How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

4 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Hurray, Haiduk has checked in!

I have crazy time now, too much work with UV-printers, including other cities, so throughout last week I visited three points in three different oblasts. And this is not all, so I can dissappear again %) 

[JonS]

Welcome back H

[kraze]

3 hours ago, Kraft said:

This is objectively true. 

All the new PD games are 'streamlined' DLC filled garbage bags.

last bit of offtopic: HoI3 was actually the only game I did a full playthrough in in the whole series. Because of its wargame nature, which was too good for what Paradox usually does.

Unfortunately during campaign as US, after defeating both Japan and Germany - I broke the reality by invading USSR. The game totally crapped out and started throwing Red Army events at me, like "liberating" Minsk, thinking I was the USSR here - and constantly reverting captured territories back to USSR and then to USA again every other game day.

[Elmar Bijlsma]

13 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Not just yours.  A bunch of pages ago we had a Ukrainian soldier from the front reporting from Bakhmut that the offensive started 2 weeks ago, but the word hasn't gotten out yet.

What tea leaves do we have to sift through to figure out what is going on?

*snip*

Watching the recent footage like the ghoul I am, I am deffo seeing an up-tick in good vehicles. T-80BM's, BMP-3s. Famously the Terminators a while ago, too. And more frequently bigger groups of them then typical. So I would concur, from my very limit view, the attack is already underway to a degree. Presumably in the hopes of turning the Ukrainians out of their main lines before the B team shows up to push the "lesser" defensive lines further back.

 

As for the much vaunted 150k+ Russian troops about to wade into battle: additional troops do not an additional army make. What craptastic artillery, tanks, APCs etc will they be issued with? If the Russians can magic actual complete fighting formations together, that's great but whose artillery ammo will they be firing? From all the whining about lack of artillery support from the Russians currently in the line, they might be disinclined to share what they have.

I predict a very small  period where these reserves might make an impact, before they fizzle out.  I cannot imagine them having the staying power for a prolonged offensive. I'd be amazed if they had the logistics and cadre for anything more then a week or two.

 

I am a bit baffled about the expected timing of the big Russian push. We all saw what happened last year. Putin is almost certainly insisting on a result at the earliest opportunity. But by doing so he's reducing the chances of a result he might like.

Edited February 7, 2023 by Elmar Bijlsma

[The_Capt]

4 minutes ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

Putin is almost certainly insisting on a result at the earliest opportunity. But by doing so he's reducing the chances of a result he might like.

I think you just summarized the entire Russian strategic problem of this war.

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

Watching the recent footage like the ghoul I am, I am deffo seeing an up-tick in good vehicles. T-80BM's, BMP-3s. Famously the Terminators a while ago, too. And more frequently bigger groups of them then typical. So I would concur, from my very limit view, the attack is already underway to a degree. Presumably in the hopes of turning the Ukrainians out of their main lines before the B team shows up to push the "lesser" defensive lines further back.

 

As for the much vaunted 150k+ Russian troops about to wade into battle: additional troops do not an additional army make. What craptastic artillery, tanks, APCs etc will they be issued with? If the Russians can magic actual complete fighting formations together, that's great but whose artillery ammo will they be firing? From all the whining about lack of artillery support from the Russians currently in the line, they might be disinclined to share what they have.

I predict a very small  period where these reserves might make an impact, before they fizzle out.  I cannot imagine them having the staying power for a prolonged offensive. I'd be amazed if they had the logistics and cadre for anything more then a week or two.

 

I am a bit baffled about the expected timing of the big Russian push. We all saw what happened last year. Putin is almost certainly insisting on a result at the earliest opportunity. But by doing so he's reducing the chances of a result he might like.

The KGB training course Putin went thru clearly didn't include anything so crass as getting even a jeep, much less an AFV, unstuck from an effectively infinite mud bog. This omission is killing the Russian Empire, because no amount of will, or application of the whip, will get tank across a field if it is muddy enough.

[Kinophile]

 

 

[Bulletpoint]

20 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

 

 

Wow, his pant legs are blown off like in some old cartoon. Looks like a really lucky escape. Brave guy.

