How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[womble]

20 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

It seems clear that the West, Russia, probably every major nation did not regard Ukraine's ability to resist would be this good or Russian war making be this bad.

I wonder how the new "Public Secret Intelligence" paradigm fits in with this. I get the feeling that the NATO intelligence community might've had more than a little to do with the failure of the "5th column" in Ukraine, and it wouldn't surprise me much, given how comprehensively NATO and Ukraine together have won almost every information battle so far, to find out that many of the things "sent" in the first few days of the war were already in-country, but "embargoed" until things "got hot".

The initial attempt to pre-empt Russian aggression, by simply pointing out that "we" knew what they were up to did fail, but if the spooks were aware of the traitors and how their teeth were going to be pulled, and the military were as aware as some accounts suggest that the UA was a much-reformed outfit (and reinforced by the local defense units), it doesn't seem a stretch to think their assessment of Ukraine's chances might've been closer to reality-as-it-turned-out than we're giving them credit for. Is it possible that the intelligence community's accurate assessment of the execrable readiness state of the RA suggested to them that Putin was bluffing because "how could he not know he's got a paper tiger?"

[Commanderski]

1 hour ago, sburke said:

I'll put him in the tentative column.  @Haidukas Captain of first rank that is equivalent to Colonel, correct?

Captain 1st rank (Russian: Капитан 1-го ранга, romanized: Kapitan 1-go ranga, lit. 'Captain of the 1st rank') is a rank used by the Russian Navy and a number of former communist states. The rank is the most senior rank in the staff officers' career group. The rank is equivalent to colonel in armies and air forces. Within NATO forces, the rank is rated as OF-5 and is equivalent to captain in English-speaking navie

[MSBoxer]

55 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Another guy that should spend some time in this thread.  The suggestion at the end of this article is that we need to wrap our heads around the fact that Russia is willing to fight for Ukrainian territory for years.  What he needs to wrap his head around is that's not practical.  I think some of you might have seen me mentioning it a few times over the last 6 weeks.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraine-war-isnt-sprint

Steve

Gee Steve, not sure how I missed those 47 posts

[Kinophile]

Ref the ref of Sinai earlier - as described, accurately, on one level it was the superb Israeli infantry that solved the issue and won the fight. But this is just the surface effect. It was the Israeli ability, as Steve indicates above, to "retool" itself and adapt to the situation. Even deeper than that, it was the Israeli army's emphasis on small unit leadership that allowed that to happen at all. 

Russia has nowhere near this flexibility and mindset. If it runs into a sinai-esque situation it will do the only thing it can do - attack as it always has, without adaptation, and will suffer the results.

From the Gen. Hertling article it's clear the UA began winning this fight two decades ago, when it started focussing on its NCO Corp.  Russia did not, and here we are. 

We're all jabbering about drones and ATGMs but really, it's the UKR infantry (reg and TDF) that are the war-winning wonder weapon.

Like with tanks, drones can only affect the fight, not take ground or hold it. Same with AtGMs. At the end of the day you need competent, well-lead small groups of motivated and smart men to fight, operate the drones, use the Intel, site the ATGMs, hold and win.

G'wan the Crunchies!

Edited April 15, 2022 by Kinophile

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, sburke said:

I'll put him in the tentative column.  @Haidukas Captain of first rank that is equivalent to Colonel, correct?

Yes.

[FancyCat]

15 minutes ago, Huba said:

Did they? As I remember, the matter of DNR, LNR and Crimea was to be discussed separately during Istanbul talks, and they didn't ever get to it. I might be wrong though.

Ukraine offered to discuss this further with Russia, over a longer timetable independent of securing a ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian forces to the preinvasion lines.

ISW has released a update, looks like Moskva indeed was not equipped with missiles to attack land based targets. Still, the withdrawal of the rest of Russian warships from the area indicates their ability to fire at the southern front is degraded. ISW believes Russia will throw forces piecemeal and not wait for a grand offensive, so looks like the May 9th deadline is looking true.

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1514986517109907461?t=o_IFpPX1I5eQ4KRl_Xq6Lw&s=19

[The_Capt]

28 minutes ago, db_zero said:

My guess and its only a guess is if you look at a map of the natural gas reserves in Ukraine a wide sweeping movement would put a vast majority of those natural gas reserves under Russian control.

Another issue is water. Ukraine cut off the water supply to the Crimea and it caused crop failures and water rationing. Russia wants to control water flow so the Crimea has access to enough to meet its needs.

