How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Bulletpoint]

5 hours ago, kevinkin said:

The question is what's next. Some think Russia can't surrender any land in Ukraine without complete state upheaval.

I'm no expert on Russian politics, but I am starting to think that we have been surprised so many times during this war already.

Maybe the war will just end with Russia being thrown out completely from Ukraine and then... as the world holds its breath... nothing much happens.

Putin just keeps his power, explains away the defeat using his state controlled propaganda outlets: It's all Nato's fault and backstabbing by the decadent West.

Many Russians will be unhappy, but then again they are pretty much used to that by now.

 

[Zeleban]

At the Machulishche air base, an increase in the flight activity of a Russian Aerospace Forces unit armed with the X-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic aviation missile system is recorded. The unit is working on the issue of delivering strikes against targets on the territory of Ukraine from launch zones in the airspace of the Republic of Belarus by performing regular flights of MiG-31K type aircraft from the complex.

On the section of the State Border of Ukraine (GKU) with the Republic of Belarus (Derzhavichi - Loev, Gomel region), the enemy is reinforcing his grouping with the forces and means of the 103rd brigade (+ to the 1st unit of the battalion level). In the same direction, the operation of the enemy radar and one EW station is recorded.

In the period from November 15 to 18, the Russian command delivered for the needs of its air defense units deployed on the territory of Belarus, by 4 military transport aircraft of the Il-76 type, another batch of anti-aircraft guided missiles for S-300 \ 400 air defense systems (from 20 to 30 transport launch containers). Probably, these are converted missiles adapted for firing at ground targets.

In Belarus itself, the so-called “mass verification of military records” is being carried out, which will supposedly last “until the end of this year.” According to the country's defense department, “from mid-November to the end of this year, these data will be verified in all, without exception, those registered for military service. In this regard, during November, a significant number of citizens of the country will take part in these events (that is, they will receive the appropriate summons and instructions ...)”.

At once, in several sectors of the front, the issuance of Iranian-made personal military equipment to the personnel of the Russian occupation forces (in particular, helmets and bulletproof vests ...) is recorded. According to Ukrainian experts, these samples have reduced combat properties and qualities compared to similar samples of Western or Ukrainian production.

So, in the area of Bakhmut, Kremennaya and in separate sections of the Melitopol and Mariupol directions in units with a significant number of "partially mobilized" Russian citizens (the so-called "Chmobiks"), this equipment is issued to personnel in small batches and in limited quantities.

In the area of the base of the Black Sea Fleet (Sevastopol), the command of the fleet, after the attack of the ships of the fleet by unmanned surface drones, increased the performance of sentinel service on the outer roadstead by increasing the forces and means allocated for the protection / defense of the water area. From now on, at least 2 patrol / patrol ships of project 22460 Okhotnik and a detachment of forces as part of anti-sabotage boats of project 21980 Grachenok and other watercraft are involved in this, constant hydrosonic and sonar reconnaissance is organized.

[womble]

24 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

I'm no expert on Russian politics, but I am starting to think that we have been surprised so many times during this war already.

Maybe the war will just end with Russia being thrown out completely from Ukraine and then... as the world holds its breath... nothing much happens.

Putin just keeps his power, explains away the defeat using his state controlled propaganda outlets: It's all Nato's fault and backstabbing by the decadent West.

Many Russians will be unhappy, but then again they are pretty much used to that by now.

 

I would hope that the world's sanctions would just keep getting cranked tighter and tighter on the gangsters in the Kremlin, until they accept that they must pay reparations and submit to war crimes trials. And that the West keeps the Ukrainians supplied with all manner of things such that Russia will never be able to come back across the border.

[Bulletpoint]

3 minutes ago, womble said:

I would hope that the world's sanctions would just keep getting cranked tighter and tighter on the gangsters in the Kremlin, until they accept that they must pay reparations and submit to war crimes trials. And that the West keeps the Ukrainians supplied with all manner of things such that Russia will never be able to come back across the border.

I hope the same, but I don't think there's any level of sanctions that we could impose that would make Putin and his cronies submit. Or make Russians revolt against him.

[Tux]

13 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

This also raised suspicions in Poland, but can be explained on legal basis. Danilov demanded (in quite boorish words, to put mildly, considering the circumstances...) immediate access and right to conduct his own investigation. As I understand it, both states lacks even legal acts for conducting separate independent full investigations on each other territory, as it is literally undermining one's trust into sovereignity (which btw was one of reasons why exhumations of Wolhynia massacres were so difficult to conduct on UA soil for so many years). After several hours somebody in PL (or more likely US) side finally figured out it looks pretty bad to block them given gravity of the crisis, so Ukrainian investigation teams were given access to crash site and status of auxiliary investigation with wide insight into collected evidence. I frankly don't know if they have rights to interrogating witness, as couldn't find any info; they could be theoretically given such right on informal courteus basis,as it sometimes happen in such cases. They spend there at least several hours today.

