How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

55 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is all true and I wish the UN would make some sort of definitive statement about this, but man-oh-man has the UN been AWOL on this war.  I doubt Russia would attack a non-belligerent ship flying under a UN flag on a grain run to Odessa.  I even doubt they'd attack an Egyptian, Indian, or Pakistani flagged ship doing the same.

Steve

The UN is structurally incapable of refereeing between the Big Five who hold permanent seats and vetoes on the Security Counsel. This is a structural flaw that resulted from the U.N. rules being codified by the victors of WW2 without quite realizing how badly they were going to be getting along in a few years. In any event none of them would have agreed to an organization that had the ability to restrict their freedom of action. "International Law" is just a polite fiction covering the fact that might makes right if you have enough of it.

The Ukraine war presents the same three choices it always has. 1) Effectively surrender Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe to Russian Domination. This effectively shatters NATO and the broader "Western Alliance" and points to a an UGLY 21st century. 2) Provide Ukraine enough support to win this war. This is inevitably going to take several more months, and perhaps much longer. Unfortunately this pushes the world food production system to VERY high degree of stress, since Ukraine and Russia quietly became the the worlds leading exporters while virtually no one paid attention. There just is not enough spare capacity to compensate. 3) NATO can end this war in a week and dares Putin to start WW3 over it.

My personal  opinion is that option one is a non starter, and the balance of risks between options two and three is much closer than is commonly assumed. This is clearly a minority opinion, but Sri Lanka has already descended in to absolute chaos over the food crisis. They clearly had a LOT of preexisting issues, but that just makes them the canary in the coal mine. There are a lot of countries out there just barely holding it together withe bailing wire and the hope that  things are getting just a little bit better. A multi year food crisis is going to sink a lot of them. The downside risk of NATO not intervening decisively have been understated, and the Russia's desire to fight NATO has been greatly OVERSTATED. If Russia wanted to fight NATO a tenth of the support we have ALREADY given Ukraine would be more than enough casus belli. Russia isn't fighting NATO because it doesn't want to, and knows it would lose. A rock solid ultimatum and two or three heavy brigades crossing the Polish Ukrainian border would have wonderfully clarifying effect on the thought processes of various factions in Moscow.

 

Edited May 22, 2022 by dan/california
dropped a word

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Huba said:

We all find the southern axis the most probable for Ukrainian counteroffensive I think, and so do the analysts that dare to speak about the subject. In the scenario you outlined I would disagree with the "blockade the Crimea" part. If Ukraine is able to pull off the offensive that liberates whole Kherson, IMO it is Crimea that should be next.

There's very little reason to think Ukraine could pull off an attack into Crimea any time soon.  It would be a large undertaking that would be very exposed to risk and absolutely would get Russia's attention.  Might even have Putin give in to reason and do a full mobilization (which could be a good thing).

I think the more practical thing to do is bottle up Crimea and concentrate on diving into the underbelly of DPR.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

42 minutes ago, akd said:

https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/22/europe/ukraine-russian-officer-resigns/index.html

Article is mostly an interview with one “refusenik” junior officer from an unknown SMD unit, but also includes this unverified claim about the 150th MRD:

 

BTW, there was an obscure, but interesting, bit in that report:

Quote

That night they spent hours painting white stripes on their military vehicles. Then they were told to wash those off, he said. "The order has changed, draw the letter Z, as in Zorro," he remembered being told.

This is more evidence that the initial Crimean forces went into Ukraine with "stripes", then they changed them to elongated "Zs" or removed them completely when higher command decided they should all be Zs.

Steve

[dan/california]

Interesting for several reasons. First it is not an over edited mess, secondly it shows the first two spotting rounds being way off, then subsequent rounds getting VERY accurate. They also seem quite worried about counter battery if they actually stopped shooting at this point. Because it seemed like their was a lot more targets.

