How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[fireship4]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Heard this interesting bit on the radio today by a total fluke.  Go to the 40:18 mark and you'll hear a guy named Tetlock describing exactly what went wrong with the bulk of the experts who called this war so horribly wrong even though I'm pretty sure this was recorded before the war:

https://freakonomics.com/podcast/season-11-episode-43/

It's really interesting stuff.  There's more from Tetlock on Freakonomics from the past about how bad forecasting is and why the people making wrong calls don't face "punishment" for being bad at their jobs.

Steve

Let me guess, having not listened to the podcast nor looked up the guest... is it about forcasters not having skin in the game?  About putting their money where there mouth is making for much better prediction?  I say so because I think I listened to an advocate of something similar on EconTalk some time ago.  A great podcast by the way.

24 minutes ago, dan/california said:

That is a FANTASTIC thread. But could we please ask google to translate the whole thing, instead of hitting the button over and over again. And yes I realize I am complaining about UI issues on technological miracle...

Here you go: https://threadreaderapp-com.translate.goog/thread/1540963832096608256.html?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en-US&_x_tr_pto=wapp

Edited June 27, 2022 by fireship4

[dan/california]

11 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

This is a translation of that tweet thread?

Lot to unpack here and I am not sure I agree with all of it - for example we have no idea what the Russian losses around Severodonetsk have been, so “minimizing risk for gain” could be way off.

One thing I do not see on the Russian side is an actual strategy.  For example, if the strategic end is to “take the Donbas and declare victory”, what is the Russian plan for the very real possibility that Ukraine won’t let them hold it?  Russian strategy has been and continues to be in this war, entirely in isolation of reality and largely based on hope.

Do they hope Ukraine has had enough and taps out?  Do they somehow figure they can call the Donbas “mother Russia” and go nuclear?  The reality is that it is taking just about everything the Russian have to take very small chunks of ground right now.  I do not think they will be able to actually take the Donbas, Luhansk maybe, but not Donetsk; however, even if they do will they have broken the will of Ukraine to resist?  The West?

The West cannot not allow Russia to gain from this in anyway.  Russia at a min must be economically punished, back to 2014 lines or better and with new internal power structure, one we can actually negotiate with, in place. If we cannot do that the western global order has failed…and China is watching. 

Ukraine has all the hallmarks of a nation that has embraced a war to the point it is now part of their culture.  You do not defeat a nation in this state by taking a few hundred square kilometres of real estate, you would need to break their backs and shatter that unity or completely exhaust them.   So long as the West keeps supporting, Ukraine will keep fighting…and we have reason to keep supporting.  

So back to Russian long game…and we have been over this.  How do they defend what they have taken while Ukraine continues to mobilize and modernize, and they are heading in the opposite direction?  How does Russian defend an extremely long front without enough troops against a very motivated opponent with increasing capability?  Beyond that, how does Russia renormalize to remove sanctions, scare Sweden and Finland away from NATO, get NATO national to not spend trillions on defence and wipe humanities memory of their complete gong show so they can re-emerge as a great power?

Short answer is that they cannot.  At best, the Russian government may convince or cow enough domestic population in order to stay in power and basically get to sit at the same lunch table as North Korea for the next 25 years.  That or we fail and the global order and all it pays for is at risk - and for the record, this is what happens when you let things slide.  We failed in 2014 and here we are, we fail again and what does 2030 look like?

Did I mention you need to run for Parliament?

[The_Capt]

49 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Did I mention you need to run for Parliament?

You did but I am not taking it personally.

The author does hit on a very important point - UA would be well served in solving for the counter-offensive.  Tactically and operationally it would put further strain on an already shaky Russian operational system.  Strategically and politically it would shore up some of the also-shaky boots in the West who are worried Ukraine is somehow near collapse because they have pulled out of a tiny corner in the Donbas after repelling 2-3 Russian operational axis in the North.

