How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[RockinHarry]

8 hours ago, Pete Wenman said:

 

nice if beeing true. Let them feel some frost as well. Might remind them what UKR is supposed to feel from now on. Yesterday we´d first snow here in germany btw.

[Zeleban]

21 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Where could I find Mashovets' reports? My ability to read Cyryllic is extremely rusty, but getting better, so I may give it a go.

Thanks!

https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu Here is his telegram channel in Russian.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Short interview with a Ukrainian drone operator.

 

[Huba]

Reading about the lateat RU missile attacks, something just occured to me: why are this attacks not done during the night? It seems an obvious disadvantage to launch the missiles, and especially the Shaheeds during the day, as these can be tracked and engaged by using only the mk1 eyeball. Some MANPADS that UA uses cannot be operated at night too, ditto for simpler AA guns and improvised weapons. So why RU insist on the daytime attacks? 

[Beleg85]

19 hours ago, kraze said:

And that's another thing. Our government plays foreign policy really safe since February but here are they going all out - raising stakes, taking risks that are otherwise avoided - now why would they do it if they knew they would gain nothing from it but trouble if it's just our malfunctioned missile?

Yes it's obvious that Ukraine, we want as much NATO involvement as possible, while NATO wants as little of it as possible - but this wouldn't be the way to play this - it's just going to piss people off if there's nothing to base it on.

True, many people including myself ask this question. One of answers may be: roughly from the same reason why we still lack one coherent, convincing theory why actually South was captured so quickly, especially Kherson bridges were not blown out early in the war (except treason on mid-to-high level SBU rogues, which many people in Ukraine also seem to find only half-explanatory at best). In other words, somebody is trying to cover skin of their own or his collegues. Such processess may be effects of denial, rush to avoid consequences, machismo, informational lag, personal/institutional rivalries, wishfull and short-sighted thinking or myriad other issues. No bureaucratic institution on this planet is free of such things, and they could even start as low as at the level of commanding officer of this AA battery that shoot missile or his immediate superior. Again, I don't know enough about internal fractures withing current UA administration to even strive to answer it. Definitelly state apparatus of any country waging such brutal war is not be best place to search for truth. Militaries are by definition suspicious,  journalist access is limited, while frankly everybody is engaged in far more important things.

I only know if Zhelensky will be in need to swallow the bitter pill and admitt to mistake, this whole thing may cost Ukraine a lot of credibility, maybe even some support. If he will go stubborn for whatever reason, it will be even worse. I personally really don't like a situation in which fundraising is dropping as a consequence of it (unfortunatelly I already have first signals of it from charity workers, so far locally) . Sensacionalist portals and twitter accounts like EuromaidanPR also don't help to amend the situation (one can check what they wrote there after the incident;to me, they should be closed just for spreading RU disinfo).

All of it is If Ukrainian officials were wrong, that means, but by this stage I doubt effects of invastigation will go well for "Russian missile" theory. Radar evidences of NATO are probably solid, and today services finished physical part of examination, so even reporters can film relatively free at the site. We need to wait, hopefully not too long.

 

Edited November 20, 2022 by Beleg85

[chuckdyke]

Lower than Judas Iscariot who had the decency to hang himself.

[Battlefront.com]

11 hours ago, The_Capt said:

What we have not seen, or at least not fully confirmed is “why Feb 22?”  What was the forcing function here?  A lot of theories from “Putin is dying”, “Putin was sure he could get away with it” and “The Devil made Russia do it”.  But not really line up well.  In the end we may never really know but regardless…it was a terrible idea obviously.

I think there's actually two questions to be asked... why explicitly winter 2022 and then, separately, why February?  There's a lot of reasons cited for why winter 2022 that are plausible, including poor health, determining NATO would get stronger, various internal calculations showed the population needed a distraction, etc.  There's also been a bunch of things suggested which are unlikely, such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan or perceived weakness of Biden's Admin generally.  However, it seems clear that the planning for the war started sometime in the Spring of 2021 IIRC and the target date seems to have been Winter 2022 from the very start.

