How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Der Zeitgeist]

18 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Yes but is it for this thread? We keep getting distracted by other topics which, while fascinating in themselves, are not really about military developments in the war.

Just to clarify: With my post about the Bucha satellite imagery, I didn't mean to start an entire discussion about various Russian disinformation efforts. I just came across this yesterday, found it easy to debunk, and thought it might prove helpful as a reference for anyone getting into a discussion about this particular Russian narrative.

[billbindc]

 

What is the general reaction here to the idea that Russia has some sort of grand offensive planned in the east? Do they possess the logistics, the manpower and the morale for it? I keep reading Ukraine warning about it and hearing that US officials are worried. Thoughts? 

[BeondTheGrave]

Just now, billbindc said:

 

What is the general reaction here to the idea that Russia has some sort of grand offensive planned in the east? Do they possess the logistics, the manpower and the morale for it? I keep reading Ukraine warning about it and hearing that US officials are worried. Thoughts? 

Russia seems pretty clear that it wants the war over by the beginning of next month, and wants to cement its gains in the DR/LR region and along the Kherson-Mariupol axis. As long as Mariupol holds out its a herringbone in the landbridge, and really AFAIK there havn't been many gains to speak of in the DR/LR region. The UA situation in both areas is, however, quite precarious. Mariupol may be heading towards falling, I dont think many expected it to hold out even this long. While some UA forces in the DR/LR seem in danger of a conventional encirclement. All this taken together suggests to me that Putin has a strategic drive for a second offensive, as well as an operational opportunity. Moreover Russia has been routing troops from north, through Belarus, to the south. These will almost certainly be in poor condition, but could make for an ugly numbers situation, especially if you think that UA is more exhausted than is being reported in the media. This would, by a conventional estimate, lead me to conclude that Russia is poised to at least make modest gains in the east and accomplish its new, more limited, objectives. Many of which it already holds. 

Of course thats by a conservative, bearish, and conventional reasoning. The UA is almost certainly in much better shape than the Russians, even it wasn't it has basically infinite supplies and manpower given the nature of the war. Second, one assumes that a conventional encirclement would matter for those UA troops. It seems like Russia has done a pisspoor job of holding down territory that they cant bring under the direct fire of their rifles and tanks. I would imagine any encirclement would be so leaky as to be more of a danger to the attacker than the defender. And third we assume that Russia can bring a number of troops to the line that are truly decisive. As Steve, Capt, and I have discussed previously I suspect that Russia may need to move above a 6:1 combat ratio, roughly, before its numbers really begin to matter. I dont see them operationally being able to do that, especially as Ukraine brings in more and more trained volunteers, with more and more western hardware. I would imagine any man they can is being shipped east right now. And without an overwhelming advantage, I dont see how Russia can achieve tactical superiority, especially with beaten and depleted units. 

So IMO there will probably be another offensive in the east. If I were a betting man I would put money on Russia not conquering another major city, and also that UA counterattacks will continue to snap up more territory. But of course Ukraine and NATO have to worry. They have to prepare for the worst case eventuality even though things may look more upbeat. Surely the situation in the Ukraine Army is far more dire than any of us here realize. Theyve been fighting high intensity warfare for over a month now and their casualties are surely mounting. They will need a constant influx of every military supply the west has to stay in action as local supplies are used up. 

[Bulletpoint]

54 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Yes but is it for this thread? We keep getting distracted by other topics which, while fascinating in themselves, are not really about military developments in the war.

My apologies in advance (I've lived in Canada for too long, pre-emptive self shaking is ingrained!) as I don't want to come across as a dogmatic Thread Guard.

No offense taken, +1.

54 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I'm personally more curious about Kherson and the developing decisive battle in the East

Yes, let's focus on this.

My prediction is that the Russians won't be able to break through there either, but that the Russian Army won't collapse as has been predicted. So I'm thinking it will turn into a stalemate with trenches and shelling and misery (as I think it's generally been for the last couple of years but on a bigger scale).

Whether you believe tanks are now obsolete or not, I think we can agree that they have not proven themselves to be the breakthrough weapons they were designed to be, at least not in this war. I don't see that changing any time soon.

Edited April 7, 2022 by Bulletpoint

[riptides]

I thought that city to be on the verge of surrender?

