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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

There's a couple of ways to cause Russian forces a lot of angst, but taking Kherson is certainly a big one.  From a propaganda standpoint showing the people celebrating their REAL liberation will be quite something to get out there for people to see.

The base to Crimea isn't as short a you think when you consider the length of travel for supplies to get to the Crimea in the first place.  The majority of Russian military infrastructure is significantly north of there.  Sure, stockpiles were available there at one point, but it's probable the prewar supplies are long since gone.  Now stuff has to be trucked or put on rail from hundreds of KMs away to then probably mostly by boat to Crimea and then from there up to the front.

Plus, once Ukraine gets within artillery range of the choke point that adjoins Crimea to the mainland the forces north are screwed.

Steve

Right right right, of course!  I read an entire book on WW2 crimea (by forczyk) and shoulda thought of that.  That isthmus, you don't have to own it to cut it, great point.  Ya just gotta get close enough. 

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I was kinda hoping they could tell me what is happening to be honest.  From a human being standpoint every minute of this war has been a horror show.  From a professional military standpoint every minute of this was has been a fascinating horror show.  I say this with no small amount of guilt but I chose the red-handed path far too long ago to flinch away now. 

I subscribe entirely this sentiment of fascinating horror @The_Capt. I am not talking much about what I am watching and reading about to anyone else (other than in these forums and a few email exchanges) because it is just awful. My family and friends aren't up to absorb all of what is happening: my partner saw yesterday for the first time the footage from Mariupol maternity by those AP journalists that escaped and she was very upset for quite a while, when the narrator explained what was going on as the images of a pregnant woman whose pelvis was broken and carried a dead baby in her belly were coming up. I kept to myself that Vice News video about Kharkiv. I am worried that I am becoming insensitive.

Those videos depicting POW mistreatment are just awful, and probably depict a war crime. I say "probably" because I can't help wondering 1) why shooting them in the first place and 2) why record it on your phone. If politicians get busted because of stupid dick pics, or your neighbor gets their private porn posted on Facebook accidentally, I would have wanted to believe that people has become more educated about digital media spreading uncontrollably. Unless this was recording for bragging purposes, of course. 

In any case, a war crime is a war crime is a war crime ...

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I think we are all watching to see how the Ukrainian Doctrine works on the offense.  I am not sure how much is "slow" and how much is "deliberate" at this point.  I also suspect that there is a lot of collective learning and adaptation happening right now.  We saw hints of this in Mosul, as light/SF forces would push to contact and then "stonk" forces would come forward when the enemy was "Found and Fixed".

In the East (and the Southwest on the road to Krivoy Rog) we have seen quite decisive local counterattacks by the Ukrainian forces, ending up in the destruction of large combat units. I say "local" because they're very localised in terms of frontage (along one road).

The counterattacks against the Russian "horns" threatening Kyiv, especially on the western side of the city, do seem to be quite general, spanning a front of about 50 kms (I may be getting my scale slightly off, but not by much). It is very difficult terrain (urban, forests, many water obstacles), and from what I recall from the latest map with Ukrainian unit details from Jomini of the West, involving mostly Territorial Defence Forces (no need to post here sensitive data to tell me how wrong I am about the force composition, send me a private message!).

 

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In this war, I am thinking we might see more "Isolate, Find, Fix" then stonk.  The tempo and pace of that action will be a key indicator of where offensive action may be heading.  On the downside you still basically have hybrid forces for the most part, or at least until the UA figures the time is right for conventional mass; however, the Russians have taught all one thing, use conventional mass carefully.  So hybrid forces do not normally move with the speed and tempo of large conventional ones, it is one of the reasons we look down on them as a "poor mans force".

Correct me if I am wrong re: what are the ideas of the US Army about this, but to bring about an operationally significant result you have to 1) breakthrough and 2) cut off the LOC of the enemy (or some variation of the above). And this works like a Russian doll: step 1) actually breaks down into smaller scale breakthrough-envelopment engagements. Looks like a hybrid force is entirely capable to achieving the infiltration/breakthrough part at a local level. But if you want to force the Russian army to retreat, what you need to do is to breakthrough (with hybrid forces or traditional "massed fires") and then have a mobile force to maneuver and sit on the roads that bring supply from Belarus. Then you plan for defeating the more than likely counterstroke or breakout attempt.

Maybe the terrain is not good for deploying armour (thinking that you want that armor to run into the enemy depth and cut the line of communications), or maybe those assets are being employed elsewhere (Kherson, JFO are of operations). Or maybe the tactical breakthroughs are too fleeting to be exploited in time by mobile forces, if those are available.

