How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Zeleban]

 

There was information that the Russians retreated from Dudchany to the village of Milove, Kherson region

[Taranis]

"Ukrainian armored vehicle drives along the front line in the Donetsk region, October 3, 2022."

* MT-LB

[Butschi]

1 hour ago, Combatintman said:

Quoting myself ...

So - your theory holds no water at all.

When did that become an acknowledged fact here? Last time I asked if there was actual proof that there was early intel and the withdrawal from Afghanistan was due to that I was shouted down.

[Pete Wenman]

Some interesting thoughts from Tom Cooper on the nature of the ground war.

Full article here https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-4-october-2022-kherson-da84b46d8131

It's a lengthy read, but well worth the effort given previous conversations here 

Quote to whet the appetite

Quote

UAV-guided artillery.

….and then ‘not just some UAV-guided artillery’, but UAV-guided artillery networked with help of automatic tactical management systems (ATMS) — like Kropyva/Urtica (Ukraine) and Sozvezdiye/Constellation (Russia).

That means not only that both sides are deploying ‘plenty of artillery’: both the Russians and Ukrainians are deploying hundreds of UAVs on a constant search for enemy troops and vehicles. With help of ATMS, these UAVs are in constant contact with field headquarters. As soon as UAVs find something of particular interest: the object in question is subjected to artillery fire.

Unsurprisingly, UAVs — no aircraft and no helicopters — are the primary target of air defences on both sides, and both are shooting down UAVs in droves, every single day. Whenever they fail to do so, whoever and whatever is found by an UAV within 10–15km from the ‘frontline’, is shelled by artillery in a matter of 1–5 minutes.

This is getting so far that there are times and sectors of the frontline where Ukrainians — who, arguably, are better equipped with UAVs — are spending 30, 40, 50% of the flight time of their UAVs to run reconnaissance of their own positions, just in order to make sure these couldn’t be found by the Russian UAVs.

This is why artillery of both sides is hiding most of the times. Yes: it’s frequently hiding even when involved in fire action.

Sometimes, this is reaching such proportions that Ukrainians are protecting their ‘most precious’ self-propelled artillery pieces 1-for-1 by such rare stuff like German-made Gepard Flakpanzer: whenever the artillery piece in question goes into fire action, the Flakpanzer is responsible to protect it — from enemy UAVs, and thus from enemy artillery.

In turn, UAVs are foremost searching for enemy artillery. Whenever they find some, this is shelled until either destroyed, or until it runs away outside the range. That’s what they call ‘counter-battery action/fire’.

Sometimes, enemy artillery is not going to run away when targeted, but — preferably with help of UAVs, but sometimes with support of artillery radars — shoot back at the artillery that’s shooting at it. That’s what they call ‘artillery duels’.

Second principal target of artillery are fortifications: especially fortifications behind the frontline, like those used to protect headquarters, specific objects and/or vehicles — but also fortifications along the frontline. Fortifications are constructions designed to protect people and equipment: they can be anywhere between ‘relatively primitive’ (like a ‘simple, shallow trench’), and ‘elaborate’ (say, a bunker made of 1m thick concrete, with specially designed openings for fire-arms, which can be shut down with help of armoured covers etc.).

This is why whoever only can is doing his/her best to hide fortifications — to camouflage them, foremost with help of vegetation, or by ‘embedding’ them into terrain and vegetation; and why, in turn, why whoever only can is trying to find such objects, and then shell them, too.

Now, pay attention: I’ve just spent more than a full DIN A4 page (and that in fonts 10) to explain ‘just the basics’ — and haven’t even come as far as to ‘explain that with infantry and/or tanks’.

The reason is that these are the ‘fundamentals’ of this war. This is how 80–90% of action is fought — both by the Russians and Ukrainians. Should there be any doubts, invest 5–10 minutes of googling around to find articles quoting 80–90% of casualties on either side being caused by artillery.

Bottom line: most of the time, and regardless if on the move or standing still, everybody is hiding: hiding from UAVs, and from artillery.