[Raptor341]

23 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

The Ukraine war presents the same three choices it always has. 1) Effectively surrender Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe to Russian Domination. This effectively shatters NATO and the broader "Western Alliance" and points to a an UGLY 21st century. 2) Provide Ukraine enough support to win this war. This is inevitably going to take several more months, and perhaps much longer. Unfortunately this pushes the world food production system to VERY high degree of stress, since Ukraine and Russia quietly became the the worlds leading exporters while virtually no one paid attention. There just is not enough spare capacity to compensate. 3) NATO can end this war in a week and dares Putin to start WW3 over it.

My personal  opinion is that option one is a non starter, and the balance of risks between options two and three is much closer than is commonly assumed. This is clearly a minority opinion, but Sri Lanka has already descended in to absolute chaos over the food crisis. They clearly had a LOT of preexisting issues, but that just makes them the canary in the coal mine. There are a lot of countries out there just barely holding it together withe bailing wire and the hope that  things are getting just a little bit better. A multi year food crisis is going to sink a lot of them. The downside risk of NATO not intervening decisively have been understated, and the Russia's desire to fight NATO has been greatly OVERSTATED. If Russia wanted to fight NATO a tenth of the support we have ALREADY given Ukraine would more than enough casus belli. Russia isn't fighting NATO because it doesn't want to, and knows it would lose. A rock solid ultimatum and two or three heavy brigades crossing the Polish Ukrainian border would have wonderfully clarifying effect on the thought processes of various factions in Moscow.

 

Couldn’t have put it better myself. I’ve personally felt this way since day one, and there is only more reason to believe it now. Option 1 is a complete non-starter, and the difference between 2 and 3 isn’t as much as most think. Russia has more than enough reasons to escalate with any NATO member, yet they have not, because while still dangerous, they are a battered conventional force. The West has the room to escalate and force the Russians out or to bring them to the negotiating table, if only we have the political  willpower to up the pressure. While there are risks to any escalation, there are also a host of risks if we do not. 
 

A more focused argument may be again the topic of opening up a sea lane into Ukraine - what is Russia going to do when confronted by a NATO/International fleet with the express mission of maintaining a naval LOC? Attack? Because that will fail - the power balance between the limited RFN units in the Black Sea / Med is massive, it is a lose lose for Russia if they even tried. 
 

*Quick fire opinions here*

Edited May 22, 2022 by Raptor341

[Battlefront.com]

Another interesting interview from a Russian soldier who surrendered (or captured) early in the war.

 

Lots of this we've heard before, but it's always interesting to hear specifics and there's quite a lot of variation.  The most interesting parts for me were:

• his Regiment (503rd MRR, 19th MRD, 58th CAA, Southern MD) was recently revived, however it was never fully brought up to strength even though the unit was officially listed as full strength.
• they were brought to Crimea for "exercises", but like many units they simply drove around and did inspections because, as we know, there were no exercises. 
• they initially had all of their fancy gear (NGV, thermals, radios, etc.), but they were told to turn them in the night before the invasion.  The next day when they went to invade they were told they would get them back soon.  A couple of days later they were told the items had been stolen.  What most likely happened was the paperwork said they were issued and that they would report them as lost in combat.
• desire to go into Ukraine was extremely low.  Some bribed their way out of combat just ahead of the invasion (he speculated some had inside info that the war was going to happen) others tried to refuse.  However, they were constantly convinced to stay by tried-and-true method of threatening so that the bulk back down and the rest feel they have no choice but to stay put.
• significant friendly fire incidents because radios were stolen or not available (he said their two command vehicles weren't functional and were left behind).  Basically, nobody knew where anybody was.
• it seems that the officers and men spent a lot of time thinking of how to get out of the war.  A lot of them.  Eventually they did make a group move and, if I understand correctly, they even destroyed two of their tanks in order to surrender to Ukrainians.

Steve

[Huba]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

There's very little reason to think Ukraine could pull off an attack into Crimea any time soon.  It would be a large undertaking that would be very exposed to risk and absolutely would get Russia's attention.  Might even have Putin give in to reason and do a full mobilization (which could be a good thing).