Thank you for the information: I wasn’t sufficiently aware about the sensitivities that still exist between the two countries.

[womble]

13 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

I hope the same, but I don't think there's any level of sanctions that we could impose that would make Putin and his cronies submit. Or make Russians revolt against him.

Then let them rot. It's a kind of "justice", so long as everyone else who's threatened by them gets to live well.

[kevinkin]

Sorry if this was posted already. It's from late September. But still a good read today:

https://www.ausa.org/publications/reflections-russias-2022-invasion-ukraine-combined-arms-warfare-battalion-tactical

Drop a few BTGs in a fishbowl and they do OK. Drop them in a pond, not so OK. Ground forces need to be able to organize to fight in either. Russia did not organize its units to fight in a pond. Perhaps they had dreams of expeditionary warfare projecting Moscow's interests overseas with light formations. I read at one point that a division commander fights with their battalions and is expected integrate them into a force with one purpose. Russia drop a bunch of pawns on the board to be gobbled up by an Ukrainian queen. Having no tradition of Auftragstaktik, recon pull warfare is near impossible to pull off having a blind bunch of BTGs unable to work together. 

The same holds true for the opposite side of this idea: negative aspects of warfighting in small theaters can be quickly overcome, thereby hiding potentially deleterious structural problems with force structure, warfighting doctrine and strategies. This appears to be part of the problem plaguing Russian armed forces in Ukraine—its vaunted BTG is floundering in Ukraine today. False positive “lessons learned” and bad habits acquired in 2014–2015 are hindering Russian land forces operating throughout Ukraine today. 

Aside from bad habits, the Russian BTG’s structure and support network is maximized for small theater warfare, not medium or large theater warfare. Its small stature, ad hoc structure and detachment from its organic C2 and sustainment networks makes it a problematic force design for medium or large theater warfare. Given the Russian Army’s performance in Ukraine thus far, it is not a stretch to suggest that the BTG is the wrong formation for the war. However, as Ukraine closes the door on Moscow’s forces, pushing them closer to Russia, especially in the Donbas and in the areas proximal to Crimea, one should expect the BTG to fare better than it has throughout the war. This is because those BTGs will be operating on smaller battlefields, more comparable to those on which they found success in 2014–2015. 

[womble]

8 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

...one should expect the BTG to fare better than it has throughout the war. This is because those BTGs will be operating on smaller battlefields

Possibly, but comparisons will be difficult to scale, given the other confounding circumstances imposed on the RUAF since the beginning of their latest criminal adventurism (loss of trained personnel, loss of equipment, loss of officer corps, loss of air superiority). And it's arguable that shorter supply lines just means easier HIMARS targets now that UKR has seemingly started to approach parity in long range fires (at least in effect, if not actual tonnage). The BTG concept leans heavily on that indirect fire superiority, too, so missing that is another reason we may not see the BTG perform "as well" as it did in '14, as they are compressed by the UKR's corrosive offensives.

[RockinHarry]

1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:

I'm no expert on Russian politics, but I am starting to think that we have been surprised so many times during this war already.

Maybe the war will just end with Russia being thrown out completely from Ukraine and then... as the world holds its breath... nothing much happens.

Putin just keeps his power, explains away the defeat using his state controlled propaganda outlets: It's all Nato's fault and backstabbing by the decadent West.

Many Russians will be unhappy, but then again they are pretty much used to that by now.

 

that might well be. And since that regime doesn´t care on public opinion or suppresses it anyway....

They just got to take care that not too many their (potential) cannon fodder escapes to the outlands.

[chuckdyke]

Difference between hitler and putin. You can't throw anybody out of the window in a bunker. 

 

[RockinHarry]

39 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

I hope the same, but I don't think there's any level of sanctions that we could impose that would make Putin and his cronies submit. Or make Russians revolt against him.

Yup, he´ll keep sticking to his version of a multipolar world (or parallel universe) til the end. No doubt about that. But that sanctioning will be a pointer to anybody else thinking about doing bad things to his neighbors as well. Sooner or later many a gov will have to take side. No more abstentions from UN votings and such.

