How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[pintere]

Looks like Ukraine is assembling its own set of shock units that are specifically earmarked for offensive action. Recruitment is apparently going well so far, with thousands of volunteers signing up:

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has announced the formation of assault brigades called the Offensive Guard. Volunteers who want to help the state expel Russian invaders and liberate the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine can join them.

The Offensive Guard is eight professional assault brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs consisting of patriotic soldiers who want Ukraine to win the fight against Russian aggression.

The National Guard of Ukraine invites you to Bureviy, Chervona Kalyna, Kara-Dag, Rubizh, Spartan, and the most famous, Azov. At the same time, the State Border Guard Service is recruiting volunteers for the Steel Border brigade, and the National Police is recruiting for an assault brigade called Rage.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs said that the units would consist of current police officers, border guards, and National Guardsmen. And the core of officers, sergeants, and soldiers will be defenders with significant experience who have shown themselves to be the best during the defense of Donbas since 2014 and the liberation of the Kharkiv region after February 24, 2022.

The soldiers will not be sent to the front immediately. First, they will have to undergo several months of intensive training to ensure the combat cohesion of the new units. Only after that will they be able to take an active part in offensive operations to drive the Russians out of Ukrainian soil.

The best instructors in firearms training and tactical medicine will be involved in the training of the soldiers, who will be equipped with high-quality weapons and equipment.

https://fakty.com.ua/en/ukraine/suspilstvo/20230204-gvardiya-nastupu-yaki-ye-brygady-vymogy-pidgotovka-zarplata-ta-pilgy/

[billbindc]

35 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

 

This is, btw, what I meant earlier by "absurd" responses.

You took what I said and immediately stretched it out to the most extreme BS possible, comparing it to moon landing conspiracy-thinking and eventually being more forward in calling it "crackpot." So, quite plainly, everybody who doesn't agree with you is a crackpot, right? They're all just a bunch of dummies, right? And then I sit here and have people coming out of the woodwork telling me I'm the one being snide...? 

Do you have Russia's battleplans in your lap? Do you have a microphone into their war room? Did you wiretap their red telephones? Where do these certainties even come from? Think tanks? Two seconds ago you said you got into it with a Marine over WMDs in Iraq. Should I unfurl a giant scroll of think tanks who said there were totally WMDs in Iraq? Because I bet that Marine sure did. You argument boils down to you "know" what Putin is thinking, and what he's thinking is really stupid, therefore Putin is really stupid and Russia is totally borked. Man, I totally get that from an emotional standpoint. But from a logical one, nobody who "studies warfare" should ever say anything is a certainty when it comes to an outcome of an ongoing war.

I’m curious what your record is of calling events before they happened in this war is…because you are spouting off at folks that have professional interest and experience in the subject who quite accurately do that exact thing.

[Battlefront.com]

  

7 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

 

This is, btw, what I meant earlier by "absurd" responses.

'

You took what I said and immediately stretched it out to the most extreme BS possible, comparing it to moon landing conspiracy-thinking and eventually being more forward in calling it "crackpot." So, quite plainly, everybody who doesn't agree with you is a crackpot, right? They're all just a bunch of dummies, right? And then I sit here and have people coming out of the woodwork telling me I'm the one being snide...? 

You came in here with an attitude that you know more than anybody else.  You did so in a condescending way and then, when challenged, the best you can come up with is the "my opinion is just as valid as yours because all opinions are valid" line of argument.

It is not snide to take someone's own argument and show why it is flawed.  If you don't like where your own logic winds up, then you should rethink your argument instead of blaming the other guy for point out how flawed it is.

7 minutes ago, Khalerick said:

Do you have Russia's battleplans in your lap? Do you have a microphone into their war room? Did you wiretap their red telephones? Where do these certainties even come from? Think tanks? Two seconds ago you said you got into it with a Marine over WMDs in Iraq. Should I unfurl a giant scroll of think tanks who said there were totally WMDs in Iraq? Because I bet that Marine sure did. You argument boils down to you "know" what Putin is thinking, and what he's thinking is really stupid, therefore Putin is really stupid and Russia is totally borked. Man, I totally get that from an emotional standpoint. But from a logical one, nobody who "studies warfare" should ever say anything is a certainty when it comes to an outcome of an ongoing war.