[The_MonkeyKing]

7 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

and even more Leo1 from Germany (adding to the original 88 number so 187 in total from Germany):
Rheinmetall will transfer 88 vehicles, and another 99 will come from FFG

Add to this 20 from Denmark and 40ish from Belgium company total gets close to 250. There are even more available in the western countries.

in CMSF in very scientific experiments Leo1A5 vs T90 seem to be on bar with each other.
Both one-shot each others most of the time. T-90 has better survivability gets less shots off because worse spotting. Balances out.

 

Also even more M113 incoming from the Spain and UK.

lol, they just keep coming. Add +100 to that number

and yes, the Danish and Netherland Leo1 is just in addition to their Leo2

[Haiduk]

19 hours ago, pintere said:

Looks like Ukraine is assembling its own set of shock units that are specifically earmarked for offensive action. Recruitment is apparently going well so far, with thousands of volunteers signing up:

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has announced the formation of assault brigades called the Offensive Guard. Volunteers who want to help the state expel Russian invaders and liberate the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine can join them.

To be honest, this is more PR-campaign (but good one!), than real creating of new units. Indeed only two brigades from eight anounced will be completely new, but they will have already existing cores. Many volunteer formations, gathered from police servicemen and retired fight as separate "special purpose units", so they now will be gathered into one brigade. The same with Border Guards. Other six "Offensive Guard" brigades are subordinated to National Guard and just will be transformed to assault brigades from existing units. To this time we had only one "pure combat" unit in Natioanl Guard - 4th Rapid reaction brigade. Even "Azov" was a "separate special purpose detachment" in composition of 12th National Guard operative brigade. Their name "Azov Regiment" was unofficial. All other in bigger or less degree combined combat and law-supporting tasks. Now selected brigades will become combat only

So, we will have next units:

- Police assault brigade "Liut' " (eng. "Rage"). Form itself on the base of volunteer special purpose police regiments "Tsunami", "Safari" and special purpose patrol battalion "Luhansk-1" (exists since 2014)

- 15th Border Guard mobile detachment "Stalevyi Kordon" ("Steel Border"). Looks like BTG/regiment-size unit. Before a war 10th special mobile Border Guard detachment existed (about a battlion-size) as "Border Guard special forces". There is unknown either 15th will be exteded 10th or this will be other unit. 

National Gurad units:

- "Azov". No comments. "Detachment" will be extended to official brigade. 

- "Spartan". Will be established on the base of 3rd operative brigade from Kharkiv. Before a war it was enough strong unit, having even a tank company. 

- "Rubizh" ("Mark, Frontier"). New name and new tasks for 4th Rapid reaction brigade, who hardly fought in Hostomel and Rubizhne. I suppose, their new name is derived in memory of the battle for this city.

- "Bureviy" ("Hurricane, wirlwind"). On the base of 1st special purpose operative brigade. Before 2014 it had a name "Bars" and considered as "courtier" brigade for protecting of Kyiv from unrests. But even in that time they already had many newest toys and equipment.  

- "Chervona kalyna" ("Red viburnum"). On the base of 14th operative brigade. The name derived not because of actual patriotic song, but also from their dislocation place - Kalynivka town in Vinnytsia oblast. Before 2014 this was special purpose regiment "Jaguar", which prevented Donbas scenario in Kharkiv.

- "Kara-Dag" (name of vulcano mountain in Crimea, "Black mountain" in Crimea-Tatarian). On the base of 15th operative brigade from Zaporizhzhia. Before 2014 this was special purpose regiment "Gepard"

Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed that they have already 7000 applications to this units 

 

Edited February 7, 2023 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

9 hours ago, Yet said:

If the RU army is destroyed, donbas liberated etc. but RU walks away with Crimea, they 'lost'. Is this a RU defeat in your terms?

Absolutely, in part because Crimea is not the focus of this war.  The other part is Russia already had it at the start of the February offensive, therefore retaining it can't be seen as a "win".  Losing Crimea, on the other hand, would just compound Russia's losses.

