How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

@Haiduk can you please comment UKR side claims of recent strikes at RU AD using HARM please? I mean it looks like there was a serios strike on 5-7 august with good result. Arestovich even claim that RU AD is infective in Kherson. What do you think?  

I just have posted here official report of General Staff about destroyed Russian AD assets, and I can't add anything more ) Some military officilas have written in mockery style "this is Russian fake and propaganda, we hadn't platforms to launch HARM"

Though, minister of defense Reznikov anounced anti-radar missiles as far as on 25th of July or some later. Many thought this would be far perspective, but I think, they already were delivered to Ukriane and, likely their first usage was on 18th July in Lazurne, when newest Russian low-altitude radar complex 48Ya6 Podlyot K1 was hit. But because of also two other vehicles of this complex were destroyed, more likely this was HIMARS strike.

Edited August 8, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

The ambush on Russian armored column near Krasnopillia, Izium axis

 

[Haiduk]

 

[Grigb]

30 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Evening Map time. This time I decided to add a description of patterns I see.

• RU seems to be decreasing frontal pressure on UKR strongpoints.
• Attacks stalled at important Pisky, Bakhmut and Soledar. No attacks on important Avdyivka.
• Instead, I belive RU tries to probe flanks for left hook at Vuhledar, left hook at Kodema and increase pressure at North (Ivanovo-Dayivka area). Not much sucess though
• UKR indirectly admitted they are transferring forces - stated RU goal is to fix URK forces in Donbass, inflict casualties and prevent UKR from transferring forces
• Due to the above and overall weakness of RU offensive I started to suspect it is spoiling offensive
• Where could be real RU offensive and whether it could be at all is not clear

The reason RU offensive is weak is lack of manpower.

Quote

Human famine at the front near Donetsk. First of all, this explains the fact that the enemy has not yet been pushed back from the capital of the DPR.

Losses? Yes. War. Takes companies. Whole companies. This is a vile law of war.

Lack of people in platoons and battalions. Alas, it is so. And the situation, to put it mildly, is not simple. No scaremongering and decadence. Who was [there], he understands.

It just happens that [sometimes] there is no one to go forward.

Everything is simple. Arty works, suppress the UKR and press them into clay and crushed stone. The thinned companies attack, but there is simply NOT ENOUGH infantry. And the enemy has the opportunity not only to raise his head again, but also to snap and counterattack. So never rush to announce the "flags on the towers" in advance, if only because you don't want to be silent later.

We have everything in Donbass - special forces, bodyguards, ministers and their deputies, speakers, military officers and volunteers. And the infantry is being thinning so that sometimes it becomes quiet where a week ago there was a line of middle-aged men in a pixel. Unfortunately, there is not enough "orchestra" [Wagnerites] for everything. Unfortunately.

I do not lose hope that one big Russian orchestra will play, and the enemy will be annihilated...

LDNR forces are spent.

[Calamine Waffles]

2 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:

How does HARM work? Does it just hook into the biggest radar around or is there targetting information exchanged? I would expect anti-radar missile to be mostly fire and forget, so maybe it doesn't require much jury-rigging. It is not like some fox-1 that requires continual targeting info.

I guess, anyway.

HARM is inertially guided with terminal radar-seeking. It doesn't need a lock to be fired.

http://www.ausairpower.net/API-AGM-88-HARM.html

Quote

The big innovation in the HARM was in its intelligent (radar) video processor based seeker, which was designed to recognise the characteristic Pulse Repetition Frequencies (PRF) of threat radars, in a manner similar to that performed by an RWR. This would allow the missile to select a specific radar operating in any given band.

...

Because a programmable video processor was used, decision logic in the missile's software allowed it to select the highest threat target should the emitter it was fired at shut down. The use of an inertial midcourse guidance package allowed long range shots against emitters which could be difficult to home on at such ranges, once close enough the HARM would switch to its receiver and home to impact.