Ah!  And now we have the other tried and true winding down of a poorly executed line of argument... throw into doubt that which you can't debate.  This is the sad realty of the world we live in today.  It's akin to someone saying that weathermen get it wrong so might as well consulted the Farmer's Almanac or tarot cards because there's really no difference.

Here's the difference between us.  We each have a premise.  My premise is based on decades of study and knowledge specific to this war and probably 1500+ hours of studying the war since it started.  I am blessed to have conversations with lots of people who are smart, well informed, and articulate.  Through this thread we have pulled together massive amounts of information, filtered it, and discussed it.  Included in this are think tanks and individuals who have shown a consistent ability to correctly analyze this war as it's unfolded, as well as all the people who have got things wrong (learning from the mistakes of others is important).  Collectively this group has helped me arrive at the conclusions that I've come to.  I am not some sort of all knowing God, just someone who pays attention and has the skill set to understand what I'm seeing.  So far I've been far more right than wrong, though by no means do I have a perfect track record and the story of this war is not yet over so the future is certainly not known to me.

Your premise, on the other hand, appears to be something you thought up on your own with very little of anything I just mentioned above.  You have even provided us insights into why, which boils down to everything is an opinion and all opinions are equally valid.

Not really a great way to establish your views as credible.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Some of you will find this humorous...

Last Fall I had dinner with a recently retired US Army Colonel who had spent most of his career in Military Intelligence.  Special Forces for most of it, IIRC.  Obviously we talked about the war and where it came from.  I recounted how spot on our prediction for the 2014 war was, including the low level details.  He chuckled and said "well, that just meant you were paying attention.  Putin has a playbook, after all".  My response was something like "I know, that's what I keep telling people, but they weren't paying attention so they think I'm some kind of Nostradamus".

This thread has been invaluable to me, personally and professionally, in helping form a fairly accurate picture of what's going on in this war.  Which is important because people do pay me for knowing stuff

Steve

[Beleg85]

2 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Interestingly, it looks like drones are now used right during the battle to repel mechanized attacks.

Exactly, second or third such case in last days. If we observe more of it  (and more complicated), we may actually have a new trend in warfare we speculated a lot about, but did not witness before on larger scale.

Btw. Vuhledar shows that there is something seriously odd with Russian offensive plans from the get go...right now we observe Russian elite  from roughly 155 and 40 marines brigades + other units of 58th army, the same that assaulted Mariupol (units, not soldiers) being slaugthered in fields like it would be march of 2022 again. Attacking headlong into well-dug Ukrainians from chiefly 72nd bgd (these guys with the skulls on their patches that stemmed and canalized entire Eastern Military District in the early days of war...). So what is the cause? Vuhledar in itself is not even that strategically crucial to explain this level of wasting of one of most precious soldiers.

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-2-february-2022-vuhledar-8e34b3cc3ae1

If they start from this, I am very curious what they have in their sleeve. More and more serious analysts seem to think we are already in this much-hyped Russian offensive...if so, perhaps we shouldn't expect easily defined start, development and culmination. Just amorphic grinding fest with various levels of intensity like Dirlewagnerite "creeping push" in Bakhmut area.

Btw,. Khodakovsky (one of Russian milbloggers) whine that Ukrainians are getting "insolent" there, counterattacking second night in a row on established Russian lines near Vuhledar and calling serious reinforcments into area. He is afraid they may try to actually counterattack in larger force, perhaps to take back Pavlivka.

Edited February 7, 2023 by Beleg85

[billbindc]

4 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Exactly, second or third such case in last days. If we observe more of it  (and more complicated), we may actually have a new trend in warfare we speculated a lot but did not witness before on larger scale.

Btw. Vuhledar shows that there is something seriously broken with Russian offensive plans from the get go...right now we observe Russian elite  from roughly 155 and 40 marines brigades + other units of 58th army, the same that assaulted Mariupol (units, not soldiers) being slaugthered in fields like it would be march of 2022 again. Attacking headlong into well-dug Ukrainians from chiefly 72nd bgd (these guys with the skulls on their patches that stemmed and canalized entire Eastern Military District in the early days of war...). So what is the cause? Vuhledar in itself is not even that strategically crucial to explain this level of wasting of its most precious soldiers.