Neon for lasers used in microchip production. Last thing the West wants is Russia in control of a good portion of the global supply. Lithium is also a potential factor.

Behind every war there is usually a economic and resource issue behind the stated "noble" goals. It may not be completely rational from a military point of view to attempt a wide sweeping offensive, but it wouldn't be the first time a dictator insisted on military strategy based on resource reasons as opposed to sound military strategy.

 

Natural gas makes no sense, we already covered that.  Ukraine has a tiny fraction compared to what Russia already owns.  Water, Lithium and Neon, now that is a twist, maybe.  I am not sold on the "economic theory" of this war, or at least any I have heard, the cost/benefits do not add up.  I think this is about power overall, but I am not sure it is all about economic power.

[The_Capt]

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/04/15/ukraine-facial-recognition-warfare/  (paywall but someone else will pick it up).

So when we talk about old-school political warfare, this is what it starts to look like.

Edited April 15, 2022 by The_Capt

[Haiduk]

@sburke @Kinophile

Mayor Artyom Ogoltsov, 332nd Guard helicopter regiment (airfields Pushkin, Pribilovo, Leningrad oblast) of 6th AF and AD Army, Western militrary district. This regiment is armed with Mi-28N, Mi-35 and Mi-8AMTSh. Google search shows, during maneuvers Zapad-2021 he was a pilot of Mi-28N. Data of the death unknown

 

Edited April 15, 2022 by Haiduk

[Der Zeitgeist]

45°10’43.39″N, 30°55’30.54″E

 

[Maquisard manqué]

2 hours ago, sburke said:

Much as I really love bashing Russia, blaming them for most of the world's problems is a stretch. 

 

@kraze This. You’re right that were Russia a functioning democracy acting in the interests of its population, then a lot would be better in the world, not least everything mattering in Ukraine right now. But Russia is nowhere near important or powerful enough to be the cause of the hugely varied local and global forces driving international migration.

[sross112]

The talk of the upcoming offensives today is based on the concept of destroying a large number of UA in the Donbas. Our general synopsis is that without some sort of magic wand it is fairly impossible for the RA to do this. With an all out effort and a bunch of luck the RA might be able to pull off the breakthrough and encirclement but I'm pretty sure no one here thinks that they would have anything left to reduce the "trapped" troops. Like we talked about a couple weeks ago, if they did manage to make the kettle, who would truly be surrounded? The UA has a lot of combat power in there and it isn't likely to roll over and play dead. On top of that, this has been their AO for several years now so I would think that they would have lots of supplies stockpiled within that area and wouldn't run out of beans, bullets and Band-Aids as fast as and encircled pincer would. 

Basically we are gaming the same thing that the "experts" are gaming. Said experts haven't gained our confidence and trust so far so why are we following their lead? Yes it is the most obvious attack from a military stand point if your goal is to destroy the enemies military, but is that their goal? If we compare to the negotiations Putin has realized that his vaunted military might wasn't what they thought it was, the UA is a beast, the people are very troublesome to logistics and everyone on his side is running low on combat power and high tech munitions. The surviving generals have to know this too and such and operation is out of bounds by May 9th. Throw in some crappy weather on top of it and how could they realistically expect to achieve that goal? If they have rolled back their demands on the negotiations I would think that means they know what kind of pickle is coming for them if this isn't over fairly soon.

I said a couple weeks ago that I thought they would do whatever it takes to clear Mariupol, secure their land bridge and any gains in the L/DPR and then shoot for a ceasefire. Their problem right now is they don't have anything to bargain with. How do they get a bargaining chip that Zelensky will take seriously and the west will pressure for a cease fire? They need hostages. Where is a big bunch of hostages that they could take? Kharkov. 

It's been pointed out several times that the forces that withdrew from the Kyiv area haven't been moved south to form a stronger pincer from that region. The reinforcements coming in aren't predominantly going south. The units being rebuilt and reinforced haven't been moving south of Izium. So if this Donbas pincer movement is expected to take place, why isn't there a southern pincer? Especially considering for the past few weeks that has been deemed to be the weak point in the line. That is where the schwerpunkt should be coming from. Instead all the forces remain in the northern sector where the UA and the world expects the attack and is building up for it. Even if the Donbas encirclement worked the UA units in the kettle really don't work as hostages. Even if the RA managed to somehow reduce the entrapped UA units in the end the losses that they would sustain ends the ability of the RA to do anything else for a very long time. The "victory" would surely lead to defeat as they have nothing left to defend against a Ukraine that has added more resolve to crush them and continues to grow their military through western aid and training up reserves. No win this way.

