How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Calamine Waffles]

Does Ukraine have any 115 mm ammunition?
 

 

[Harmon Rabb]

4 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Does Ukraine have any 115 mm ammunition?
 

 

Does the writing on the gun say "fury"? Someone likes that Brad Pitt movie.

[Huba]

21 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

 Considering how close Poland & Ukraine havd become in Defense,  we should probably look at a post-war UA army as both NATO but also deliberately mirroring some Polish approaches, while retaining UKR specific force structures. 

(naturally,  each army in NATO has its own characteristics and approaches, I'm saying that the POL-UKR defenses establishments will be uniquely tightly bound together). 

An important aspect of Polish aid to UA has been the ease of transfer of 100s of tanks, AFV,  SPGs etc,  due to the commonality of equipment, logistics and training. Eg. the Twardys sent were 99% familiar to UA, they had existing stocks of parts and anything different was easily sourced from Poland. Germany has been of minimal use in terms of AFVs, in comparison. Plus everything is in German,  whereas Polish & Ukrainian are very similar (my Polish wife can understand  Ukrainian, but not really speak it. But it would be easy to brush up, she says). 

Poland is now consolidating its tank fleet to 1-2 models, building the support infrastructure and logistics skillset as well as doctrine and if I was a Polish CJCS  I would very much integrate UKRs battle experience into the new doctrine.

And vice versa - a New Model UKR Army should both reflect the new realities of modern war and integrate closely with the Polish brethren. That cross-border binding would make a POL UKR alliance a fearsome enemy to any Russian attack. 

So a UA tank fleet should really echo whatever Poland builds, with a strong communication between the two forces.

A good parallel would be US-UK defense relations, but more balanced and far more integrated/mutually informed down to the tactical level (whereas US-UK is more if a strategic relationship with operational interoperability.) 

Perspective model of Polish forces is to have 2 types of tanks - M1 and K2. It is quite possible that UA will also become an M1 operator in the near future, so this would be a common denominator for both armies. As for the rest, I'm pretty sure UA will be stuck with Soviet types for the foreseeable future, simply due to costs (and having experienced, trained reservists for these!). Some tweaks like NATO-compatible BMS, comms, FCS upgrades will probably be done. They will have to sort the inventory too and decide which types to keep in service for longer, and which (rarer ones) to put in reserve firs. IMO it will be a decade or two before they will withdraw them, and when they do, they will very much want the replacement to be produced locally, most probably in cooperation with somebody (here comes K2PL dressed in all white...).

IFVs/ APCs will be a much much tougher nut to crack IMO, as they already have an ungodly mix of every imaginable type. I really don't see anything at the moment that could serve as a basis for the future UA NATO forces, they will have to start from scratch.

For SPGs the situation is a lot better, at the moment it seems that PzH2000 and Krab will form the core of their force, with remaining types to be slowly withdrawn to reserve.

 

Edited September 14, 2022 by Huba

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Sooooo... who here wants to go on the record and state, unequivocally, that Russia is not going to fall apart because of this war?  Clearly state your intentions and the Forum will note the date and time of your statement.  We'll announce the winners of the contest at a later date

OK, so some of you might be saying "yeah, but these places that are now suddenly shooting at each other again aren't Russia, so git stuffed!".  Technically that is correct, but one has to remember all of these places were part of the Soviet Union.  The tensions that caused these areas to break away from the Soviet Union and fight amongst themselves exists on the arbitrary line on the map that separates these places from the remains of the Soviet Union (i.e. The Russian Federation).

Since the early 2000s Russia, once it regained its footing, kept both sides of border in the Caucuses relatively quiet.  It was a bloody and destructive path to get it that way, but it did.  However, like all things Russian, the policies from the Kremlin never even tried to do anything to get at the various roots of the Caucuses problems.  Nope, short cuts and violence have been their go-to strategy here as elsewhere.

We are already seeing the effect of a weaker Russia on the Caucuses.  For now it's mostly on the other side of its border, but it won't stay there.  It never has and that is exactly why Russia has put so much effort in keeping things peaceful in the former Soviet territory.

No timeline on when things go from bad to worse, but it will inevitably get worse.  Sadly, probably MUCH worse.