Now, as a retired Lieutenant-Colonel of the US Marines nicely commented in a private chat, yesterday, this is where Ukrainians are enjoying quite some advantage. Reason? Whether motorised or airborne, the Russian infantry is ‘vehicle tied’. Its troops rarely venture more than 100 metres away from their vehicles. Because these vehicles are easy to detect and track — whether by radars, by infra-red or low-light TV systems — the Russian infantry is quite easy to find, too. On the contrary, Ukrainian infantry is frequently operating ‘miles away’ from its supporting vehicles. I.e. ZSU infantry is much harder to find.

P

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, Pete Wenman said:

Some interesting thoughts from Tom Cooper on the nature of the ground war.

Full article here https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-4-october-2022-kherson-da84b46d8131

It's a lengthy read, but well worth the effort given previous conversations here 

Quote to whet the appetite

P

Cooper can be a bit hit or miss (or his own sources are) when it comes to situation reports, but I agree this is pretty good synthesis, many thanks.

Whether motorised or airborne, the Russian infantry is ‘vehicle tied’. Its troops rarely venture more than 100 metres away from their vehicles. Because these vehicles are easy to detect and track — whether by radars, by infra-red or low-light TV systems — the Russian infantry is quite easy to find, too. On the contrary, Ukrainian infantry is frequently operating ‘miles away’ from its supporting vehicles. I.e. ZSU infantry is much harder to find. 

Edited October 4, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[kraze]

52 minutes ago, Huba said:

I think we are way overestimating the power of UA winter. First, global warming is a thing, and the weather is on average much less severe than it used to be. I recall months long periods of negative temperatures and snow lying around, right now it's no longer the case - you get maybe 2 weeks of that per year. In general, mud is much more annoying during winters now than snow. Granted, I live 2K km from Donbas, but I bet the pattern has to be at least somehow similar. Kharkiv is on average 4C colder than my city.

Second, when you look at typical temperatures in UA, it is not that bad at all. There might be periods of nasty weather, with uber cold continental air coming in, but on average it's really not that horrible. It is of course way different in the mountainous areas, but all the fighting takes place in the low positioned flatlands.

Perhaps some of our Ukrainian users could shed a bit of light on that? @Haiduk @krazeIs going around the countryside on snow scooter during the winter possible at all?

winters are random and unpredictable in Ukraine. You can have below zero temps and zero snow resulting in the solid frozen ground one week - and the very next one it's like +1C and a massive wet snow dump which turns everything into mud, then suddenly it's -10C - 20C and a knee-deep snow. And then it's +4-+6C temps and sunny days.

[Huba]

There's a new Rybar update on Kherson:

- looks like RU is fleeing from/ dead in the whole northern salient
- he confirms UA entrenched in Dudchany, and intends to continue the attack towards Berislav
- there's a success along Inhulets too, he implies UA took Novodimitrivka and continues south

There's no need to comment this map really, looks like RU is collapsing

Edited October 4, 2022 by Huba

[poesel]

9 hours ago, sburke said:

Ukraine likely would not do so.  Moldava would be the one to resolve that, it is their territory.

But Moldova and by extension Romania would likely be _very_ grateful for the removal of that wart from their eastern flank.
I doubt the West would miss the opportunity of this war to remove Transnistria from the map.

23 minutes ago, Pete Wenman said:

Sometimes, this is reaching such proportions that Ukrainians are protecting their ‘most precious’ self-propelled artillery pieces 1-for-1 by such rare stuff like German-made Gepard Flakpanzer: whenever the artillery piece in question goes into fire action, the Flakpanzer is responsible to protect it — from enemy UAVs, and thus from enemy artillery.

Damn opsec - I would love to see one in action!

[Huba]

12 minutes ago, poesel said:

But Moldova and by extension Romania would likely be _very_ grateful for the removal of that wart from their eastern flank.
I doubt the West would miss the opportunity of this war to remove Transnistria from the map.