Quote

The HARM has four basic operating modes. The Pre-Brief, Pre-Emptive or Position-Known (PB/PE/POS) mode is a Lock On After Launch (LOAL) mode, and is used for standoff maximum range attacks on emitters of a known type and location, within several degrees of the missile boresight. This is the basic mode used by dedicated defence suppression (SEAD) aircraft such as the F-4G and Tornado ECR, or F-16CJ/HTS. In PB/PE/POS mode, as used by the Tornado ECR or F-4G, the aircraft's Emitter Locating System (ELS) determines the identity and position of the target, which are downloaded to the missile. The launch aircraft will then toss the missile to impart the best possible range. The missile flies on inertial guidance until it acquires the target, and then homes to impact. The PB/PE/POS mode is essentially offensive and most commonly used when taking down an IADS.

A sub-mode of the PB/PE/POS mode is Equations-Of-Motion (EOM) mode which allows more precise selection of emitters at maximum range, in a high density environment. The EOM mode is more specific than PB mode in terms of target selection, and can engage off axis if required, but requires more precise target position information than the baseline PB mode. The target position data can be provided by an onboard receiver or datalinked from an external source (eg Rivet Joint to F-16CJ).

The Target Of Opportunity (TOO) mode, also termed the HARM as Sensor (HAS) or Direct Attack (DA) mode is a lock-on-before-launch (LOBL) mode in which the missile receiver is used before launch to acquire the target. This mode allows off axis attacks on emitters within the field of view of the seeker. It is typically used as an offensive mode by non-dedicated strike aircraft to suppress emitters.

The Self Protect or Launch Off RWR (SP/LOR) mode is a short to medium range mode used defensively to engage targets within 360 degrees of the launch aircraft. In SP mode the HARM is slaved to the aircraft's RWR and given a prioritised list of threats. The highest priority threat will be engaged after launch. The SP/LOR mode is similar to the TOO/HAS/DA mode, but provides a larger search footprint.

Based on the wreckage, it is also the AGM-88D, which has GPS guidance supplementing the inertial guidance. This allows it to accurately hit radar emitters even after they have been turned off.

 

Quote

Development effort continues on the HARM design to further refine its capabilities. The greatest weakness of established HARM variants is their inability to accurately home on targets which have ceased to emit. Often the missile may not guide close enough to inflict any useful damage.

The AGM-88D Block 6 variant is intended to eliminate this limitation in the HARM, for range known launches. The Block 6 upgrade is a cooperative German-Italian-USN effort to fit the missile with a precision guidance kit, employing GPS-inertial guidance. The HARM fitted with this kit would fly a much more exact trajectory, using GPS to aid its inertial package, producing some improvement to the missile's existing 50-80 NMI range. Should the emitter be lost, the missile will continue its flight under GPS inertial control to impact. The CEP of the GPS guidance package will be of the order of 20 ft, however the limitation to lethality will be primarily imposed by the accuracy of targeting receiver used to initialise the missile. Since target GPS coordinates for known fixed targets may be determined by other means, the missile has potentially very high lethality against a fixed IADS installation.

 

Edited August 8, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[dan/california]

 

48 minutes ago, Huba said:

Not that I feel like I know enough about JDAM operations, but assuming you are to attack a fixed, previously located position, wouldn't regular bombsights be enough to put the bomb close enough so that guidance kit will manage to drive it home? That of course rules out attacking any target of opportunity, but should be fine for blasting RU defense lines and such. Artillery is fine and all, but cannot rival a quarter ton of explosives falling right on enemy head.

I think, emphasize think, that the problem is the super low level flying that seems to be the only kind anybody can do and survive in this air defense environment. The size of the acceptable launch window goes down with altitude very quickly for anything without a rocket motor. The distance they can glide is directly related to the altitude and speed they are launched with. So if you are launching from the crazy low altitude we are currently seeing you need good avionics integration to put the bomb in the correct window, because it isn't very big.

 

[Probus]

9 hours ago, Grigb said:

Not the modern Kremlin. We are talking about huge blow at RU prestige akin to the loss of Crimea. You cannot claim you liberate RU people when RU people are dying in droves. 

UKR is shelling Donetsk and it is already a big political crisis there. RU is afraid of Kherson humanitarian crisis due to the bridges. But that's nothing compared with winter arriving in destroyed regions. 

Very interesting. I’ve always imagined a wall of propaganda keeping that info out of the hands of the Russian people. Not so easy anymore. I wish that NATO or even Ukraine could/would broadcast videos to the Russian people to see the seeds of doubt. 

[Probus]

9 hours ago, Grigb said:

Not the modern Kremlin. We are talking about huge blow at RU prestige akin to the loss of Crimea. You cannot claim you liberate RU people when RU people are dying in droves. 