Steve

What is our timeline? 

I will happily predict the current Russian state will not fall apart in any substantial way for the next 10 years.

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Lt. Col. Dmitry Kochetkov, Commander 1st Motor Rifle Battalion, 70th Motor Rifle Regiment, 42nd Motor Rifle Division:

 

[Battlefront.com]

33 minutes ago, billbindc said:

What is our timeline? 

Good point!  Entropy predicts the Human species will likely not be here forever, so good to put timeframe on things.

33 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I will happily predict the current Russian state will not fall apart in any substantial way for the next 10 years.

We have our first taker   I could ask what you mean by "substantial", but I think I get your gist from previous conversations.

My personal timeline is it could happen within the next 1-3 years, however there are several scenarios that would make it more in your timeline than mine.

Which gets us to the bugger of all this tea leaf reading... there's too many scenarios to ponder.  Russia being militarily defeated is a certainty, but HOW it is defeated has a big impact on what happens after.  A quick and "orderly" coup against Putin is very different from a protracted period of governmental chaos.  Etc.

Each passing day we have a little more insight as to which way this is headed.  I am in the school of "the bigger they come, the harder they fall".  Or put another way, "for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction".  Putin's regime has been pushing far harder than it can sustain.  The recent collapse of the Khakiv front is an example of this playing out in military terms.

Steve

[billbindc]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

Good point!  Entropy predicts the Human species will likely not be here forever, so good to put timeframe on things.

We have our first taker   I could ask what you mean by "substantial", but I think I get your gist from previous conversations.

My personal timeline is it could happen within the next 1-3 years, however there are several scenarios that would make it more in your timeline than mine.

Which gets us to the bugger of all this tea leaf reading... there's too many scenarios to ponder.  Russia being militarily defeated is a certainty, but HOW it is defeated has a big impact on what happens after.  A quick and "orderly" coup against Putin is very different from a protracted period of governmental chaos.  Etc.

Each passing day we have a little more insight as to which way this is headed.  I am in the school of "the bigger they come, the harder they fall".  Or put another way, "for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction".  Putin's regime has been pushing far harder than it can sustain.  The recent collapse of the Khakiv front is an example of this playing out in military terms.

Steve

I can believe there will a slackening of control around the margins. Maybe that Georgian border creeps back north, maybe the Chechens develop some further autonomy, maybe there's a brushfire war in the Caucasus. But by substantial, I'm thinking something that changes the fundamental geography of the core Russia state. Siberian independence, a Yakuts republic. In short, an actual dissolution of the state that it cannot contest with any success militarily. I *do* think a late Ottoman style senescence is likely but I just don't think the near peripheral segments have the strength the center will retain.

[Battlefront.com]

This is an interesting look at the inside of the Russian police by someone who lost faith with the Putin regime:

The basic narrative is that this guy got a clue and tried to apply his new perspective within his job even though he figured it would get him fired.  And it did (well, he resigned before he got fired).  He then tried to instill his beliefs as a history teacher, but that also didn't work.  After the war started he got turned in by some parents who didn't like what their kids were learning.  He was visited by FSB.  That ended his teaching job, but he feels he has strong connection to the students.  This led to his name coming up for criminal prosecution, which resulted in FSB following him around.  He took the hint and relocated to Turkey.

He has hope for the future because, in his view, the youth is diverging from their parents and grand parents.  He has some pretty good insights into the sociological problems facing Russia, even if you disagree with his cautious optimism.

One interesting bit at the beginning where he mentions that he believes Russia will break apart, starting with the Far Eastern provinces going independent first.  He is from one of those, Sakha Republic, and doesn't feel he can speak for any other place.

Steve

[Combatintman]

1 hour ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Does the writing on the gun say "fury"? Someone likes that Brad Pitt movie.

Probably thought Fury was a tactical model for armoured combat ... hence ending up zapped and captured when confronted with the real thing.

[sburke]

5 hours ago, Huba said:

Zelenski in Izium. Waiting for Putin to visit Kherson. There's a Polish word "kozaczyć", literally "to cossack", which means to act with bravado, to be audacious  >>> this guy.