So why February?  Putin's forces were already in position for the better part of a month before February 23rd, but instead sat around freezing and consuming large amounts of supplies.  The speculation is that the Biden Admin's diplomatic offensive caused disruption to Putin's calculations and he held off until he was convinced attacking was still viable.  It seems likely, in my mind, as it also seems likely that a primary reason the rank and file had little idea of what was about to happen.  To the extent that many units crossed into Ukraine not having a clue what they were supposed to do.  It seems Putin's idea of OPSEC is to not tell the soldiers where they are going or why.

We're going to need to see some high level Kremlin types divulging this sort of information to know for sure.  I'm sure the US intel leading up to the war has most of the answers, but I don't expect they'll divulge them any time soon.

Steve

[MikeyD]

You may recall 2014 Putin delayed his war in Ukraine specifically until after the Sochi winter Olympics was over. Feb 2021, while the Beijing Olympics was taking place, I said that Putin's gonna pull the trigger within a week of the closing ceremonies - and he did.

[Offshoot]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

So why February?  Putin's forces were already in position for the better part of a month before February 23rd, but instead sat around freezing and consuming large amounts of supplies.  The speculation is that the Biden Admin's diplomatic offensive caused disruption to Putin's calculations and he held off until he was convinced attacking was still viable.

 

I read an article a few days before the war started that essentially said it was now or "never" (unfortunately I can't find the article now). The Russian forces were in such a state that they either had to attack now or be withdrawn to be refitted. If they waited any longer, they would have been in no state to attack. At the time there were stories of Russian soldiers living in train stations buying their own food and selling their fuel. A personal account by an airborne soldier linked somewhere in this thread also attested to this.

The diplomatic offensive very likely affected Putin and he may himself have been holding out hoping the west would give in. But in the end he had to use it or lose it (at least for a long time, as well as the initiative and a good amount of face). So Putin chose to use it.

[Zeleban]

NATO doctrine assumes that the main role in air defense is played by aviation. As a result, the majority of NATO countries have weak and small air defense. For example, Poland's air defense system in 2022 consisted of air defense systems of an even older model than Ukraine's (S-200, S-125). I found an interesting article on Facebook about the Polish air defense and their ability to repel a missile strike. It is without translation, so I will translate it myself.

What about air defense in Poland, and can the Poles defend themselves against racist missiles

- After yesterday's "arrival" over Poland during the Russian missile attack, there was a lot of wonder about how NATO (as the collective sum of the military power of the participating countries) could "sleep through" the attack. And the problem lies in the fact that even the same Poles have anti-aircraft defense at a "symbolic" level.

If we take data on air defense units in the Polish Air Force, there is only one S-200B battery covering Warsaw. And 17 S-125 Neva SC complexes (in a mobile version, on a tracked chassis).

If we take the data for the units of the army air defense as part of the Polish Ground Forces, then the picture looks somewhat "richer".

In particular, the Poles still have 20 2K12 "Kub" complexes, 64 "Osa-AK" complexes (this figure is as of the end of last year), 42 short-range Poprad air defense systems, 20 ZSU-23-4MP Biala anti-aircraft artillery complexes ( the Polish upgrade of "Shylka"), and about a hundred Pilica complexes - a "hybrid" of the modified ZU-23-2 and Piorun MANPADS. Also - about 300 units of "classic" ZU-23-2.
But the situation with air defense equipment for the Polish naval forces looks the most colorful. Their fleet has two anti-aircraft divisions and two anti-aircraft batteries armed with S-60 and ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns and "Peruns". And with such a simple array of forces, the Poles cover in particular the pride of their Navy - two batteries of NSM coastal missile anti-ship complexes.

[Zeleban]

Of course, the NATO doctrine provides that air defense primarily relies on aviation, ground means come second. But the Poles are not happy with aviation either.

The Polish Air Force currently has 3 squadrons of 48 F-16 fighters, which are also "sharpened" for strike functions. And 2 squadrons of 22 MiG-29 fighters and 6 training and combat MiG-29UB. And here, the Poles have everything in terms of fighters. The promised F-35 will be no earlier than 2025-2026.