So instead, encircle Kharkov. Everyone expects the attack to the Southeast, go Northwest. Shorten the encirclement distance considerably. Pocket only a couple brigades instead of a dozen that you have to deal with. Your combat power can be more focused out than in. Even if half the population of Kharkov and the surrounding area has left you probably still have a million civilians in the cauldron. Now you have an instant humanitarian crisis and a nice hostage to trade for some concessions at the negotiation table (Putin keeps L/DNR and land bridge, gives up Kherson and Kharkov). Since you are a soulless piece of dung you make your point by an intense 24 hour indiscriminate artillery barrage just to add some pressure to act quickly at the negotiation table.

Do I think this is possible? Probably not due to all the problems with the RA ops so far, but they'd have a much better chance at this than a Donbas encirclement. It also works with who they are, what they are willing to do and what we've seen with their troop locations/movements so far. It's really the only way I see for them to get any leverage for negotiations.

Thoughts?

[acrashb]

25 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So when we talk about old-school political warfare, this is what it starts to look like.

From the article, "The Ukrainians champion the use of face-scanning software from the U.S. tech firm Clearview AI as a brutal but effective way to stir up dissent inside Russia, discourage other fighters and hasten an end to a devastating war."

Given the atrocities proven and suspected in the Russian-held area and the attacks on non-military targets like refugee-laden train stations and hospitals, the Washington Post needs to re-calibrate what it calls "brutal".  

I'm not a fan of Clearview for regular law enforcement, but am a fan of how it is being used right now in Ukraine.  I think the primary effect will be to further erode trust in Russian officialdom in the eyes of their people, which can only help.  And it's an example of Ukrainian adaptability, or "forced innovation".

[BeondTheGrave]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I am not sure why mainstream military analysis is still thinking in terms of big sweeping muscle movements for Russia at this point.  They tried that in the first phase of the war and failed.  We have discussed how "more troops" does not translate into "more combat power" extensively.  But I am still seeing talking heads discussing Russian offensives in pretty expansive terms.

Ive said it before, youve agreed (I think?) and so its old ground, but I'll just say it again. Maybe this time the people on the TV will hear me. 

The west has never broken out of its WWII mentality. WWII (adding in of course a conventional WWIII ca 1989 or Desert Storm) is how we are told war should look. Big sweeping troop movements, hundreds of thousands on the march, big lines dashing across maps sweeping all in front of it. In 1945 it made a lot of sense. Even in the death throes of the Nazi empire this is basically how the war played out. In winter 1944 the Germans attacked a weak point in the allied line, swept all before them, right up until they were stopped first by the herringbone at Bastogne and second by US&UK troops in Belgium. Then it was the Americans turn to do the same. Ditto for Desert Storm. This is the 'normative war' in the western brain. And of course how did it end? Germany surrendered in a tent, signing a piece of paper saying they give up, while the remains of their armies were rooted out of bombed out cities. And in Japan, a US battleship sailed into the port at the enemy capital to receive the surrender, complete with band and photographers. 

We learned a couple times since then that war isn't as much like that as we think it is, but in each case it shows up like an aberration, a scar. Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, these were not fun wars for the US. Not popular or easily understandable. Its easy to describe the tactics of the war, but to chart its progression on a map? I havn't even seen professional historians try to write operationally on either one. These wars, IMO, have always been treated like exceptions to the norm. The war we dont want to fight. The war we were tricked into, not just politically but militarily by an enemy too cowardly to just stand up and fight a pitched armored battle (except of course Vietnam had those and we in the US just conveniently forget that fact). The reporting on these wars helps to reinforce the idea that the 'Peer-to-peer' great power war is still more like the mid-20th century than the 21st.

