How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

as if no one has bothered to think about where the weapons are going?  Oh, gosh golly, we're all utterly f-ing incompetent and need serial con man RP to lecture us on good governance.

[danfrodo]

I guess I better give myself a vacation, this is making my blood boil.

[dan/california]

39 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

It's the thought that counts

Absolutely proven true already.  Ukraine went into this war with a huge amount of tactical UAV capacity, very limited mid range (TB2), and nothing strategic that I know of.  Because Russia insists on fighting this entire war as if it is a bunch of disconnected tactical exercises, Ukraine's ISR is almost perfectly lined up to cause Russia maximum pain.

The bridge crossing is a perfect example.  It was rushed and very poorly executed.  Russia did not even follow their own doctrine, not to mention tap into the fantastic successes of previous Soviet operational successes.  Instead, they just tried to ram a bunch of vehicles over an obvious crossing and hoped nobody would notice.  But because Ukraine has plenty of UAV capacity down at this level, all they needed to thwart Russia's plan was a good (normal) chain of command headed by some decent (maybe excellent!) officers, and an f'n $200 quadcopter.

Some day I'm going to get over this bridge crossing.  Really, I will.  But man-oh-man, it's going to be a while

Steve

One of the questions we probably won't get answered for at least a year or three is how many hundreds of Nato analysts, and how many gigawatts of server farm were expended every day to turn the several zillion incoming ISR streams being generated into a coherent picture of the battlefield that is handed to the Ukrainian General Staff as a bow-tied present every morning, and again after afternoon tea. The Russians have essentially never generated even a tank company sized surprise action that I am aware of, much less anything on a scale that might matter. Anyone who actually wants to win the next war is going to have to figure out how to deal with that.

Edited May 13, 2022 by dan/california
dropped a word

[danfrodo]

well, one more:  did you hear the utter bull-s--t RP spewed about covid and vaccines?  How many americans died because he sat there in the senate telling endless lies, attacking the CDC constantly?  feeding into the lie machine that was literally killing hundreds of americans every day.  That's Rand Paul.

[purpheart23]

48 minutes ago, Phantom Captain said:

MAGA.  Lol.  No intellectual defense of anything, just talking points, confrontational attitude and dismissiveness of anything contrary to their delusional reality.  Not worth arguing.  Seriously.

Thanks for chiming in.

[Phantom Captain]

First off, anyone who says they "hate all politicians they are all the same", is being intellectually dishonest or willfully ignorant.  If you can't tell the difference between fascist politicians that are working to overthrow our democracy and the democratic ones trying to save it, then.... I don't know what to say other than what I just said.  

Second, on Rand Paul.  What Steve said.  Again, intellectual dishonesty or willful ignorance.  Your pick.  We know exactly why Rand does what he does.  

He's a disgrace and an embarrassment.  

I'm done.  I just had to say it.

[Battlefront.com]

1 minute ago, danfrodo said:

well, one more:  did you hear the utter bull-s--t RP spewed about covid and vaccines?  How many americans died because he sat there in the senate telling endless lies, attacking the CDC constantly?  feeding into the lie machine that was literally killing hundreds of americans every day.  That's Rand Paul.

You said you would back away from the keyboard.  I am asking you to do that now without me having to flip the switch on you.

Steve

[akd]

Should’ve stayed put:

 

[purpheart23]

 

3 minutes ago, Phantom Captain said:

First off, anyone who says they "hate all politicians they are all the same", is being intellectually dishonest or willfully ignorant.  If you can't tell the difference between fascist politicians that are working to overthrow our democracy and the democratic ones trying to save it, then.... I don't know what to say other than what I just said.  

Second, on Rand Paul.  What Steve said.  Again, intellectual dishonesty or willful ignorance.  Your pick.  We know exactly why Rand does what he does.  

He's a disgrace and an embarrassment.  

I'm done.  I just had to say it.

You're not done, you don't get to try to character assassinate me because you disagree with me and just walk away, that's what's known as a coward, you shouldn't let your effeminate emotions cloud your soft judgement.

Edited May 13, 2022 by purpheart23

[Phantom Captain]

Just now, purpheart23 said:

That's because you're soft.

 

You're not done, you don't get to try to character assassinate me because you disagree with me and just walk away, that's what's known as a coward, you shouldn't let your effeminate emotions cloud your soft judgement.

Hahaha!  Bye troll.

[purpheart23]

Just now, Phantom Captain said:

Hahaha!  Bye troll.

..l..

[Vacillator]

Okay, I'm off to play some CM...

