How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, c3k said:

Finally, that brings up the "burn rate". The big pushes are what are getting attention, but what is the daily level of attrition in the "quiet" sectors? How many artillery shells are being used per day and to what effect? What about raids, recce, etc? Ukraine may have mobilized more and sooner, but we don't know how many are dying across the front.

Of course we know less about the Ukrainian side than the Russian side for a host of reasons, but for sure the umpteen thousands of HE flung at Ukrainian positions have not all been wildly off the mark.  Ukraine is suffering casualties and it appears that it's so far been reluctant to commit new units into the fight.  So it is likely that forces are wearing thin in places just as they are for the Russians.

4 hours ago, c3k said:

This is what may have led to that Territorial Defense unit collapsing. Just the daily grind, followed up by a determined enemy advance.

I think it has more to do with the underlying nature of the TD (aka militia) units more than anything else.  We saw this in 2014 as well.  Some units are just not motivated to fight somewhere other than their tribal homeland (so to speak).  The same goes for the large amounts of militia units on the Russian side.  The LPR units pulled out of Donbas to hold the Kharkiv area went onto social media to complain loudly.  A South Ossetia regular army unit, that is still much like a militia, put down their weapons and walked home rather than fight.

The interesting thing here is that both sides did what armies have done for centuries... they put poorer quality forces in places they think they can hold in order to free up better quality forces to achieve something more difficult.

In this case it seems Russia put militias around Kharkiv to hold a static line while their regular units moved into the Donbas for the big offensive.  Ukraine did the opposite, it seems, by putting militias into a static sector that had not seen any significant motion in months while it put more capable units into the Kharkiv area to push the Russians back.

What we're seeing are the downsides of militias used where regular forces should be.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Drawing attention back to Schlottman's analysis of what Popasna might mean going forward.  He is all about looking at bipded counts instead of just tanks and IFVs.  In particular he thinks that Ukraine and Russia are nearly at manpower parity, which is not good for an attacker that has shown its forward progress is paved in its own bodies:

For those who haven't read the rest, you should do so.  It's a good analysis of Russia's BTG problem.

Steve

[TheVulture]

Another very good Perun video,  this time on what Finland and Sweden joining NATO would mean.  Also contains a description of Finland as "basically a giant bomb shelter".

 

 

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Lt. Col. Valentin Kuzmin, HQ staff of 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division

 

Edited May 21, 2022 by akd

[Battlefront.com]

40 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Markos at DailyKos echoing Steve, yet again.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/5/20/2099283/-Ukraine-Update-Seriously-stop-panicking-about-Popasna

LIBERAL SITE, ENTER AT YOUR OWN PERIL.  But he's an artillery veteran who's had excellent coverage of the war.  Today he makes case that even losing the severodonestsk salient is not a big deal.

I see the local map and get kinda uncomfortable, then look at a wider map and realize just how small that area is. 

Yeah, he has some interesting things to say.  Though I'm biased, because I just said the same things myself   In particular he said this:

Quote

Rather than panic over Russian gains in this area, just assume Severodonetsk and Lysychansk fall. Consider them gone, off the board. Then ask yourself, what did that get Russia? The answer is truly not much. And hey, there’s a really good chance Russia never gets them anyway! We’ve seen them screw up too many times to assume that they’re finally getting their shit together. 

Bolded the part I've been saying since the first few weeks of this war.  Russia could take back all of the Donbas tomorrow and it won't change the strategic picture one bit.  Ukraine is showing neither the interest nor the need to let Russia have a frozen conflict.  Russia can not afford to fight a long war, so ultimately taking this or that town doesn't matter in terms of eventual outcome.