The authors math is off on BTGs in the defence.  1 full strength BTG for every 5 kms is not bad but you need at least 1 to 2 more BTGs for the same piece of ground in order to sustain it over time.  This does not even count for reserves, support/enablers and logistics.  The front from Kharkiv to Kherson is about 800kms long, that is 320-480 BTGs at 2-3 per 5kms to hold what Russia has take with depth and rotations over time.

The author and I do agree on one key point, Russia has lost this war - however it is still figuring out how badly.

Edited June 27, 2022 by The_Capt

[akd]

TLDR: 

Quote

20 km. For 83 days!

 

[The_Capt]

17 minutes ago, akd said:

TLDR: 

 

That is 241 meters per day.  I also am hesitant to give Russia too much credit for adaptation in this last offensive.  Back in May they looked like they were trying for manoeuvre/break out at Izyum and those attacks stalled.

I suspect these grinding artillery heavy assaults are not some clever re-tooling, they are the only tactical offensive option the RA has left.  The reliance on massed artillery is straight out of historical doctrine but we have not seen concentrations like this since WW2.

The other weird thing is the near total absence of armor/mech breakout.  The last big mech push we saw was back at that bridge crossing.  Reports from Severodonetsk looked like infantry-artillery primarily, which may explain the walking pace of this thing.

I think that Russian warfare has devolved over time, not evolved.  I am very interested as to why.

[Harmon Rabb]

George W Bush calls out the Russian government for what they are trying to do.

[Battlefront.com]

44 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I think that Russian warfare has devolved over time, not evolved.  

That's been my take on it too.  It is like a criminal gang who think of themselves like Oceans movie master thieves try something big, most get arrested, and the few who don't do a daylight "smash and grab" for a bit of pedestrian jewelry. And even then the job goes poorly.  Signs that the master criminals have learned from their mistakes or is it this is all they could come up with with the remaining brains, manpower, and tools at their disposal?  Latter, definitely.

44 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I am very interested as to why.

I have a feeling that at some senior level there's a realization that they suck at war and have determined that they aren't likely to survive another large scale maneuver centric offensive.  When examining alternative options they found only one that fit Russia's real capabilities, slimmed down the goals to match, and went forward in the hopes that something better would come from it.

Related, the Tweet reposted here about the victory arch monstrosity being built in Moscow underscores how much this war was intended to prop up internal support for his regime.  Planning for that thing had to have started almost at the same time as was the decision to invade Ukraine (summer of 2021 at latest, some indications even earlier).  This underscores why Putin is so heavily focused on taking some militarily meaningless ground despite the costs.  He's got to have SOMETHING to pair with that arch, no matter how pathetic it might be.

I think we can be assured that political considerations over military ones will continue to dominate decision making.  Ukraine, on the other hand, is decidedly focusing its efforts on military goals.  Politics might be war by other means, but usually the nation that wins the war wins politically as well.  Russia seems to have either forgotten this or thinks it can break with tradition.

Steve

[FancyCat]

A lot of these bombings seem to be going on......interesting they are targeting civilian jobs. Going straight for the throat. 

TASS states in the same article that,

Quote

On Friday, Dmitry Savluchenko, chief of the Kherson military-civilian administration’s family, youth and sports department, was killed in a car blast.

 

 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

That is 241 meters per day.  I also am hesitant to give Russia too much credit for adaptation in this last offensive.  Back in May they looked like they were trying for manoeuvre/break out at Izyum and those attacks stalled.

I suspect these grinding artillery heavy assaults are not some clever re-tooling, they are the only tactical offensive option the RA has left.  The reliance on massed artillery is straight out of historical doctrine but we have not seen concentrations like this since WW2.

The other weird thing is the near total absence of armor/mech breakout.  The last big mech push we saw was back at that bridge crossing.  Reports from Severodonetsk looked like infantry-artillery primarily, which may explain the walking pace of this thing.

I think that Russian warfare has devolved over time, not evolved.  I am very interested as to why.

 

Interestingly they had the highest tank and AFV losses today of the last several weeks. Although the Ukr report doesn't make clear where. But they pushing or getting pushed somewhere.