[Ultradave]

41 minutes ago, CivE said:

Thanks for this, and to several other people who responded as well. I'm trying to follow along with the ongoing discussion by @The_Capt, @Battlefront.com and others about the lessons to be learned from the first part of this war (and trying to keep in mind that the value of those lessons for us as spectators is not worth the price that Ukrainians are paying). "Mass" has been a key concept in this, and I think I'm correct in understanding that to be the concentration of force in time and space, but I wasn't sure if the "weight" of the units was meant to be part of that. Now I know it isn't, except that AFVs give heavy mechanized infantry the firepower and mobility to create their own local mass, and the ability to get their mass to the right place at the right time as part of larger unit maneuvers.

I'm trying to understand what you all think is new or different about the role of light infantry in this war. I think you've been saying it, but some of the terminology is new to me, so thanks for your patience as I rewind and try to re-state some basic things in this long post. I don't think anybody is surprised that light infantry can eat away at heavier forces on strategic timeframes. And I don't think we've seen light infantry become immune to combined arms attacks on the tactical level. It looks like the difference is that improvements in some key technologies have passed a tipping point that dramatically increases the importance of dismounted infantry in the balance of combined arms operations.

The improvements in technology mean that capabilities in reconnaissance, communications, and accurate long range fire power can be pushed down to much smaller light infantry units. On the defense this allows infantry to focus long range fire power against concerted attacks while remaining dispersed and concealed. Direct armor attack remains possible, but at a steep exchange rate. Artillery attack or suppression is possible, but it takes a lot of tubes and a lot of shells to cover all the possible hiding places, and it's expensive in supplies if not losses. Ditto air attack. But bypassing well equipped light infantry is also dangerous because even after being suppressed or pushed back a little they can retain the capability to find and attack the enemy lines of communication, either independently, or in coordination with neighboring units or higher command. As someone here said, the attacker would basically need to clear and protect a 10km wide corridor along their supply line, which looks more like an occupation than a breakthrough, takes resources away from the advance, and slows everything way down.

Mechanized infantry can't play the front line defensive role because more of their capabilities are built into vehicles that can only maneuver well in terrain where they are easy to spot by satellite or drone, and hit with artillery or aircraft. Plus they need gas every day and if they are cut off they quickly run out of options. Lower tech or more cheaply equipped light infantry couldn't do this because they wouldn't have the quality or quantity of portable AT weapons, or enough situational awareness to make good decisions on a rapidly developing battlefield. Units without permission, training, inclination, or morale to take their own initiative can't do it either. Insurgents can't do it to such good effect because the occupying force isn't trying to fight a conventional battle at the same time. But Ukrainian foot infantry with phones, drones, mortars, and loads of AT weapons have shown they can take a beating on day one of an enemy attack, and still have the ability to re-organize, re-orient, and mount their own counter attacks or ambushes for days. Trying to bypass or cut off forces like these turns into a "I'm not locked in here with you, you're locked in here with me" situation. That has been a capability of elite units in the past, but it looks like the new technologies bring it in the reach of far more units with less training.

Looking at the bigger defensive picture, the light infantry don't have to be decisive, they just have to do their part as part of a larger defensive operation to add "friction" to whatever part of the enemy's advance is still within marching distance. Mechanized units move to block the head of the attack, armored units go for its throat, the infantry keep throwing kidney punches, and artillery, air, and strategic assets strike as far back along the tail as they can reach. Even accounting for Russian incompetence, I looks like one of the big surprises or lessons so far has been how important of a contribution light infantry make to that bigger picture. 

There has been less discussion here of the role of light infantry on the offense, except for the idea that while the enemy's long range recon and fires prevent your heavier forces from assembling in the rear, infantry can still infiltrate forward despite drone surveillance with some pretty effective weapons. Maybe we will know more soon. There has been a lot more discussion about air power, autonomous systems, is this the end of the tank etc., but I think this is sort of where the consensus is at least for infantry in the defense. Am I getting it sort of right? What I am I missing? Am I using the words right?

 

You are. And I can comment on a couple things you bring up. 

First of all, the role of light infantry in the defense comparing Ukraine to {anything else}. During the Cold War, in the 82d Airborne we trained on something called the AAAD (Airborne Anti-Armor Defense). In practice, and from what I've seen of Ukraine, what wee did is a more concentrated version. We would have been in the line somewhere, with the mission to stop/seriously degrade the oncoming Soviet armor columns. To do this, we were loaded to the gills with TOWs and LAWs in strongpoints with interlocking fields creating crossfire kill zones. In Ukraine it seems to be much more decentralized, with hit and run tactics, rather than strongpoints. Just like mechanized company teams, we had alternate and fallback firing positions. This is a likely task of light infantry thrown into the line of battle.