The author of the above article again draws people's attention to the fact that for a breakthrough to matter the attacker must have the ability to exploit it.  There's a lot of very solid reasons to doubt Russia can do that.  There's also a lot of solid reasons to suspect that Ukraine isn't going to freak out if its LOCs get disrupted.  Ukraine has shown time and time again that it is capable of fighting cut off and under intense pressure for weeks and even months.  Mariupol being the highest profile case, but certainly not the only one.  In fact, if OSINT Aggregator is correct, there's a reinforced company sized force of Ukrainians fighting in the Izyum area for weeks now and Russia can't clear it out despite supposedly having 22 BTGs in the area at one point.  Now that we're getting more evidence that often BTG = Company, this makes even more sense.

Yes, this operation is dangerous for Ukraine.  Based on how the war has been going so far, though, I think it is far more dangerous for Russia.  I think they are dangerously overextending their already overextended capabilities on something that has no real chance of success.  So far this has always turned out badly for Russia.

Steve

[Vanir Ausf B]

No panic, but...

 

[Battlefront.com]

25 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

No panic, but...

 

Lyman is lumped in with a whole bunch of other places that fit into the category of "It isn't surprising that Ukraine loses X, it's amazing that they've held onto it for so long!".  We were talking about Lyman's immanent fall a month ago, yet here we are now with it maybe falling soon.

Steve

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

For sure having the high ground is a good thing and desirable objective.  Combat is generally more difficult going uphill than down.  No doubts about that here or pretty much anywhere.  However, my commentary was specific to the terrain analysis Tweet about the importance of traditional advantages of high ground for observation.  This is where I think things become trickier.

The terrain around me is similar to what is around Popasna, though vastly more forested.  In my part of the world holding the high ground offers, at best, soda straw views of very select portions of the surrounding area.  For example, there's a road that crests a large hill and you can clearly see the surrounding slopes and even some terrain features 50 miles away.  Nice view, but you can't see the large town that's only 2 miles away because of terrain undulations and tree cover.  Not only that, but the defender can view onto the other side of the hill to check out what's there while the attacker is limited to only what its position can view through direct LOS.

If this were WW1 or WW2 that height + map + skilled observer would certainly have an advantage over someone defending the town.  Now?  Meh... I'd put my money on the defender + drone in the town vs. the attacker with height + map + skilled observer.  A drone will learn vastly more than the observer on the hill. 

The difference between my area and Popasna is tree cover.  It's pretty clear that much of the terrain surrounding Popasna is fields.  This is a distinct advantage for the force on the high ground it the positions are static.  But mobile warfare?  I'm not so sure.  As the old saying goes... LOS works both ways.  If the attacker needs to move over a hill and down into the valley then it is just as likely that the defender will see the attack coming as than the attacker sees the defender.  Especially because the force in motion is easier to spot.

I think drones, at the very least, counteract one of the longest held advantages of holding high ground -> observational superiority.  The other advantages and disadvantages likely remain.

Steve

And the steeper/more difficult the terrain, the more it makes sense to just deal with it remotely.

I'm in the foothills of a steep mountain range (the San Gabriels in SoCal) that are popular for recreation.  Very steep with a mix of scrub and sometimes dense trees.  We have multiple rescues every nice weekend.  If the lost and injured can't tell rescuers where they are, the traditional way to find them is like an infantry assault - hike groups of people in through all the likely canyons to cover all the trails and fire roads.  They still do that, to an extent, but helicopters with FLIR change that significantly.  The local agencies have a ton of helicopters, many equipped with FLIR and NV capability, and fly searches.  Drones are just the extrapolation of helicopters to something small, fast, and cheap, especially if you don't need to have a rescue/medical crew on board to pluck someone out of the forest and treat them. A bunch of small drones with IR vision is way more useful than a helicopter if all you want to do is turn them into coyote food.  The drones become combined ISR/loitering munitions.