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What hybrid forces do have, particularly in this war, is more freedom of movement.  That and a very high level of self-synchronicity which is a big plus for tempo as it becomes decentralized.  A guy named Antoine Bousquet wrote about "chaoplexic" warfare, a war on the seam between chaos and complexity, and hinted at a lot of what Ukrainian forces appear to be doing, whilst the Russian forces were more rigidly adhering to our old solution.  I think we can all agree how the defensive phase for Ukrainian forces went, I am going to be watching closely as the offensive phase occurs. But it is probably way too early to draw any solid conclusions.

Not too early to start formulating the questions @The_Capt. Will check out Bousquet's paper (available on JSTOR): https://www.jstor.org/stable/25144928

PS: To my colega @Fernando. Salas-Larrazabal book was first published in 1973, and there is only a second edition from 2006. Looking at the reviews of the 2nd edition, the publisher just reprinted verbatim the 1973 text. Salas-Larrazabal is an interesting character, who was motivated to bring about a "balanced" account of the performance of the Spanish Republic army during the Civil War. I say "balanced" within the contex of the late days of Franco's dictatorships. So when you say "the book dispels" many myths about the Spanish Civil War... I guess that was for someone of my dad's generation (born in 1946), not for someone of my generation, raised and educated under our current Democratic regime.

As for the question of how well has Salas-Larrazabal stood the test of time.... not quite well. One of his tenets - that the Spanish Republic was flooded with heaps of military equipment like Ukraine is now by NATO countries - has been proved false and based on the intelligence assessments of the National Army. Recent research - as I requested, from the last 20 years - such as this one (https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/38179/) does a very good job of tracking where was the Spanish Republic sourcing critical military equipment (surprise, surprise, via black market and smuggling!), the very expensive and highly publicised purchases in gold of tanks and aircraft from the Soviet Union notwithstanding. Miguel Campos has gone on to writing a book based on his Thesis

https://www.planetadelibros.com/libro-armas-para-la-republica/343864

I don't have the time to go over every other of the 6 or 7 thesis of Salas-Larrazabal introduction.

Going to the bottom of the specific details of the very early stages of the Spanish Civil War (we're in Month 1 of the Russian War of Aggression on Ukraine) is off-topic. Yet the topic is informative towards the discussion re: people's army/hybrid vs. conventional army, as it is the impact of sanctions and weapons embargoes. For instance, If the West had embargoed weapons as it did back in 1991 - ensuring the temporary military superiority of the Serbs over Slovenians, Croats and Bosniak - to Ukraine, I am pretty sure we would now be watching Yanukovych or some other convenient cat's paw sitting in the Presidential Palace in Kyiv.

Edited by BletchleyGeek
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On 3/27/2022 at 3:15 AM, BletchleyGeek said:

I totally missed the drone on drone aerial combat. They had an unidentified uav flying over them and then a (rather friendly) German Sheperd comes to check on them...

@Lethaface

My apologies for the misunderstanding: When I wrote "drone vs. drone warfare," I was referring to the fact that the Ukrainians set out to target Russians with their drones, but ended up getting targeted by Russian drones. This was my first glimpse of what The_Capt has been describing as the naval-like ISR battle.

Re-posting with a new pitch: 'The hunter becomes the hunted: Drone warfare'

 

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2 hours ago, billbindc said:

Has there been an attempt at damaging the Kerch Bridge yet? 

Not that I'm aware of, though there was some video of SAMs streaking up from Crimea a couple of days ago.

It seems to me that Ukraine is continuing to play things safe as it did in 2014.  While it would be completely justified, and totally legal, for it to strike targets in Belarus and Crimea, there doesn't seem to be a lot of benefit in doing that right now.  The hurt Russia is putting on Ukraine is (mostly) coming from within its own borders, so why not concentrate on the easier stuff first?  Dealing with Russia's air bases is effectively out of Ukraine's reach anyway and it's just as easy to kill off logistics in Ukraine as it is external to it.

So why hold back on something like the Kerch Bridge?  Because destroying it gives Putin a propaganda victory for firing up Russians because it "proves" that Ukraine is a threat to Russia.  Yeah, yeah, yeah... never mind that Russia stole Crimea by force of arms and is now waging an illegal war of aggression... that's over most of their heads.  What matters to Putin is he said this "operation" was to protect Russia and a direct example of an attack on Russian soil (which, again, is inaccurate in the case of Crimea) reinforces that in the minds of probably many.

Nope, I think the best strategy is to get within range of the bottleneck and lay waste to it.  That is probably more realistic than taking out the Kerch Bridge and just as effective.