 

[Kinophile]

Right up the hooter of both tanks. Very satisfying. And again, unsupported tank platoon. No mech inf nearby. No rear security.  Both turrets point the same way, so identical mindset/orientation. Not even covering each other's flanks.

 

Edited April 7, 2022 by Kinophile

[The_Capt]

16 hours ago, Hapless said:

RE: Drones

One of the issues with giving everyone a drone is that you get a kind of information overload/ information bog where soldiers have to (or feel like they have to) process all feeds of information before they make a decision or make a move (after all, self-preservation is a thing). A bit like turning the OO dial up to eleven and never DA-ing.

Case in point: the British Army has done some testing adding, amongst other things, GoPros to the end of Challenger main gun barrels- the cameras are mounted to point left and right so that a tank can roll up to a corner, edge the barrel out of cover and be able to get a good look without exposure. Sounds good until the tank crews (reputedly) lost all speed and momentum, stopping at every opportunity to look around corners with their new toy.

Now, if you can create a universal feed where the data from all your drones is synthethised in a cloud and then disseminated to all participants in near real time, via a Blue Force Tracker type thing (Red Force Tracker?) or some kind of augemented reality feed, thereby cutting the processing out and simply overlaying the info over soldier's basic tasks... then you'd be cooking.

(As a side note- giving that laser warning recievers are a thing I wonder why no one has decided to put a tank's laser rangefinder on a drone and do all the lasing from a different angle?)
 

So I am very interested in UA information management.  First of all they have demonstrated information superiority over the Russians almost at every level, which I suspect has been a decisive factor in the war so far and leads to more questions than answers:

- How did they do it?  Based on the level of open source information out there Ukrainian defence looks like it has adopted a "whole of nation" approach to the collection and dissemination of information along with total mobilization of military effort.  From what I can tell this democratization of intelligence has worked and allowed the UA and defenders get ahead (and around) Russian advances before they could gain momentum.  How is that collection happening?  Is it entirely over the internet?  Hotspots?  Are they employing those Startlinks?

- How did they manage information overload?  In the west data overload is a big issue.  As @Hapless notes it can paralyze an OODA loop by over saturation leading to longer orientation times. The UA, on the surface, looks like it has gotten around this...how?  My guess (and it is a guess) is that by adopting a hybrid C2 approach they are relying a lot on self synchronization at a micro level.  Info sharing is not being collected into a giant cloud but is instead in a whole host of little clouds all over the battlefield.  Peer to peer tactical units and groups are sharing to synchronize themselves...a lot of the anecdotal stories shared by @Haiduk seem to point to this.  In western experience this akin to the action of the airborne forces in Normandy, they did not wait for centralized orders, they simply ad hoc re-grouped and "went out to make trouble".  So this is not new, but what is new is the level and resolution of that information.

- What does central information management look like in this war?  The Russian model in this is as important as the UA one because it failed gloriously.  I suspect the Russians have been relying on BTG level centralization of C4ISR and it has not worked.  First this is the Soviet legacy model.  Second, we saw it in 2014.  Problem with this centralized model is that it can either starve or overload, in the Russian case I suspect it starved.  In the UA case how are they handling information flow to the center?  It must be happening but who or how are they deciding what stays at the tactical level and what gets elevated to paint a clear operational level picture.  I can't help wonder if the UA is not getting "big data" support from the US and others, which is very interesting as a lot of those systems have not been tested in conventional warfare. The connection between self-synchronized tactical level and centralized operational level is another dimension of hybrid in this war and it hinges on what appears to be an emergent information management system.  I have no doubt it might look like chaos to the outside observer but it is working.

 

 

[Kinophile]

Some humour:

Darth Putin

@DarthPutinKGB

If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, denies it’s a duck, demands you prove it's a duck, accuses you of being a duck, says your dog is a duck, that your friend's cat is a duck & that all 3 'ducks' are Russophobic ducks paid to be crisis actors, it’s a Kremlin duck. 

[DesertFox]

All Info - S.3522 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 | Congress.gov | Library of Congress

 

 

[db_zero]

1 hour ago, billbindc said:

 

What is the general reaction here to the idea that Russia has some sort of grand offensive planned in the east? Do they possess the logistics, the manpower and the morale for it? I keep reading Ukraine warning about it and hearing that US officials are worried. Thoughts? 

There are vast natural gas fields in the area threatened. Russia already controls territory that’s 10 miles away from the vast natural gas fields according to reports I’ve seen.