UKR is shelling Donetsk and it is already a big political crisis there. RU is afraid of Kherson humanitarian crisis due to the bridges. But that's nothing compared with winter arriving in destroyed regions. 

Very interesting. I’ve always imagined a wall of propaganda keeping that info out of the hands of the Russian people. Not so easy anymore. I wish that NATO or even Ukraine could/would broadcast videos to the Russian people to see the seeds of doubt. 

[Probus]

10 hours ago, Grigb said:

Not the modern Kremlin. We are talking about huge blow at RU prestige akin to the loss of Crimea. You cannot claim you liberate RU people when RU people are dying in droves. 

UKR is shelling Donetsk and it is already a big political crisis there. RU is afraid of Kherson humanitarian crisis due to the bridges. But that's nothing compared with winter arriving in destroyed regions. 

  Very interesting. I’ve always imagined a wall of propaganda keeping that info out of the hands of the Russian people. Not so easy anymore I suppose.
 I wish that NATO or even Ukraine could/would broadcast videos to the Russian people to see the seeds of doubt. 

[Huba]

36 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I think, emphasize think, that the problem is the super low level flying that seems to be the only kind anybody can do and survive in this air defense environment. The size of the acceptable launch window goes down with altitude very quickly for anything without a rocket motor. The distance they can glide is directly related to the altitude and speed they are launched with. So if you are launching from the crazy low altitude we are currently seeing you need good avionics integration to put the bomb in the correct window, because it isn't very big.

Well, how about the JDAM-ER kits then? AFAIK these are in service already, and for sure can be manufactured really easily, basically being just a wing kit attached to regular JDAM. And with range of 70km, I'd think attacking targets on the frontline should be relatively safe. Pure speculation of course, but if US is going to invest in UA planes (as is clearly is already) I'd think that would be the next step, with quite "gamechanging" potential.

Also a general thought that with HARM appearing in UA, we see another case of slowly crossing the escalation threshold. First HARMs appeared there, Amraams (ground launched for now) are on the way. Next might be some other A2G ordnance, and then a small number of F-16 suddenly won't bother anybody that much. Then number of airframes increases. We saw the same mechanism in the work a few times already.

 

Edit: oh, and more stuff is going UA way, from quite unexpected direction. Erdogan is surely trying to milk two cows at once:

 

Edited August 8, 2022 by Huba

[Harmon Rabb]

If Ukraine does get F-16s as a I'm going to start flying the F-16 using this aircraft livery in DCS.

 

[danfrodo]

33 minutes ago, Huba said:

Well, how about the JDAM-ER kits then? AFAIK these are in service already, and for sure can be manufactured really easily, basically being just a wing kit attached to regular JDAM. And with range of 70km, I'd think attacking targets on the frontline should be relatively safe. Pure speculation of course, but if US is going to invest in UA planes (as is clearly is already) I'd think that would be the next step, with quite "gamechanging" potential.

Also a general thought that with HARM appearing in UA, we see another case of slowly crossing the escalation threshold. First HARMs appeared there, Amraams (ground launched for now) are on the way. Next might be some other A2G ordnance, and then a small number of F-16 suddenly won't bother anybody that much. Then number of airframes increases. We saw the same mechanism in the work a few times already.

 

Edit: oh, and more stuff is going UA way, from quite unexpected direction. Erdogan is surely trying to milk two cows at once:

 

A while ago a veteran on this forum said MRAPS are terrible for anything outside of driving on roads that might have mines.  He hated them, I recall.  Too tall, bad ergonomics, bad off road, etc.  

I would think better than driving around in little pickup trucks but he felt otherwise.

 

Edited August 8, 2022 by danfrodo
edit

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

LDNR forces are spent.

Thanks for the latest batch of translations.  Just finished catching up on the last few pages.

I'm surprised there's anybody here that would think that Russia's failure to make significant gains in Donetsk is on purpose.  Even the NY Times today had an article that speculated that maybe the Russians can't advance because they are physically unable to.  And if the mainstream media is starting to wonder about this, then I think it's pretty safe to assume it's been a fact for quite a while

Russia has for sure, without any doubts in my mind at all, lost the strategic initiative.  While it's uncertain how much Ukraine can do to offensively, it's now able to do things which force Russia to take actions it otherwise does not want to do.  What we have seen already is drawing forces away from Donetsk and diverting them to the south. 