[Machor]

The BBC have updated their article with an interesting tidbit, which shows that we truly are witnessing world history in the making - if Covid didn't convince you of that:

Russia in historic foreign debt default, reports suggest

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-61929926

"Russia has defaulted on its overseas debt for the first time in more than a century after missing a Sunday deadline, reports suggest."

"The last time Russia defaulted on its foreign debt was in 1918, during the Bolshevik Revolution when the new communist leader Vladimir Lenin refused to pay the debts of the Russian Empire.

Russia's last debt default of any kind was in the 1998 as the country was rocked by the rouble crisis during the chaotic end of Boris Yeltsin's regime. At the time Moscow failed to keep up payments on its domestic bonds but managed not to default on its overseas debt."

[Vanir Ausf B]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

Interestingly they had the highest tank and AFV losses today of the last several weeks. Although the Ukr report doesn't make clear where. But they pushing or getting pushed somewhere.

It's hard to know if those numbers can be trusted. For example, Ukraine claims to have shot down 217 fixed-wing aircraft and 184 helicopters but Oryx confirms 35 and 48, respectively.

[MikeyD]

If Russia had only lost 35 aircraft since February they'd still be doing air sorties into the Ukraine interior.

[Hapless]

Another short video about drones from French TV: https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/vlmgk0/a_french_television_channel_report_on_the_uaf/

Shows what's going on back in the CP, which I don't think we've seen before. It's not clear if they're watching the drone feed live or playing it back for the reporter-  (probably clearer to someone who understands French!).

Maps are visible and unblurred, which apparently resulted in casualties and at least one death. OPSEC matters.

[Vanir Ausf B]

6 minutes ago, MikeyD said:

If Russia had only lost 35 aircraft since February they'd still be doing air sorties into the Ukraine interior.

Into the teeth of unsuppressed AA? Doubtful. They have cruise missiles for that.

Russian air is very active, but they stay close to their own lines.

[FancyCat]

Another ammo dump.

 

[Grigb]

Something continues to brew at Ugledar.

• Author: It's hard under Ugledar. I won't say much, and I don't need to.
• Other guy: To what purpose you started discussion, especially in the Maps [section of the forum]?
• Author: Ok. Our assault on the heights in the direction of Shevchenko got bogged down, to put it mildly. UKR went on the counterattack skillfully apply arty in conjunction with UAV and radar counter-battery fire. We have losses
• Other guy: Are the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation helping?
• Author: +-0

 

• Author: Yeah... of course ... let it be according to you, I started the conversation in vain, probably because tomorrow is the funeral of a young good guy. And there are more to come. Admin three [I do not know what that means]. I'm off to drink.
• Other guy: On the other side there's a 59th like?
• Author:  I won't say for sure. There were news that AIDAR was pulled up there.

[Grigb]

Girkin fresh assessment. part 1

Quote

A brief overview of the situation at the front.

1. The "Border" front (from the border with Belarus to the Kharkiv region).
Both sides, suspecting the enemy of the ability to deliver an insidious unexpected blow (justifiably or not - I do not know), gradually accumulate forces, trying to cover the border. The former "respected Kiev partners" do it a little better - they have more human resources. In this regard, they also take the initiative, firing at Russian military and civilian objects on our side of the border and sending the DRG [Diversion and Recon group], having already twice (from what has become widely known) destroyed small units of border guards (6 and 4 killed, both times with impunity).
Probably, both sides are not yet ready to create a continuous "active" front in this extended area due to lack of resources. That does not exclude the "attack" of one of the parties with tactical or propaganda purposes.

2. Kharkiv Front.
Local battles continue in the northern and central sections. The Russian troops, apparently, either do not have the strength to develop the offensive, or the desire to develop it. The "partners" have a desire, but there is not enough heavy weapons. Russian troops, having moved forward, created a "security zone" that covers adjacent areas of the Russian Federation from shelling and is able to act as a springboard for a future offensive on Kharkiv.
On the southern section (Balakleya district) - The AFU has been trying to endanger the flank strike of the Izyum grouping of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the past week. The matter did not progress beyond the local battles.