9 hours ago, Yet said:

When in 2060 we are looking back  the RU army and industry are restored, we trade again and looking back, they institutionalised Crimea being part of RU. 

on the long term; isnt this still a Russian win considering pre-2014?

Germany is stronger than than it was in 1939.  I still consider they lost WW2 pretty soundly.

9 hours ago, Yet said:

1 battle to take (2014), 1 battle to institutionalise(now).

Although I think of this war as being related to 2014, clearly Russia already incorporated Crimea.  This war has done nothing to improve the situation with Crimea specifically, but instead put it at risk.  The land corridor it secured isn't likely going to be held long term and even if it does I don't think the price was worth it.

9 hours ago, Yet said:

I believe Xi (and in lesser amount Putin) think in long timespans (something we partially de-learned possibly because our 4-year view democracies?). Because of this difference views on  shortterm wins and longterm wins, negotiations might be possible?

A very good point to consider.  However, I don't believe Putin is a long term thinker.  In fact, some theories "why this war, why now" is because Putin wanted to crush Ukraine while he was still alive to see it done.  That is not good long term thinking.

The more a single person controls a state, the less long term planning is.  This makes sense because an autocratic system is inherently imbalanced, therefore the emphasis on the regime is trying to keep things stable through any means necessary.  Because what is the point of planning 10 years from now if you get killed in a coup this year?

This is one of the reasons to be very alert to China now that it is becoming more autocratic.  The more power Xi secures for himself, the more likely short term interests will rule over long term ones.  China's long term goals were one of the primary reasons I didn't fear them militarily, but now...

Steve

[danfrodo]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This makes sense because an autocratic system is inherently imbalanced, therefore the emphasis on the regime is trying to keep things stable through any means necessary.

I'd say this another way: autocrats care only about the autocrat; the nation is a critical  extension of the ego (status, sense of power, etc) of the autocrat, but it still exists only to serve the autocrat in the mind of the supreme ruler.  We can call hitler a nazi or stalin a commie or mussolini a fascist.  But in reality hitler was a hitler-ist, stalin a stalin-ist, and mussolini a mussolini-ist, first and foremost.  

[Pete Wenman]

For those that can access the BBC iPlayer

https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m001grdw/ukraine-the-peoples-fight

[The_MonkeyKing]

 

• Current RUS Donbass offensives also starting to be done with "class-A" units with bad results
• Seems the RUS "class-A" quality has reduced with losses and new recruits 
• Current offensives are very different from the past months. Mechanised assaults. 
• These operations seems to be the start of this awaited RUS offensive
• This "awaited RUS offensive" is going to look very underwhelming. Also the early signs point to this.
• One likely goal for these attacks is Izium. The need it to advance to Dombas deeper than Bakhmut. Unlikely to succeed
• Very sceptical of new fronts opening. Attack from belarus would take many times the current forces and months of buildup like we saw a year ago
• UKR is clearly preserving its highest quality forces. Line is now been held by territorials, legion and national guard
• Very hard to tell where the UKR forces are located. Brigades often send single battalion tactical groups all over the place.
• RUS also seems to have been preserving its highest quality forces
• UKR seems to have a plan of setting up new 3 corp level formations. Western armored equipment is part of this plan.
• RUS minimal wargoal is Dombas but it is also the hardest nut to crack. Unlikely to succeed.
• Best case RUS can hope for is to keep the current lines(take some, lose some) somewhat and exhaust both sides.
• The current tank discussions going to wrong direction. This new equipment is not going to be in time for the next offensives but is going to give critical future security for UKR. They can afford to take losses now. Even the most perfect major offensive is going to cause losses of armored vehicles in the hundreds.
• Mike doesn't believe in the NATO equipment wunderwaffe. What UKR need is equipment to equip their new brigades, not so critical is it modernized T-72 or leopard 2A4. Especially the tank debate is over valued. Biggest need is for IFV and APC. Also the greatest technological leap is in western IFV not MBTs.
• UKR needs artillery ammo, air defense, precision fires, long range precision fires and armored vehicles. In that sort of priority.
• RUS was very unlucky with the mild winter. Energy war and the UKR strike campaign
• RUS seems to have run out of missile stockpiles and is now firing at the rate of production. This means maybe one wave per month.
• Western jets are just a matter of time. No matter what UKR is going have to switch to western airframes.