There is also the fear that Russia could take control of the coasts and ports. That would be a catastrophe for Ukraine as it would then become a landlocked nation with no access to the sea.
 

If that takes place then Ukraine is ruined economically. Ukraine could keep the rest of the country but it would no longer be a viable one and would become dependent on the west for survival.
 

The request for heavy weapons especially offensively oriented heavy weapons like tanks is to allow Ukraine to counterattack and retake the economically valuable territory back from Russia.

Supporting Ukraine both militarily and economically could become a problem in the upcoming months. The Fed is going to start raising rates aggressively and reducing its balance sheets.

Inflation is raging and a recession is being discussed in economic circles. The ugly prospect of stagflation something many Americans have never experienced could be in the cards.

IMO: Putin may be trying to prolong this war if things don’t go his way. The economic pain may cause fractures in the West and he knows midterms is taking place in November and the party hostile to the current one is slated to win big and has pro-Russia elements. A Presidential election is coming up in 2 years and he may get an admission more sympathetic to Russia in office.

Putin has gone all in. I’m of the opinion he’s gone all in and put all his chips on the table and it’s ride or die time. He is determined to revive the Russian Empire and take control of all the historical gaps in geography that threatens Russia. He doesn’t care about wealth, the economy or anything else. It’s now or never the demographic trends in Russia dictates that it’s now or never.

Edited April 7, 2022 by db_zero

[db_zero]

Good report on Ukraine mastery of information warfare:

 

[Kinophile]

@The_Capt ref 1812...I'm curious where you see the parallels specifically. Is it in the belated American response to the realities of fighting the British, but where their response (while late) became the correct one?

And in contrast the Russians are in a similar position but are making no signs of developing the correct response? That is, they are still bring the same bent hammer to the deep buried nail (Or some other such crappy metaphor  )And is their ingrained doctrine preventing them from even being able to develop the correct response in the short time frame required?

I'm personally comparing this war to the Russo-Japanese war, although more from geo/internal political POV rather than a strictly military doctrine comparison.

[Kinophile]

Dammit, Steve!!

I can't labour under this cruel and specious tyranny of the limited likes any longer!

ALL POWER TO THE LIKERS!

[c3k]

Russian offense: Yes, one is in the works. Izyum as the northern "breakthrough" sector for the pincer from the north.

From the south? Well...they're not doing as well. But, they will try something. The goal will be to endanger the large Ukrainian salient in the east.

The result: a long front, dug in, with a stalemate.

This will allow Putin to declare victory. He'll have gained territory, "protected" the enclaves of Luhansk and Donetsk (solidified Crimea); he'll lay claim to the resources in that region.

If Ukraine/West want him to cede the territory, they'll have to offer something up...like easing the sanctions, etc. (No NATO in Ukraine, etc.)

Then, he'll "compromise" and pull back to a location still beyond where the post-2014 frontline was. (I say "frontline" NOT "border" because that was an illegal occupation/invasion by Russia in 2014).

 

The counter? Ukraine has to decisively smash any Russian offensive AND gain back much (all?) of the territory it lost since February 24th. The first part is within their capabilities (as long as supplies continue getting to their forces, like ATGMs.)

The second part, regaining their territory will be much harder and longer to do.

 

My prediction:

I see the Russian offense being stalled/smashed. Putin digs in, makes his declarations. The West (hopefully) stays firm in the sanctions and starts prosecuting the warcrimes and atrocities committed by Putin's forces. Meanwhile, Ukraine uses a nibble and take strategy to slowly win back its territory, a small parcel at a time. The combat will continue for about 2 years, most of it being akin to WWI trench raids.

 

My hope:

Russian offensive is a bloody failure. Ukrainian forces route them. There is widespread morale collapse. Ukraine is able to leverage its reserve manpower and resources from the West and, using well-placed mini-offensives, retake all its territory, up to and including the pre-2014 Ukrainian border. 

 

[The_Capt]

12 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Great points here.

@The_Capt is probably busy in his day job, but @Bil Hardenberger, any thoughts on this 'lack of scale' problem? where a depleted BTG or a company TG just doesn't have enough left to fulfil the concept, which I understand to be very roughly to be both the 'fingers' and the 'fist:

No doubt about it, something is happening to Russian mass.  We do not know if it is the Russians getting in their own way or as a result of UA actions, maybe a combination of both.  The standard belief is that the Battle Group, Battalion Task Force or BTG are supposed to the smallest tactically self-sufficient blocks of conventional mass.  They are baked into a Bde-like structure and are designed to be able to run and burn for days, pointed at operational objectives. 