3. Slavyansk direction.
Along the entire front south of the Izum (from the Big/Great Kamyshevakhi to the Seversky Donets) - local battles, artillery skirmishes and actions of reconnaissance and sabotage groups. The Russian Armed Forces did not conduct offensive actions in the classical sense of the word, focusing their efforts on attempts to "put the squeeze on" the agglomeration of Severodonetsk-Lisichansk. Although the "probing" of the enemy's positions and attempts at tactical advancement continue. The AFU, slightly counterattacking in places, continue to strengthen with their main forces on the approaches to the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk fortress and along the Slavyank-Barvenkovo line, hoping to give a decisive defensive battle here if the command of the Russian Armed Forces decides to storm this fortified area head-on.

4. The agglomeration of Severodonetsk-Lisichansk.
Fierce fighting continued along the entire front for a week with heavy losses for both sides (on our side, the lion's share fell again on the LDNR NM). The enemy managed to withdraw the remnants of its forces from the bridgehead on the left bank of the Seversky Donets (south of Severodonetsk), abandoning most of the heavy weapons and suffering substantial losses in manpower. However, the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and units of mercenaries defending here avoided complete defeat and destruction. The situation was similar in the Gorskoye-Zolotoye "fortress" - despite heavy losses, the enemy managed to withdraw the core of its garrison from the operational environment, leaving only small units and groups of demoralized deserters forgotten in the "cauldron" during the general withdrawal. Few prisoners were taken. - We can say that our "pincers have captured the air." Nevertheless, a dangerous protrusion in the rear of the advancing Popasna group to the west has now been "cut off" and the integrity of the AFU front on the southern and southeastern outskirts of Lisichansk has been disrupted. The Armed Forces of the LDPR and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation went directly to the southern outskirts of Lisichansk, and to the west they almost took it into an operational environment, which, however, as of yesterday evening had not yet been completed. I assume the possibility of a gradual (certainly with battles) withdrawal of the AFU garrison in the direction of Seversk and the completion of the battle for this area within a week (if the AFU does not put large fresh reserves into battle).

[Taranis]

37 minutes ago, Hapless said:

Another short video about drones from French TV: https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/vlmgk0/a_french_television_channel_report_on_the_uaf/

Shows what's going on back in the CP, which I don't think we've seen before. It's not clear if they're watching the drone feed live or playing it back for the reporter-  (probably clearer to someone who understands French!).

Maps are visible and unblurred, which apparently resulted in casualties and at least one death. OPSEC matters.

The videos they show are live. They come from drones but also from surveillance cameras mounted on electric pylons (videos with a black watermark). They say they see everything, show the starting position of the drones (the one at the beginning of the report where they take cover and which is later marked with an X on the map) but also the position of the Russian tank on the map. To sum up the video, they express their frustration because due to the lack of ammunition they cannot shoot everything they want.

[Grigb]

Part 2

Quote

5. Seversk-Bakhmut-Soledar front.
Without significant changes. Here is the second strip of long-term defensive structures built by the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the validity of the "non-alternative [for RU] Minsk agreements". In addition, all these cities have concentric defensive contours. In Artemovsk and Soledar there are still Soviet-built military bases (while in Soledar there is an underground heavily deepened and fortified storage base). The assault on the second lane, occupied by a sufficient number of troops, will not be successful without exerting all the forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the LDNR NM, and I do not predict it in the near future (unless, of course, the Russian military command decides otherwise contrary to common sense).

6. Donetsk Front.
The penetration into the first line of defense of the AFU near Avdiivka did not receive further development for the same reason - an acute shortage of combat-ready units and an equally acute shortage of manpower in the units available. At the front from Gorlovka/Toretsk (Dzerzhinsk) to Maryinka - positional battles, the activity of unmanned aerial vehicles and enemy snipers and exhausting shelling (most often alternately; yesterday, for example, they smashed Gorlovka) of military facilities, life support facilities and just residential quarters of frontline cities by the artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

7. The Southern Donetsk Front.
The enemy managed to push our troops in the area south of Ugledar for several days, throwing the "second-line" units of "mobiks" defending here by 2-3 kilometers (in some places a little more) and moving the front line to the villages of Pavlovka and Egorovka. The strike was clearly limited and distracting in nature - in order to weaken the pressure of the strike group of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the LDNR NM on Lisichansk. Nevertheless, he demonstrated the relative weakness of our front in a rather important direction.