At the end discussion about cluster ammo, escalation and nuclear escalation 

Mike Kofman and Ryan Evans cover a lot of ground in this episode about the war in Ukraine: Russian goals in the Donbass, the coming Russian counter-offensive, the state of Russian and Ukrainian forces, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, cluster and sensor-fuzed munitions, fourth-generation fighter aircraft, a warm winter, nuclear risk, and more. If you are interested in what's happening in and around Ukraine, this is another must-listen episode.

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

 

• Current RUS Donbass offensives also starting to be done with "class-A" units with bad results
• Seems the RUS "class-A" quality has reduced with losses and new recruits 
• Current offensives are very different from the past months. Mechanised assaults. 
• These operations seems to be the start of this awaited RUS offensive
• This "awaited RUS offensive" is going to look very underwhelming. Also the early signs point to this.
• One likely goal for these attacks is Izium. The need it to advance to Dombas deeper than Bakhmut. Unlikely to succeed
• Very sceptical of new fronts opening. Attack from belarus would take many times the current forces and months of buildup like we saw a year ago
• UKR is clearly preserving its highest quality forces. Line is now been held by territorials, legion and national guard
• Very hard to tell where the UKR forces are located. Brigades often send single battalion tactical groups all over the place.
• RUS also seems to have been preserving its highest quality forces
• UKR seems to have a plan of setting up new 3 corp level formations. Western armored equipment is part of this plan.
• RUS minimal wargoal is Dombas but it is also the hardest nut to crack. Unlikely to succeed.
• Best case RUS can hope for is to keep the current lines(take some, lose some) somewhat and exhaust both sides.
• The current tank discussions going to wrong direction. This new equipment is not going to be in time for the next offensives but is going to give critical future security for UKR. They can afford to take losses now. Even the most perfect major offensive is going to cause losses of armored vehicles in the hundreds.
• Mike doesn't believe in the NATO equipment wunderwaffe. What UKR need is equipment to equip their new brigades, not so critical is it modernized T-72 or leopard 2A4. Especially the tank debate is over valued. Biggest need is for IFV and APC. Also the greatest technological leap is in western IFV not MBTs.
• UKR needs artillery ammo, air defense, precision fires, long range precision fires and armored vehicles. In that sort of priority.
• RUS was very unlucky with the mild winter. Energy war and the UKR strike campaign
• RUS seems to have run out of missile stockpiles and is now firing at the rate of production. This means maybe one wave per month.
• Western jets are just a matter of time. No matter what UKR is going have to switch to western airframes.

At the end discussion about cluster ammo, escalation and nuclear escalation 

Mike Kofman and Ryan Evans cover a lot of ground in this episode about the war in Ukraine: Russian goals in the Donbass, the coming Russian counter-offensive, the state of Russian and Ukrainian forces, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, cluster and sensor-fuzed munitions, fourth-generation fighter aircraft, a warm winter, nuclear risk, and more. If you are interested in what's happening in and around Ukraine, this is another must-listen episode.

You should write summaries for a living.

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

And I am in the "Russia is Sucking at this War because They Showed Up Dressed for Another One (tm)" camp.  Or more to the point "War has Fundamentally Shifted and Russia has Adapted Much More Poorly Than The UA(tm)" camp - they have tents right next to each other.  We do have campfire sessions with the "Russia Sucks at War(tm)" camp because I think we agree on a lot more than we disagree on...and then they pull out the smores.

Yeah, the difference between our two positions is rather small.  I think they built an army that couldn't do much more than parade, you think they simply built the wrong army.  Interesting as the differences might be, it doesn't seem to have much relevance to this war because clearly they don't have the army they need to win AND they do not appear to have the ability to change that at this point.