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-2-february-2022-vuhledar-8e34b3cc3ae1

If they start from this, I am very curious what they have in their sleeve. More and more serious analysts seem to think we are already in this much-hyped Russian offensive...if so, perhaps we shouldn't expect easily defined start, development and culmination. Just amorphic grinding fest with various levels of intensity like Dirlewagnerite "creeping push" in Bakhmut area.

My personal take is that the offensive at least in shaping terms began about two weeks ago.

[Beleg85]

6 minutes ago, billbindc said:

My personal take is that the offensive at least in shaping terms began about two weeks ago.

Could be the case, it is more or less when Vuhledar party started. However, I would expect them to dent Ukrainian defense with cheaper units, not wasting their semi-elites. VDV also seem to be at least partially already engaged near Svatovo and Bakhmut; latest dispatch from arond Bakhmut area by Lachowski specifically mentions that Wagnerites are at this point being largely replaced with VDV and regular motostrelki, at least north of the city.

Edited February 7, 2023 by Beleg85

[The_Capt]

39 minutes ago, pintere said:

Looks like Ukraine is assembling its own set of shock units that are specifically earmarked for offensive action. Recruitment is apparently going well so far, with thousands of volunteers signing up:

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has announced the formation of assault brigades called the Offensive Guard. Volunteers who want to help the state expel Russian invaders and liberate the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine can join them.

The Offensive Guard is eight professional assault brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs consisting of patriotic soldiers who want Ukraine to win the fight against Russian aggression.

The National Guard of Ukraine invites you to Bureviy, Chervona Kalyna, Kara-Dag, Rubizh, Spartan, and the most famous, Azov. At the same time, the State Border Guard Service is recruiting volunteers for the Steel Border brigade, and the National Police is recruiting for an assault brigade called Rage.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs said that the units would consist of current police officers, border guards, and National Guardsmen. And the core of officers, sergeants, and soldiers will be defenders with significant experience who have shown themselves to be the best during the defense of Donbas since 2014 and the liberation of the Kharkiv region after February 24, 2022.

The soldiers will not be sent to the front immediately. First, they will have to undergo several months of intensive training to ensure the combat cohesion of the new units. Only after that will they be able to take an active part in offensive operations to drive the Russians out of Ukrainian soil.

The best instructors in firearms training and tactical medicine will be involved in the training of the soldiers, who will be equipped with high-quality weapons and equipment.

https://fakty.com.ua/en/ukraine/suspilstvo/20230204-gvardiya-nastupu-yaki-ye-brygady-vymogy-pidgotovka-zarplata-ta-pilgy/

Well that is not a nation about to tap out.  Speculate all we want, Ukraine is setting up for a counter-offensive (or maybe just an offensive) this summer by the looks of it.  By then some of this western kit will be integrated into their fleets and then we will see how this thing goes.  We should see a deep strike campaign first, those new missile systems will get a work out.

But first whatever this thing the RA is doing needs to culminate.

[Offshoot]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'm very curious what the thinking was for launching an attack of this size when it seems counter to everything they've been doing for most of this war.  Did they think they had achieved a breakthrough and this was intended to be an exploitation force?  Did they think it was time to give massed armor another shot?  Are they trying to find alternatives to massed artillery due to shortages?

The UK MoD assessment is "...it is unlikely that Russia has sufficient uncommitted troops in the area to achieve an operationally significant breakthrough."

This attack included elements of the same unit that complained about their commanders after heavy losses last November, so it seems nothing has changed - https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/11/07/elite-russian-marine-unit-slams-military-leaders-for-baffling-battle-losses-a79303

There was discussion here recently about the impact of Russian losses on the mindset of Russians generally, but I wonder what the impact is specifically on Russian frontline soldiers (not counting Wagner around Bakhmut given their policies on refuseniks). Do I remember rightly that there were recent reports of soldiers around Vuhledar refusing to attack? I thought it was mentioned in this thread recently but I couldn't find it.

 

Retired Australian general Mick Ryan on "how Ukraine will seek out where Russia's next offensives might occur" - https://mickryan.substack.com/p/divining-russias-main-effort-in-2023

Edited February 7, 2023 by Offshoot

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Some of you will find this humorous...