From tactical aviation, the Poles have 18 Su-22M aircraft, which can only work against the enemy with unguided aerial bombs. Or conduct reconnaissance using hanging containers with Soviet-made equipment.

For such a large country, aviation is, to put it mildly, insufficient. Poland understands this very well, which is why it is literally forced to "patch holes with improvised means." For example, Warsaw wants to purchase at least two more squadrons of new F-16s, but the queue for such aircraft is scheduled until the early 2030s.

The Poles were able to quickly implement a slightly different option - to order the delivery of 50 South Korean FA-50 combat training aircraft to replace their MiG-29 and Su-22M.

Indeed, Poland is currently conducting the Wisla program for the purchase and production of 4 batteries (16 air defense systems) of Patriot complexes. But they will be on combat duty no earlier than 2025.

The situation is similar with the Narew program, as part of which the Poles are buying the latest Sky Saber medium-range air defense systems from Great Britain. Poland received the first complex of this type in July 2022, another one should be received by the end of this year, but the delivery of the other 21 complexes will take several years.

Against this background, various exotic proposals are already slowly being heard in the local press. For example, that Poland needs to build over-the-horizon radars for long-range detection of Russian cruise missiles. Or - to rebuild the energy infrastructure so that it "fits" into the coverage area of existing and promising means.

Because the Poles clearly understand that they do not have enough resources for the "Soviet" density of air defense cover. Even in spite of the fact that the defense budget for 2023 will reach a record $21 billion.

[Zeleban]

And another interesting article from the same source. This time about the last missile attack on Ukraine.

The following can already be said about today's massive rocket attack by the Rashists. - In fact, it is not entirely correct to say that "this is how Russia took revenge for the defeat at Kherson" or that "this is how the Kremlin took revenge for the humiliation at the G20". It is more correct to say here that the Rashists carried out this missile attack only because they had the technical opportunity to do so.

When the Russians carried out the first massive attack on the energy infrastructure on October 10-11, they already "scooped up" their inviolable stock of cruise missiles. For example, at that time near Kyiv, our anti-aircraft defense shot down the Russian X-101, manufactured in the second quarter of 2022. Although it is usually the old missiles that are fired first.

The Kremlin started the war with a 10-year supply of cruise missiles, and now has a lag of only a few months. That is why the Russians now keep an interval of 2 weeks between the next mass missile strikes. Because the Russian Federation cannot replenish its inventory of cruise missiles faster.

This time, the Russians were "late" - usually they start the attack in the morning, but today they started in the afternoon. It seems that there is also a "technological" explanation here. Usually, for attacks, the Russians use a "mix" of Tu-95MS bombers (which can carry up to 6 missiles) and Tu-160 (which can carry up to 12 missiles).

This time there were only Tu-95MS, a record number of 14 aircraft per flight. And here there may be such an explanation - it seems that the on-board equipment on the Tu-160 "jammed" in the process of preparing for departure. That is why the Rashist aviation engineers had to "repack" the Kh-101 and Kh-555 into the bomb hatches of the Tu-95MS. That is why the orcs were "late" this time.

If we count on the basis of figures from open sources, the Russian Federation still has at least 300 air-based cruise missiles Kh-101 and Kh-555 + naval "Calibre". And this will probably be enough for another 3-4 such massive shelling. Therefore, the Russians, as a vile and insidious people, will always find an "excuse" for another stike on Ukraine to amuse their bloodthirsty audience. If, of course, they can withstand a production cycle of 2 weeks for a cruise missile.

 

After all, the "window of opportunity" narrows for them.

 

If during the raids on October 10-11, about 50% of the winged hawks were shot down, today - more than 80%.

[Haiduk]

Winter is coming

[Seminole]

We see lots of vids where UKR ATGMs kill Russian AFVs, but does anyone know how the Russians are getting most of their kills?

Is it also predominantly Russian ATGMs?  Anyone seen anything in that regard?

[Zeleban]

19 minutes ago, Seminole said:

We see lots of vids where UKR ATGMs kill Russian AFVs, but does anyone know how the Russians are getting most of their kills?

Is it also predominantly Russian ATGMs?  Anyone seen anything in that regard?