What were seeing in Ukraine though is that war has changed since 1945, asymmetry isn't the 'dirty trick' of the man in the black pajamas. Its the ideal endstate of a decentralized, networked, and fluid form of warfare. I have a very low opinion of the kind of "analysts" and "historians" you see popping up on TV and hocking their right-to-best-seller books. Perhaps you all have gotten that sense from me before. But I genuinely think that the people in this thread have a much better head, and more importantly a much more open an honest manner, than those you see on TV. Someone like Max Boot, and his stupid ****ing hat, isn't writing honest history. Hes writing history to sell a very specific viewpoint to a very specific group of policymakers. If you really read into what hes writing, hes trying to become THE COUNTERINSURGENCY GUY. He has his magic tonic (will also regrow your hair, he totally just wears that hat to look cool) and hes thinks its perfect for you. We had that Fox News Col from a few hundred pages ago, that guy is just doing the same thing. The talking heads get booked because they say what the networks and papers want them to, they either will say the line or, if youre a lucky booker, actually believe it to be true. Then a million people watch that show, or read that article, and say 'hey this guy is onto something, and dont you know he has a cool hat!' So of course when it comes to something like this, their off the shelf solutions are unworkable. Because they dont understand the problem, or are even honest about what they do and do not know.  

WWII is great, because, we won! Unless youre Max Boot in which case 1960-1964 is your paradigm because we could have won if people had just bought the tonic hes now repackaged. But now we see something outside of that mold, which defies easy classification. If you were looking at the direction war has been going in the last few years you see things you recognize. Hell I wont call myself the most forward looking person, but I still see a lot of the 1970s and 80s in all this too. But if youre stuck in the 1960s, or worse the 1940s all this is quite surprising. One of the best examples of this was Reddit, where in the runup to the crisis people were asking genuinely if the US was going to have to start drafting people again. That should say a lot about where the public's head is in regards to warfare. And the mass media, especially the mass news media, put it there. 

[Saberwander]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

On the other hand, Zelensky mentioned a few days ago that re-taking DNR and LNR would cost 40 000 lives (something along those lines anyway), and it is not it the plans at the moment. Might it be that the eventual fall of Mariupol will be the end of the war, with Russia retreating to pre-February lines and Ukraine accepting that as preferable to continuing the war? Lives would be saved (to a degree) but it seems like a rotten compromise.

1 hour ago, Huba said:

Did they? As I remember, the matter of DNR, LNR and Crimea was to be discussed separately during Istanbul talks, and they didn't ever get to it. I might be wrong though.

I don't think Ukraine would accept such a peace. It makes no sense for them. They have the western attention and help, they are doing well and Russia is under massive sanctions that will only make things worse for Putin at home. Accepting some kind of rotten peace would make their situation worse. The west would forget about them, with time sanctions would ease and Russia would be more ready next time around.

I think the offer Ukraine made was not one that Russia could accept. It required full pullout of all Russian troops from Ukraine (including DNR/LNR) and then in time a referendum whether they want to stay independent. That offer was obviously unacceptable to Russia and probably is to this day. 

25 minutes ago, sross112 said:

I said a couple weeks ago that I thought they would do whatever it takes to clear Mariupol, secure their land bridge and any gains in the L/DPR and then shoot for a ceasefire. Their problem right now is they don't have anything to bargain with. How do they get a bargaining chip that Zelensky will take seriously and the west will pressure for a cease fire? They need hostages. Where is a big bunch of hostages that they could take? Kharkov. 

Thoughts?

This is a good idea. I can throw in another city they could offer, Kherson. The city hasn't been destroyed, it's on the "opposite" side of a major river so giving it up in fact makes their "future" border easier to defend. 

However as always, I don't think Ukraine would accept this type of a deal. At least how it looks from my vantage point. It's always possible that Ukrainian military is extremely depleted and that they have to accept these kind of terms. 

[Battlefront.com]

54 minutes ago, womble said:

 Is it possible that the intelligence community's accurate assessment of the execrable readiness state of the RA suggested to them that Putin was bluffing because "how could he not know he's got a paper tiger?"

I am sure of this, at least for some.

Using myself as an example, even before we got near this war I was convinced that Ukraine could beat Russia.  Eventually, at least.  I did not expect the invasion phase to be so grossly incompetently prosecuted.  But skip that bit for now as not relevant to your point

As someone who has watched Putin closely for a long time, there was an undeniable consistency in how he pursued and didn't pursue whatever it was he was after.  This applied to both domestic and international goals.  The primary element of this consistency was his firm commitment to having viable options at any given decision point.  Putin has been described as ruthlessly pursuing his aims, and that's true, but he always showed a fairly strong degree of caution when it came to suffering consequences.  Therefore, he ensured there were options available to avoid them.