There are two primary reasons to doubt that Russia is moving its forces south as part of some new master plan to win the war in Ukraine:

1. Clearly Russia's combat objectives have been reduced to taking all of Luhansk and Donetsk.  Now that Luhansk is taken, Donetsk must be taken for Putin to try and quiet down the war.
2. Russia has tried fancy maneuvers and breakthroughs many times in this war and they have always failed.  It's been pursuing bloody frontal assaults for nearly 3 months now because it's the ONLY thing it has had any success with.

Russia is rapidly running out of options and I am sure the Russian general staff is acutely aware of this.  They would not take forces away from the Donetsk front if it wasn't deemed absolutely vital to maintaining a viable land bridge to Crimea.  They also wouldn't reduce forces in Donetsk or Luhansk for another attempt at complex maneuver warfare somewhere else (e.g. Vostok driving north from positions west of Donetsk City).  Well, with one caveat... that senior Russian leadership is in touch with reality and/or isn't willing to gamble everything on an operation that has almost no chance of success.

For the last couple of months I've not seen the Russian leadership try anything risky.  Stupid?  Yes.  Wasteful?  Yes.  But not risky.  It seems they've learned at least one lesson since the Easter offensive fell flat... risky doesn't seem to work well for Russia.  Of course, Russia always reserves the right to revisit hard won lessons and go stupid at any time of its choosing

Steve

[OldSarge]

41 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

A while ago a veteran on this forum said MRAPS are terrible for anything outside of driving on roads that might have mines.  He hated them, I recall.  Too tall, bad ergonomics, bad off road, etc.  

I would think better than driving around in little pickup trucks but he felt otherwise.

 

The Oskosh JTLV would be an interesting vehicle to see in the mix. It is the replacement for the HMMV and adds quite a few tactical capabilities. Lithuania, Montenegro and Slovenia are using it as well.

[Battlefront.com]

About the Kherson situation.

It is entirely possible that Ukraine might not conduct a full scale offensive in Kherson for one or more reasons, but if they don't do it there then I don't think we should expect it elsewhere.  Ukraine is concentrating a wide array of its newly acquired offensive capabilities there already.  Including, it now seems, HARM attacks on AD equipment.  If Ukraine intended to do something big elsewhere, we'd see similar activities at a minimum.

What Ukraine is doing now is systematically weakening the Russian forces on the western bank of the Dnepr.  Since time is on their side they can afford to do it correctly.  Even allowing Russia to bring in replacements is smart because this means Russia is taking stuff from other sectors and presenting it on a silver platter to be destroyed without Ukraine having to redeploy or expand its capabilities.

Think about Combat Mission.  Would you rather the enemy feed all of its tanks, one at a time, into a single well equipped ambush spot of your choosing OR would you rather maneuver those same forces around the battlefield to take out the tanks wherever the enemy might want them to be?  I know the answer so let's move on

Ukraine doesn't have to launch a huge all-or-nothing offensive to defeat Russia's forces in Kherson.  Ukraine doesn't even need to have numerical or even equipment superiority to win this.  What Ukraine needs is the ability to choose where and when it attacks Russian force that are operating with restricted (ideally highly restricted) LOCs.

Thinking about this in wargaming terms, let's say that Russia has 10,000 troops present and this force requires 1 unit of food, 1 unit of ammo, and 1 unit of fuel per day per soldier to function under current conditions.  Let's be generous and assume that the ferries and remaining bridge capacity allows 10,000 units of each type of supply per day.  Which means as long as the status quo remains the same, Russia can hold out indefinitely.

Now let's say Ukraine hits a limited sector of Russia's frontage and obligates it to triple it's supply needs (expended and lost due to combat) for that specific sector.  Let's say it involves 1000 soldiers.  This means it now has to bring in 12,000 units of supply for the same sized force every single day.  If the capacity is only 10,000, this means every day supplies will be short of what is needed.  In 5 days it is the equivalent of having 1 day without any supply at all.  If this small amount of pressure is exerted over a month (30 days) it is the equivalent of Russian forces going without ANY supply for 6 whole days. 

