheap chinese IR sensors are cheap, and there aren't expensive ones on the market.  They have no reason to restrict their export to the US, other than to hide lack of capability, because I can get US/Canada manufactured sensors.

 

 

[chrisl]

22 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

U.S. intel on China considering lethal aid for Putin's war was gleaned from Russian officials
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/us-intel-china-considering-lethal-aid-putins-war-was-gleaned-russian-o-rcna72994

 

Until we actually see chinese stuff showing up in quantity on the Russian side, I'm going to take "China is considering" the same way one should interpret "I'll think about that" from my graduate advisor.  It translates to "I'm not going to say no, but it's not going to happen".

[niall78]

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/mar/04/cpac-rightwing-republicans-ukraine-support-marjorie-taylor-greene

 

Worrying article in the Guardian this morning.

Lot of moaning here about German weapons and the like but this is pure fifth column action by the usual suspects in the US.

[chuckdyke]

3 minutes ago, niall78 said:

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/mar/04/cpac-rightwing-republicans-ukraine-support-marjorie-taylor-greene

 

Worrying article in the Guardian this morning.

Lot of moaning here about German weapons and the like but this is pure fifth column action by the usual suspects in the US.

Never mind a US Republican President guaranteed the integrity of the Ukraine for exchange of the nuclear weapons that country possessed. If the US renege on its guarantees it will be just about as credible as China or Russia. But without doubt the Republican party should be aware of this.

[niall78]

2 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

Never mind a US Republican President guaranteed the integrity of the Ukraine for exchange of the nuclear weapons that country possessed. If the US renege on its guarantees it will be just about as credible as China or Russia. But without doubt the Republican party should be aware of this.

Are they involved with taking Russian money like the Conservatives in the UK?

Brexit was built on Putin's cash and disinformation. A cheap way to destabilise the EU and wreck the UK.

Has he got fingers in the political/media system in the States?

[chuckdyke]

Alice in Wonderland once you're on the Merry Go Round you can't just jump off it. 

[Grigb]

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

Now this I found *very* interesting:

If true (that this is really their assessment) it would explain why the Ukrainians keep holding on to Bakhmut despite the enormous costs and risks. I think anyone would deem a 7-1 casualty ratio favourable under such circumstances. Whether this is actually accurate remains to be seen of course.

While the ratio may be overstated, the basic idea is valid. Underground infrastructure protects UKR forces from RU arty in urban settlements. It also takes a lot more effort and ammunition to flatten these settlements.
So, they allow UKR forces to have an incredibly favorable exchange ratio, and as a result, these settlements must be held for as long as possible.

It's a bad idea to abandon Bakhmut's concrete buildings and underground tunnels in favor of log cabins and knee-deep potato pits.

 

2 hours ago, Rokko said:

I have noted several times, though, that the Ukrainians often seem to release drone footage of flights which seem to have served no other purpose than to count mountains of dead Russians. Perhaps their baseline estimates are more accurate than we would think...

 

Here is quote from recent infamous post from one of RU propagandists. Several RU propagandists reposted the post, thinking that the situation is so serious that it is preferable to acknowledge it rather than dismiss it.

Quote

Nobody is available to continue the assault. The [LDPR] Corps' [regular] personnel were long gone. The LDNR mobilized have already gone, but the war has not finished. Orenburg, Perm, Irkutsk, etc. Muzhiks will have to go into battle...Regardless of the training we may provide them, they will be easily destroyed by enemy artillery when they manage to storm enemy positions. Except for an EXTREMELY rare "Lancet," we have nothing to suppress enemy artillery, which means we [simply have to send] additional mobilized troops.

Enough said. 

[Ales Dvorak]

6 hours ago, Harmon Rabb said:

That Boris Johnson is everywhere.

Even on the flag.

 

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, chrisl said:

I have to disagree on a bunch of that.

#1) I'm not so sure that defense is strongly favored.  Ukraine wasn't prepared to fight a static defense and had to give up a lot of territory early to trade for time.  If defense were heavily favored, Russia wouldn't have made the initial gains that it did.  When Ukraine has been on deliberate offense (Kyiv, Kharkiv, then Kherson) they've made rapid gains.  What they didn't do in any of those is attack head on.

#4) "Ukraine has done brilliantly at seizing these openings" is incorrect.  They've done brilliantly at creating those openings.  As I pointed out in #1 - Ukraine had to trade a lot of distance for time and to let Russia overextend itself in order to make the counterattack in Kyiv work.  They played that defense and counterattack to their strengths and took advantage of weaknesses of the RA (which were visible to the combination of UA, babushkanet, and NATO ISR).  They used all that ISR to devastate the column headed for Kyiv, leading to the "gesture of goodwill".  They used that ISR plus NATO materiel to create a situation around Kharkiv that Russia was forced to retreat from to avoid collapse.  They did it in parallel around Kherson to avoid getting drawn into a slow and brutal urban fight.  I suspect they're doing it again while Russia bashes its head against Bakhmut, and we'll probably see the effects when the ground gets solid again.