I think the more practical thing to do is bottle up Crimea and concentrate on diving into the underbelly of DPR.

Steve

 

Isn't it mostly the question of will to actually win the war? UA entering Crimea would be the humiliating defeat that would shake Russia like nothing else that could happen in Donbas, except maybe a total collapse/ huge encirclement of their army there. The argument about not escalating/ not annoying Putin too much stopped being relevant, apart from mobilization what is he really going to do?

Now for the technical feasibility. The total area of Crimea is considerably smaller than what is envisioned in the Kherson offensive we agreed would be feasible sometimes in the future. The area itself is very isolated, and compared to Donbas extremely hard to resupply for Russians, especially if the wet dream of ATACMSs attack on Kerch bridge (and also Crimean ports) was to be fulfilled. This is a crucial element I think, but if UA was provided with the capability, and once Ukrainians established a foothold south of Perekop, they should have much easier job logistically then Russians.

 Assaulting Crimean cities like Sevastopol (we know Russians are extremely good at defending it  ), Simpheropol and taking the mountains in the south sounds like absolutely huge undertaking, but the rest of the peninsula is really flat and no different then rest of southern Ukraine. If UA was to reach the vicinity of Kerch peninsula, the campaign is really over, as Russians can't resupply the remaining forces on Crimea ( with some anti-ship missiles stationed there basically whole Crimean and Azov shores are no longer accessible for Black Sea fleet), and can't realistically land on the peninsula to take it back.

As for the soft underbelly of DPR, is there really one? We see how hard it was for Russians to break the fortifications in Donbas - I assume that the DLPR has comparable line on their side. There are multiple river obstacles to cross too, and we see how difficult it is. Compared to Crimea which borders the sea from all sides, Ukrainians in the east can't really do anything about their flanks being exposed to counterattacks from Russian mainland. Even if Ukrainians completely push  the Russians to the state borders, RU can return in any moment they please, while Crimea once taken would require landing by sea and air which is just crazy talk.

Now I'm not saying I'm absolutely right here, but I'd be happy to hear the arguments why what I wrote doesn't make sense

 

Edited May 22, 2022 by Huba

[Boche]

The part of all the important gear evaporating on the eve of the invasion is astonishing. As we all know corruption is rife in the R.Army but man...how many lives did that "little act" cost.

[Huba]

OK, so ISW is not clear if Russians are preparing to renew offensive in the south, or are waiting for Ukrainian counteroffensive to happen:

 

 

Edited May 22, 2022 by Huba

[DesertFox]

Amazing. Looks like all three crewmembers survived.

 

 

[Calamine Waffles]

5 hours ago, danfrodo said:

Anyone ever watch Denys Davydov for UKR war info?  Nice 'big picture' view of the war plus what's up locally, ~daily content.  He's a Ukrainian commercial airline pilot.  He just today posted a longer review on where the war has been, where it is, and where it's going.  He's calm, balanced, and seems to know his stuff. 

A couple days ago he mentioned big UKR offensive(s) would come sometime mid-June to early July.  Which made me realize I keep looking for some big event, day after day, that probably isn't coming.  UKR is building a proper war machine with the incoming weapons and new troops.  Contrast this to RU that is desperately hurling every warm body and 30+ yr old BMP it can find at the front lines.

https://www.youtube.com/c/RoadHomeMotorcycleVlogs

 

He is okay for like the broad military picture and getting a sense for what things are like in Ukraine, but he lacks the detailed technical/military knowledge, so generally don't rely on him for like opinions on hardware etc.

[FancyCat]

Isn't there indication that support for war is much softer than one would think? That when faced with much more frightening realities, instead of doubling down, Russia might well blink due to the fact the population has not been prepped for a actual war with Ukraine?

Yes, lots of bluster from Russia and Russian population but ain't no one volunteering....the volunteers are already mobilized. There wasn't some overwhelming patriotism that causes enlistment to rise was there? It's easy to deny Ukraine is a potent force, when Crimea is threatened, will look much different.