[Pete Wenman]

 

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Sorry if this was posted already. It's from late September. But still a good read today:

https://www.ausa.org/publications/reflections-russias-2022-invasion-ukraine-combined-arms-warfare-battalion-tactical

Drop a few BTGs in a fishbowl and they do OK. Drop them in a pond, not so OK. Ground forces need to be able to organize to fight in either. Russia did not organize its units to fight in a pond. Perhaps they had dreams of expeditionary warfare projecting Moscow's interests overseas with light formations. I read at one point that a division commander fights with their battalions and is expected integrate them into a force with one purpose. Russia drop a bunch of pawns on the board to be gobbled up by an Ukrainian queen. Having no tradition of Auftragstaktik, recon pull warfare is near impossible to pull off having a blind bunch of BTGs unable to work together. 

The same holds true for the opposite side of this idea: negative aspects of warfighting in small theaters can be quickly overcome, thereby hiding potentially deleterious structural problems with force structure, warfighting doctrine and strategies. This appears to be part of the problem plaguing Russian armed forces in Ukraine—its vaunted BTG is floundering in Ukraine today. False positive “lessons learned” and bad habits acquired in 2014–2015 are hindering Russian land forces operating throughout Ukraine today. 

Aside from bad habits, the Russian BTG’s structure and support network is maximized for small theater warfare, not medium or large theater warfare. Its small stature, ad hoc structure and detachment from its organic C2 and sustainment networks makes it a problematic force design for medium or large theater warfare. Given the Russian Army’s performance in Ukraine thus far, it is not a stretch to suggest that the BTG is the wrong formation for the war. However, as Ukraine closes the door on Moscow’s forces, pushing them closer to Russia, especially in the Donbas and in the areas proximal to Crimea, one should expect the BTG to fare better than it has throughout the war. This is because those BTGs will be operating on smaller battlefields, more comparable to those on which they found success in 2014–2015. 

I think analysis such as these miss the much bigger points and possible implications of this war.  The easy answer seems to be to blame the BTG concept - “bad BTGs”, “silly BTGs!”.  So go look up the BTG structure and then compare it to the TF or BG structures in the west - we are not talking about a massive difference.  From what I have seen the BTG kinda slides in between the Battlegroup and Combat team.  There is no fundamental flaw nor does “designed for small wars”” track, if, Russia could upscale BTGs into working formation structures.

The issues at play are far larger than “those darn BTGs”:

- ubiquitous and persistent very high resolution ISR - particularly on the UA side.  The RA could optimize BTG all week, or even adopt identical structures as the US and they would still be in trouble because 1) they still need a lot of gas, and 2) the UA can see those supply lines from space via western ISR. “Finding beats flanking”.

- long range precision strike.  The UA can not only see the RA, they can hit them at ranges traditionally the purview of AirPower.  The UA has employed a fraction of the indirect fires compared to the RA and done a lot more damage to the RA operational system proportionally.  “Mass beats isolation, precision beats mass, massed precision beats everything.”

- unmanned systems.  We are seeing the dawn of the impact of mass use of unmannned systems on the battlefield which appear to be right on the seam of ISR and strike.  “Swarming beats surging”

- smart long range, man portable.  The impact of next gen ATGMs and MANPADs on the RA has been enormous.  It has dramatically changed the role of light dispersed infantry and their corrosive effects on an opponent.   “Small cheap distributed many, beats few expensive concentrations of large”.

In short, I am becoming more and more convinced that US/western formations may have faired better strategically and even operationally but we would be learning the same lessons tactically that the RA are is we faced a similar scenario.  So, not all about the BTGs.

 

Edited November 19, 2022 by The_Capt

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, womble said:

Possibly, but comparisons will be difficult to scale, given the other confounding circumstances imposed on the RUAF since the beginning of their latest criminal adventurism (loss of trained personnel, loss of equipment, loss of officer corps, loss of air superiority). And it's arguable that shorter supply lines just means easier HIMARS targets now that UKR has seemingly started to approach parity in long range fires (at least in effect, if not actual tonnage). The BTG concept leans heavily on that indirect fire superiority, too, so missing that is another reason we may not see the BTG perform "as well" as it did in '14, as they are compressed by the UKR's corrosive offensives.

There's an even bigger point that the article missed.  The "success" of the BTGs in 2014/2015 is, as Kevin alluded to, partly due to overall combat environment they were in at the time.  Specifically, highly motivated Ukrainian forces using outdated military equipment, command structures, and styles of leadership.  They also had lots of problems with OPSEC thanks to the army and SBU being riddled with Russian agents.  It's pretty obvious this is NOT the opposing force Russia faces today.