I'm absolutely positive that Transnistria's days are numbered - the moment to move will be a bit later IMO, when the RU defeat will be a done deal. I recall that UK directed some of it's military support to Moldova (with no details given) and some UA help was directed to it's allies in Europe "both NATO members and other" or something like this. 
Also, given that ethnically and regarding language, Moldovans and Romanians are basically the same people (oversimplification, don't shoot me  ), if it comes to fighting, I bet RO will be helping directly including SOF deployment etc. in Moldovan uniforms.

Edited October 4, 2022 by Huba

[TheVulture]

33 minutes ago, kraze said:

winters are random and unpredictable in Ukraine. You can have below zero temps and zero snow resulting in the solid frozen ground one week - and the very next one it's like +1C and a massive wet snow dump which turns everything into mud, then suddenly it's -10C - 20C and a knee-deep snow. And then it's +4-+6C temps and sunny days.

Coming up next in "How hot is Ukraine gonna get?": How cold is Ukraine gonna get?

[Kinophile]

3 hours ago, Canada Guy said:

Kinophile, you mentioned snowmobiles, but all the UA army needs is a few Aimo Koivunen

https://allthatsinteresting.com/aimo-koivunen

The references to the winter weather are interesting.  I live in a part of Canada that is on average -20C in Feb but last year it dripped down to around -51C (-60F for our American friends).

I assume parts of Ukraine have the same weather patterns.

I was freezing after 45 minutes outside in great gear and good winter boots and keeping up a good pace to keep warm. I am not joking when I say that Canada should ship winter gear to Ukraine instead of anything else. General winter could be a deciding factor. 

I've previously shot overnight on the Toronto Lakefront in January and holy ****ing **** its awful. Just ****ing ****ty **** **** *** **** mother****er **** ****y ****ing awful. And that was with Baffin boots, heating pads, many layers, canada goose level coat, insulated overalls, gloves with heat pads, spare layers, etc. I was fine, in the end, but I was in no bloody hurry to do anymore days on 1st Unit of The Strain, I can tell you.

I've never been so cold - except in the old power station, the Hearn. But that has gigantic concrete floors that hold and radiate the cold, plus wind* and a nice nasty asbesto-y dust to blow around and as it was literally my first day on a film set and I knew nothing, I absolutely was not dressed correctly. 

Which is the point, really.

I don't know if anyone else noticed, but we were all jabbering in the Spring about the expected rains giving a mud season that would slow down RUS ops. Personally I saw very little impediment or hindrance due to surface conditions. Certainly nothing dramatic compared to the Wehrmacht's experience. 

I doubt this coming winter will slow the UA. As has been noted by others, winter hits the unprepared unequally. 

And I dont hear no stories about Ukraine "losing" 1.5 million winter uniforms.

 

_{*Wind is the killer, it really is. I find Terry Pratchet's description of a "Lazy Wind" as perfectly apt - "It doesn't bother going around, it just goes right through you."}

Edited October 4, 2022 by Kinophile

[Grigb]

19 minutes ago, Huba said:

There's a new Rybar update on Kherson:

- looks like RU is fleeing from/ dead in the whole northern salient
- he confirms UA entrenched in Dudchany, and intends to continue the attack towards Berislav
- there's a success along Inhulets too, he implies UA took Novodimitrivka and continues south

There's no need to comment this map really, looks like RU is collapsing

Yes, I just would like to add some details.

RU situation is very difficult. There are claims they are extremely short on ammo, and it looks like they do not have meaningful reserves at Berisalv, air support is sporadic and arty support is weak. However, it is not full-blown collapse yet. Remnants of RU forces are still trying to conduct fighting retreat and trying to slow UKR forces as much as possible. They blown up dam at Dudchany and now regrouped at Milovo (tip of red arrow). AFAIR it is their last defensive line.

On the other hand, the trend for collapse is set. If RU high command will not do something to change situation dramatically the collapse might happen as soon as in 1-2 days. But the options seem limited - there are claims of huge reinforcement coming Kherson but even if it is true (claimed huge reinforcements to Lyman were weak in reality and could not affect situation much) they still need to cross the river. Apart from that it seems they can only take forces out of the perimeter at western part - means weaken Kherson city defenses.