 

Just like Ukraine - artillery.

I am sure that the lion's share of the losses of any armored vehicles on both sides falls on artillery. Since there are no more massive attacks of armored vehicles as at the very beginning of the war. Both sides keep armored vehicles in the rear and push to the front line only when necessary.

[Haiduk]

24 minutes ago, Seminole said:

We see lots of vids where UKR ATGMs kill Russian AFVs, but does anyone know how the Russians are getting most of their kills?

Is it also predominantly Russian ATGMs?  Anyone seen anything in that regard?

There were some videos of Kornet, Metis-M and Fagot launches but mostly "somewhere" with unknown result. But yes, this war is a war of artillery and AT-mines

Edited November 20, 2022 by Haiduk

[Beleg85]

Regarding AT issue- short clip of very balsy Ukrainians throwing probably RKG-3 AT granade at Russian armour; unfortunatelly, rather unsuccessfully:

 

[poesel]

About AA guns: why don't we see more of the ZSU-23-4? It should be on par with the Gepard (about the same age) and Ukraine has them (as well as many other former Warsaw pact nations). Should be more than adequate for all those small, slow drones we currently see.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZSU-23-4_Shilka

?

[Huba]

6 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Of course, the NATO doctrine provides that air defense primarily relies on aviation, ground means come second. But the Poles are not happy with aviation either.

The Polish Air Force currently has 3 squadrons of 48 F-16 fighters, which are also "sharpened" for strike functions. And 2 squadrons of 22 MiG-29 fighters and 6 training and combat MiG-29UB. And here, the Poles have everything in terms of fighters. The promised F-35 will be no earlier than 2025-2026.

From tactical aviation, the Poles have 18 Su-22M aircraft, which can only work against the enemy with unguided aerial bombs. Or conduct reconnaissance using hanging containers with Soviet-made equipment.

For such a large country, aviation is, to put it mildly, insufficient. Poland understands this very well, which is why it is literally forced to "patch holes with improvised means." For example, Warsaw wants to purchase at least two more squadrons of new F-16s, but the queue for such aircraft is scheduled until the early 2030s.

The Poles were able to quickly implement a slightly different option - to order the delivery of 50 South Korean FA-50 combat training aircraft to replace their MiG-29 and Su-22M.

Indeed, Poland is currently conducting the Wisla program for the purchase and production of 4 batteries (16 air defense systems) of Patriot complexes. But they will be on combat duty no earlier than 2025.

The situation is similar with the Narew program, as part of which the Poles are buying the latest Sky Saber medium-range air defense systems from Great Britain. Poland received the first complex of this type in July 2022, another one should be received by the end of this year, but the delivery of the other 21 complexes will take several years.

Against this background, various exotic proposals are already slowly being heard in the local press. For example, that Poland needs to build over-the-horizon radars for long-range detection of Russian cruise missiles. Or - to rebuild the energy infrastructure so that it "fits" into the coverage area of existing and promising means.

Because the Poles clearly understand that they do not have enough resources for the "Soviet" density of air defense cover. Even in spite of the fact that the defense budget for 2023 will reach a record $21 billion.

So let me expand about that a little bit. In general, this article seems to have the numbers right mostly, but some takes from it are well, a bit disputable.
As a preamble to the whole discussion it's important to acknowledge that AD (as much as the rest of PL armed forces) were almost criminally neglected for quarter of a century, and basing any assumptions about the importance placed of them in the PL doctrine, based solely on it's present state might be a tad misleading.
Poland began the serious attempt at AD modernization only after 2014, with whole process picking up speed only around 2019, and being put in overdrive in 2022. At the moment it consists of 3 main programs: Pilica+, Narew and Wisła

Pilica was initially a program of point defence AD, each battery consisting of a radar and a bunch of ZU-23 integrated wtih Grom/ Piorun launchers. In this form we just finished a delivery of 6 battery of it. This program however is now updated to Pilica+, which also includes a SHORAD layer, adding 2 iLaunchers for CAMM missiles to each battery. The plan is to obtain 21 batteries in total, including modernizing the already delivered 6. I'm not sure about the source of the "100" number from this article, but it is obviously incorrect.