Last Fall I had dinner with a recently retired US Army Colonel who had spent most of his career in Military Intelligence.  Special Forces for most of it, IIRC.  Obviously we talked about the war and where it came from.  I recounted how spot on our prediction for the 2014 war was, including the low level details.  He chuckled and said "well, that just meant you were paying attention.  Putin has a playbook, after all".  My response was something like "I know, that's what I keep telling people, but they weren't paying attention so they think I'm some kind of Nostradamus".

This thread has been invaluable to me, personally and professionally, in helping form a fairly accurate picture of what's going on in this war.  Which is important because people do pay me for knowing stuff

Steve

I think the speculation on “what Putin was thinking” is a little deliberately obtuse and more often a defensive reflex to re-write some sort of early bad assessments.

Russia invaded along 6 major operational axis.  Tried a deep snap around Kyiv which looked a lot like a decapitation attempt.  And then tried for some pretty obvious deep operational objectives - some of this axis pushed 200kms into Ukraine.  All the while firing cruise missiles all over the countryside in some sort of “shock and awe” thing.  I mean is if walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it is probably a hard snap invasion to setup a proxy power situation.

I mean what else was the plan?  A brief tour of the countryside followed by a barn dance?  Of course we cannot know exactly what the plan was but there isn’t that much doubt based on the execution.

One thing we have not talked a lot about, largely because it is kind of insensitive to our Ukrainian members, is what would have happened if Russia pulled it off?  

Edited February 7, 2023 by The_Capt

[billbindc]

32 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I think the speculation on “what Putin was thinking” is a little deliberately obtuse and more often a defensive reflex to re-write some sort of early bad assessments.

Russia invaded along 6 major operational axis.  Tried a deep snap around Kyiv which looked a lot like a decapitation attempt.  And then tried for some pretty obvious deep operational objectives - some of this axis pushed 200kms into Ukraine.  All the while firing cruise missiles all over the countryside in some sort of “shock and awe” thing.  I mean is if walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it is probably a hard snap invasion to setup a proxy power situation.

I mean what else was the plan?  A brief tour of the countryside followed by a barn dance?  Of course we cannot know exactly what the plan was but there isn’t that much doubt based on the execution.

One thing we have not talked a lot about, largely because it is kind of insensitive to our Ukrainian members, is what would have happened if Russia pulled it off?  

The strangest thing about the "who can know what Putin thinks?" trope is that he quite clearly states what his intentions are. Russia's not a riddle, wrapped in an enigma these days...it's a short guy in the Kremlin making clear statements about what he wants the world to be for anyone who's willing to listen without preconceptions. Under the previous three administrations, Putin got used to the maneuvering room that gave him. This time, not so much.

[sburke]

13 minutes ago, billbindc said:

The strangest thing about the "who can know what Putin thinks?" trope is that he quite clearly states what his intentions are. Russia's not a riddle, wrapped in an enigma these days...it's a short guy in the Kremlin making clear statements about what he wants the world to be for anyone who's willing to listen without preconceptions. Under the previous three administrations, Putin got used to the maneuvering room that gave him. This time, not so much.

He's also got quite a history to show the type of person he is.  he's not the great and powerful Oz, just a two bit thug with dreams of grandeur and a freakin mountain size chip on his shoulder.

Masha Gessen has written some good stuff on his history.  I don't necessarily agree with all the points in this interview, but it is definitely an interesting perspective tracing Putin's reaction from the western response to Serbia in Kosovo.

Masha Gessen: What the Media Gets Wrong About Putin | Video | Amanpour & Company | PBS

[Beleg85]

Seems like perhaps interesting article, linking it here to read for tomorrow:

https://unherd.com/2023/02/the-madness-behind-the-battle-for-bakhmut/

[billbindc]

1 minute ago, sburke said:

He's also got quite a history to show the type of person he is.  he's not the great and powerful Oz, just a two bit thug with dreams of grandeur and a freakin mountain size chip on his shoulder.

Masha Gessen has written some good stuff on his history.  I don't necessarily agree with all the points in this interview, but it is definitely an interesting perspective tracing Putin's reaction from the western response to Serbia in Kosovo.