HOWEVER, saying that, it isn't the best role for light infantry, and we didn't really expect to happen except in desperation, to plug a gaping hole. Which of course, gave us a fair estimate of our potential lifespan at the time (seriously, none of us expected to live to 30).

Your last point about offense - light infantry is most suited to "mobile" offensive operations, and we've seen some of those, mostly unsuccessful, by the Russians. An airmobile operation to seize an airfield, or over a river to assist in a bridging operation making an instant expanded bridgehead are classic light infantry ops. For non-airborne or non-airmobile ops, ("legs" in paratrooper terminology  ), offense from a light infantry unit is fairly limited. A typical mobile op could be to airlift a unit into an airfield, seize it, and then hold on for dear life for a day, or two, or three, until the armor/mech units can either be 1) airlifted in to reinforce/relieve, or 2) force their way to join up, or 3) some combination of the two. As you can imagine, these are high risk/high reward operations, with a large potential for hanging that light infantry unit out in the breeze.

There are some differences in Russian and US airborne/airmobile units in that Russia can airdrop light IFVs right along with the infantry. That would be quite a nice advantage if you can do it right. When you do something like that, OUR doctrine would be drop infantry first, secure and expand the drop zone and THEN you drop vehicles, including artillery (mortars come in first with the infantry). Don't I don't know how the Russians do it, (or considering how things have been going, how they are SUPPOSED to do it, which can be two different things.)

I don't know enough about Ukraine's airborne and airmobile units to compare, so perhaps @Haiduk could jump in and comment. This may have been well covered but in reading 700+ pages (and I have), it may have escaped my overworked brain cells.

I hope this helps. Feel free to ask more questions. We're all trying to figure out what's happening

Dave

[akd]

Not sure if this is an elaborate fake…

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=5195940497095131&set=pcb.5195940560428458&type=3&theater

Edited May 13, 2022 by akd

[Ultradave]

17 minutes ago, Vacillator said:

Okay, I'm off to play some CM...

Oh, I know what THIS means

 

[Vacillator]

7 minutes ago, Ultradave said:

Oh, I know what THIS means

Yes Dave, yes.  Well this is a wargaming forum .

Edited May 13, 2022 by Vacillator

[Ultradave]

51 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Off topic... Moon (you old timers might remember him!)

Whoah!  What a blast from the past that name is!!

[Armorgunner]

55 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Off topic... Moon (you old timers might remember him!) moved to the US many years ago.  He asked why our roads were so awful.  I said, easy... road budgets are determined by the local (town) government and people don't want to pay what it costs to make good roads.  As a result we have much lower taxes, but also poor quality roads compared to where he was in Germany.

It is fun though.  People deliberately under fund the infrastructure they rely upon most, then complain about how bad the infrastructure is.  Oh, and they still complain about taxes.

Some days I find it hard to imagine Humanity making it much longer.  We seem to succeed only when we've run out of ideas how to screw things up

Steve

Roads was not a good comparison with Sweden/Germany  As we have among the worsts roads in Europe! Becouse of the cold winters, and in the spring when the melt comes in. The roads crack up, in the northern half of Sweden at least.

[dan/california]

10 minutes ago, Ultradave said:

You are. And I can comment on a couple things you bring up. 

First of all, the role of light infantry in the defense comparing Ukraine to {anything else}. During the Cold War, in the 82d Airborne we trained on something called the AAAD (Airborne Anti-Armor Defense). In practice, and from what I've seen of Ukraine, what wee did is a more concentrated version. We would have been in the line somewhere, with the mission to stop/seriously degrade the oncoming Soviet armor columns. To do this, we were loaded to the gills with TOWs and LAWs in strongpoints with interlocking fields creating crossfire kill zones. In Ukraine it seems to be much more decentralized, with hit and run tactics, rather than strongpoints. Just like mechanized company teams, we had alternate and fallback firing positions. This is a likely task of light infantry thrown into the line of battle.

HOWEVER, saying that, it isn't the best role for light infantry, and we didn't really expect to happen except in desperation, to plug a gaping hole. Which of course, gave us a fair estimate of our potential lifespan at the time (seriously, none of us expected to live to 30).