Next level is Narew, which is quite similar in principle to Sky Sabre (using the same launcher and missile, but different radar and especially the C4 system). At the moment we only got the "small Narew", i.e. 2 firing batteries of 6 launchers, and associated radars. It is mostly used for training, identifying the teething problems etc. It is to be followed by the "big Narew" of at least 21 more batteries, furnished with new Sajna radar ( similar to Giraffe AMB but with state of the art GaN technology). As part of it, production of CAMM and CAMM-ER is being set up locally under a license.

Wisła, which is basically a Patriot/ PAC-3MSE anti-missile system follows similar path - we bought 2 batteries already, with the existing AN/MPQ-53 radars, and already took initial deliveries. This is to be followed soon by another 6 batteries, but with new LTAMDS radar systems.

All 3 tiers are to be seamlessly integrated into a networked, dispersed system using indigenous  C4 solutions for Narew and Pilica+, at high level integrated with Wisła (and potential allied systems as needed) by ICBS. There are also various additional radar systems to be integrated into this network, including very long range 3D radars, meter-wave systems for detecting stealth aircraft, passive detection systems etc. There's also an ongoing program for a network of blimp mounted radars for stand-off ground-huggers detection.

Given all that, the statement that PL will not be able to achieve the "Soviet density" of ground based AD is absolutely false, in fact it's the other way around - what we're aiming at is a system way more comprehensive than we had previously, aimed at more or less complete coverage of the whole PL territory, Israel style. The only thing missing from this project is the very high/ long range tier, though there are very concrete plans for 100+ km CAMM-MR development, to turn Narew into a medium range system with some ABM capability. 

Regarding the Air Force modernization, the way the current gov tackles this is quite controversial. FA-50 purchase is really hard to justify, especially as we don't even know what radar/ weapons are to be integrated with it. A lot of people assumes that MoD bought these only to be able to show some actual airframes flying before the next election... 

As for all the legacy systems mentioned in this article, it is a general consensus that most/ all of them are going to Ukraine at some point, perhaps with the exception of S200 (which btw is based around Szczecin, not Warsaw), and some modernized Osa/ Shilka. During latest Ukraine Contact Group session PL pledged to deliver some "short range systems" - a bit enigmatic statement, as it could basically mean anything from the current roster.

 

Edited November 20, 2022 by Huba

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, poesel said:

About AA guns: why don't we see more of the ZSU-23-4? It should be on par with the Gepard (about the same age) and Ukraine has them (as well as many other former Warsaw pact nations). Should be more than adequate for all those small, slow drones we currently see.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZSU-23-4_Shilka

?

On 2014 Shilkas were decomissioned so far. In late 2014 the process of their returning  to service begun, but turned out they were in pretty bad conditions. Many of spare parts were absent and some of them even had been taking in Russia via third countries or with smugglers. Initially repaired Shilkas moved to separate units, which had a task to stop LDPR infantry advance untill heavy wepon arrive from withdrawal zones. But later they were included to AA-battalions of new-formed motorized infantry brigades and marines brigades. Motorized infantry brigade should have 8 Shilkas. Marines probably had only 4, but I didn't recall  now. 

In best case in pre-war four mot.inf and two marines brigades we could have at least 40 Shilkas. Might be some number were repaired and stored in reserve, but I don't know. But even theese Shilkas had disabled radars - as I know their components didn't manage to replace. Several UKR enterprises offered modernization with new radars, but all this was limited only with several specimens for demonstration. 

So, Shilkas mostly can be used only for direct optical targeting or as infantry support. Without radar it value as effective AA means is doubtful. Also we have big defficite of usual ZU-23 and barrels for them  

[Battlefront.com]

10 hours ago, Offshoot said:

I read an article a few days before the war started that essentially said it was now or "never" (unfortunately I can't find the article now). The Russian forces were in such a state that they either had to attack now or be withdrawn to be refitted. If they waited any longer, they would have been in no state to attack. At the time there were stories of Russian soldiers living in train stations buying their own food and selling their fuel. A personal account by an airborne soldier linked somewhere in this thread also attested to this.