[LongLeftFlank]

9 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Kreminna

Remember 1200 pages back when we were all counting Russian BTGs?

 

Russian blogger 'Sladkov', quoted at length on Pat Lang's blog.

https://turcopolier.com/combined-arms-tactics-ttg/

Ukrainians do not take Liman and other villages head-on. There are forests and swamps around [them]. They operate in maneuverable groups, up to a platoon, three jeeps, one “Kozak” (something in between our “Typhoon” and “Tiger”). That’s it. And there are many such groups going forward.

There is no big collective goal, they do not accumulate in one place. Their comms are reliable (stable closed communication between groups and headquarters, use of large and small UAVs). They inspire fear with their appearance (who knows, maybe it’s a regiment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine coming towards you).

These groups envelop the villages, block them. The same way the militants in August 1996 took Grozny.

Everything from the fact that we [Russians] lock ourselves in our bases, do not pierce the entire space around with tentacles, do not have the active defense initiative, give it to the enemy....

If there is a city in front of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and operational space around, they will go the same way, in front of the “Cossack patrol” then large groups, but also enveloping the city. And then, figuratively speaking, the bend of the arm behind the back, followed by strangulation. 

****

From the comments

 “In the war with Ruin, the bureaucracy wins."

Serdyukov laid a mine under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation”. It includes a quoted passage from a DPR commander complaining that he is drowning in paperwork (machine translation):

“I don’t see or hear any personnel. Organized the shooting — couldn’t attend. I prepare bottled “forms”, personnel security clearances, a patient record book, an evening verification log, training plans, platoon logs. I don’t have any company equipment — there are reports on fuel and lubricants, receiving and writing off ammunition… There is a war going on, and I don’t see people: meetings, papers, reports, offices.”

The author ends with this staggering claim:

During the Great Patriotic War, a combat order took up half a page and was often issued after the fact, to avoid wasting time and losing operational understanding of the situation.

Now the order is 10-20 A4 sheets for the simplest task and is issued before its oral delivery. And, God forbid, it will not comply with the governing documents invented by Serdyukov. And there is always someone to report “inconsistencies” in the actions of real commanders

https/katyusha.org/vojna/v-vojne-s-ruinoj-pobezhdaet-byurokratiya.-minu-pod-mo-rf-zalozhil-serdyukov.html (in Russian)

...I dunno, sounds to me like Serdyukov actually had some fairly sound ideas, even though he and his Amazon girlfriend took a nice slice for themselves.  Paying off the greater thief at least protects you from the lesser thieves ... a pattern of corruption as old as human civilisation.

Edited October 4, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[chuckdyke]

Old European tactics. Infiltrate with a small but motivated group. Lead the new recruit by example and eliminate the enemy before they can recover. Old but proven strategies. Bash them up till they stop resisting.

 

[kraze]

https://babel.ua/en/news/85129-estonia-transferred-drones-to-ukraine-it-was-them-which-the-russian-tried-to-export-for-the-needs-of-the-army-of-the-russian-federation

A historic event here. For the first time in 8.5 years of war common russians actually did something to help Ukraine.

[Huba]

36 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Yes, I just would like to add some details.

RU situation is very difficult. There are claims they are extremely short on ammo, and it looks like they do not have meaningful reserves at Berisalv, air support is sporadic and arty support is weak. However, it is not full-blown collapse yet. Remnants of RU forces are still trying to conduct fighting retreat and trying to slow UKR forces as much as possible. They blown up dam at Dudchany and now regrouped at Milovo (tip of red arrow). AFAIR it is their last defensive line.

On the other hand, the trend for collapse is set. If RU high command will not do something to change situation dramatically the collapse might happen as soon as in 1-2 days. But the options seem limited - there are claims of huge reinforcement coming Kherson but even if it is true (claimed huge reinforcements to Lyman were  weak in reality and could not affect situation much) they still need to cross the river. Apart from that it seems they can only take forces out of the perimeter at western part - means weaken Kherson city defenses.