Masha Gessen: What the Media Gets Wrong About Putin | Video | Amanpour & Company | PBS

If I made a list of folks to pay attention to on this topic it would include: 

Masha Gessen

Julia Ioffe

Andrei Soldatov/Irina Borogan

Mark Galleoti

John Sipher

 

 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I think the speculation on “what Putin was thinking” is a little deliberately obtuse and more often a defensive reflex to re-write some sort of early bad assessments.

Russia invaded along 6 major operational axis.  Tried a deep snap around Kyiv which looked a lot like a decapitation attempt.  And then tried for some pretty obvious deep operational objectives - some of this axis pushed 200kms into Ukraine.  All the while firing cruise missiles all over the countryside in some sort of “shock and awe” thing.  I mean is if walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it is probably a hard snap invasion to setup a proxy power situation.

I mean what else was the plan?  A brief tour of the countryside followed by a barn dance?  Of course we cannot know exactly what the plan was but there isn’t that much doubt based on the execution.

One thing we have not talked a lot about, largely because it is kind of insensitive to our Ukrainian members, is what would have happened if Russia pulled it off?  

This article is a well thought out place to start.

 

Quote

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/12/zelensky-congress-speech-us-ukraine-support/672547/

The link has a screwy title but it goes to the right place.

Then read this one...

 

Quote

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/01/russias-invasion-ukraine-war-nuclear-weapon-nato/672727/

and explain to me why Ukraine does not already have 600 155 tubes, 500 Bradleys, 250 Abrams, and every ATACMs in inventory. 

2 hours ago, pintere said:

Looks like Ukraine is assembling its own set of shock units that are specifically earmarked for offensive action. Recruitment is apparently going well so far, with thousands of volunteers signing up:

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has announced the formation of assault brigades called the Offensive Guard. Volunteers who want to help the state expel Russian invaders and liberate the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine can join them.

The Offensive Guard is eight professional assault brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs consisting of patriotic soldiers who want Ukraine to win the fight against Russian aggression.

The National Guard of Ukraine invites you to Bureviy, Chervona Kalyna, Kara-Dag, Rubizh, Spartan, and the most famous, Azov. At the same time, the State Border Guard Service is recruiting volunteers for the Steel Border brigade, and the National Police is recruiting for an assault brigade called Rage.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs said that the units would consist of current police officers, border guards, and National Guardsmen. And the core of officers, sergeants, and soldiers will be defenders with significant experience who have shown themselves to be the best during the defense of Donbas since 2014 and the liberation of the Kharkiv region after February 24, 2022.

The soldiers will not be sent to the front immediately. First, they will have to undergo several months of intensive training to ensure the combat cohesion of the new units. Only after that will they be able to take an active part in offensive operations to drive the Russians out of Ukrainian soil.

The best instructors in firearms training and tactical medicine will be involved in the training of the soldiers, who will be equipped with high-quality weapons and equipment.

https://fakty.com.ua/en/ukraine/suspilstvo/20230204-gvardiya-nastupu-yaki-ye-brygady-vymogy-pidgotovka-zarplata-ta-pilgy/

This sounds like truly excellent news to me...

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-its-not-too-late-deter-china-invading-taiwan

Excellent podcast about the risk of war in the Taiwan Straight. We need to spend some money and stop pretending it is a long term problem, if you want the short version. Speaker believes Xi would consider trading half the Chinese Navy for the island to be a success. He has to understand he just isn't getting it, period.

[chuckdyke]

He remembers British Gunboat Diplomacy worked and tries the same tactic. Just become politically incorrect again folks. 

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, billbindc said:

My personal take is that the offensive at least in shaping terms began about two weeks ago.

Not just yours.  A bunch of pages ago we had a Ukrainian soldier from the front reporting from Bakhmut that the offensive started 2 weeks ago, but the word hasn't gotten out yet.

What tea leaves do we have to sift through to figure out what is going on?  Aside from the numerous reports from the front, we also have a more comprehensive view from people like Mashovets, Budanov (now head of the military), and the likes of Mick Ryan.

1. We have seen increased buildup of forces in three areas; Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Vuhledar.
    