[dan/california]

 

[danfrodo]

20 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

He is okay for like the broad military picture and getting a sense for what things are like in Ukraine, but he lacks the detailed technical/military knowledge, so generally don't rely on him for like opinions on hardware etc.

Totally agree, CalaimeWaffles.  He thinks every BTG is full strength and doesn't understand the gear, as you said.  But good daily maps and occasional insights that I don't get elsewhere.  Plus I always like to see how a Ukrainian sees things.

[danfrodo]

16 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

Perhaps a rather strategic criticism to light a fire under Scholz.  If Scholz is asked about this, he'll say it's not true.  Then he'll be asked what he's doing that shows it's not true.  Hopefully will help make it hotter for him to keep prevaricating.

[billbindc]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

1. The UN is structurally incapable of refereeing between the Big Five who hold permanent seats and vetoes on the Security Counsel. 

2. Unfortunately this pushes the world food production system to VERY high degree of stress, since Ukraine and Russia quietly became the the worlds leading exporters while virtually no one paid attention. There just is not enough spare capacity to compensate. 

 

Answering two of your points: 

1. This is one pretty large reason why Russia is unlikely to use a nuke in Ukraine. It's seat on the Security Council would revoked, China wouldn't be inclined to protect them and the UN then would become a fairly useful conduit of power directed at containing Russia. Freedom of navigation for the Black Sea grain ports would be an obvious mission.

2. Don't believe the hype on world food stocks: https://asmith.ucdavis.edu/news/russia-ukraine. Yes, prices will rise and countries with marginal ability to cope are going to get hurt but it's one factor among many (as you note) in regard to Sri Lanka and many others. There's a global recession beginning to shape up and that's a much bigger factor.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

 

Isn't it mostly the question of will to actually win the war?

No, will is important but logistics is even more important.  I don't think Ukraine has the capability to engage in two large offensives in a row.  Blitzing to take over places abandoned by retreating Russians who collapsed is more feasible, but I do think Russia will manage to defend Crimea even in the event of a civil war.

1 hour ago, Huba said:

As for the soft underbelly of DPR, is there really one? We see how hard it was for Russians to break the fortifications in Donbas - I assume that the DLPR has comparable line on their side

 

DLPR do not have internal defensive lines as far as I know, so if Ukraine sneaks around the side it should be nothing more than terrain and improvised defenses.  In 2014 Ukraine made very good progress in the middle part of Donestsk, which is why Russia went over the border and smashed them.  This time, though, the Russians are already on that side of the border.  If Ukraine can break through then Donetsk should be vulnerable from the rear.

Steve

[dan/california]

15 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

No, will is important but logistics is even more important.  I don't think Ukraine has the capability to engage in two large offensives in a row.  Blitzing to take over places abandoned by retreating Russians who collapsed is more feasible, but I do think Russia will manage to defend Crimea even in the event of a civil war.

DLPR do not have internal defensive lines as far as I know, so if Ukraine sneaks around the side it should be nothing more than terrain and improvised defenses.  In 2014 Ukraine made very good progress in the middle part of Donestsk, which is why Russia went over the border and smashed them.  This time, though, the Russians are already on that side of the border.  If Ukraine can break through then Donetsk should be vulnerable from the rear.

Steve

The other factor that makes the DPR/LPR vulnerable is the way Russia is recruiting every military aged male who can pass the mirror test. And then using them up like they were cheap ammunition that is about to expire. If the Russian lines collapse the population that would have provided some sort of defense in depth/partisan resistance will have already been used up.

[Huba]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

No, will is important but logistics is even more important.  I don't think Ukraine has the capability to engage in two large offensives in a row.  Blitzing to take over places abandoned by retreating Russians who collapsed is more feasible, but I do think Russia will manage to defend Crimea even in the event of a civil war.

DLPR do not have internal defensive lines as far as I know, so if Ukraine sneaks around the side it should be nothing more than terrain and improvised defenses.  In 2014 Ukraine made very good progress in the middle part of Donestsk, which is why Russia went over the border and smashed them.  This time, though, the Russians are already on that side of the border.  If Ukraine can break through then Donetsk should be vulnerable from the rear.