This is with Ukraine actively engaging 10% of the Russia force.  Does anybody seriously think Ukraine can't apply that amount of pressure?

Obviously my numbers are pulled out of my arse, so they shouldn't be taken verbatim.  The point I'm making, however, is sound.  Ukraine only has to apply enough force against Russia to over commit its ability to supply them.  I believe Ukraine could do it today if it wanted to, but maybe with higher risk than it wants to take.

Steve

[G.I. Joe]

6 hours ago, Huba said:

The only answer that makes sense is that somebody researched that as a contingency at some point. But even if they started from scratch, these aircraft would be most available, and known inside out by US technicians - best starting point.

Yes, my best guess would be that installing HARMs on a Soviet-built aircraft probably could be done faster than doing an F-16 conversion course for a fighter pilot qualified on a different type (especially if they have little or no experience on NATO equipment). I did read some articles on the latter a while back and it seemed like the consensus was that a realistic timeframe for the latter is probably around 2-3 months, give or take.

Fitting HARMs, I can't really say, but less than a month certainly sounds plausible. For what it's worth, the RAF fitted AGM-45 Shrike ARMs on an Avro Vulcan and Sidewinders on Nimrods on a rather short timetable during the Falklands War...

Assuming it could be done faster than training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16, it makes sense as a way to give Ukraine a basic SEAD capability as soon as possible to pave the way for a potential F-16 delivery.

Edited August 9, 2022 by G.I. Joe
Trimming redundancy from hastily written post..

[Huba]

22 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

About the Kherson situation.

It is entirely possible that Ukraine might not conduct a full scale offensive in Kherson for one or more reasons, but if they don't do it there then I don't think we should expect it elsewhere.  Ukraine is concentrating a wide array of its newly acquired offensive capabilities there already.  Including, it now seems, HARM attacks on AD equipment.  If Ukraine intended to do something big elsewhere, we'd see similar activities at a minimum.

What Ukraine is doing now is systematically weakening the Russian forces on the western bank of the Dnepr.  Since time is on their side they can afford to do it correctly.  Even allowing Russia to bring in replacements is smart because this means Russia is taking stuff from other sectors and presenting it on a silver platter to be destroyed without Ukraine having to redeploy or expand its capabilities.

Think about Combat Mission.  Would you rather the enemy feed all of its tanks, one at a time, into a single well equipped ambush spot of your choosing OR would you rather maneuver those same forces around the battlefield to take out the tanks wherever the enemy might want them to be?  I know the answer so let's move on

Ukraine doesn't have to launch a huge all-or-nothing offensive to defeat Russia's forces in Kherson.  Ukraine doesn't even need to have numerical or even equipment superiority to win this.  What Ukraine needs is the ability to choose where and when it attacks Russian force that are operating with restricted (ideally highly restricted) LOCs.

Thinking about this in wargaming terms, let's say that Russia has 10,000 troops present and this force requires 1 unit of food, 1 unit of ammo, and 1 unit of fuel per day per soldier to function under current conditions.  Let's be generous and assume that the ferries and remaining bridge capacity allows 10,000 units of each type of supply per day.  Which means as long as the status quo remains the same, Russia can hold out indefinitely.

Now let's say Ukraine hits a limited sector of Russia's frontage and obligates it to triple it's supply needs (expended and lost due to combat) for that specific sector.  Let's say it involves 1000 soldiers.  This means it now has to bring in 12,000 units of supply for the same sized force every single day.  If the capacity is only 10,000, this means every day supplies will be short of what is needed.  In 5 days it is the equivalent of having 1 day without any supply at all.  If this small amount of pressure is exerted over a month (30 days) it is the equivalent of Russian forces going without ANY supply for 6 whole days. 

This is with Ukraine actively engaging 10% of the Russia force.  Does anybody seriously think Ukraine can't apply that amount of pressure?

Obviously my numbers are pulled out of my arse, so they shouldn't be taken verbatim.  The point I'm making, however, is sound.  Ukraine only has to apply enough force against Russia to over commit its ability to supply them.  I believe Ukraine could do it today if it wanted to, but maybe with higher risk than it wants to take.