Steve

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5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Nope, I think the best strategy is to get within range of the bottleneck and lay waste to it.  That is probably more realistic than taking out the Kerch Bridge and just as effective.

Steve

Besides.  When they take back Crimea, they can put a toll booth on their end.

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47 minutes ago, akd said:

Little more clean-up:

 

Thanks for the update!

I know it is incredibly frustrating for us sitting here waiting for Ukraine to conduct an operationally significant counter attack, but these small attacks are smart because they minimize Ukraine's exposure to casualties while at the same time achieving meaningful gains.

As I've said since the very first day of this war, time is on Ukraine's side from a military standpoint.  Every day Russia gets notably weaker and less capable, Ukraine gets stronger militarily.  Sadly, time is not on the side of civilians and Ukraine's physical infrastructure.  Ukraine has to play the hand that was dealt to it by Putin, so every single ounce of death, destruction, and suffering is ultimately his responsibility.  Not that he cares.

Ukraine is doing this right.  I expect bigger things to come every couple of days.  The momentum is building on their side, diminishing on Russia's side.

Steve

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Just now, sburke said:

Besides.  When they take back Crimea, they can put a toll booth on their end.

"Passport please.  You are from Ukraine?  That will be $10, thank you and Glory to Ukraine!"

"Passport please.  Ah you are from Russia.  That will be $1,000,000 toll, and note that we don't accept Rubles but your Master Card will work here.  Well, provided your account isn't frozen."

Yup, life after this is going to be rather different for the previous occupiers.

Steve

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40 minutes ago, BletchleyGeek said:

I subscribe entirely this sentiment of fascinating horror @The_Capt. I am not talking much about what I am watching and reading about to anyone else (other than in these forums and a few email exchanges) because it is just awful. My family and friends aren't up to absorb all of what is happening: my partner saw yesterday for the first time the footage from Mariupol maternity by those AP journalists that escaped and she was very upset for quite a while, when the narrator explained what was going on as the images of a pregnant woman whose pelvis was broken and carried a dead baby in her belly were coming up. I kept to myself that Vice News video about Kharkiv. I am worried that I am becoming insensitive.

Those videos depicting POW mistreatment are just awful, and probably depict a war crime. I say "probably" because I can't help wondering 1) why shooting them in the first place and 2) why record it on your phone. If politicians get busted because of stupid dick pics, or your neighbor gets their private porn posted on Facebook accidentally, I would have wanted to believe that people has become more educated about digital media spreading uncontrollably. Unless this was recording for bragging purposes, of course. 

In any case, a war crime is a war crime is a war crime ...

In the East (and the Southwest on the road to Krivoy Rog) we have seen quite decisive local counterattacks by the Ukrainian forces, ending up in the destruction of large combat units. I say "local" because they're very localised in terms of frontage (along one road).

The counterattacks against the Russian "horns" threatening Kyiv, especially on the western side of the city, do seem to be quite general, spanning a front of about 50 kms (I may be getting my scale slightly off, but not by much). It is very difficult terrain (urban, forests, many water obstacles), and from what I recall from the latest map with Ukrainian unit details from Jomini of the West, involving mostly Territorial Defence Forces (no need to post here sensitive data to tell me how wrong I am about the force composition, send me a private message!).

 

Correct me if I am wrong re: what are the ideas of the US Army about this, but to bring about an operationally significant result you have to 1) breakthrough and 2) cut off the LOC of the enemy (or some variation of the above). And this works like a Russian doll: step 1) actually breaks down into smaller scale breakthrough-envelopment engagements. Looks like a hybrid force is entirely capable to achieving the infiltration/breakthrough part at a local level. But if you want to force the Russian army to retreat, what you need to do is to breakthrough (with hybrid forces or traditional "massed fires") and then have a mobile force to maneuver and sit on the roads that bring supply from Belarus. Then you plan for defeating the more than likely counterstroke or breakout attempt.

Maybe the terrain is not good for deploying armour (thinking that you want that armor to run into the enemy depth and cut the line of communications), or maybe those assets are being employed elsewhere (Kherson, JFO are of operations). Or maybe the tactical breakthroughs are too fleeting to be exploited in time by mobile forces, if those are available.

Not too early to start formulating the questions @The_Capt. Will check out Bousquet's paper (available on JSTOR): https://www.jstor.org/stable/25144928

PS: To my colega @Fernando. Salas-Larrazabal book was first published in 1973, and there is only a second edition from 2006. Looking at the reviews of the 2nd edition, the publisher just reprinted verbatim the 1973 text. Salas-Larrazabal is an interesting character, who was motivated to bring about a "balanced" account of the performance of the Spanish Republic army during the Civil War. I say "balanced" within the contex of the late days of Franco's dictatorships. So when you say "the book dispels" many myths about the Spanish Civil War... I guess that was for someone of my dad's generation (born in 1946), not for someone of my generation, raised and educated under our current Democratic regime.

