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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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4 minutes ago, keas66 said:

Who used the word "irritate " first Steve ?

Ok, ok, let's all settle down.  Irritate is fine by me.  We are in a heated debate, I am sure we can irritate each other just fine and still have productive conversations. 

Look, we are all on the same side here.  We vary in some areas but I can say we are all very much pro-Ukrainian on this thread.

Probably on me, I poked back too hard.  I withdraw "irritate", maybe frustrate is a better word, but hey we can disagree.  So long as we keep it clean and most importantly productive.

Right?

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I have to say, it's really striking to me how frantic the Russian mobilization looks. They *don't* have the capacity to process these men. They lack the materiel to properly cloth, shoe and arm them for the kind of war and winter they are about to face. In the field, they are going to be an enormous logistical strain that will not appreciably do much more than hold a sector that isn't in the way of a direct Ukrainian offensive.

  • If they are trying to make a political statement of will to NATO, well NATO can see what I can see what I can see too.
  • If they are making a domestic political statement, they aren't exactly shoring up public faith in the war.
  • If they are merely trying to back fill units, why ignore actual training/abilities/requirements?

I can only think, watching it that they are really, truly about to collapse on one or more fronts and must perforce just funnel in bodies and hope for the best. If anyone has a better answer, I'm curious.

 

 

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There are risk escalation moments.

- Retaking LPR/DPR
- Retaking Crimea
- post-war settling of populations

- post-war rebuilding

 

LPR and DPR are the least risky both because their forces are already engaged, Ukraine can boil the frog, and its unlikely that western electoral populations will become engaged. This means that LPR/DPR cannot make Ukraine's life significantly harder, they can "cross the red line" in a way that doesn't create a reaction (will Russia nuke Ukraine for capturing a pig farm in LPR? Will Western supporters say "No! Return that pig farm!"?), and Ukraine can exercise its preference without Western support being withdrawn or damaged.

Retaking Crimea is far more risky. It is militarily more difficult. There is a clear red line (Perekop). Russia has a stronger claim to it. I suspect more Russians feel that it is "Mother Russia" than LPR/DPR so this means more special interests in Russia will want to work together to defend it. For example, LPR/DPR has hardcore nationalist and its own government. Crimea has hardcore nationalist, military, perhaps oligarchs who own land or have wealth tied up in the area, etc... This will bring in more Western opinion and pressure (both government and electoral)  and the West can use rebuilding as a stick to halt Ukraine.

To sum up Crimea:
- Very clear red line

- More parties in Russia lay claim to it

- Militarily more expensive to retake (even Warlordism might find Crimea being a tough nut to crack)

- Easier for West to also declare red line or see red line

Post-war population measures seems low risk as long as Ukraine does not screw up too much. Even intentional resettlement of populations can probably be done with good documentaries on Russian crimes in Bucha and Izyum. West will shrug and it seems to me that LPR/DPR will be in state closer to Germany in 1945 with most iits men fought out and exhausted. Less likely to lead insurgency and more likely to be done with war and glad that there is no longer threat of bombings and death of loved ones.

post-war rebuilding this seems like stick West can use to control Ukraine to some degree. Big risk here seems to be war lasting past 2024 and new U.S. government being less friendly to Ukraine or electoral unhappiness at large size of funding. Biggest seems to me is that Western voters bulk at the price.

3 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I have to say, it's really striking to me how frantic the Russian mobilization looks. They *don't* have the capacity to process these men. They lack the materiel to properly cloth, shoe and arm them for the kind of war and winter they are about to face. In the field, they are going to be an enormous logistical strain that will not appreciably do much more than hold a sector that isn't in the way of a direct Ukrainian offensive.


With how Russia has done so far I suspect that they don't have a good hold on what they can/cannot handle and are overshooting their mark. Maybe they were expecting a lot of loss through corruption/draft dodging?

They also might be reading current Ukrainian offensives as largely exhausted and trying to backfill as mush as possible by the time of the winter freeze and renewed large attacks.

 

Edited by Twisk
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2 hours ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Committing economic suicide
 

 

I really, really hope they do this because it would be unbelievably stupid and damaging to their exports.

But more likely it's just some politician trying to score points with Kremlin via a press release... and tomorrow nobody actually does anything about it.