There's a new rybar about situation around Davidyv Brid and it's very inconsistent. First he says this:

Quote

After several unsuccessful attempts to storm the Russian positions in Davydov Brod , the Ukrainian command switched to a consistent probing of the defense of the RF Armed Forces.

And then this:

Quote

The Ukrainian command will continue the assault on Russian positions in Davydov Brod in the coming hours. In case of success in this sector, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will probably start moving in the direction of Charivnoye to cut through the grouping of the RF Armed Forces on the right bank of the Dnieper .

I'd interpret it as UA just blocking the village itself and preparing for, or already striking south through the grey zone. if they manage that, and the northern pincer reaches Mylove, it is lights out for the whole grouping.

[Grigb]

3 minutes ago, Huba said:

There's a new rybar about situation around Davidyv Brid and it's very inconsistent. First he says this:

And then this:

I'd interpret it as UA just blocking the village itself and preparing for, or already striking south through the grey zone. if they manage that, and the northern pincer reaches Mylove, it is lights out for the whole grouping.

Yes, RU declare UKR are attacking the settlement while it is just blocking force probing RU positions. And the main force is already on the move. 

[LongLeftFlank]

15 minutes ago, Huba said:

If they manage that, and the northern pincer reaches Mylove, it is lights out for the whole grouping.

Sorry to be so bloodthirsty, but the VDV units north of the Dnepr need to be aggressively cut off and destroyed -- as in KIA or prisoners -- not allowed to escape, even weaponless, across the river. 

Is mining the Dnipr -- letting a steady stream of magnetic mines drift down -- fair play?

The paras will likely sell their lives dearly, like cornered animals, but it is best that they do not furnish veteran cadre for new formations, whether for purposes of a future war, or for internal repression on behalf of the next set of thugs who take control in Moscow.

Edited October 4, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Grigb]

21 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

Old European tactics. Infiltrate with a small but motivated group. Lead the new recruit by example and eliminate the enemy before they can recover. Old but proven strategies. Bash them up till they stop resisting.

 

As far as i understand UKR call it Dagger tactics. Dager is platoon size unit usually up to three jeeps and one Kossak armored car.

They probe the front line for weaknesses. Once weakness is found they signal location to the main force and move with other Daggers through, blocking RU controlled settlements when necessary. Before RU can even realize what is going on their rear is full of UKR Daggers, RU defenders are blocked at their positions and the UKR mechanized hammer is coming.

[Kraft]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

There's a new Rybar update on Kherson:

- looks like RU is fleeing from/ dead in the whole northern salient
- he confirms UA entrenched in Dudchany, and intends to continue the attack towards Berislav
- there's a success along Inhulets too, he implies UA took Novodimitrivka and continues south

There's no need to comment this map really, looks like RU is collapsing

That already is a chunky % of the Kherson groups territory gone, especially if you add what Rubar has already marked Blue (in a futile attempt to downplay this advance im sure) that was taken within the last 2 prior days.

Seems the RU panic on TG was well deserved, I wish them more sleepless nights >:)

 

 

[Huba]

2 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Sorry to be so bloodthirsty, but the VDV units north of the Dnepr need to be aggressively cut off and destroyed -- as in KIA or prisoners -- not allowed to escape, even weaponless, across the river. 

They will likely sell their lives dearly, like cornered animals, but it is best that they do not furnish veteran cadre for new formations, whether for purposes of a future war, or for internal repression on behalf of the next set of thugs who take control in Moscow.

Not letting them escape should be relatively easy, unless they are getting airlifted out as we speak. I'm sure the end of RU forces on the right bank will involve both a lot of POWs and huge carnage, there's just no other way...

[LongLeftFlank]

3 minutes ago, Grigb said:

As far as i understand UKR call it Dagger tactics. Dager is platoon size unit usually up to three jeeps and one Kossak armored car.