And if you have even rudimentary ELINT capability (especially if it's on the drones), you can make it even easier to find and eliminate anybody in the high ground. I even have my own simple ELINT - I added an ADS-B antenna to the roof because it requires LOS and the canyons sometimes make it hard to know who's flying around.  Now I look at a map in my home office and see who's flying around and guess what they're doing from the pattern instead of going outside with binoculars and hoping to get a glimpse through the limited field of view.  A bunch of drones with receivers and their own GPS can buzz around and very accurately locate the source of any RF transmissions that they can pick up.  That's not even hard - it's what the "MLAT" mode of ADS-B display already does using a bunch of COTs hardware that costs less than $150/station retail, and all you need is four stations. Again, the wonder of microelectronics (limited availability in Russia), because it depends on cheap drone controllers (which are pretty sophisticated), cheap software defined radio, and cheap GPS chips.  Once you have the transmitter location, you can send a missile or drone to eliminate it, no boots required.  So even if a defender has the high ground, the attacker can remotely reduce the ability of the defender to coordinate and eliminate individual strong points, negating some of the traditional advantages.

[akd]

RU claims about UKR build-up for counter-offensive on the Kherson front:

Ian Matveev considered this the most risky, but most promising, in his analysis of three strategic courses of action available to Ukraine:

m

[Suleyman]

I don't know if Ukraine would do good attacking Kherson. The Russian regular units stationed there may be tough to take out, only because of the defender's advantage including the air support they would have. If Ukraine pulls it off though, definitely a wow. 

That Ukrainian company holding off in Oskil, is doing great I mean at the end of the day these soldiers are defending their country they will put up tough resistance. I think they're in big danger though, CAS and artillery will be directed at them no? I hope they don't suffer heavy casualties.

[Huba]

49 minutes ago, akd said:

RU claims about UKR build-up for counter-offensive on the Kherson front:

Ian Matveev considered this the most risky, but most promising, in his analysis of three strategic courses of action available to Ukraine:

m

There were some videos of UA troops training with ex-PL T-72s and ex-NL M113s published maybe a week ago. Today, UA officially added completely new 5th Tank Brigade to it's roster. Zelensky said today that Ukraine has 700K men defending it. I don't recall any other specific info on the UA reserves build-up, but the number tweeted by Def Mon does not seem impossible,with the notion that large part of it is just motorized infantry.

As for the plan outlined in the second tweet, I'm really skeptical about taking the Kherson bridges intact, and given that the river is hundreds of meters wide building the bridge might also be quite hard. I wonder if Russians have the audacity to blow the Nova Kakhovka dam to deny crossing to the UA. To make this plan viable, UA would have to advance east of the Dnipro too, and I don't think they have the strength for it yet. What I can imagine is limited offensive to just re-take the Kherson city - given apparent numerical superiority of UA forces in the region this could maybe be doable. UA could test it's ideas about conducting larger offensive actions and gain experience, and of course it would be a great morale booster if successful.

Edit: actually, after closer examination it seems that blowing up the dam is not necessary - road and rail bridges there are built in the way that it should be possible to completely demolish them without compromising the dam itself. Which makes the plan to advance across the Dnipro in Kherson even more unlikely.

Edited May 21, 2022 by Huba

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Lyman is lumped in with a whole bunch of other places that fit into the category of "It isn't surprising that Ukraine loses X, it's amazing that they've held onto it for so long!".  We were talking about Lyman's immanent fall a month ago, yet here we are now with it maybe falling soon.

Steve

The fact that civilians who should have left weeks and weeks ago are shellshocked and unhappy when the war actually does show up on their doorstep is absolutely awful for the civilians in question. It is not an indication of imminent military failure. The far more significant part of that article is that 777s have entered the fight in that area. Which is the clearest possible indicator that the Ukrainians are addressing the problem.

[FancyCat]

Nothing would pierce the Russian narrative or bolster Ukrainian resolve more then retaking Kherson, destroying Russian hopes for a puppet republic in Southern Russia. Retaking Kherson would indicate to the Ukrainian population that their country's ability to defend them is secure, and the calculations for those inclined to cooperate with Russia will substantially decline for Russia.

Would also be very disastrous for Russia domestically and internationally. There isn't any evasive arguments for Russia giving up Kherson, unlike Kiev, Kharkov.