His ability to correctly determine when to push, how hard to push, and when to stop pushing has been nothing short of brilliant IMHO.  As someone who has studied autocrats for more than half of my life, I respected the Hell out of how good he was at playing this game and was often equally critical of how poorly his adversaries played it.

When sitting down and running down the pros/cons of a full on invasion of Ukraine, I was never able to come up with a scenario that offered him the sorts of options he's always had in previous confrontations.  Which led me to believe that Putin was not likely to go forward with a full invasion and that much of the public release of US intel was off the mark.  Because anything other than that seemed to indicate that Putin had either gone soft in the head or was vastly less prepared for what was to come than any other example in his time as the head of Russia.

As the intel became more specific and we got into January and then February I began to wonder if Putin was really going to make a massive miscalculation.  The week or so before the war started I started to be more convinced of it.  A few days before the war I was sure of it.  And yet, I still had difficulty believing Putin was about to screw up that badly.

Here is something I wrote to a friend on February 19th (4 days prior to the war starting) that gives you some insights to my thinking.  I am posting it in its entity and unedited except for one small bit of foul language:

Quote

I dunno… maybe we are reading Putin’s decision making wrong.

Putin stands out as an exception from other dictators because (so far) he’s recognized the limitations of his power and acts accordingly.  Usually dictators overestimate what they can get away with and that brings about their demise.  Most fail early, some can hang onto power for decades (like Putin) through a combination of pragmatism and ruthless.  But just because a dictator has managed to make it for quite a while doesn’t mean he won’t overstep at some point.

Maybe, just maybe, Putin is about to invade Ukraine despite all the logical reasons why he shouldn’t.  Reasons that maybe Putin of even 5 years ago would not have cast aside, but the Putin of today ignores/

This article speculates that maybe the Putin we all know and love, the one who is a pragmatic and murderous a**hole, has given way to the more usual type of dictator who overestimates his grip on things and takes something too far:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/18/world/europe/putin-russia-ukraine.html?searchResultPosition=24

"In Moscow, many analysts remain convinced that the Russian president is essentially rational, and that the risks of invading Ukraine would be so great that his huge troop buildup makes sense only as a very convincing bluff. But some also leave the door open to the idea that he has fundamentally changed amid the pandemic, a shift that may have left him more paranoid, more aggrieved and more reckless."

History certainly has quite a few people of influence who have gone down the WTF path for one reason or another.  We should not consider Putin to be immune to doing the same.

If he does go in, the next question I have is when will there be a serious coup attempt in Moscow and who might wind up replacing Putin?  I’m thinking the military is the most likely replacement as he’s effectively neutralized civilian rivals.

Steve

So, an Amateur Putin Watcher™ (that being me) was thinking this way, I have no doubts that the professionals were also wondering WTF was going on with Putin's decision making.

Steve

[Haiduk]

One more captured TOS-1A. Probably old video, but unseen before. "O" marking - NE axis

 

[acrashb]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

His ability to correctly determine when to push, how hard to push, and when to stop pushing has been nothing short of brilliant IMHO.  As someone who has studied autocrats for more than half of my life, I respected the Hell out of how good he was at playing this game and was often equally critical of how poorly his adversaries played it.

Agreed, which begs the question of what is different this time?  How did he go from playing chess back to checkers?

Things that have been mooted:

1) he's so ill that he's nuts (aka "is exhibiting poor judgement")

2) he's been so isolated during covid that he's nuts

3) he realizes, aligned with many assessments, that Russia is in decline and this is the last chance, odds or no odds.

4) he is getting old and has succumbed to Ozymandias' syndrome.

5) isolation, corruption, and all of the other autocratic factors left him with the incorrect facts resulting in the reasonable (although wrong) impression that it would be a cakewalk.

6) Ukrainian counter-espionage portrayed themselves as weak in order to keep their cards close to their chest (if so, it backfired if the goal was to prevent war, and I'll update an old adage: if you would have peace, be seen to be prepared for war).
7) other things.

I haven't seen a single convincing narrative as to why Russia went all-in, just dribs and drabs and mixtures of the above.  I thought they were bluffing - Lucy and the football again with the West in the role of Charlie Brown - to extract concessions, as has worked so well before and as fits the traditional Russian negotiation strategy.  

Perhaps the only way to know is to ask Putin directly if and when he is before the ICC.

 

[The Steppenwulf]

The discussion points raised around a hypothetical cease fire/peace settlement are forgetting that Russia's predominant demand for settlement is that Ukraine be a neutral nation without any security guarantee - the  counter demand of Ukraine for any such agreement.