The diplomatic offensive very likely affected Putin and he may himself have been holding out hoping the west would give in. But in the end he had to use it or lose it (at least for a long time, as well as the initiative and a good amount of face). So Putin chose to use it.

Yeah, I was focused too much on the "why didn't he launch the war in January instead of almost March", but you are correct that late February was about as long as he could keep his units in the field.  They were already in pretty bad shape in some cases due to ineptitude of keeping forces in the field during the winter.  Also, mud season was coming right up so if he didn't want weather to bog down his beautiful 3 day offensive he had to pull the trigger.

In summary, it appears that a variety of strategic reasons caused Winter 2022 to be the chosen time for "solving the Ukrainian question" with early-to-mid January being the likely anticipated start date.  The early and strong messaging from the West (initially led by the US, then US and Britain, then others) caused Putin to put things on hold until the Western threats could be assessed.  I also expect it was deeply troubling to Russian leadership that the West apparently knew a lot about their invasion plans, so they probably wanted some time to make some alterations.  One of those changes might have been to keep everybody below Divisional level clueless until the last minute.

That's the best explanation I can come up with until some within the Western or Russian high level circles fills in the gaps.

Steve

[Huba]

6 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

On 2014 Shilkas were decomissioned so far. In late 2014 the process of their returning  to service begun, but turned out they were in pretty bad conditions. Many of spare parts were absent and some of them even had been taking in Russia via third countries or with smugglers. Initially repaired Shilkas moved to separate units, which had a task to stop LDPR infantry advance untill heavy wepon arrive from withdrawal zones. But later they were included to AA-battalions of new-formed motorized infantry brigades and marines brigades. Motorized infantry brigade should have 8 Shilkas. Marines probably had only 4, but I didn't recall  now. 

In best case in pre-war four mot.inf and two marines brigades we could have at least 40 Shilkas. Might be some number were repaired and stored in reserve, but I don't know. But even theese Shilkas had disabled radars - as I know their components didn't manage to replace. Several UKR enterprises offered modernization with new radars, but all this was limited only with several specimens for demonstration. 

So, Shilkas mostly can be used only for direct optical targeting or as infantry support. Without radar it value as effective AA means is doubtful. Also we have big defficite of usual ZU-23 and barrels for them  

Poland still has a considerable number of Shilkas in service, called "Biała". These are modernized, radar replaced with IIR cameras and integrated with Grom/ Piorun missiles. Rumors have it that some are already in Ukraine, as well as considerable numbers of ZU-23 of various modifications.
Reportedly Poland exports a lot of 23mm ammunition, producing it at full capacity at the moment. While it does not get much attention in the media, it is quite clear that the 23mm AA guns are being heavily used in UA.

[Haiduk]

4 minutes ago, Huba said:

Rumors have it that some are already in Ukraine, as well as considerable numbers of ZU-23 of various modifications.

Taras Chmut, the head of Back-and-Alive charity fundation told they had a negotiattions with some Polish weapon trader about large party of ZU-23, but unsuccessfully - Polish side wanted too high price

Edited November 20, 2022 by Haiduk

[Huba]

Just now, Haiduk said:

Taras Chmut, the head of Back-and-Alive charity fundation told they had a negotiattions with some Polish weapon trader about large party of ZU-23, but unsuccessfully - Polish side wanted too high price

Interesting, I didn't hear about it at all. But it seems to pertain to a private dealer, not a state owned stocks, right? PL gov stopped issuing any official information about what exactly are we donating to UA, but rumors about various 23mm systems were quite strong since the very beginning of the war. What can be established as fact are ammunition deliveries, there was a contract signed between UA and PL producer Mesko in June.

[Haiduk]

5 minutes ago, Huba said:

But it seems to pertain to a private dealer, not a state owned stocks, right?

Yes, our charity funds negotiate only with commercial traders. Back-and-Alive and probably Poroshenko's fund have direct licenses for military equipment supply. The fund of Serhiy Prytula probably buy equipment through some intermediary company.  

Edited November 20, 2022 by Haiduk