Steve

I think that what you described here can be quite accurately expressed with one word: a siege. Whole right bank of Kherson is now a fortified region, semi encircled by UA forces who are slowly starving out and reducing it instead of storming the walls I think mamy rules of classical pike and shot era siege warfare will be applicable here - but it is a thought for tomorrow, time to sleep

[Chibot Mk IX]

3 hours ago, Calamine Waffles said:

HARM is inertially guided with terminal radar-seeking. It doesn't need a lock to be fired.

http://www.ausairpower.net/API-AGM-88-HARM.html

Thanks for sharing that, it brings back my memory of 300+ pages DCS manual reading  

[LongLeftFlank]

9 hours ago, chrisl said:

I've been wondering about that for RU artillery shells lately.  It seems like all they can do anymore is flatten a space with arty and then creep in, move a little forward, and repeat.  Someone has got to be tracking how much they're using daily, how much they're losing daily, and how much they can make to predict when they'll be incapable of even pretending to advance.

As @sburke kindly observed, my thread participation has become scant in the past month due to work (sadly, I'm not an oil trader, although I do ok). Also, I note our esteemed new grognards in residence, @Grigb , 

@Beleg85 , @Hubaand others are finding better sources now than I could. Many thanks, guys!

Ref. @chrisl 's post, it seems to me the UA reactions to Russia's blunt force saturation bombardments are the time tested ones:

1.  where they have time, or the use of existing tunnel works, dig deep, with solid overhead cover and camou. That's the 'WW1 solution', used in nearly all positional warfare ever since explosive shells became available to armies in volume. Leave the dugouts only when the enemy is danger close.

2.  otherwise, 'deepen' their fronts -- up to 10kms now? -- (a) avoiding putting too many defenders in one targetable spot, (b) maxing use of dummies and camou, (c) using schweige (silent) ambush positions, (d) mines in huge volumes, and (e) nimble shoot-and-scoot fire teams to retard Russian advances into this thinly manned zone prior to calling in their own guns.  I believe the Russians are adopting similar (though not identical) dispersed tactics, which is why the UA in turn is having trouble attacking in mass/with mech (except in the wooded areas near Izyum or the densely settled areas around Kharkiv, where they can infiltrate at scale).

=>  This urgent need to spread out seems to me to explain many of the UA withdrawals we've seen (and now, some of the Russian moves); being 'cauldroned' isn't just being cut off, it's about being forced to be too dense on the ground.  Furthermore, forcing the attacker to make himself 'dense' in canalised terrain, bring up his direct fire vehicles, etc. and then blasting the hell out of him, can be well worth giving up some ground (temporarily or permanently).  However, I also believe both sides are becoming skilled at leaving behind mines and sensors to make reoccupying vacated ground costly.

.... (which is why I believe the next phase of this war -- retaking the lost lands -- is going to be less about drones and more about mines, which the Russians can still make in quantity)

Villages or hedgehog strongpoints are less valuable tacticallly than previously, as the Russians just zero and level every structure. Conversely, woodlands or large urban or mining/industrial zones that mask movement but can't be leveled remain valuable, and very tough nuts to crack.

Notice, these dynamics also make river crossing bridgeheads far more vulnerable for both sides (on top of the crossing risk itself), as there's less space in the kessel to spread out and avoid counterfires (e.g. Inhulets crossing).

As most here know well, the Wehrmacht tried out a lot of the above 'zone' defence tactics in later WW2, although their artillery tended not to be equal to the task of area denial when the Red Army was determined to break in en masse.

....Anyway, that's the basics of it, I'm sure more knowledgeable folks here can elaborate and correct.

P.S. Some of the same dynamics above are readily visible in my (unfinished) CMBN Le Carillon sequence, where successive US regiments kept 'clearing' the Germans out of Le Meauffe village, only to (re)discover it was a trap, a lethal mortar magnet. They'd withdraw leaving just an OP, and the German snipers and sappers would come in again, infiltrating from the bocage: lather-rinse-repeat for a full month. A lot of the Italian campaign was fought much the same way.

Edited August 9, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Aragorn2002]

4 hours ago, Haiduk said:

The ambush on Russian armored column near Krasnopillia, Izium axis

 

Can't help thinking it must have looked like that in WW2, during the fighting in the Ukraine. 