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Anyway, at the beginning of this war we saw a lot of "macro-masking" in mainstream analysis of what was going on.  This is essentially applying macro frameworks built on a lot of assumptions that tell you one thing, when the realities at the micro level are showing something entirely different.  This very often creates a false macro picture built on a foundation of bad sand, and when the bottom falls out a lot of finger pointing goes on.

We, here on the good ol BFC forum, went the other way.  We took a lot of micro-observations and upscaled them to arrive at our macro conclusions, which as is turns out were more accurate than the mainstream assessments.  2.5 million views later and here we are.  The trick to micro-upscaling is to use enough samples to avoid the anecdotal-trap (where one small story becomes the entire story), and of course try and filter out confirmation biases as best we can.

Absolutely spot on.

As for the need for widespread exposure to a large variety and quantity of micro events is easy enough to see by poking through various threads where someone complains about X tank being "unrealistic" because they lost it due to some sort of corner case situation.  The situation is realistic, therefore the tank in real life might well have been destroyed, but either way it is not a circumstance that should be "upscaled".  Which is what we tell our customers all the time when they got all hot and bothered by one instance amongst thousands.

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

We also have to be very careful about mis/dis information.  But with that in mind we have been seeing a lot on the RA performance Feb-Jul,  as I have posted several times we actually have an operational level AAR out of RUSI on this part of the war.  We all have been watching social media carefully and seeing all sort of war-porn as Russians get cut to pieces etc and stories of Ukrainian force generation (tank week was a blast).  All of this is data has been pointing to a growing sense, in my mind at least, that the RA is continuing to devolve as a fighting force.  This does not mean "fall apart", it means that they have rolled back their doctrinal approaches to match the fighting forces that they are able to employ. 

I agree.  However, there is something to consider.  Elmar said something above that got me thinking of what might happen if Russia's current force chews itself up before the 150k (plausible) reserves get moved into place?  Is this force capable of offensive action?  I doubt it.  Is this force even capable of mounting a consistent defense against Ukrainian attacks?  Maybe, maybe not.  I bet at the very least it will be uneven.

What happens, then, if the reserves become the defacto army?

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

We suspected the RA had devolved at Severodonetsk as it shifted from manoeuvre to firepower based attacks. ....

To my mind the RA is in a serious dilemma.  In order for it to make offensives work employing a WW2 style of mass, they need that WW2 mass.  And they do not have it. ...

This is an very tall order.  And based on what we have seen from the RA, maybe an impossible one.  ...

So I honestly expect a lot of boom, boom.  Cratered fields and all.  We will see a lot of noisy attacks, and there will be UA casualties but until we see some sort of actual operational level manoeuvre the RA is stuck in the same box it created for itself last spring. 

This is exactly what I am expecting.

Those of us who were actively reading this thread last Spring and early Summer will remember several instances where the Russian fanbois and Western worry warts got all excited because Russia had just made some "major breakthrough".  I distinctly remember me saying, each time, that Russia would not be able to exploit the situation.  Whether it be Izyum, Severodonetsk, Popasna, or smaller scale situations the end result has always been that Russia expended too much of its combat power achieving the breakthrough over too long a period.  By the time they went to do exploitation their forces were worn out and Ukraine had successfully built a new line of defense.

Coordinated encirclement operations have been disastrous for the Russians ever since the first days of the war.  If that is what Russia is attempting to do (and logically it makes sense they should), I am confident they will fail.  Perhaps more-or-less directly (like Kyiv) or more delayed impact (like Kharkiv).  Either way, whatever they are up to will not end well for Russia.

Steve

[Haiduk]

Matrice 300 in the role of tank-hunter

[Battlefront.com]

Thanks for the summary!

12 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

• The current tank discussions going to wrong direction. This new equipment is not going to be in time for the next offensives but is going to give critical future security for UKR. They can afford to take losses now. Even the most perfect major offensive is going to cause losses of armored vehicles in the hundreds.

This is an excellent point I haven't seen raised yet.  If I have 100 tanks on hand and no idea when I will get any more, I am going to be more conservative in my uses of those tanks.  On the other hand, if I know I'm going to have 100 tanks later on to replace the ones I lose now, well then my range of options widens.