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1 minute ago, Twisk said:

There are risk escalation moments.

- Retaking LPR/DPR
- Retaking Crimea
- post-war settling of populations

- post-war rebuilding

 

LPR and DPR are the least risky both because their forces are already engaged, Ukraine can boil the frog, and its unlikely that western electoral populations will become engaged. This means that LPR/DPR cannot make Ukraine's life significantly harder, they can "cross the red line" in a way that doesn't create a reaction (will Russia nuke Ukraine for capturing a pig farm in LPR? Will Western supporters say "No! Return that pig farm!"?), and Ukraine can exercise its preference without Western support being withdrawn or damaged.

Retaking Crimea is far more risky. It is militarily more difficult. There is a clear red line (Perekop). Russia has a stronger claim to it. I suspect more Russians feel that it is "Mother Russia" than LPR/DPR so this means more special interests in Russia will want to work together to defend it. For example, LPR/DPR has hardcore nationalist and its own government. Crimea has hardcore nationalist, military, perhaps oligarchs who own land or have wealth tied up in the area, etc... This will bring in more Western opinion and pressure (both government and electoral)  and the West can use rebuilding as a stick to halt Ukraine.

To sum up Crimea:
- Very clear red line

- More parties in Russia lay claim to it

- Militarily more expensive to retake (even Warlordism might find Crimea being a tough nut to crack)

- Easier for West to also declare red line or see red line

Post-war population measures seems low risk as long as Ukraine does not screw up too much. Even intentional resettlement of populations can probably be done with good documentaries on Russian crimes in Bucha and Izyum. West will shrug and it seems to me that LPR/DPR will be in state closer to Germany in 1945 with most iits men fought out and exhausted. Less likely to lead insurgency and more likely to be done with war and glad that there is no longer threat of bombings and death of loved ones.

post-war rebuilding this seems like stick West can use to control Ukraine to some degree. Big risk here seems to be war lasting past 2024 and new U.S. government being less friendly to Ukraine or electoral unhappiness at large size of funding. Biggest seems to me is that Western voters bulk at the price.


With how Russia has done so far I suspect that they don't have a good hold on what they can/cannot handle and are overshooting their mark. Maybe they were expecting a lot of loss through corruption/draft dodging?
 

I'd add the first major UA offensive into newly annexed territories. From stated RU PoV, these will be attacks into Russia itself, theoretically warranting nuclear response. If they don't follow through with the threat at this moment, IMO risk of it happening in LDPR/ Crimea will be greatly diminished. And I think they won't even lift a (nuclear) finger for Melitopol, which will dilute their narrative and ultimately hurt their deterrence.

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12 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, ok, let's all settle down.  Irritate is fine by me.  We are in a heated debate, I am sure we can irritate each other just fine and still have productive conversations. 

Look, we are all on the same side here.  We vary in some areas but I can say we are all very much pro-Ukrainian on this thread.

Probably on me, I poked back too hard.  I withdraw "irritate", maybe frustrate is a better word, but hey we can disagree.  So long as we keep it clean and most importantly productive.

Right?

Apologies  and agreed .

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42 minutes ago, cyrano01 said:

The UK has obviously taken the view that Scotland and  N. Ireland  do have such a choice having either held referenda or legislated for them.

N Ireland is a good example.  It is occupied Irish territory.  Ireland was conquered by England but had never conceded to that occupation. In the case of N Ireland it was a matter of how bad they wanted full national integrity or the ability to move on finally as an independent nation state after centuries of occupation.  The net result for England has been a continuing political football with a disproportionate impact on English politics and a political/military pain that just keeps on giving.

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Taking stock on the mobilisation, those fleeing, the reaction in Russia. The end result?; exposure of Putin, his message, as an absolute scam as more Russians are exposed to the military, its shortcomings,  the unnecessary war, and the upcoming casualty rate.  The more Russians exposed to Putin's scam, the more dangerous they are to the regime. Expect an internal revolt in 2023.  

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2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Now here is a very important question: Will Ukraine support free and fair (UN monitored) elections in these regions in order to allow citizens to decide their own nationality?  Will Ukraine honor the choices made in these regions, even if the vote in significant areas leads to secession?

More to the point, will Ukraine concede land to a democratic process?  I think there is a mountain of evidence of Russian interference; however, there is clearly also a deeper issue here as well.  One that should be addressed through democratic process.