[danfrodo]

33 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The fact that civilians who should have left weeks and weeks ago are shellshocked and unhappy when the war actually does show up on their doorstep is absolutely awful for the civilians in question. It is not an indication of imminent military failure. The far more significant part of that article is that 777s have entered the fight in that area. Which is the clearest possible indicator that the Ukrainians are addressing the problem.

Must.  Send.  More.  ASAP.  from everyone.  France, Germany, everyone.  This is the world's opportunity to do the right thing and let dictators know that the 'free world' will punish such blatent aggression.  'course, most of  the world's dictators and dictator-wannabees are quite upset to see such a (mostly) unified response. 

I wonder where Putin stands on the "stupidest moves in history" list?  Gotta be pretty high.  Up there w Conrad of Austria (WW1), Hitler, Napolean in Russia (generally I think Boney was brilliant, but that one was not smart).

[Battlefront.com]

37 minutes ago, Huba said:

As for the plan outlined in the second tweet, I'm really skeptical about taking the Kherson bridges intact, and given that the river is hundreds of meters wide building the bridge might also be quite hard.

From where I sit, the only way Ukraine is going to get over the Dnepr in the Kherson area is after they have fully cleared the west bank AND compelled the Russians to pull back from the eastern bank.  I do not think it is feasible for Ukraine to do an opposed crossing for anything more than light infantry raids.

I still think the best plan is to clear out all Russian forces on the western bank including Kherson, if possible.  The primary goal being to free up forces that are currently needed for containment duties.  The Russians are far away from logistics hubs so they won't likely do well if Ukraine starts pushing hard.  I'd start with clearing out and isolating Kherson in order to obligate the Russians north of there to retreat or, ideally, get pinched off.

With the west bank secure, forces could be relocated over the Dnepr at Zaporizhzhia.  Drive south towards Melitopol while also clearing out the eastern bank of the Dnepr.  Try and advance down to Crimea and obligate Russia pulling out of Kherson if it hasn't already.  Blockade Crimea call it a success.

The purpose of this offensive is not to pocket and destroy Russian forces, though it could happen in a few places.  The purpose isn't even to cut off the supply lines out of Crimea as they aren't of much use to anybody other than the forces to be dislodged.  Instead, the primary purpose is to take back a large swath of land, killing a lot of Russians in the process, and then winding up with a shorter and more geographically flexible frontline.

Steve

[Taranis]

@Battlefront.com

Ukrainian military destroyed Russian pontoon crossing over Siversky Donets river near Serebryanka village

https://t.me/spravdi/8844

[Battlefront.com]

Recounting of Ukrainian General Staff reporting on casualties suffered by the LPR.  I haven't had a chance to look for the source, but where I got it from is reliable enough I don't think it is necessary:

No less than 17,247 men have died fighting as members of the LPR military, and another 8,931 were wounded.

This probably explains the difference in casualty estimates between Ukraine and the West.  The West seems to be focused on Russian Federation, whereas Ukraine is focused on the war as a whole.  Add Ukraine's LPR number to the Western calculations and you get the total Ukraine has been reporting.

Having said that, there is also the DPR to consider and they have certainly suffered a ton of casualties.  LPR is the smaller of the two forces, so if they've suffered this many then DPR has likely suffered even more.  Which doesn't make a lot of sense as that would mean 100% of Ukraine's total casualty count is DLPR!  We know that's not true.

I could more easily believe that 17k+ DLPR soldiers have been killed and another 12k Russians.  That seems more likely IMHO.

Steve

[Calamine Waffles]

Interesting, probably the first T-64BM2 I've seen in this war so far. It's the latest and most advanced BM Bulat model (has 1,000 hp 6TD engine, thermal gunner optics, and additional ERA on the side to cover the autoloader more completely).
 