As for the question of how well has Salas-Larrazabal stood the test of time.... not quite well. One of his tenets - that the Spanish Republic was flooded with heaps of military equipment like Ukraine is now by NATO countries - has been proved false and based on the intelligence assessments of the National Army. Recent research - as I requested, from the last 20 years - such as this one (https://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/38179/) does a very good job of tracking where was the Spanish Republic sourcing critical military equipment (surprise, surprise, via black market and smuggling!), the very expensive and highly publicised purchases in gold of tanks and aircraft from the Soviet Union notwithstanding. Miguel Campos has gone on to writing a book based on his Thesis

https://www.planetadelibros.com/libro-armas-para-la-republica/343864

I don't have the time to go over every other of the 6 or 7 thesis of Salas-Larrazabal introduction.

Going to the bottom of the specific details of the very early stages of the Spanish Civil War (we're in Month 1 of the Russian War of Aggression on Ukraine) is off-topic. Yet the topic is informative towards the discussion re: people's army/hybrid vs. conventional army, as it is the impact of sanctions and weapons embargoes. For instance, If the West had embargoed weapons as it did back in 1991 - ensuring the temporary military superiority of the Serbs over Slovenians, Croats and Bosniak - to Ukraine, I am pretty sure we would now be watching Yanukovych or some other convenient cat's paw sitting in the Presidential Palace in Kyiv.

Actually, successful Slovenian war for independence lasted only ten days with a total of 70 KIAs and 100 WIA and then Yugoslav National Army pulled out of Slovenia to Bosnia :( thus West's embargo was irrelevant. Before retreat there was a tank brigade of M-80's MBTs (upgraded Soviet T-72) stationed near capital Ljubljana, and they were considered dangerous because they could not be defeated by Slovenian Territorial Defense RPG-7s. Thus, new Slovenian government clandestinely procured German Armbrust https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armbrust  which could destroy M-80s. TD's Strela-7s were also successfully used to fight the Yugoslav Air Force. Regarding Croatia and Bosnia - they were indeed heavily embargoed.

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3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Not exactly.  It can be fired in a direct attack mode in that it doesn't rely upon the aiming system, but the missile still fires down.  It has no forward explosive capability as far as I know.

The distance between shooter and target matters a lot when you start talking about angle of attack issues.  Firing from a 2nd story window against a tank 400m away will probably work.  Firing from what looks to be a 3rd or even 4th story window against something that's directly below is an entirely different matter.

And if it was fired from the 2nd story, it's unlikely it had armed itself by the time it impacted.  As AKD pointed out it has a minimum range as do most missile systems.

Steve

Do we know for sure that the missile was an NLAW?

Assuming it was, then what Steve said about the NLAW shaped charge being angled downward is correct.  It's a rather unique construction.

Here's how NLAW works: it's designed to "overfly" the target, sense its presence (I think magnetically) and then detonate the shaped charge downward into the tank's thinly-armored roof, from about 1 meter above.

It stands to reason that aiming steeply down at a target below could cause problems with this sort of attack geometry, although interestingly the Saab website says, "You can fire down 45 degrees".

I wonder if the problem has more to do with range.

The NLAW's minimum range is reportedly 20 meters.  That's excellent for a (semi) guided missile, but in the video, the target tank is awfully close.  I wonder if it's even closer than 20 meters.  Maybe just 15m?  Couple that with the steep downward angle, and it might explain why the detonation didn't seem to work properly.  (It seemed to explode a bit too early).

Charles

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Michael Kofman on Politico

"[...]the Russian military probably only has a couple of weeks left in terms of combat effectiveness left inside Ukraine.

[...]Frankly, the same is true for Ukrainian forces. I can’t guess what their losses are, but they’re not in any better shape."

I dont by that. They cannot be in as bad shape (comparatively) as Russian.

My impression of Ukraine's status:

Morale: HIGH

Equipment: GOOD

Personnel: ABUNDANT

LOCs: SECURE

Ammo: OODLES of it.

Popular Support: ROCK SOLID

MEMES: Hilarious

Oh and they're seven Generals, several entire BTGs up on the RA. And a landing ship. And a bucketload of Helos.

 

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17 minutes ago, Battlefront said:

Do we know for sure that the missile was an NLAW?

Assuming it was, then what Steve said about the NLAW shaped charge being angled downward is correct.  It's a rather unique construction.