I don't think there is much point in holding elections, because the outcome of the vote is going to be almost entirely determined by the pre vote negotiations on WHO gets to vote. As The_Capt and Haiduk have implied that can be argued about forever. I think it makes much more sense cut out middle whatever and negotiate with Moscow about the final status directly. Ukraine needs this to come out one of two ways. In the Ukrainian total victory scenario it is very simple, these areas are part of Ukraine, they get Ukrainian law, Ukrainian rights, and votes in Ukrainian elections. Basically how the south was reintegrated after the U.S. Civil war. It only took a hundred years to work the kinks out, but the basics really were settled in 1865. 

In the stalemate scenario, where Ukraine can't militarily reconquer the Donbas at an acceptable cost, best scenario is Russian annexation. That lets Ukraine, however bitterly, just forget about the whole region, it is Russias problem. It also means the region loses any claim whatsoever to any political influence in Kyiv. This severs Moscow's most obvious lever into Ukrainian politics. Last but not least it would be the better for the people of the region than almost any in between status. Moscow has treated the Donbas MUCH WORSE than anywhere else in Russia, it has basically been a chew toy for the worst elements in the Russian security services. Belgorod is not exactly paradise, but from the point of view of an average citizen in the L/DPR it probably looks like one. Any form of intermediate status just utterly bleeps the people that live there, and gives an excuse for another war. No one is investing a dime in the Donbas if the final status there is uncertain. I am strongly of the opinion that this is to be avoided if humanely possible, it might not be.

 

29 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

You can see what such people will do, when UKR troops were liberating Kharkiv oblast. They just fled to their beloved Russia, whith which they identified themselves. Of course, some pro-Russian part of population will remain, some will return from Europe and western Ukraine (yes, they, hating all european and ukrainian fled to the west, not to Russia). But Secretary of National Security Council Daniliov, answewring on the question of journalist "How we get along with people, whith wich we didn't leave together already 8 years?" said: "This is not about WE get along with them, this is about how THEY get along with us. This is fundamental thing. If someone is not satisfied our laws and other things, we don't keep anyone - the world is large"   

See response to The_Capt above...

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, ok, let's all settle down.  Irritate is fine by me.  We are in a heated debate, I am sure we can irritate each other just fine and still have productive conversations. 

Look, we are all on the same side here.  We vary in some areas but I can say we are all very much pro-Ukrainian on this thread.

Probably on me, I poked back too hard.  I withdraw "irritate", maybe frustrate is a better word, but hey we can disagree.  So long as we keep it clean and most importantly productive.

Right?

The thread, and everyones blood pressure might benefit from more discussion of Ukraines for an adequate supply, rotation, and laundry of winter socks for its troops, and less on counting chickens that unfortunately are still very fresh eggs. Because getting the socks right will grant us the privilege of arguing about the peace from the best possible place. 

1 minute ago, billbindc said:

I have to say, it's really striking to me how frantic the Russian mobilization looks. They *don't* have the capacity to process these men. They lack the materiel to properly cloth, shoe and arm them for the kind of war and winter they are about to face. In the field, they are going to be an enormous logistical strain that will not appreciably do much more than hold a sector that isn't in the way of a direct Ukrainian offensive.

  • If they are trying to make a political statement of will to NATO, well NATO can see what I can see what I can see too.
  • If they are making a domestic political statement, they aren't exactly shoring up public faith in the war.
  • If they are merely trying to back fill units, why ignore actual training/abilities/requirements?

I can only think, watching it that they are really, truly about to collapse on one or more fronts and must perforce just funnel in bodies and hope for the best. If anyone has a better answer, I'm curious.

 

 

The Putin's regime's determination to relive 1917 in full never ceases to amaze. And these guys will have LONG train ride to ponder exactly who they want to fight, and what the odds are for being alive in a year depending on the choice.

 

HOLY BLEEP people I can't keep up, there have been eleven response while I typed this.😵

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1 hour ago, sburke said:

Question for @Haidukand @Grigb

I am trying to understand what motivated Russia to do the prisoner swap.  