 

Also, interesting video from the Austrian Bundesheer about Ukrainian artillery with GIS Arta and Starlink (use auto translate for English subtitles)
 

 

Edited May 21, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[Battlefront.com]

19 minutes ago, Taranis said:

@Battlefront.com

Ukrainian military destroyed Russian pontoon crossing over Siversky Donets river near Serebryanka village

https://t.me/spravdi/8844

Again?  I'm sorta surprised, sorta not.  Logically they need to get across the river to really mess up the Ukrainian rear, but on the other hand all the other attempts under better circumstances failed spectacularly.  It would appear that Russia just doesn't want to learn from its mistakes.

Steve

[sross112]

44 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

From where I sit, the only way Ukraine is going to get over the Dnepr in the Kherson area is after they have fully cleared the west bank AND compelled the Russians to pull back from the eastern bank.  I do not think it is feasible for Ukraine to do an opposed crossing for anything more than light infantry raids.

I still think the best plan is to clear out all Russian forces on the western bank including Kherson, if possible.  The primary goal being to free up forces that are currently needed for containment duties.  The Russians are far away from logistics hubs so they won't likely do well if Ukraine starts pushing hard.  I'd start with clearing out and isolating Kherson in order to obligate the Russians north of there to retreat or, ideally, get pinched off.

With the west bank secure, forces could be relocated over the Dnepr at Zaporizhzhia.  Drive south towards Melitopol while also clearing out the eastern bank of the Dnepr.  Try and advance down to Crimea and obligate Russia pulling out of Kherson if it hasn't already.  Blockade Crimea call it a success.

The purpose of this offensive is not to pocket and destroy Russian forces, though it could happen in a few places.  The purpose isn't even to cut off the supply lines out of Crimea as they aren't of much use to anybody other than the forces to be dislodged.  Instead, the primary purpose is to take back a large swath of land, killing a lot of Russians in the process, and then winding up with a shorter and more geographically flexible frontline.

Steve

I think the best plan for Kherson, if the UA has the striking power that people are saying, is to go straight for the bridge on the east side of Kherson. Short distance of maybe 30km so if the RA isn't defending in depth it is very possible to get there quick. Then push east for the other bridge/dam. While doing this they should livestream from the lead vehicles on telegram and other Russian social media outlets. Let everyone in the RA on the Kherson side of the Dnepr panic and run for those bridges, viola, highways of death!! 

As far as the bridges themselves, the UA should just push up to them and not cross. Even if the RA doesn't have them wired and blow them that way, they become a primary target to get dropped if the RA is pocketed or collapses around Kherson. No sense in pushing troops across and increasing your own logistical nightmare unless you are ready to play the Siversky Donets game. Better to do as you say. Clear the Kherson side and shift forces to the area north of Melitopol for the next push. 

If the UA has the forces that are claimed they should be able to free Kherson pretty quickly I'd think. 

[Livdoc44]

20 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Interesting, probably the first T-64BM2 I've seen in this war so far. It's the latest and most advanced BM Bulat model (has 1,000 hp 6TD engine, thermal gunner optics, and additional ERA on the side to cover the autoloader more completely).
 

 

Also, interesting video from the Austrian Bundesheer about Ukrainian artillery with GIS Arta and Starlink (use auto translate for English subtitles)
 

 

Funny, I just today, in an effort to be a bit more realistic, I swapped out the Oplots for the more ubiquitous T-64bvs in the "Dueling Shashkas" scenario. I originally was going to use Bulats but decided against it as I hadn't seen any in the conflict as yet. Good catch! Bulats here I come!

In the original play through this morning, even switched the leadership, morale, and fitness of the Russians to be a bit more - ahem - appropriate. Ha, still got smoked. 

Edited May 21, 2022 by Livdoc44
Clarity

[TheVulture]

1 minute ago, sross112 said:

I think the best plan for Kherson, if the UA has the striking power that people are saying, is to go straight for the bridge on the east side of Kherson. Short distance of maybe 30km so if the RA isn't defending in depth it is very possible to get there quick. Then push east for the other bridge/dam. While doing this they should livestream from the lead vehicles on telegram and other Russian social media outlets. Let everyone in the RA on the Kherson side of the Dnepr panic and run for those bridges, viola, highways of death!! 