2. These forces are not just any forces, they are (maybe) reconstituted VDV and armored units in Kreminna area, Wagner's forces in Bakhmut, Marines and armored units in Vuhledar.  We have this information verified by several sources, but Zeleban's translation of Mashovets from yesterday makes it all very clear.
    
3. Back on January 25th Zeleban posted another Mashovets post about possible offensive activites already in motion. The basic gist of it is pushing westward from the north (Kreminna) and south (Vuhledar), with pressure/distraction from the middle (Bakhmut).  Phase 2 of this grand plan is to crush all of the Ukrainian forces between these two pincers.
    
4. It is quite possible we will once again see large expenditures of artillery made possible by months of cutting way back on its use.  If it happens it will communicate very clearly to us what Russia's plans are because they no longer have the tubes and munitions necessary to light up the whole front to confuse where the points of emphasis are.  Alternatively, they might have run down tubes and munitions to such low levels already that they don't have enough to splurge even for large scale offensive.
    
5. The ultimate goal of this grand offensive is to wind up with Luhansk and Donetsk forestall a Ukrainian summer offensive.
    
6. After seizing this ground it will flood the DLPR with mobiks coming from the suspected upcoming mobilization.  Ukraine, pushed back and bloodied from this grand encirclement, won't be able to do much of anything this year and maybe even next year.
    
7. Russia will then suggest Ukraine accept its generous terms of feezing territory as is in exchange for not wiping Ukraine off the map in 2024.

What do we know about Russia's ability to pull this sort of operation off?  A lot, though it depends on how much Russia has learned from past mistakes.  We have seen some shifts and improvements, but nothing that suggests Russia has thrown out Russian Federation interpretation of Soviet doctrine.  In short, there's nothing to convince me that Russia no longer Sucks at War™.

Everything seems to point to Russia engaging in this sort of grand encirclement to get this war over with ASAP.  Just like Winter, Spring, and Summer of last year Russia is looking to get everything it wants in a large, dramatic operation rather than more manageable operations.  Mashovets even seems to think that the Russians might be thinking even bigger than this!  Which wouldn't surprise me one bit.  Russia's appetite for victory has always been greater than it's abilities.

We here have repeatedly explored the "who has more time on its side" question and I think solidly have come to the conclusion that Ukraine might not have all the time in the world to win this, but Russia has precious little time before it loses it.  Putin likely launched this war, in part, due to concerns that his regime's clock was counting down faster than he anticipated.  To the degree he thought that in the past few years is the degree he is going to be desperate to get this war frozen in 2023.

There is also the appointment of General Gerasimov in overall control of the fighting.  Who here thinks that Putin would put his top military commander in charge of day to day operations and tell him "take your time.  Let's just see how things go and report back, OK"?  Anybody?  Didn't think so.  Which means it is extremely likely that there's a big offensive in the works sooner rather than later.

Pulling back, here's what I see:

1. Putin needs to have some new lines on the map to prove to his people that he's achieved something.  This war was supposedly about the Donbas, he's got the south and knows the north isn't going to happen, therefore Donbas is the logical focus for any offensive.
2. Russia is on the backfoot for sure, and anybody senior in Russia knows this.  The steady flow of deadly Western weapons to Ukraine emphasizes that it will only get worse.
3. Rebuilding from the losses of 2022 is likely not producing the end product that Russia feels will give it a decisive edge any time soon.  This is my speculation, but I think these units are seriously devoid of equipment and show no signs of being any better than the destroyed units they are replacing.  In other words, Russia's opportunities for a successful large scale offensive are unlikely to improve with time.
4. I doubt very much that Russia's concept of military operations has not significantly changed since last year. A grand encirclement plan they have no chance of pulling off is consistent with every previous offensive operation they have attempted since the start of this war, so this it is likely they will try it again.
5. I have characterized the Putin regime's primary methodology as coming up with a half arsed plan for a quick return, then half arsing the execution of the plan.  As with the big encirclement plan, I've seen nothing in the last year to think Russian planning is better thought through and resourced than it was before this war started.

That's my take on things as they stand today.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

OK, we all know that I'm in the Russia Sucks At War™ camp and we've long since discussed that I put myself in there more-or-less before this war started.  I'm not a founding member, but I'm not one of the Johnny Come Lately types either.  I say this because what I'm about to posit might sound like it's coming from the heart and not from the head, but I do assure you I've put at least some thought into this!