If Russia is serious about any deal it will have to drop this demand and that would mean an acknowledgement of a strategic defeat for Russia and Putin. The overall aim of this conflict would be thwarted and Putin would be agreeing to it. This position is intractable presently and can only be settled if Putin is deposed or RA accepts defeat.  

[FancyCat]

51 minutes ago, sross112 said:

So instead, encircle Kharkov.

Sounds quite doable, but Ukrainian deployments to the East, isn't Kharkov a major point to oppose a Russian push from Izyum? Won't they just run into the same units that smashed the northern front and relocated? 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/04/15/ukraine-facial-recognition-warfare/  (paywall but someone else will pick it up).

So when we talk about old-school political warfare, this is what it starts to look like.

Sending the family a picture of the body, and a picture of the ID card does make the point rather thoroughly. The Russians can go home anytime. The only thing waiting for them in Ukraine is a zinc coffin, if there is enough left to bury, and the Russians bother to recover their dead.

51 minutes ago, Maquisard manqué said:

@kraze This. You’re right that were Russia a functioning democracy acting in the interests of its population, then a lot would be better in the world, not least everything mattering in Ukraine right now. But Russia is nowhere near important or powerful enough to be the cause of the hugely varied local and global forces driving international migration.

No but the Russians more or less systematically try to make every single problem worse. From Le Pen, to Assad, to who knows how many African dictators, they pick the worst actor on a given stage and back them. Sometime they back them a lot, sometimes jus enough to keep them from sinking. But there goal is alway more chaos, more disruption of the rules based order, and hey if there is some money to be made in blood diamonds or whatever, that's cool too.

[womble]

11 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

So, an Amateur Putin Watcher™ (that being me) was thinking this way, I have no doubts that the professionals were also wondering WTF was going on with Putin's decision making.

I was trying to make a point somewhat tangential to Putin's evolving personal calculus of risk, namely: "Are we underestimating the accuracy and precision of the NATO appreciation of Ukraine's likely durability in the face of Russian attack?" 

Some of what we're seeing wrt RA readiness kinda doesn't come as a surprise, "with hindsight", but is it wishful thinking to imagine that the professionals who spend their working lives examining and analysing the Russian threat, using sources of information none of us have access to, would have seen enough signs to put together a prediction that BTGs wouldn't work, that formations would be dislocated and understrength, that equipment wouldn't function as designed due to shoddy maintenance, that Ukrainian political resistance would be staunch (because the potential hostile actors within the political establishment had been neutralised) and that RA logistics would be... inadequate?

Maybe it's not a question that can be answered until memoirs come out and papers get declassified, but perhaps those with more experience of what intelligence organisations can do are able to shed some light?

[Haiduk]

Russian say we are "fascists", ok - then here our MG42... ok... M53 or MG3

Edited April 15, 2022 by Haiduk

[Huba]

7 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Sending the family a picture of the body, and a picture of the ID card does make the point rather thoroughly. The Russians can go home anytime. The only thing waiting for them in Ukraine is a zinc coffin, if there is enough left to bury, and the Russians bother to recover their dead.

No but the Russians more or less systematically try to make every single problem worse. From Le Pen, to Assad, to who knows how many African dictators, they pick the worst actor on a given stage and back them. Sometime they back them a lot, sometimes jus enough to keep them from sinking. But there goal is alway more chaos, more disruption of the rules based order, and hey if there is some money to be made in blood diamonds or whatever, that's cool too.

Their whole international policy, hell even their identity seems to be based on opposing "The West" at this point, without any moral quandaries. It is understandable if you look at them like at Germany in the interwar period. Not that their making themselves any good by taking such position.

[womble]

5 minutes ago, acrashb said:

I haven't seen a single convincing narrative as to why Russia went all-in, just dribs and drabs and mixtures of the above

Most convincing for me is the argument that "Russia" (at some level) was convinced that their 5th column would prevail, the centre wouldn't hold and all the (or at least enough) military districts would be neutralised by similar actions to what happened around Kherson.

Whether this didn't happen because of NATO/UKR intelligence successes, or GRU peculation/failure/overreporting-of-success, or because the RUS assesments were based on sheer self-delusion I don't have the foggiest  But it seems to me that Putin and anyone who could persuade him to take a different path were convinced that Ukraine was a house of cards that needed only a firm push to topple.