For now, we can only speculate:

  1. RU needs some of the high-ranking prisoners and UKR uses it to arrange a bigger prisoner swap
  2. In this particular case there is persistent rumor/speculation that swap was arranged to free Medvedchuk with bunch of RU just as addition
  3. There is RU claim based on alleged quote of UKR intelligence official (I did not check as I do not see it as important) that UKR know/has something that allows them to pressure RU negotiation delegation in to more favorable for UKR direction - for example Medvedchuk could tell them some interesting stories about Kremlin deals in L-DPR.

 

1 hour ago, sburke said:

It seems so counter to their narrative and guaranteed to upset a powerful constituency.

Constituency is not upset by the swaps per se. They are upset because every time it is done very unprofessionally - indeed it looks like it is done against RU propaganda narrative. Also, it shows RU as inept and corrupt morons.

 

1 hour ago, sburke said:

One item of info we don't have is beyond the one MP dude, who are the other 54 Russians swapped in this deal?

For unknown reason there is little Info about them:

Quote

 

Of the 55 Russians who returned from captivity today:

  • 2 senior officers (lieutenant colonel and major)
  • 6 junior officers
  • 4 ensigns
  • 40 enlisted and non-commissioned personnel
  • 2 servicemen of the NM DNR
  • 1 LPR NM serviceman

 

 

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2 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The Putin's regime's determination to relive 1917 in full never ceases to amaze. And these guys will have LONG train ride to ponder exactly who they want to fight, and what the odds are for being alive in a year depending on the choice.

 

The next few weeks should be really telling. If all the new conscripts were seen rocking full Ratnik gear rolling in BMP3's and T14s it might give the population a sense of pride and confidence. However, I doubt anyone here believes that will happen. When they see the newly formed units wearing sneakers, toting Mosin's and dragging their T55s towards the front it will probably produce some counter-productive sentiment towards Moscow.

Could be the nail in the coffin for some sort of 1917 moment.

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13 hours ago, dan/california said:

 

Well when we want his friend at CGSC to turn off the cloaking device and join the discussion it behooves us to be nice to him...

I tried. Concerns about sorting the contradictory thicket of work rules about posting on social media have already ended his prolific sim and other related internet articles from ten or fifteen years ago. Which I reluctantly admitted weren’t awful. Even tried a threat that Aragorn and LongLeftFlank might pay him a persuasive “visit”.  He remains unmoved. Honestly, it’s too bad. He has experience pertaining to this thread that would be of interest. 

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Let's skip the sources credibility for a moment. As we said, all the train lines from the north, ie through Kupyansk or Starobilsk are already out of order, and RU has to re-route everything through Luhansk. If UA manages to push into Luhansk oblast a bit and hit some overpassed/ bridghes on the line to Millerovo, they will have to go through Volgograd :D 

 

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4 minutes ago, Bufo said:

 

It really does make a person want to give Ukraine a thousand cruise missiles, and nuclear warheads for a hundred of them...

At any rate it does reinforce the ongoing narrative that that Ukraine is fighting perhaps the most justified war in the history of mankind. Unleashing monsters like this over things that could have been comfortably argued about in in a nice Swiss hotel for the next fifty years is just beyond unconscionable. 

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1 hour ago, FancyCat said:


I don't think there's anything wrong with suspension of normality during war and obviously there will be a period of reintegration. EU influence on Ukraine will keep Ukraine from getting too anti-democratic or repressive, and Ukraine's civil society looks to be holding up well. We have no idea the will of the population in the pre-invasion regions now. I'm not sure how uncertainty about reintegration equals a scenario where the West needs to fret about Ukraine retaking all her territory back.

My only thoughts about reintegration stem from American history. Military occupation and administration of the southern states, lasted 12 years and in my opinion should have lasted way longer and been harsher. But comparing reintegrations like that has no value and offers little in the way of lessons.

Not sure the EU has managed to avoid Hungary or Poland’s slide away from democratic liberty. What would make Ukraine different? Tbh the fact Ukraine has currently such a long way to go to acceding to the EU is almost all about it’s systems of governance and their robustness (or lack of) to corrosion/corruption. So I’m not sure there’s a lot of blind faith in Ukraine…

Zelensky and his govt have impressed, but what if the next lot are different?
 

NATO membership is in some ways much simpler. Who are your troops going to fight and how reliable are they? How much do we need you? (Why yes please join us Turkey)

Edited by Maquisard manqué
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