#5) Ukraine has solved for large scale attacks against prepared defenses.  The answer is "don't".  It's more effective for them to corrode the Russian logistics train and keep pushing the supply depots further and further back as longer range weapons come in from NATO.  The NYT thing I linked to had an indirect statement that indicated that UA CB capability has forced RU artillery back far enough that the UA supply route into Bakhmut isn't under RU fire control, despite the extent of the RU pincers (as an aside, I don't think RU has succeeded yet in any attempt to close a pincer of any size since Feb 2022)

#6) I think it's pronounced "ISR plus action at a distance", and maybe spelled "GLSDB+ATACMS".  It provides the equivalent action at a distance of a western air force, at the penalty of slightly less response speed and flexibility than you'd get with NATO style air supremacy.  Air support is really just a flavor of very long range artillery.

#7 & #8) I don't think we have evidence of difficulties of UA force generation other than them not throwing masses into frontal attacks. And that's something we've already seen that they don't really do.  They are feeding reinforcements into Bakhmut at possibly a fairly high cost because they're getting sufficient information to convince them that the relative cost is much, much higher for RU.  Aside from the body count videos, they also can get complementary information through various forms of ISR to verify the impact to the RU forces.

It's really hard to say Ukraine is "struggling to hold Bakhmut".  It's got essentially no strategic value as a geographical location to occupy.  They aren't struggling to hold it.  They're staying there because the see a long term advantage to the effect it's having in RU forces.  RU started working on it in what, August?  And they've gained how many kms at what price?  

I doubt that China is supplying 10k lancets, and it's even less likely that they'd supply as many NLAW/Jav knockoffs (which are going to be kind of sad for lack of IR detectors). I can (and sometimes do) buy a lot of cheap chinese electronics, but cheap chinese IR sensors are cheap, and there aren't expensive ones on the market.  They have no reason to restrict their export to the US, other than to hide lack of capability, because I can get US/Canada manufactured sensors.

 

 

Good response, thanks, especially on cheap Chinese kit, although here in Asia I notice there are some really high quality Chinese consumer brands, like Xiaomi (Mi).  But sounds like you're in the business.

I am really just trying to challenge the 'Time Is On Ukraine's Side' folks.  The bar goes up over time, don't count on Russia rotting in place while Ukraine prepares the Big Push.

However, I think we will have to disagree on how large a role luck (and timely Western-provided ISR?) played in 'shaping' those opportunistic counterattacks. To me your take reads like 20/20 hindsight; especially in the early days, nobody was in a position to set cunning traps. While signs of Russian  incapacity were there from the start, for those here with eyes to see it, nobody knew yet just how universal it was and how long it would last without serious attempts at remedy.

Edited March 4, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Good response, thanks, especially on cheap Chinese kit, although here in Asia I notice there are some really high quality Chinese consumer brands, like Xiaomi (Mi).  But sounds like you're in the business.

I am really just trying to challenge the 'Time Is On Ukraine's Side' folks.  The bar goes up over time, don't count on Russia rotting in place while Ukraine prepares the Big Push.

However, I think we will have to disagree on how large a role luck (and timely Western-provided ISR?) played in 'shaping' those opportunistic counterattacks. To me your take reads like 20/20 hindsight; especially in the early days, nobody was in a position to set cunning traps. While signs of Russian  incapacity were there from the start, for those here with eyes to see it, nobody knew yet just how universal it was and how long it would last without serious attempts at remedy.

Isn't it just a 'glass is half full vs half empty' type of consideration? I mean to who is it a surprise that Ukraine, after a year long war against a vastly larger invader which has itself mobilized a big number of extra troops, is also seen requiring pressing men into frontline service quickly? Be it because they need more men for the rotation pool, plug potential gaps allowing offensive units to be concentrated for offensive ops, or because they are behind the curve?

I prefer my glass half full and going on the proceedings of the war until now I'd say that is warranted. But of course not all is well and there are always risks. 

With regard to 'Time is on Ukraine's side', I'd say that depends on what happens during 'time'. On the long run a stalemate might be in Russia's relative favor. Russia is probably able to keep up some form of offensive pressure (although not like Bakhmut I'd say) for a long time, while building up more forces. That's a risk.
But here time has already been on Ukraine's side, because Russia has had to dial down it's ambitions and scale of offensives during the course of the war. A year ago today's status quo would have been considered as a Major Russian defeat. The expected anniversary offensive has turned out to be only the continuation of Bakhmut. Russia seems to be running out of it's escalation options.

But Ukraine isn't played out afaik, they still have 'options' and some of those include letting the Russians run out of steam while looking for the next opportunity to do profitable business. As such they have the time and can wait for Russia to make a mistake. They don't need to be in a rush for a 'breakthrough offensive'. 

Without evidence of the contrary I'd say Ukraine was/is deliberately holding onto Bakhmut while keeping their cards close to their chests. It's not pretty, but I guess war is hell and Russia even with all of it's flaws still has a lot of firepower and 'meat' to throw in the grinder and that's always going to be a 'difficult situation' to be in contact with.

Edited March 4, 2023 by Lethaface

[FancyCat]

 

[Beleg85]

Tank from 54th surprising Russian infantry. Video is cut so they probably largely escaped.