8. On the Zaporozhye and Kherson fronts.
In general, no changes. There is a growing activity of the enemy everywhere and, especially, its artillery, as well as the DRG.

General conclusions:
1) The protracted battle of the "Second ("Concrete") stage of SVO" is gradually coming to an end. Whether it will end with an operational pause or immediately go into a "Battle for the initiative" (the "effective stage" announced by Kadyrov) - I will not undertake to guess, but I still expect that this battle will begin outside of Donbass. The battle ends with tactical successes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but strategically it is generally unsuccessful, since by the beginning of the 5th month it was not possible to defeat the AFU grouping in the Donbas, and similarly it was not ousted from most positions.
2) The defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the battle for Severodonetsk-Lisichansk on the one hand, and the failure of the strategic operation to liberate the Donbass of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - on the other - have already led to a further increase in military supplies for the Armed Forces from "dear Western partners" (not mine). In July and August, much will be decided after the reserves from both sides are put into battle. Time works both against the so-called "Ukraine" and against the Russian Federation. But time works more against the Russian Federation. Moreover, being seduced by local (and expensive) successes, the Russian political authorities are critically slow to realize the need for a speedy transfer of the country's economy "on military rails".

[Grigb]

Civilian "Girkin" about RU gold industry

Quote

An agreed decision was announced to include an embargo on the import of Russian gold in the next package of sanctions. [Gold is a sort of] the second item of budget revenue from export earnings after hydrocarbons...

Now the export of gold from Russia has been practically stopped without any sanctions. It forces manufacturers to wonder where to put [the excess of] it. Theoretically, the state would buy it, but the trap is that in fact gold has turned into an illiquid commodity. It has ceased to be the equivalent of anything in Russian conditions and is just a beautiful and almost useless rarity. Therefore, it is completely unprofitable for the state to buy it, but the second option - selling it to the population is even more unthinkable...[RU state does not want RU citizens to have any sort of wealth it cannot steal quickly] 

In general, gold producers have no idea what will happen next. The industry is still working, but if it does not receive revenue for the sale of the goods it produces (albeit very special one), then a crisis will quickly begin in it.

 

[Grigb]

Regarding Belarus Nukes discussion, here is quote from recent Putin-Luka meeting:

Quote

Alexander Lukashenko:... Vladimir Vladimirovich, we are very stressed by the situation and the policy pursued by our neighbors. You know, in general, these are the leadership of Poland and the leadership of Lithuania. The policy of confrontation. And you have enough [issues] from them, especially in Ukraine: recently, most of the mercenaries, as we notice, are from Poland [It looks like RU propaganda tend to explain fresh UKR formations by claiming they are from Poland - I mean according to RU UKR army is destroiyd several times over.]  I don't understand why they need this, confrontation, but it is clear that they are stading behind their backs, pushing and so on [Not clear what he means but it is Luka, he has foot in his mouth] . But the policy is disgusting, the behavior is aggressive.

Lithuania is the same. Recently, there has been a growing flow of information about their plan to stop transit from Russia through Belarus to Kaliningrad, to isolate Kaliningrad. Listen, this is akin to declaring some kind of war already, such things are unacceptable in modern conditions.

We are very concerned about the issues of training flights of United States and NATO aircraft that are training to carry nuclear warheads and nuclear charges. This is very annoying for us.