What if Russia just did a Khafji at Vuhledar?  You know, an attack that the defender thought was a recon in force when it was, in fact, a main assault.  It would explain a few a few things we were wondering about earlier, wouldn't it?

Of course this could have been a probe or a recon in force, but it doesn't feel like it to me.  It seems like the probes happened in the previous few days and the larger attack yesterday was intended to gain some ground.  Which, of course, it didn't.  Either way, the losses have likely screwed up whatever Russia's plans are for this sector of front.  Perhaps for others as well if it was designed to be a test run.

Also, I presume that the Russians are still coordinating actions based on schedules instead of observable conditions.  If that's true, and the attack in Vuhledar was the first part of a larger multipart plan... logically their slaughter will throw off the entire operation.  The question is if senior command has the flexibility to adjust the plan, to the point of cancelling it, or are their minds and/or hands tied and they'll go forward with the rest of it anyway?  Earlier in the war I would say DEFINITELY they would keep to their time tables because that's what we saw done so many times.  Now?  Well, this might be one area that Russian senior command has improved over the last year and take corrective action instead of proceeding as if nothing happened.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Heh... I just read Tom Cooper's piecing together of the Vuhledar activities over the past week.  Seems there's more evidence that yesterday's push was an act of desperation to get the southern portion of the strategic plan advancing.

Cooper has always been very good at piecing together OSINT into a cohesive timeline.  I stopped reading his stuff because he kept straying from reporting into commentary that wasn't very good.  A few of you have said he's returned to his roots and what I just read seems to indicate that, so I think I'll return to reading his updates.  Thanks!

Steve

[dan/california]

16 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

OK, we all know that I'm in the Russia Sucks At War™ camp and we've long since discussed that I put myself in there more-or-less before this war started.  I'm not a founding member, but I'm not one of the Johnny Come Lately types either.  I say this because what I'm about to posit might sound like it's coming from the heart and not from the head, but I do assure you I've put at least some thought into this!

What if Russia just did a Khafji at Vuhledar?  You know, an attack that the defender thought was a recon in force when it was, in fact, a main assault.  It would explain a few a few things we were wondering about earlier, wouldn't it?

Of course this could have been a probe or a recon in force, but it doesn't feel like it to me.  It seems like the probes happened in the previous few days and the larger attack yesterday was intended to gain some ground.  Which, of course, it didn't.  Either way, the losses have likely screwed up whatever Russia's plans are for this sector of front.  Perhaps for others as well if it was designed to be a test run.

Also, I presume that the Russians are still coordinating actions based on schedules instead of observable conditions.  If that's true, and the attack in Vuhledar was the first part of a larger multipart plan... logically their slaughter will throw off the entire operation.  The question is if senior command has the flexibility to adjust the plan, to the point of cancelling it, or are their minds and/or hands tied and they'll go forward with the rest of it anyway?  Earlier in the war I would say DEFINITELY they would keep to their time tables because that's what we saw done so many times.  Now?  Well, this might be one area that Russian senior command has improved over the last year and take corrective action instead of proceeding as if nothing happened.

Steve

The question of course is will Putin allow the MOD to recalibrate? Or he so desperate for something, anything , by the one mark that he smash what is left of the semi-competent bits of the Russian army a hoping once again that sheer bloody mindedness will be enough.

[chrisl]

18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

OK, we all know that I'm in the Russia Sucks At War™ camp and we've long since discussed that I put myself in there more-or-less before this war started.  I'm not a founding member, but I'm not one of the Johnny Come Lately types either.  I say this because what I'm about to posit might sound like it's coming from the heart and not from the head, but I do assure you I've put at least some thought into this!

What if Russia just did a Khafji at Vuhledar?  You know, an attack that the defender thought was a recon in force when it was, in fact, a main assault.  It would explain a few a few things we were wondering about earlier, wouldn't it?

Of course this could have been a probe or a recon in force, but it doesn't feel like it to me.  It seems like the probes happened in the previous few days and the larger attack yesterday was intended to gain some ground.  Which, of course, it didn't.  Either way, the losses have likely screwed up whatever Russia's plans are for this sector of front.  Perhaps for others as well if it was designed to be a test run.