Here's how NLAW works: it's designed to "overfly" the target, sense its presence (I think magnetically) and then detonate the shaped charge downward into the tank's thinly-armored roof, from about 1 meter above.

It stands to reason that aiming steeply down at a target below could cause problems with this sort of attack geometry, although interestingly the Saab website says, "You can fire down 45 degrees".

I wonder if the problem has more to do with range.

The NLAW's minimum range is reportedly 20 meters.  That's excellent for a (semi) guided missile, but in the video, the target tank is awfully close.  I wonder if it's even closer than 20 meters.  Maybe just 15m?  Couple that with the steep downward angle, and it might explain why the detonation didn't seem to work properly.  (It seemed to explode a bit too early).

Charles

Whoa, Charles sighting.

Regardless of their advertising, that distance and angle for a top attack missile is going to be very tough on the fuse timing.

I'm certain that's over 20m, but I'm not sure it detonated at all.

It clearly didn't do much more than start a small fire from the remaining fuel.

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48 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Michael Kofman on Politico

"[...]the Russian military probably only has a couple of weeks left in terms of combat effectiveness left inside Ukraine.

[...]Frankly, the same is true for Ukrainian forces. I can’t guess what their losses are, but they’re not in any better shape."

I dont by that. They cannot be in as bad shape (comparatively) as Russian.

Yeah, I don't either.

There's more differences than you listed, but militarily the important one is that Ukraine has shown it can defend itself while outnumbered and out equipped.  Russia has shown the exact opposite.

What this means is that Ukraine would have to first fall to a level that is equivalent to Russia's current state AND Russia's current conditions would have to remain fairly stable.

Anybody really think that's likely?

Steve

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1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

Michael Kofman on Politico

"[...]the Russian military probably only has a couple of weeks left in terms of combat effectiveness left inside Ukraine.

[...]Frankly, the same is true for Ukrainian forces. I can’t guess what their losses are, but they’re not in any better shape."

I dont by that. They cannot be in as bad shape (comparatively) as Russian.

My impression of Ukraine's status:

Morale: HIGH

Equipment: GOOD

Personnel: ABUNDANT

LOCs: SECURE

Ammo: OODLES of it.

Popular Support: ROCK SOLID

MEMES: Hilarious

Oh and they're seven Generals, several entire BTGs up on the RA. And a landing ship. And a bucketload of Helos.

 

I think as @The_Capt has been pointing out, folks are making assumptions based on their own knowledge base and not allowing for the fact they have an inherent bias and therefore difficulty interpreting events.   

What is clear is that the Russian military doesn’t stand a good chance of achieving its initial political aims

That he allows ANY chance for Russia achieving its political aims is surprising.  That went out the window weeks ago.

We will either see a significant operational pause and some kind of ceasefire that will lead to a settlement, or that pause will introduce a rearming period where Russia will introduce a number of units that they’re bringing up to the border right now. They have more forces, they have more materiel. Their losses are significant, but their rate of attrition as a share of the force is likely not as bad as Ukraine’s. But we don’t know. What matters is less the losses and more the losses as an actual share of the country’s military capacity. So Ukraine may be doing well, but nonetheless they’re still losing significant amounts of materiel and equipment.

The idea of an "operational pause" has been discussed ad nauseum here.  In addition the question of military capacity is based on a false comparison.  The Russian Army as it was projected prior to the war and the expected behavior of the UKR Army based on his premise of how the war would be fought as well as it's size.  As it turns out what Russia brought to the battle is a significant portion of the useful forces it has while UKr forces are growing while it's resupply way outpaces Russia's. 

I would agree though the next two weeks are critical.  My expectation of how things will look in two weeks is significantly different.  I'll give him this.  That was written a week ago and doesn't reflect on the reverses Russia has had around Kiev and some of the info that has come out about Russia reserves.

Edited by sburke
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1 hour ago, CAZmaj said:

Actually, successful Slovenian war for independence lasted only ten days with a total of 70 KIAs and 100 WIA and then Yugoslav National Army pulled out of Slovenia to Bosnia :( thus West's embargo was irrelevant. Before retreat there was a tank brigade of M-80's MBTs (upgraded Soviet T-72) stationed near capital Ljubljana, and they were considered dangerous because they could not be defeated by Slovenian Territorial Defense RPG-7s. Thus, new Slovenian government clandestinely procured German Armbrust https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armbrust  which could destroy M-80s. TD's Strela-7s were also successfully used to fight the Yugoslav Air Force.

Thanks for the (very interesting) factoid. Any ideas where could I find more about the story of how the Slovenian government got those anti-tank weapons?

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