Your last point about offense - light infantry is most suited to "mobile" offensive operations, and we've seen some of those, mostly unsuccessful, by the Russians. An airmobile operation to seize an airfield, or over a river to assist in a bridging operation making an instant expanded bridgehead are classic light infantry ops. For non-airborne or non-airmobile ops, ("legs" in paratrooper terminology  ), offense from a light infantry unit is fairly limited. A typical mobile op could be to airlift a unit into an airfield, seize it, and then hold on for dear life for a day, or two, or three, until the armor/mech units can either be 1) airlifted in to reinforce/relieve, or 2) force their way to join up, or 3) some combination of the two. As you can imagine, these are high risk/high reward operations, with a large potential for hanging that light infantry unit out in the breeze.

There are some differences in Russian and US airborne/airmobile units in that Russia can airdrop light IFVs right along with the infantry. That would be quite a nice advantage if you can do it right. When you do something like that, OUR doctrine would be drop infantry first, secure and expand the drop zone and THEN you drop vehicles, including artillery (mortars come in first with the infantry). Don't I don't know how the Russians do it, (or considering how things have been going, how they are SUPPOSED to do it, which can be two different things.)

I don't know enough about Ukraine's airborne and airmobile units to compare, so perhaps @Haiduk could jump in and comment. This may have been well covered but in reading 700+ pages (and I have), it may have escaped my overworked brain cells.

I hope this helps. Feel free to ask more questions. We're all trying to figure out what's happening

Dave

I am out of likes so let me just say great post!

As to specifics, I think a great deal of it comes down to the fact that being able to space those strong points at least five or ten times further apart increases the amount of artillery it takes takes to suppress them by more than a reasonable logistics train cam move, at least for old style area fires, which seems to be the only kind the Russians have in any quantity. It would make them more vulnerable assault by infantry, but the Russians don't seem to have any. Thoughts?

 

[Armorgunner]

20 minutes ago, akd said:

Not sure if this is an elaborate fake…

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=5195940497095131&set=pcb.5195940560428458&type=3&theater

probably fake? The turrets usaualy  is located, way of the tanks. Not on them 

[Ultradave]

12 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I am out of likes so let me just say great post!

As to specifics, I think a great deal of it comes down to the fact that being able to space those strong points at least five or ten times further apart increases the amount of artillery it takes takes to suppress them by more than a reasonable logistics train cam move, at least for old style area fires, which seems to be the only kind the Russians have in any quantity. It would make them more vulnerable assault by infantry, but the Russians don't seem to have any. Thoughts?

 

Thoughts? Yes. (and thanks for the compliment - I'm out of likes as well or I would have liked your like ) As everyone liked to answer questions in the Army, it "depends on the situation".  In theory, today's ATGMs are longer range, more accurate, and more importantly, more accurate AT longer ranges, than those of the Cold War, where this AAAD concept arose. But my thoughts are that terrain will be more important. You need strongpoints that have at least some cover and concealment, and good fields of fire. That will probably make more difference in how to deploy.

Yes, dismounted infantry supported by their IFVs under cover of heavy artillery, is the way to clear the AT positions, keeping the tanks back until it's [more] safe for them to advance. If you can bring enough artillery to bear, then the ATGMs have to keep their heads down. Has to be pretty much continuous, and until your own infantry is pretty much on top of the defensive positions (danger close but in the offense). Russia so far has shown pretty much NO capability to properly employ infantry in support of tanks to protect them from light infantry AT attack. The reasons for this have been covered pretty well, I think (combination of inability to learn and shortages of bodies in TOE). 

Is that what you had in mind?

Dave

Edited May 13, 2022 by Ultradave

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, CivE said:

Thanks for this, and to several other people who responded as well. I'm trying to follow along with the ongoing discussion by @The_Capt, @Battlefront.com and others about the lessons to be learned from the first part of this war (and trying to keep in mind that the value of those lessons for us as spectators is not worth the price that Ukrainians are paying). "Mass" has been a key concept in this, and I think I'm correct in understanding that to be the concentration of force in time and space, but I wasn't sure if the "weight" of the units was meant to be part of that. Now I know it isn't, except that AFVs give heavy mechanized infantry the firepower and mobility to create their own local mass, and the ability to get their mass to the right place at the right time as part of larger unit maneuvers.

I'm trying to understand what you all think is new or different about the role of light infantry in this war. I think you've been saying it, but some of the terminology is new to me, so thanks for your patience as I rewind and try to re-state some basic things in this long post. I don't think anybody is surprised that light infantry can eat away at heavier forces on strategic timeframes. And I don't think we've seen light infantry become immune to combined arms attacks on the tactical level. It looks like the difference is that improvements in some key technologies have passed a tipping point that dramatically increases the importance of dismounted infantry in the balance of combined arms operations.