Therefore, an analysis of that the BTGs will perform better in 2023 than 2022 because logistics won't be as strained is really off the mark.  The situation Russian will find itself in 2023 is about as different from 2014/2015 as one can get.  The_Capt pointed out some of the specifics, but the things Womble just outlined are in that mix as well.  Therefore, the article Kevin posted seems to, once again, falling into the trap of thinking Russia can pull a rabbit out of its hat.  I know there's no rabbit in there because Russia doesn't even have a hat left

Steve

[Artkin]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think analysis such as these miss the much bigger points and possible implications of this war.  The easy answer seems to be to blame the BTG concept - “bad BTGs”, “silly BTGs!”.  So go look up the BTG structure and then compare it to the TF or BG structures in the west - we are not talking about a massive difference.  From what I have seen the BTG kinda slides in between the Battlegroup and Combat team.  There is no fundamental flaw nor does “designed for small wars”” track, if, Russia could upscale BTGs into working formation structures.

The issues at play are far larger than “those darn BTGs”:

- ubiquitous and persistent very high resolution ISR - particularly on the UA side.  The RA could optimize BTG all week, or even adopt identical structures as the US and they would still be in trouble because 1) they still need a lot of gas, and 2) the UA can see those supply lines from space via western ISR. “Finding beats flanking”.

- long range precision strike.  The UA can not only see the RA, they can hit them at ranges traditionally the purview of AirPower.  The UA has employed a fraction of the indirect fires compared to the RA and done a lot more damage to the RA operational system proportionally.  “Mass beats isolation, precision beats mass, massed precision beats everything.”

- unmanned systems.  We are seeing the dawn of the impact of mass use of unmannned systems on the battlefield which appear to be right on the seam of ISR and strike.  “Swarming beats surging”

- smart long range, man portable.  The impact of next gen ATGMs and MANPADs on the RA has been enormous.  It has dramatically changed the role of light dispersed infantry and their corrosive effects on an opponent.   “Small cheap distributed many, beats few expensive concentrations of large”.

In short, I am becoming more and more convinced that US/western formations may have faired better strategically and even operationally but we would be learning the same lessons tactically that the RA are is we faced a similar scenario.  So, not all about the BTGs.

 

I entirely agree. I would also add the terrain/weather conditions.

An unsolved question is: why did the RU think they could fight (and win) through the February thaw?

[JonS]

16 minutes ago, Artkin said:

 

An unsolved question is: why did the RU think they could fight (and win) through the February thaw?

Because there wasn't supposed to be any fighting

[The_Capt]

21 minutes ago, Artkin said:

I entirely agree. I would also add the terrain/weather conditions.

An unsolved question is: why did the RU think they could fight (and win) through the February thaw?

I strongly suspect that as in 2014 the entire Russian political and military strategic plans were built on a foundation of unassailable bad assumptions. To the point that much like the WMDs of Iraq 2003 fame, the entire Russian decision making system created a reinforcing feedback loop where only information that supported the assumption was accepted as fact - these sorts of giant echo chambers are totally toxic to military planning.

This led them to highly unrealistic planning and expectations that the war would be over in a week or two tops and slide into some sort of counter-insurgency situation that they would have to risk manage for years through a proxy puppet government.  

What we have not seen, or at least not fully confirmed is “why Feb 22?”  What was the forcing function here?  A lot of theories from “Putin is dying”, “Putin was sure he could get away with it” and “The Devil made Russia do it”.  But not really line up well.  In the end we may never really know but regardless…it was a terrible idea obviously.

As to the RA suddenly swinging this war into Russian favour via “freezing” or “shrinking so our BTGs suddenly work”, to “screw it, let’s nuke everything” - these are also built on some pretty wild assumptions, none of which really have any evidence for on the battlefield.  Freezing means that one can create relative symmetry with an opponent, and here we are not talking tanks and infantry numbers - that ship sailed at Kherson.  

We are talking things like C4ISR and the weapon platforms manned by trained soldiers to make full use of the opportunities advanced integrated ISR provides.  Russia could do this…in about a decade assuming it can work around the increasingly crushing economic pressure.  So for this war “freezing” is looking harder, a combination of western ennui and possible Ukrainian exhaustion is more likely but I honestly do not think we are there yet.  Russia cannot even establish air superiority at this point which makes freezing anything pretty damn hard.

Shrinking scale did not work in the Donbas and only exhausted the RA for really minor gains.  And nukes, well we have talked about nukes to death - punchline: if it comes down to nukes we really won’t care about the war in Ukraine anymore because we will be in WW3 - hot, warm or cold.

So we have Russia with just about zero options left other than keep pouring young men into a bloody mess until the UA and West run out of gas, or enough Russians have had enough and either force their government to stop, or change it by force.