 

There were some recent articles on a noticeable decrease in the earth's rotation.  I believe if they calculate the increased mass of Zelenski's balls we will have found the cause.,

[Vergeltungswaffe]

Militarily or politically, I'm praying we're very close now.

[Billy Ringo]

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-war-began-putin-rejected-ukraine-peace-deal-recommended-by-his-aide-2022-09-14/

 

Exclusive: As war began, Putin rejected a Ukraine peace deal recommended by aide

PARIS, Sept 14 (Reuters) - Vladimir Putin's chief envoy on Ukraine told the Russian leader as the war began that he had struck a provisional deal with Kyiv that would satisfy Russia's demand that Ukraine stay out of NATO, but Putin rejected it and pressed ahead with his military campaign, according to three people close to the Russian leadership.

The Ukrainian-born envoy, Dmitry Kozak, told Putin that he believed the deal he had hammered out removed the need for Russia to pursue a large-scale occupation of Ukraine, according to these sources. Kozak's recommendation to Putin to adopt the deal is being reported by Reuters for the first time.

Interesting that this is coming out now and, by whom?  (If it's true.)   Looks like they are placing blame for the Ukrainian fiasco directly on Putin--the heat on him is starting to rise.

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I can believe there will a slackening of control around the margins. Maybe that Georgian border creeps back north, maybe the Chechens develop some further autonomy, maybe there's a brushfire war in the Caucasus. But by substantial, I'm thinking something that changes the fundamental geography of the core Russia state. Siberian independence, a Yakuts republic. In short, an actual dissolution of the state that it cannot contest with any success militarily. I *do* think a late Ottoman style senescence is likely but I just don't think the near peripheral segments have the strength the center will retain.

I agree that there are four possible outcomes for the Russian Federation in the near term (we'll use your 10 year timeframe):

• Status Quo.  Kremlin maintains tight authority over all current administrative units, but does not deviate much from the way things are at present.
• Consolidation.  Kremlin significantly, and successfully, increases control over the populace and administrative units.
• Devolution.  In order to maintain structural integrity, the Kremlin yields some power back to the administrative units.  The key thing is that they remain accountable to the Kremlin more than not.
• Breakup.  Administrative units split off from the Russian Federation or gain a degree of autonomy that is effectively the same (extreme confederation).  The primary point here is that relations with the Kremlin are very much on the terms of the administrative unit first and foremost.

I'm ruling out Status Quo.  I doubt there are conditions which would allow Putin (or his successor) to keep going with the way things are currently structured.  If he tries I think it will transform into one of the other three options because the war has pushed too many people to extremes.

Consolidation is what I would expect from either Putin or his successor.  However, I think that Consolidation will bring about either Devolution or Breakup.  Consolidation is, to me, not any more sustainable than the Status Quo.

Devolution is a sensible way to keep the Russian Federation together.  There are a lot of pros for this sort of thing from the administrative unit standpoint.  Certainly is a lot easier than leaving.  However, Devolution only works if enlightened people get into the Kremlin before the rulers there make irreparable damage to relations with the people and administrative units.  I do not think that's the sort of political future Russia has in store for it.

Breakup, therefore, is all that remains.

Of course, there could be a mix of things.  Some areas might breakaway, some might force a devolution of power, others still might remain tightly controlled by the Kremlin.  Even in my worst Breakway away case I don't see Moscow becoming a city state, so to some degree it will retain at least some, if not most, of the territory currently making up the Russian Federation.

Steve

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think we need to start taking weather into consideration.  The next 4-5 days are expected to be rainy in the Kharkiv area, which means we aren't likely to see any significant combat advances.  At least not dramatic ones.  Next week the night time temperatures are starting to get significantly colder.  People think that it takes freezing at night to produce bad mud during the day (that is certainly true), but it's not quite that simple.