The improvements in technology mean that capabilities in reconnaissance, communications, and accurate long range fire power can be pushed down to much smaller light infantry units. On the defense this allows infantry to focus long range fire power against concerted attacks while remaining dispersed and concealed. Direct armor attack remains possible, but at a steep exchange rate. Artillery attack or suppression is possible, but it takes a lot of tubes and a lot of shells to cover all the possible hiding places, and it's expensive in supplies if not losses. Ditto air attack. But bypassing well equipped light infantry is also dangerous because even after being suppressed or pushed back a little they can retain the capability to find and attack the enemy lines of communication, either independently, or in coordination with neighboring units or higher command. As someone here said, the attacker would basically need to clear and protect a 10km wide corridor along their supply line, which looks more like an occupation than a breakthrough, takes resources away from the advance, and slows everything way down.

Mechanized infantry can't play the front line defensive role because more of their capabilities are built into vehicles that can only maneuver well in terrain where they are easy to spot by satellite or drone, and hit with artillery or aircraft. Plus they need gas every day and if they are cut off they quickly run out of options. Lower tech or more cheaply equipped light infantry couldn't do this because they wouldn't have the quality or quantity of portable AT weapons, or enough situational awareness to make good decisions on a rapidly developing battlefield. Units without permission, training, inclination, or morale to take their own initiative can't do it either. Insurgents can't do it to such good effect because the occupying force isn't trying to fight a conventional battle at the same time. But Ukrainian foot infantry with phones, drones, mortars, and loads of AT weapons have shown they can take a beating on day one of an enemy attack, and still have the ability to re-organize, re-orient, and mount their own counter attacks or ambushes for days. Trying to bypass or cut off forces like these turns into a "I'm not locked in here with you, you're locked in here with me" situation. That has been a capability of elite units in the past, but it looks like the new technologies bring it in the reach of far more units with less training.

Looking at the bigger defensive picture, the light infantry don't have to be decisive, they just have to do their part as part of a larger defensive operation to add "friction" to whatever part of the enemy's advance is still within marching distance. Mechanized units move to block the head of the attack, armored units go for its throat, the infantry keep throwing kidney punches, and artillery, air, and strategic assets strike as far back along the tail as they can reach. Even accounting for Russian incompetence, I looks like one of the big surprises or lessons so far has been how important of a contribution light infantry make to that bigger picture. 

There has been less discussion here of the role of light infantry on the offense, except for the idea that while the enemy's long range recon and fires prevent your heavier forces from assembling in the rear, infantry can still infiltrate forward despite drone surveillance with some pretty effective weapons. Maybe we will know more soon. There has been a lot more discussion about air power, autonomous systems, is this the end of the tank etc., but I think this is sort of where the consensus is at least for infantry in the defense. Am I getting it sort of right? What I am I missing? Am I using the words right?

 

This was a great summary of the 700 pages, well done sir!

[sburke]

52 minutes ago, akd said:

Should’ve stayed put:

 

That is gonna leave a mark....

[chrisl]

51 minutes ago, akd said:

Not sure if this is an elaborate fake…

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=5195940497095131&set=pcb.5195940560428458&type=3&theater

I wanna say it's shopped, but they did a pretty good job of it.  If you look at the the earliest pics we have with the blue (third) crossing site in place and partially sunk, on p733 of this thread, and more clearly in Steve's post, none of those tanks are there, and there's one set of tracks going into the water just to the right of the UKR side of the landing.  The shadows from the guns are suspiciously sharp compared to other shadows in the pic.  But there are tracks in the mud for every turret sticking up, and they look like they got the water level in the tracks to be consistent.

I think this twitter thread is from the post by @akd on p 733 and the third bridge is there, but most of the tracks aren't, nor the sunken tanks. 

Conceivably it's from another attempt at that bridge, but I don't know why they'd reverse all the tanks into the water like that intead of just getting blown up.

(edit just to note that I didn't realize that @akd posted both the original that I referred back to and the post I was quoting. doh!)

Edited May 13, 2022 by chrisl

[LukeFF]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yes, but Rand has a history of making sure he holds things up when the cameras are rolling.  That's his MO.  This was an important bill and for sure he had a chance to raise objections to it before it came to the floor, even if it meant delaying it getting to the floor.  So it's political theater masked as responsibility to score points.  It's also successful.  There's 99 other Senators, and yet we're here talking about just one of them.

Steve

Sure, but like @purpheart23 was pointing out, all I'd like to see is some oversight as well about where this money is going (as with any spending bill that comes up before Congress). It doesn't really matter to me in the long run if it was a conservative, liberal, or a senator of any other political stripe making the point. Politicians are going to be politicians and thus will always grandstand to one extent or the other, but it doesn't necessarily mean that the point they are making is a bad one.