Steve

Fair enough, I'm not going to argue about it, at this point it's just too speculative to really make sense. Let's see how the situation unfolds.

It is strange what your'e saying about the DLPR defensive positions though. I thought that the frontline in Donbas was more or less reminiscent of WW1 trenches in the way that there are two comparable defensive systems facing each other. Maybe @Haiduk or @kraze could elaborate on how pre-24th DLPR defenses look like?

[cesmonkey]

55 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

That particular exchange is about 36 minutes into this video:

 

[dan/california]

7 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

That particular exchange is about 36 minutes into this video:

 

Is there a chance in bleep of getting the entire transcript in English? I flunked German comprehensively in high school and was too traumatized to ever try again.

[Kinophile]

The fact that Crimea is so emotionally important to Russia (and not DLPR) seems like a bad strategic blunder.

It locks in a socio-political AND  military commitment that Putin cannot escape. 

Any realistic (or perceived as "realistic") threat to Crimea, its access or security will necessitate a very strong and very public response. This becomes a military commitment in waiting, a distraction that, if timed right, could detract from other sectors to UKRs advantage.

Crimea could become a Rabaul - sucking up forces, attention and resources to defend against a threat that even if not realistic (for UKR) is pyschological catnip for Russia.

The current advantage is that Crimea is difficult to land attack from Ukraine. But even a threat to its Land/sea  communications would have a disproportionate effect on the Russian mindset, and Ukraine doesnt need to physically attack across the isthmus.

But it does need to destroy the BSF and it's facilities.

Personally, I think its foolish to lock oneself into a strategic commitment based on emotion, but hey, Russia 2022 everyone...

Edited May 22, 2022 by Kinophile

[cesmonkey]

4 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Is there a chance in bleep of getting the entire transcript in English? I flunked German comprehensively in high school and was too traumatized to ever try again.

My college German is rather rusty, but I'm sure someone on this forum could provide a good translation.  

You can let Twitter translate that particular quote for you:
 

 

 

[Kinophile]

18 minutes ago, Huba said:

Fair enough, I'm not going to argue about it, at this point it's just too speculative to really make sense. Let's see how the situation unfolds.

It is strange what your'e saying about the DLPR defensive positions though. I thought that the frontline in Donbas was more or less reminiscent of WW1 trenches in the way that there are two comparable defensive systems facing each other. Maybe @Haiduk or @kraze could elaborate on how pre-24th DLPR defenses look like?

Based purely on Russian/DLPR military corruption and incompetence I highly doubt the separatist fortifications are on the scale, depth, quality or extensiveness as the UKR belt built since 2014.

Even so, any attack against prepared fortifications, no matter how shoddy, requires an extensive commitment (even "just in case") that I doubt UKR will want to get sucked into.

Also, defending DLPR units could easily recover resolve and morale in defense of their "homeland", in a way that the awful attacks against UKR defenses did not activate.

[Battlefront.com]

20 minutes ago, Huba said:

It is strange what your'e saying about the DLPR defensive positions though. I thought that the frontline in Donbas was more or less reminiscent of WW1 trenches in the way that there are two comparable defensive systems facing each other.

Yes, in the immediate frontline area that is true.  But where I'm envisioning Ukraine attacking is many KMs to the rear of those positions.

20 minutes ago, Huba said:

Maybe @Haiduk or @kraze could elaborate on how pre-24th DLPR defenses look like?

I'd appreciate that too! 

My impression is this:

Ukraine always expected Russia to renew the offensive into Ukrainian territory.  Ukraine fortified a number of places well to the rear, including Slavyansk and Kramatorsk.

Despite all of Russia's bluster about Ukraine attacking into Donbas, I don't think they ever really believed that would happen and Russia is both cheap and lazy when it comes to warfare.  I've assumed that means Russia didn't insist on there being defenses in depth like Ukraine.

Steve