Edited November 19, 2022 by The_Capt

[dan/california]

26 minutes ago, Artkin said:

I entirely agree. I would also add the terrain/weather conditions.

An unsolved question is: why did the RU think they could fight (and win) through the February thaw?

I think the initial Russian plan was more of a reinforced coup than an actual war. They expected the coup part too work so well they barely bothered to plan the war part. This led to a shambolic operational plan that revealed their many and manifest deficiencies in the worst possible way, for them. By the time someone convinced Putin to withdraw from Kyiv and attempt the artillery heavy Donbas strategy that was vaguely within their capabilities they had simply gotten to much of the "professional" force killed. 

Edit: Well that was a proper attack of crossposting. 

Edited November 19, 2022 by dan/california

[kevinkin]

6 hours ago, womble said:

Possibly, but comparisons will be difficult to scale, given the other confounding circumstances imposed on the RUAF since the beginning of their latest criminal adventurism (loss of trained personnel, loss of equipment, loss of officer corps, loss of air superiority). And it's arguable that shorter supply lines just means easier HIMARS targets now that UKR has seemingly started to approach parity in long range fires (at least in effect, if not actual tonnage). The BTG concept leans heavily on that indirect fire superiority, too, so missing that is another reason we may not see the BTG perform "as well" as it did in '14, as they are compressed by the UKR's corrosive offensives.

All good points. Perhaps the writer envisions a smaller battlefield with shorter lines of communication. Easier for the RA to manage while being able to spread out their supplies away from lucrative forward bases. Right now, it's a trying to herd a mess of blind hungry kittens into doing something positive in the battlefield.  Pretty sure the writer agrees the BTG organization is not the sole issue at play. Maybe he was on a word count and could not flesh out everything in one piece. 

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Lt. Col. Sergey Nikulin, Deputy Chief of Staff, Head of Comms., 76th Guards Airborne Division:

 

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Therefore, the article Kevin posted seems to, once again, falling into the trap of thinking Russia can pull a rabbit out of its hat.  I know there's no rabbit in there because Russia doesn't even have a hat left

To be fair to the writer, he used the minimal phrase "fair better" and never said the BTG organization would save the day if Russia falls back to hold just enough land to appease whoever needs to be. They could not do worse, so to say fair better is really just throw away terminology and does not place him out on a limb. Nowhere to go but up he "expects". But even that could be a stretch as well. Many professional writers are being codgy or nervous in predicting a RA collapse. To them, Russian conventional arms still have a few teeth left in them. Apparently this mindset is deeply embedded after years and years of the Cold War and NATO planning for the worst case scenario.    

However, as Ukraine closes the door on Moscow’s forces, pushing them closer to Russia, especially in the Donbas and in the areas proximal to Crimea, one should expect the BTG to fare better than it has throughout the war. This is because those BTGs will be operating on smaller battlefields, more comparable to those on which they found success in 2014–2015. 

Edited November 19, 2022 by kevinkin

[womble]

37 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

They could not do worse,

"Tovarich, hold my vodka, and watch this!"

I think they probably could/can, at least relative to the tasks they're asked to accomplish. Generally, offense is considered more challenging to undertake than defense... they've failed at the hard job, and it seems entirely likely they're going to fail at the easier task, while Putin expects them to "freeze the conflict". It's entirely possible that the weather is going to close in for at least a few weeks until the ground freezes in enough places for UKR to get back to grabbing back territory, so it may look like the Russian Way of War has started working, but I don't think that's going to last very long. They won't fail as hard as they would on a broader front, perhaps; it seems reasonable to suspect they'll do better there than they would have on a more dislocated deployment, for the reasons given, but better than last year? That's really difficult to assess; so much has changed in both force correlation and strategic posture.

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, akd said:

@sburke @Kinophile

Lt. Col. Sergey Nikulin, Deputy Chief of Staff, Head of Comms., 76th Guards Airborne Division:

 

Is it my imagination or did the 76th Guards Airborne Division get the bleep hammered out of it in the last stage of the fighting on the right bank, or trying withdraw from same.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

10 hours ago, Zeleban said:

After a long break Mashovets resumed his publications.

 

Where could I find Mashovets' reports? My ability to read Cyryllic is extremely rusty, but getting better, so I may give it a go.

Thanks!

[RockinHarry]

9 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

Difference between hitler and putin. You can't throw anybody out of the window in a bunker. 

 

but can offer both a gun. Adolf had balls enough taking and using it, when it was about high time. Little Putin just knows his armchair, never experienced front line combat thus he´s only good for sending thousands to their death, while keep saving his own miserable life. Poor sucker.