Here is my first hand layperson's guide to Mud Season.  You're going to say "duh, everybody knows that" for the first half, but I feel it's necessary to state the obvious to make sure the point is understood:

Ground gets muddy because of water.  Ground gets harder because the water dissipates deeper into the soil or into the air.  Air temperature and sunlight heavily influence both processes.  During the war season even heavy and prolonged rains might make the ground soft, which can cause significant offroad problems, but it generally doesn't turn the ground into a quagmire.  What we think of Mud Season (quagmire) happens when the ground temperature cools and the sun spends fewer hours with lessening strength.  Cooler temperatures and reduced energy from the sun slows down the efficiency of moving the water out of the soil (down or up).  That, in turn, means that frequent rain events, even fairly minor ones, have a cumulative effect of making the soil muddier.  At some point, long before the ground and air temperatures approach freezing, the ground is a total mess.  Then night temperatures go below freezing which makes things worse as it freezes only the top layer and the sun has to thaw that before it can warm up the soil enough to get things moving again.

My point here is that we are already in Mud Season and the difficulties that come from it will accelerate from now on until the weather is sufficiently cold both at night and during the day to freeze the soil down to the frost line (around 1.3m where I live).  Sadly, the weather in Kharkiv for the next week looks like it's going to have a severe impact on combat operations already.

I think that Ukraine's offensive in the north can continue, but it's going to be mostly road bound and that makes it easier for Russia to stop/delay Ukrainian progress.  I'd love to see some more bold moves, but I'm guessing the weather is already working against that happening.

Steve

This s where AFU's interior lines could REALLY matter. If mud ends the Northern fighting season early. AFU could shift south to push at Melitipol much faster than the Russians. Holding Recent gains around Kharkiv with the Russians road bound would require a lot less forces than taking them did. If Ukraine can make gains on the east side of the Dnipro before winter that further impinge Russian logistics west of their the Russians winter just gets that much less pleasant.

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Billy Ringo said:

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/exclusive-war-began-putin-rejected-ukraine-peace-deal-recommended-by-his-aide-2022-09-14/

 

Exclusive: As war began, Putin rejected a Ukraine peace deal recommended by aide

PARIS, Sept 14 (Reuters) - Vladimir Putin's chief envoy on Ukraine told the Russian leader as the war began that he had struck a provisional deal with Kyiv that would satisfy Russia's demand that Ukraine stay out of NATO, but Putin rejected it and pressed ahead with his military campaign, according to three people close to the Russian leadership.

The Ukrainian-born envoy, Dmitry Kozak, told Putin that he believed the deal he had hammered out removed the need for Russia to pursue a large-scale occupation of Ukraine, according to these sources. Kozak's recommendation to Putin to adopt the deal is being reported by Reuters for the first time.

Interesting that this is coming out now and, by whom?  (If it's true.)   Looks like they are placing blame for the Ukrainian fiasco directly on Putin--the heat on him is starting to rise.

This was rumored at the time.  There was even high level mention of such things by Ukrainian government officials.  The problem was, and still is, that Putin's real reasons for invading Ukraine have very little to do with NATO membership.  He is just rather shy at telling us what his real motivations are

Steve

[billbindc]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This was rumored at the time.  There was even high level mention of such things by Ukrainian government officials.  The problem was, and still is, that Putin's real reasons for invading Ukraine have very little to do with NATO membership.  He is just rather shy at telling us what his real motivations are

Steve

The information is not surprising but the leak itself is...and more so with a little unpacking. Kozak is deeply inside guy and one of Putin's personal following from Saint Petersburg. He's trusted and he's one of the few who has the standing, the personal character and the demonstrated loyalty to say "Boss, this idea really sucks". And apparently, he did and more importantly, *he* didn't leak it. What's happening is that elites who want to pull Putin down are using his own closest people to suggest the boss has lost it. Pretty interesting stuff.

[Battlefront.com]

Zelensky visited Izyum earlier today. 

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/xe0hze/volodymyr_zelenskyis_arrival_in_deoccupied_izyum/

I wonder if his security detail has US weaponry for political reasons.  Certainly sends a multi-layered message, such as "American weapons protect us" or "we are embracing our future", etc.  According to US military guys they certainly didn't pick the M4 because it's a great rifle

Steve

[Centurian52]

I'm sure I'm late to the party on this nugget of info, but I woke up to see this in the first paragraph of this morning's ISW report:

"The Kremlin acknowledged its defeat in Kharkiv Oblast, the first time Moscow has openly recognized a defeat since the start of the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin officials and state media propagandists are extensively discussing the reasons for the Russian defeat in Kharkiv Oblast, a marked change from their previous pattern of reporting on exaggerated or fabricated Russian successes with limited detail.[1] The Kremlin never admitted that Russia was defeated around Kyiv or, later, at Snake Island, framing the retreat from Kyiv as a decision to prioritize the “liberation” of Donbas and the withdrawal from Snake Island as a “gesture of goodwill.”[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) originally offered a similar explanation for the Russian failure in Kharkiv, claiming that Russian forces were withdrawing troops from Kharkiv Oblast to regroup, but this false narrative faced quick and loud criticism online.[3] The Kremlin’s acknowledgment of the defeat is part of an effort to mitigate and deflect criticism for such a devastating failure away from Russian President Vladimir Putin and onto the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the uniformed military command."

 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-13

[kevinkin]

Money talks the timeline and sometimes better than pundits can since lines distill many scenarios/factors into a single number (Gambling911 site for example):

Vladimir Putin Exit Date

2026 or Later

• +110

2023

• +300

2024

• +450

2022

• +500

2025

• +700

[sburke]

14 minutes ago, dan/california said:

This s where AFU's interior lines could REALLY matter. If mud ends the Northern fighting season early. AFU could shift south to push at Melitipol much faster than the Russians. Holding Recent gains around Kharkiv with the Russians road bound would require a lot less forces than taking them did. If Ukraine can make gains on the east side of the Dnipro before winter that further impinge Russian logistics west of their the Russians winter just gets that much less pleasant.

considering the damage done to Russian forces in this area they probably don't even need a force as large as they did prior to hold it.  I am still of the mind of an overall operational pause but mud season would be a great time to develop the shaping for the next offensive.  Russian logistics should be even easier to disrupt in this period and localized moves to further degrade Russian manpower are certainly on the table.

[The_MonkeyKing]

The dam:

The river:

I say braking this dam would be a big help for the Russians Kherson defense. 

[The_MonkeyKing]

Some more footage. Some nice flooding would indeed be a critical help for the Ruskies. 

May very well just be controlled emergency release from the dam. But same effect of flooding the river.

Edited September 14, 2022 by The_MonkeyKing

[DerKommissar]

Ok, time to take a look at my crystal ball:

Caucasuses (Chechnya and Dagestan -- possibly Ossetia) will split over the next couple of years. Possibly with help of Turkey.

The Russian Federation is no longer a geopolitical competitor, in any sense or scope. Short term: there can be anything from a bloodless coup to a perpetual civil war. It is cloudy.

Long term: this leaves only the US and China as geopolitical competitors. The resultant state(s) will have to choose to whom to pledge their allegiance.

It's most likely that the RF will turn into a NK-style, hermit, client state for China. Under Putin or one of his replacements.

Somewhat likely: another Russian civil war would boil down into a proxy-war between China-backed East and US-backed West.

Least likely: the RF becomes an EU style Union, of proto-democratic republics.

Which way the wind blows depends on the actions of our world leaders, right now.

Edit: BTW, I would like to see the Ukrainian defense industry's rebirth, after the war. They were a massive exporter and manufacturer of everything from planes, to tanks, to rifles. With a freer economy and a wealth of experience, we could see a new pheonix rising.

Edited September 14, 2022 by DerKommissar

[Huba]

7 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Some more footage. Some nice flooding would indeed be a critical help for the Ruskies. 

May very well just be controlled emergency release from the dam. But same effect of flooding the river.

Evil bastards, and ruthless. I guess RU will do a major counterattack when the crossings are out of action. My bet is that UA bridgehead across the river is too well developed to collapse due to being temporarily cut off, UA has to have emergency bridging equipment and amphibious vehicles at hand. But the risk is certainly increased.

[The_MonkeyKing]

Just now, Huba said:

Evil bastards, and ruthless. I guess RU will do a major counterattack when the crossings are out of action. My bet is that UA bridgehead across the river is too well developed to collapse due to being temporarily cut off, UA has to have emergency bridging equipment and amphibious vehicles at hand. But the risk is certainly increased.

All depends on the situation on the ground.

This could be an enabler for Russians to retreat orderly from all or part of their positions. Or if Russian situation is good enough they could indeed remove Ukrainian Bridgehead and so one of the three attack directions.

Given that the news of the dam keep developing to a worse direction.