Therefore, I ask you to consider the question of a mirror answer to these things, without overkill. They are training to carry nuclear warheads, please help us at least adapt our planes that we have, the Su-35 [clearly confused with Su-30], in my opinion, which can carry nuclear charges. I'm not saying that tomorrow we will transport or you will transport nuclear ammunition there, but we can't joke, we remember 1941, when we were lulled [by the West] to sleep: everything will be fine, everything is quiet, no one will attack – and then we were not ready for this. Therefore, this is a very serious situation for us, and this is not the first time I have put this question before you. I know what you were considering at the Ministry of Defense.

I would like to hear how events will develop here. I do not hide it, I raise the question that we can be ready for everything, even for the use of the most serious weapons, in order to protect our Fatherland from Brest to Vladivostok. This is our immediate responsibility. And especially these trainings, you also know about them, American flights using NATO partners. If they train, they probably think something, or why train?

In general, we need to discuss a range of defense and security issues with you today so that our people understand that they, Russians and Belarusians, are under serious protection.

Vladimir Putin: Alexander Grigoryevich, we will now talk about the whole range of issues related to infrastructure development, trade, and the implementation of major projects.

...As for security issues, yes, indeed, the Americans have 200 tactical nuclear ammunition stored in Europe, mainly atomic bombs, 200 in six European member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. For their possible use, 257 aircraft have been prepared – and not only American, but also these countries I mentioned.

Alexander Lukashenko: Outside the United States.

Vladimir Putin: Outside the United States, in Europe.

Alexander Lukashenko: And there is no such base in Russia. [clearly, the guy is talking with the foot in the mouth. Either he is a genius actor or Galeev overestimated his intelligence]

Vladimir Putin: Not in Russia.

You said that it would be possible to respond in a mirror way. It is possible, but you and I probably shouldn't even answer in a mirror, there is no need.

But I fully agree with you that we are obliged to take care of the unconditional provision of our security, the security of the Allied State, and maybe other CSTO countries.

Therefore, I propose the following: the Belarusian army is armed with a fairly large grouping of Su-25 aircraft, they could be retrofitted accordingly.

Alexander Lukashenko: The 25th planes?

Vladimir Putin: Yes, Su-25. They could be retrofitted. True, this modernization should be carried out at aircraft factories in Russia, but we will agree on how to do it. And start training the flight crew accordingly. This is the first.

And the second. As we agreed with you, you raised the question about this, we have made a decision: within the next few months we will transfer Iskander-M tactical missile systems to Belarus, which, as you know, can use both ballistic and cruise missiles, conventional and nuclear ones.

I propose to instruct the defense ministries and the chiefs of the General Staffs to work out all the details related to this joint work.

Alexander Lukashenko: Yes, I absolutely agree.

Vladimir Putin: Agreed.

 

[Huba]

According to Defence24.pl, UA and DE MoD are negotiating transfer of additional 6 PzH2000, with perspective for even more from DE, NL and IT stocks. 

[Aragorn2002]

9 minutes ago, Huba said:

According to Defence24.pl, UA and DE MoD are negotiating transfer of additional 6 PzH2000, with perspective for even more from DE, NL and IT stocks. 

I doubt the Netherlands will send more, since they have only a bare minimum left for our own forces, but who knows.

[Huba]

Just now, Aragorn2002 said:

I doubt the Netherlands will send more, since they have only a bare minimum left for our own forces, but who knows.

The article mentions that there are talks about restarting the production - it's just based on a single press release, so nothing concrete at all, but in the post-Feb24 it would make sense. We can expect a huge interest in SPGs in upcoming years, and only one realistically left on the market is K9/ Krab, If I was running Rheinmetall / KMW, I'd like a piece of the pie too.

[Aragorn2002]

2 minutes ago, Huba said:

The article mentions that there are talks about restarting the production - it's just based on a single press release, so nothing concrete at all, but in the post-Feb24 it would make sense. We can expect a huge interest in SPGs in upcoming years, and only one realistically left on the market is K9/ Krab, If I was running Rheinmetall / KMW, I'd like a piece of the pie too.

Well, all I can say it would be good news, when more dutch and other SPG's found their way to Ukraine. They are made to kill Russians, so let's use them for that noble purpose.

Edited June 27, 2022 by Aragorn2002