Combat Teams/Coy TGs are supposed to operate within that Battalion construct.  It is very rare to see one operate independently (e.g. Bridge Demolition Guard).  Since very early on in this war, we saw reports of Russians seemingly unable to fight a BTG as designed...why?  It is too easy to say "well the Russians suck", so I immediately distrust it.  The Russians have not set a high water mark of military campaigning, that much is true but how much is their fault and how much was inflicted on them by the UA?  More importantly has the UA approach essentially broken the Russian one?

I see a lot of debate on "the future of the tank?" with a lot of people in armored uniforms and tank books saying "no way" [aside: including JasonC, which does not surprise me at all as we rarely have agreed on anything].  I also see people leaning way too far, too fast with the "tank is dead...long live the infantry!!"  This is not the important question.  The important question is "what just happened to conventional warfare?"  Not just the tank, but all of it?  The entire system of mass, which looks a lot like the ones we use, just failed gloriously when by all metrics it should not have.

This odd de-aggregation of mass at the front end of Russian advances is just another symptom.  We saw Russian tanks going unsupported almost everywhere, while infantry also appear to be unsupported.  Unless the UA invented a "forget combined arms" magic ray gun, one has to wonder why this is happening.  I am not sure if it is friction caused by a combination of UAVs and long range smart ATGMs that may have insane Pk rates.  Or is it a result of information superiority leading to Russians having to adopt ad hoc tactical approaches?  Or is it a result of attrition of Russian frontline troops?

But one thing is certain, Russian mass is not working.  What happens next in the south appears to be building to a final showdown between traditional conventional mass and whatever the UA has come up with.  I suspect the Russians will double down on mass but try to build it up in a WW1 "one last push" thing.  It is going to meet the UA hybrid approach, which also includes UA conventional at certain points and spaces.  The Russian mass will be blunted, slowed and stalled complete with logistics/LOC strikes, but what we don't know is who will break first.  

Edited April 7, 2022 by The_Capt

[Saberwander]

Regarding the war - honestly I think Russia lost the war after a week. When their initial plan failed they were in a losing situation given constraints they are fighting with. These constraints are obvious problem with issuing large scale mobilization and extremely low morale of the troops which do not understand why are they fighting.

I was expecting to see massive mobilization on Ukrainian side. Given the amount of weapons coming in I expected to see 500 000 or more soldiers in the field. I understand that in this age you need much more than just a grunt with a gun but if you outnumber the enemy 3:1 or 5:1 you can do a lot of damage, even as a infantry unit with anti tank weapons.

I am not sure if Ukraine is mobilizing as much as I expected. 

I expect a slow slugging match for a while and then steady gains for Ukraine until Putin declares victory and leaves for prewar borders of LDR/DNR. Question is would Ukraine accept that and would DNR/LNR collapse if they lose active Russian support.


BTW is there an update on Kherson front?

Edited April 7, 2022 by Saberwander

[Commanderski]

9 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I can't labour under this cruel and specious tyranny of the limited likes any longer!

ALL POWER TO THE LIKERS!

I'd give you a like but I'm out too...

[Taranis]

5 minutes ago, Saberwander said:

Regarding the war - honestly I think Russia lost the war after a week. When their initial plan failed they were in a losing situation given constraints they are fighting with. These constraints are obvious problem with issuing large scale mobilization and extremely low morale of the troops which do not understand why are they fighting.

I was expecting to see massive mobilization on Ukrainian side. Given the amount of weapons coming in I expected to see 500 000 or more soldiers in the field. I understand that in this age you need much more than just a grunt with a gun but if you outnumber the enemy 3:1 or 5:1 you can do a lot of damage, even as a infantry unit with anti tank weapons.

I am not sure if Ukraine is mobilizing as much as I expected. 

I expect a slow slugging match for a while and then steady gains for Ukraine until Putin declares victory and leaves for prewar borders of LDR/DNR. Question is would Ukraine accept that and would DNR/LNR collapse if they lose active Russian support.


BTW is there an update on Kherson front?