12 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

• Mike doesn't believe in the NATO equipment wunderwaffe. What UKR need is equipment to equip their new brigades, not so critical is it modernized T-72 or leopard 2A4. Especially the tank debate is over valued. Biggest need is for IFV and APC. Also the greatest technological leap is in western IFV not MBTs.

Yup.  Newer Western equipment will help, but it's more important to get them sufficient numbers in a reasonable timeframe.

I'm more excited by the promises of Leo1 than I am Leo2!

Steve

[Haiduk]

@sburke

Are you ready? )))

Major of LPR police, Aleksandr Mazayev, deputy of police office chief of Lutugino town, Luhansk oblast. Was killed on 25th of January in arty of missile strike, probably in Kreminna. Former UKR policman, was fired in 2014. Since 2015 defected to LPR.

Second killed in the same place LPR policeman had a rank of senior lieutenant.

Lt.colonel (retired) Aleksandr Makartumov, unit and duty unkown. Judging on uniform he was in Air Forces and judging on his high military scholl he was "zampolit" of some airfield building or maintainnance speciality. Was killed in the mid of January

Major, Yevgeniy Zakharchenko, military doctor. Participated in invasion since 2014 - he served about 1,5 years on ocuupied territory of Luhansk oblast. Was killed on 2nd of March 2022 near Chernihiv

Colonel of justice (retired), Andrey Frizen, former criminalist-investigator of Investigation Committee of Russia. Enlisted at the war as volunteer in unknown rank.

Lt.colonel Andrey Koshkin, military police, Eastern military district

 

[dan/california]

14 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Thanks for the summary!

This is an excellent point I haven't seen raised yet.  If I have 100 tanks on hand and no idea when I will get any more, I am going to be more conservative in my uses of those tanks.  On the other hand, if I know I'm going to have 100 tanks later on to replace the ones I lose now, well then my range of options widens.

Yup.  Newer Western equipment will help, but it's more important to get them sufficient numbers in a reasonable timeframe.

I'm more excited by the promises of Leo1 than I am Leo2!

Steve

Western tanks are a LOT better against other tanks and ATGMS, they are no better against mines and artillery. Mines and artillery seem to do most of the killing in this war. So a LOT of the effectiveness of the western tanks is going to come down to planning and leadership by the Ukrainians to maximize strengths, and minimize weaknesses. In particular they might want to do things like actually breach minefields with soviet legacy equipment while the western stuff does overwatch, and then the first stage of exploitation. Then the deep exploitation can hopefully be pushed by lighter units. 

We saw a lot of how badly the Russians can hurt when they really have to just run away in Kharkiv, and sadly only a little of it Kherson. I really want want to see burning Russian everything strewn from Mariupol to the gates of Crimea as the Russians flee for their lives. Fingers crossed we are even half that lucky.

[The_Capt]

39 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

 

• Current RUS Donbass offensives also starting to be done with "class-A" units with bad results
• Seems the RUS "class-A" quality has reduced with losses and new recruits 
• Current offensives are very different from the past months. Mechanised assaults. 
• These operations seems to be the start of this awaited RUS offensive
• This "awaited RUS offensive" is going to look very underwhelming. Also the early signs point to this.
• One likely goal for these attacks is Izium. The need it to advance to Dombas deeper than Bakhmut. Unlikely to succeed
• Very sceptical of new fronts opening. Attack from belarus would take many times the current forces and months of buildup like we saw a year ago
• UKR is clearly preserving its highest quality forces. Line is now been held by territorials, legion and national guard
• Very hard to tell where the UKR forces are located. Brigades often send single battalion tactical groups all over the place.
• RUS also seems to have been preserving its highest quality forces
• UKR seems to have a plan of setting up new 3 corp level formations. Western armored equipment is part of this plan.
• RUS minimal wargoal is Dombas but it is also the hardest nut to crack. Unlikely to succeed.
• Best case RUS can hope for is to keep the current lines(take some, lose some) somewhat and exhaust both sides.
• The current tank discussions going to wrong direction. This new equipment is not going to be in time for the next offensives but is going to give critical future security for UKR. They can afford to take losses now. Even the most perfect major offensive is going to cause losses of armored vehicles in the hundreds.
• Mike doesn't believe in the NATO equipment wunderwaffe. What UKR need is equipment to equip their new brigades, not so critical is it modernized T-72 or leopard 2A4. Especially the tank debate is over valued. Biggest need is for IFV and APC. Also the greatest technological leap is in western IFV not MBTs.
• UKR needs artillery ammo, air defense, precision fires, long range precision fires and armored vehicles. In that sort of priority.
• RUS was very unlucky with the mild winter. Energy war and the UKR strike campaign
• RUS seems to have run out of missile stockpiles and is now firing at the rate of production. This means maybe one wave per month.
• Western jets are just a matter of time. No matter what UKR is going have to switch to western airframes.