[dan/california]

3 hours ago, Huba said:

Well, how about the JDAM-ER kits then? AFAIK these are in service already, and for sure can be manufactured really easily, basically being just a wing kit attached to regular JDAM. And with range of 70km, I'd think attacking targets on the frontline should be relatively safe. Pure speculation of course, but if US is going to invest in UA planes (as is clearly is already) I'd think that would be the next step, with quite "gamechanging" potential.

Also a general thought that with HARM appearing in UA, we see another case of slowly crossing the escalation threshold. First HARMs appeared there, Amraams (ground launched for now) are on the way. Next might be some other A2G ordnance, and then a small number of F-16 suddenly won't bother anybody that much. Then number of airframes increases. We saw the same mechanism in the work a few times already.

 

JDAM-ER is definitely better, but newer more, expensive, and there are probably less of them. And that seventy k range is assuming you launch 30,000 feet or higher. It will be a lot less if if launched at 400 ft. What I don't know is how far far back from the front Ukrainian panes have to start hugging the deck, and or how long of a SEAD campaign it would take to meaningfully affect the stand off range at which Ukrainian planes can operate at altitude. U.S. doctrine is built on the assumption that there are enough wild weasels, HARMs, cruise missiles, and god knows what else to essentially obliterate air defenses that can reach ~ 30,000 ft/10,000 meters. Then they can rain JDAMS and other things that are merely expensive on you until don't want to play anymore. How much of this the Ukrainians can do with HIMARs, and some harms remains to be seen.  If they can do ENOUGH it is war winning, since trains and railway bridges will both just go away.

8 hours ago, chrisl said:

I've been wondering about that for RU artillery shells lately.  It seems like all they can do anymore is flatten a space with arty and then creep in, move a little forward, and repeat.  Someone has got to be tracking how much they're using daily, how much they're losing daily, and how much they can make to predict when they'll be incapable of even pretending to advance.

But there are two things required for this strategy, shells and infantry. Shells are getting tight, infantry is bleeping near gone. And all indications are that infantry is going to get even harder, even faster going forward.

Edited August 9, 2022 by dan/california

[Calamine Waffles]

2 hours ago, G.I. Joe said:

Fitting HARMs, I can't really say, but less than a month certainly sounds plausible. For what it's worth, the RAF fitted AGM-45 Shrike ARMs on an Avro Vulcan and Sidewinders on Nimrods on a rather short timetable during the Falklands War...

Shrike is a lot more primitive than HARM, but HARM is still relatively independent of the carrier's sensors when operating in the PB mode compared to something like the Sidewinder or the AMRAAM.

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

I think that what you described here can be quite accurately expressed with one word: a siege.

Yes, technically.  However, I avoided using the term siege as it creates some images that aren't analogous to the situation in Kherson.  In particular a siege is usually associated with a city, a fortress, or something like we saw with Azovstal. This is somewhat different in that it's open terrain marked by small settlements and fortified defensive lines.  In that way Kherson is more akin to any other fight in depth with limited supply opportunities for the defender.  The reason I draw this distinction is the character of the fighting will be more akin to the battles in the Donbas than that of Mariupol.

The other way to view Kherson is as a bridgehead battle, though that too doesn't quite work as generally bridgeheads don't have time for the defense to pour concrete bunkers. 

The battles to develop in Kherson, therefore, will share characteristics of an urban siege, a large scale bridgehead, and a traditional defense in depth.  Assuming, of course, that Ukraine goes on the offensive there.  As much as it looks like this will be the case, it's far from certain at this point.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

From ISW's August 8 update:

Quote

Ukrainian officials confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivsky and Kakhovka bridges at night on August 7-8. Russian Deputy Head of the Russian Occupation Administration in Kherson Oblast Kirill Stremousov stated that Russian officials will postpone reopening the Antonivskyi bridge, scheduled for August 10, due to the damage to construction equipment near the bridge.

More evidence that Ukraine gets to decide if the bridge is operational or not.

Steve

[dan/california]

There are a lot of analogies with Guadalcanal. Bear with me on this. The Japanese eventually lost because their resupply was gradually choked down over a period of months. Some weeks they got more, some weeks they got less, but on average they didn't get enough to maintain a force that could stand up to the Marines. Even though the Marines had no shortage of problems themselves. In the end the U.S. won the logistics battle, and in an attritional fight that is really the only one that matters. And to put to mildly the Russians are less motivated than the Japanese.