Also, I presume that the Russians are still coordinating actions based on schedules instead of observable conditions.  If that's true, and the attack in Vuhledar was the first part of a larger multipart plan... logically their slaughter will throw off the entire operation.  The question is if senior command has the flexibility to adjust the plan, to the point of cancelling it, or are their minds and/or hands tied and they'll go forward with the rest of it anyway?  Earlier in the war I would say DEFINITELY they would keep to their time tables because that's what we saw done so many times.  Now?  Well, this might be one area that Russian senior command has improved over the last year and take corrective action instead of proceeding as if nothing happened.

Steve

Haven't we seen that show before with the progressively shrinking pincer at Izyum (IIRC - it seems so long ago I had to go back and search through the thread)?  It started out looking like it was recon and shaping and it turned out to be the main attack.  If they've been throwing away a full strength BTG per day, they may very well have spent enough of the assault force that it's just going to fade.

[Battlefront.com]

From ISW's Feb 6th report:

Quote

Ukrainian officials assess that Russian forces are preparing to launch a large-scale decisive offensive in eastern Ukraine in mid-to-late February. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov stated on February 5 that the Ukrainian military is expecting Russia to start its decisive offensive around February 24 to symbolically tie the attack to the first anniversary of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[1] Reznikov also clarified that the Ukrainian military has not observed the formation of Russian offensive groups in the Kharkiv and Chernihiv directions or Belarus; Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk noted that Russian forces are likely concentrating on launching offensive operations in the east rather than in southern Ukraine.[2] An unnamed advisor to the Ukrainian military told Financial Times that Russia intends to launch an offensive in the next 10 days (by February 15), a timeline that would allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian positions before the arrival of Western tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.[3] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are continuing to deploy reserves to Luhansk Oblast to strike after February 15.[4]

If the large scale offensive hasn't started yet, then what is going on in Vuhledar is probably a "shaping operation" to get ready for it.  Whatever it is, it hasn't gone very well so far and that probably has a lot of people moving their offices to the first floor, switching to pre-packaged foods, and walking instead of driving.

Something I've not said explicitly is that if Russia is planning a 2 prong offensive and one prong fails, my money is they won't cancel the operation.  We saw this sort of thing a couple of times in the Donbas, so why not another time?

We might see Operation Citadel only updated and facing the other direction. 

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, chrisl said:

Haven't we seen that show before with the progressively shrinking pincer at Izyum (IIRC - it seems so long ago I had to go back and search through the thread)? 

Yup, that was what I had in mind with my previous post, though there were many more examples of this in the opening phase of the war.

To refresh our memories, the most relevant screwed up offensive was in late spring and early summer when Russia tried to push southward from Izyum and west from Lyman to take Slovyansk, northward from the Andrivka (then Popasna) towards Kramatorsk, and then westward from Severodonetsk to crush everything in between. 

The south didn't get very far, though the Popasna breakthrough did eventually help.  The Izyum attacks kept getting slaughtered with no gain, eventually leading to their destruction in the Fall with the Kharkiv offensive.  For sure the attacks from Severodonetsk direction were initially successful, but not without a lot of losses (and the spectacular Bilohorivka crossing!) before stalling out well short of its goals.

Steve

[kraze]

6 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think the speculation on “what Putin was thinking” is a little deliberately obtuse and more often a defensive reflex to re-write some sort of early bad assessments.

Russia invaded along 6 major operational axis.  Tried a deep snap around Kyiv which looked a lot like a decapitation attempt.  And then tried for some pretty obvious deep operational objectives - some of this axis pushed 200kms into Ukraine.  All the while firing cruise missiles all over the countryside in some sort of “shock and awe” thing.  I mean is if walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it is probably a hard snap invasion to setup a proxy power situation.

I mean what else was the plan?  A brief tour of the countryside followed by a barn dance?  Of course we cannot know exactly what the plan was but there isn’t that much doubt based on the execution.

One thing we have not talked a lot about, largely because it is kind of insensitive to our Ukrainian members, is what would have happened if Russia pulled it off?  

Millions dead in concentration camps, as always.