At the end discussion about cluster ammo, escalation and nuclear escalation 

Mike Kofman and Ryan Evans cover a lot of ground in this episode about the war in Ukraine: Russian goals in the Donbass, the coming Russian counter-offensive, the state of Russian and Ukrainian forces, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, cluster and sensor-fuzed munitions, fourth-generation fighter aircraft, a warm winter, nuclear risk, and more. If you are interested in what's happening in and around Ukraine, this is another must-listen episode.

Oh my, well someone circle the calendar and everyone start spending like it is the end of the world - because it must be: I think I entirely agree with Mike Kofman.  Maybe I died in my sleep...Bil am I dead now?

[The_Capt]

25 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Thanks for the summary!

This is an excellent point I haven't seen raised yet.  If I have 100 tanks on hand and no idea when I will get any more, I am going to be more conservative in my uses of those tanks.  On the other hand, if I know I'm going to have 100 tanks later on to replace the ones I lose now, well then my range of options widens.

Yup.  Newer Western equipment will help, but it's more important to get them sufficient numbers in a reasonable timeframe.

I'm more excited by the promises of Leo1 than I am Leo2!

Steve

On tanks, first really coherent explanation I have heard.  Western armor is about longer-term strategic sustainment that allows Ukraine to take operational risks now.  I must be dead. 

[DesertFox]

Tank action:

 

 

[danfrodo]

18 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

On tanks, first really coherent explanation I have heard.  Western armor is about longer-term strategic sustainment that allows Ukraine to take operational risks now.  I must be dead. 

Exactly!  If UKR goes for big offensive and commits much of its armored forces and it fails w heavy losses, then they are an infantry force.  If they know they have hundreds of MBT, IFVs and AFVs coming online late 23 & early-mid 24, then they can be really aggressive.   Like El Alamein Nov 1942:  it took 10 very expensive days to break through but Monty knew he had to spend to get results and also knew if he failed he could retool and come back in a few months and punch again.

[Haiduk]

@sburke

More dead top-brass Russians

Colonel Sergey Poliakov, commander of 14th Spetsnaz brigade, Eastern military district, was killed on 3rd of Feb 2023 somewhere near Donetsk. Allegedly some officers of his HQ also were killed or wounded

Major Kiril Litvinov, aviation engineer of 37th mixed aviation regiment (Su-24M/Su-25, Gvardeyskoye airfield, occupied Crimea) of 27th mixed aviation division of 4th AF/AD Army, Southern military district. Was killed on 6th of March likely near Nova Kakhovka probably in shot down Mi-8.

  

Major (in some sources -captain, either mistake or he was promoted before own death) Vitaliy Kulchiyev, tank company commander, 155th naval infantry brigade. Was kileld on 1st of Feb 2023, likely near Vuhledar.

Major-general (retired) Dmitriy Ulyanov. Retired in 2017 as colonel and commander of 98th VDV division. During this war enlisted again as volunteer and soon was appointed as commander of new formed "mobik" unit - motor-rifle regiment from Tatarstan Republic, probably 1232nd MRR. Was killed on 5th of Feb by recon-diversion group.

  

Major Aleksandr Shevtsov, commander of SP-howitzer battalion of 4th guard tank division, 1st tank army, Western militarty district.