The last one I have is :

Ukrainian army controlled Osokorivka village in Kherson region

 

[The_Capt]

9 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

@The_Capt ref 1812...I'm curious where you see the parallels specifically. Is it in the belated American response to the realities of fighting the British, but where their response (while late) became the correct one?

And in contrast the Russians are in a similar position but are making no signs of developing the correct response? That is, they are still bring the same bent hammer to the deep buried nail (Or some other such crappy metaphor  )And is their ingrained doctrine preventing them from even being able to develop the correct response in the short time frame required?

I'm personally comparing this war to the Russo-Japanese war, although more from geo/internal political POV rather than a strictly military doctrine comparison.

Hey Russo-Japanese also works, it is on my short list of "wars as stupid as this one".

In the North American 1812 conflict I see a a lot of parallels at the operational and strategic levels.  The American political level was also looking for a short, sharp war to grab British territory while the empire was distracted by that rascal Napoleon back in the Old World.  They made some assumptions that the Americans that were living in southern Ontario would quickly roll over and would even welcome them (forgetting the inconvenient fact they were the monarchy loyalists who left after 1776).  The American military also failed on operational pre-conditions such as logistics or information warfare.  We also see the same recruiting/conscript issues in that a lot of US soldiers signed on for fixed periods and simply left once those contracts were up which eroded American fighting power dramatically.

Then at the operational level, the US had the mass, by a significant margin; however, it was false-mass.  Poorly led, poorly trained and equipped, brittle terms of service and with ridiculously corrupt logistical systems.  This force attacked fellow Anglos to the North in a series of disasters like Chrysler's Farm in which British Regular units supported by locals and indigenous fought in a hybrid fashion to cut the US forces to pieces.  To the point that the invasion of Canada completely failed and fell apart.

Now whether the Ukrainians will invade Russia and burn the Kremlin before the ceasefire is still in question.   

[Kinophile]

Perhaps it is a hybrid* of the two - 1812 for the operational aspects, Russo-Japanese for the internal politics (Russian side).

 

 

_{^{*see what I did there? I'm so fricking smart sometimes, I email congratulations to myself.}}

[Haiduk]

50 minutes ago, riptides said:

I thought that city to be on the verge of surrender?

 

This is SW outskitrs of Mariupol. Probably BTR-4 hit with 30 mm canon

[db_zero]

Russia ruble rebounds and Russian energy exports increase. 
 

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/mocked-rubble-biden-russia-ruble-193615066.html

[A Canadian Cat]

15 hours ago, db_zero said:

I actually like to watch this as well China’s spectacle’s. If their combined arms execution was like their parades we’d be in trouble.

This years parade will be interesting to see. You often see many of the Russian troops taking part smiling as they march. I expect a much more somber experience this year.

While that is possible, I predict the parade will be a lot like last year. They still have all the prototype T14s and T15s because none of them have made it to front line units. Heck they probably have had time to make sure they actually can drive this year.

[Kinophile]

31 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

[...]We do not know if it is the Russians getting in their own way or as a result of UA actions, maybe a combination of both.

[...] The Russians have not set a high water mark of military campaigning, that much is true but how much is their fault and how much was inflicted on them by the UA?  More importantly has the UA approach essentially broken the Russian one?

[...] Unless the UA invented a "forget combined arms" magic ray gun, one has to wonder why this is happening.  I am not sure if it is friction caused by a combination of UAVs and long range smart ATGMs that may have insane Pk rates.  Or is it a result of information superiority leading to Russians having to adopt ad hoc tactical approaches?  Or is it a result of attrition of Russian frontline troops?

[...] But one thing is certain, Russian mass is not working.  What happens next in the south appears to be building to a final showdown between traditional conventional mass and whatever the UA has come up with.  I suspect the Russians will double down on mass but try to build it up in a WW1 "one last push" thing.  It is going to meet the UA hybrid approach, which also includes UA conventional at certain points and spaces. 

So this begs the follow on question - what are the UA doing tactically, formation-wise, that is unbalancing the Russian BTG doctirne (on top of what RUS is doing to itself)?

[Haiduk]

5 minutes ago, db_zero said:

Russia ruble rebounds and Russian energy exports increase. 
 

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/mocked-rubble-biden-russia-ruble-193615066.html

Ruble robunds artiffically. Usual citizens can't buy USD officially. Only via black market - 210 RUB for 1 USD. Here is real exchange rate.