As far as the bridges themselves, the UA should just push up to them and not cross. Even if the RA doesn't have them wired and blow them that way, they become a primary target to get dropped if the RA is pocketed or collapses around Kherson. No sense in pushing troops across and increasing your own logistical nightmare unless you are ready to play the Siversky Donets game. Better to do as you say. Clear the Kherson side and shift forces to the area north of Melitopol for the next push. 

If the UA has the forces that are claimed they should be able to free Kherson pretty quickly I'd think. 

Attacking Kherson directly seems like a bad plan for Ukraine - attacking a city is always tough, and is going to be bad for the Ukrainian citizens still there. Better to push for the two crossing points on the Dnepir north of Kherson to either cut the Russians off or pressure them to withdraw before that happens. The more long term option to avoid fighting for Kherson would be to push south from Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol and then on threaten the Crimea entrance to sever the entire logistics flow to the west. But that's tantamount to defeating the entire southern theatre, so is going to be to ambitious at this stage.

[sross112]

14 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Again?  I'm sorta surprised, sorta not.  Logically they need to get across the river to really mess up the Ukrainian rear, but on the other hand all the other attempts under better circumstances failed spectacularly.  It would appear that Russia just doesn't want to learn from its mistakes.

Steve

It is like our modern day socialists/communists, they look at all the times it was tried and failed in the past and yet still think it will work. "Those other guys just didn't do it right!!" They will probably break out the medium girder and bailey bridges pretty soon as it has to be the fault of the pontoons.

[sross112]

2 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

Attacking Kherson directly seems like a bad plan for Ukraine - attacking a city is always tough, and is going to be bad for the Ukrainian citizens still there. Better to push for the two crossing points on the Dnepir north of Kherson to either cut the Russians off or pressure them to withdraw before that happens. The more long term option to avoid fighting for Kherson would be to push south from Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol and then on threaten the Crimea entrance to sever the entire logistics flow to the west. But that's tantamount to defeating the entire southern theatre, so is going to be to ambitious at this stage.

I agree they should avoid the city fight as much as possible. The bridge near Kherson is on the eastern outskirts and that's why I thought push straight for that instead. They would only need to clear a very small portion of the city itself to get to the bridge entrance and maybe nothing at all to take it under fire.

[dan/california]

18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Again?  I'm sorta surprised, sorta not.  Logically they need to get across the river to really mess up the Ukrainian rear, but on the other hand all the other attempts under better circumstances failed spectacularly.  It would appear that Russia just doesn't want to learn from its mistakes.

Steve

I sometimes believe Putin is intentionally pushing his army to complete failure so it doesn't have the capacity left to depose him when Russia finally loses catastrophically.

21 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Recounting of Ukrainian General Staff reporting on casualties suffered by the LPR.  I haven't had a chance to look for the source, but where I got it from is reliable enough I don't think it is necessary:

No less than 17,247 men have died fighting as members of the LPR military, and another 8,931 were wounded.

This probably explains the difference in casualty estimates between Ukraine and the West.  The West seems to be focused on Russian Federation, whereas Ukraine is focused on the war as a whole.  Add Ukraine's LPR number to the Western calculations and you get the total Ukraine has been reporting.

Having said that, there is also the DPR to consider and they have certainly suffered a ton of casualties.  LPR is the smaller of the two forces, so if they've suffered this many then DPR has likely suffered even more.  Which doesn't make a lot of sense as that would mean 100% of Ukraine's total casualty count is DLPR!  We know that's not true.

I could more easily believe that 17k+ DLPR soldiers have been killed and another 12k Russians.  That seems more likely IMHO.

Steve

The DPR/LPR are not big places, this has to push their casualties as a percentage of the total population up towards France in WW1 or Russia in WW2 doesn't it. I mean society changing near male generation wipeout level.