They probe the front line for weaknesses. Once weakness is found they signal location to the main force and move with other Daggers through, blocking RU controlled settlements when necessary. Before RU can even realize what is going on their rear is full of UKR Daggers, RU defenders are blocked at their positions and the UKR mechanized hammer is coming.

T.E. Lawrence, Orde Wingate, Popski, and all the other oddballs are giving UA a cheer from Valhalla!

And Guderian nods (although Schneller Heinz still has some time to serve in Hell).

[chuckdyke]

1 minute ago, LongLeftFlank said:

And Guderian nods (although Schneller Heinz still has some time to serve in Hell).

The man was incorrigible. His wife "how lovely the moon shines in the river." Heinz replied "no obstacle for my Panzer Formations." 

[Holien]

19 hours ago, Ultradave said:

I assume you are talking about tactical nuclear weapons here.

1. I would assume they would have the skills. Short and medium range missile units are most likely better trained, manned and are not used for cannon fodder on the front lines. There is not too much more to firing off a tactical nuclear weapon than a conventional one, once the release authorization is received. In fact, there isn't the time pressure to calculate data. It's slow and carefully checked. Same with "setting" the warhead.

2. Depends. Tactical nuclear weapons are low yield (everything is relative) compared to ICBM warheads. As such the warheads are of a simpler design and require little in the way of maintenance. Even old weapons should still work. 

3. Artillery: the US doesn't have any more and haven't for quite a while, but the Russians may. Same range as the artillery they are fired from, in their case, most likely 152mm. A 122 wouldn't have a big enough warhead size to fit a nuclear charge, kind of like a 105 for us. Also, you don't want to be that close.  Rocket artillery also - a nuclear warhead can fit rocket artillery warheads.The US used to have 155mm and 203mm nuclear artillery shells. Simple design, pretty much foolproof. Bombs are considered tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. You need jets that are nuclear capable. You'd want to be sure that you have local air superiority to use one. Then there are IRBMs (Intermediate Range Nuclear Weapons). We foolishly withdrew from the treaty because of accusations of cheating by Russia, and their complaints that the proposed Bush era BMD for Europe could also be used for IRBMs. This was correct and was fixed during Obama's administration. As for Russia's cheating, some certainly was. Some was a debatable or semantics. In any case, the US withdrew from the treaty rather than try harder to fix the issues. Russia's Iskander missiles are nuclear capable and pretty long ranged, and pretty new and shiny. No need to be up close and personal.

4. Kind of covered by the above - there's a wide variety.

5. (added by me). We don't really have a good handle on exactly how many and what types of tactical nuclear weapons Russia has. They aren't covered by a treaty. Back when GHW Bush was president he unilaterally eliminated our tactical nuclear weapons, and the Russians followed suit because they are destabilizing and both sides realized that getting rid of them was a really good idea. However that was quite a while ago now. Many were destroyed/dismantled, and many are in storage, just not deployed, (we think) and we don't have visibility into what they may have been doing since then with new or updated/replacement weapons, like we do with strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, which are covered by extensive verification as part of the treaty terms. 

 

 

Thanks for that update and very useful...

My take from that...

So just talking the Tac use I think Russia has several hurdles to overcome that could cause them issues.
 

1. Getting them safely to the battlefield and in a safe position to use will not be easy. We have seen how poor logistics have been and with a dynamic battlefield with drones overhead they might get intercepted.
    
2. You do need trained troops to use the weapons. The Russians do not have a great track record of training and ability, but it is possible they could find the right troops to take them close to the front.
    
3. Using Arty to deliver a small warhead is going to be super risky.
    
4. Using a rocket is way more likely but again they are being shot down and it might not get through.
    
5. Using Jets well that seems to be even more risky than using Arty at the moment especially as Ukraine is getting more AA systems.
    
6. Of course Putler could just go for ICBM but if he does that we are into a whole realm of hurt.

I still think it is very unlikely but idiots do stupid things like announce an uncosted budget...

You kinda hope you don't get idiots in charge but the world seems to have too many in charge at the moment...

[Huba]

Davidyv Brid liberated!