Does Soviet tactics work in Combat Mission?

[BeondTheGrave]

3 hours ago, sawomi said:

From 1960 till 1985 Cold War "gone hot" would have been nuclear right from the start. Warsaw Pact military strategic operational concepts in the Cold War went through four phases until 1991.

From "Fulda Gap: Battlefield of the Cold War Alliances":

Warsaw Pact Military doctrine as of May 1987 was defensive not only in intent but also in strategic operational implementation.

NATO planned to use tactical nuclear weapons when the frontline reached the Rootharr Mountains.

 

I would be pretty suspect of the timeline laid out here, it doesn't really correspond to the timelines laid out by either David Glantz in his books on Soviet operational theory or in FM 100-2-1. 

The four major periods of Soviet doctrinal change were 1945-1954(ish), 1954(/5/6)-late 1960s, 1970-mid1980s, and the late 80s quest for the holy doctrine, which we know never actually finished. To the astute reader, youll notice that those first two periods roughly correspond to whose in charge of the USSR at the time, and thats no accident. After victory in WWII Stalin felt that the Red Army needed no major changes, and the biggest change during the last years of Stalin's life was in the organization of the Tank Armies. After all, if THE BOSS said it was good, it was good. When he died, Khrushchev came to power with the backing of the army along with promises that they would have a freer hand in settling their internal, doctrinal, affairs. At this point you see a shift similar to what happened in the US army during the Pentatomic days. More focus on nukes, fighting dispersed without any front line, and creating formations that can do it all alone. Its my own personal opinion that had war come in the late 50s through to the end of the US involvement in Vietnam it would have gone nuclear almost immediately thanks to one side or another. But as early as the late-1960s the Russians realized that nuclear parody with the US would mean a sort of 'neutralization' of the nuclear option. Truly it would be for both, real, honest to god Mutually Assured Destruction. That meant that conventional war might be back on the menu. Moreover, in the era of the war for national liberation (that is the 60s) you cant sell Atomic warfare to places like Vietnam, Egypt, and Syria. You can sell conventional weapons backed by conventional doctrine. It may seem like an overblown concern but in the latter Brezhnev years prestige and influence in the third world became major pillars of Soviet foreign policy. This emphasis on winning the conventional battle evolved through the 1970s into the classic 'smash and grab' Operational Maneuver Group style of warfare, which was really just a return to WWII operations like @TheCaptainrightly pointed out. Importantly my reading of Soviet advisory efforts in the 3rd world, especially Egypt, suggests that the Soviets were seriously considering plans short of 'world domination.' Imagine how the 1973 October Crisis would have evolved if during negotiations the Red Army grabbed Hamburg then stopped. Having an army capable of the bite-and-hold would give the USSR its own hostage with which to leverage the west in a crisis. Again, in my own opinion had the war started in the 1970s the US probably would have lost in the short term and resorted to nukes in an all out situation. Part of that is doctrine, though Active Defense gets a bad rap IMO, and part of that was manpower which post-Vietnam was horrid. But within the timeframe of CMCW I think you see the US take its turn. In 1979 the USSR has major advantages. In 1982 the US does. And by 1985 IMO those advantages become overwhelming. AirLand battle and the PGM battle was a true seachange which totally demolished the Soviet way of warfare. By the latter 1980s the Soviets cant even really deny how far behind theyve fallen or how badly outclassed their tech is. Not only is it not as good as western tech, but the US has had several weapons generations to stockpile PGMs while the Soviets are basically starting from scratch. Its a fatal blow to the Red Army which it, and later the Russian Federation's army, only really began to recover from in the 2000s. And back to the nuclear question, after the 1960s return to the WWII style of mechanized shock and maneuver, there were plans to go with nukes and plans to go without it. The further into the late-Cold War we get the more likely the war would have started in a non-nuclear way. IMO with nuclear parity it would be pretty foolish for either side to have done a first strike. The moment of crisis for the Red Army would have come if and when its plan ran up against its first operational roadblock. FM100-2-1 suggests that all weapons were on the table if it meant keeping momentum. But as I read it it probably would have also been up to GSFG&above to make that final call. 

I think ironically, up to a certain point the more dominant NATO became tactically the more it increased the risk of nuclear war. I think in 1982-1985 the risk of a conventional WWIII going nuclear was at its highest since the 1950s. That really only changes as the Soviet system begins to falter, nobody is risking global thermonuclear annihilation in 1989 to save the decrepit USSR. 

Edited December 26, 2021 by BeondTheGrave

[sawomi]

47 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

I would be pretty suspect of the timeline laid out here, it doesn't really correspond to the timelines laid out by either David Glantz in his books on Soviet operational theory or in FM 100-2-1. 

The timeline I gave comes from Siegfried Lautsch. (Military Academy Moscow, Colonel NVA, Lieutenant Colonel Bundeswehr, Head of the Operative Department of the Military District V/5th Army of the NVA 1983-1987, Sub-Department Head for Training in the Ministry of National Defense of the GDR 1987-1990).

[Combatintman]

On 12/25/2021 at 12:32 PM, dbsapp said:

In Soviet training missions they show how to concentrate your forces and to use them en masse under heavy artillery support, you gather momentum and rush with all you have in one focused blow. 

In the campaign and many other single scenarios it simply doesn't work. To deploy this tactics means to lose your forces quickly and to do little or no damage to the opponent. The peculiar thing with the Soviet campaign is that it literally asks you to do the opposite things you had learnt from Soviet training missions. What is required from you in the first mission of Soviet campaign is to carefully scout enemy tanks and TOW vehicles and call pinpoint artillery strikes on them.

Cold War Red Army is described as heavily dependent on artillery assets and massive artillery support to pin down the enemy. But in CM world  artillery strikes on areas simply don't do anything to the vehicles, the only application they have is to bombard towns or infantry positions. At best areal artillery strikes can kill one or two lightly armored vehicles, which is far from being enough to suppress enemy defense. Many times I called pinpoint strikes on single M60 tank to find out 10 or 15 minutes later that bombardment didn't scratch the tank, it seats in full health in Moon landscape among craters with no trees around. 

In reality it should be completely destroyed or severally damaged. IRL photos from the tests:

 

 

That's one of the biggest drawbacks of CM engine and inconsistences of CMCW. In theory artillery plays major role in Soviet military planning, but in game practice it has little effect on the enemy. This virtually strips Soviet army of one of its most powerful forces. 

So does "Soviet tactics" work?

In my experience it does, but primary in Quick battles. To work it needs certain conditions. First of all, Soviet forces must have serious numerical advantage. In Quick battles this condition is met by assigning more points to the Red side than to the Blue. Second, the terrain conditions should be more or less equal. This is also true for the most of the Quick battle maps. Even artillery, which is relatively weakened under CM engine framewok, could be applied to block enemy infantry from reaching certain zones. 

But it definitely ineffective under conditions that differs from those of "equal" conditions of Quick battles.  

 

You won Rumpenheim Rumpus - I say yes if the scenario designer sets the scene correctly and ensures the assets are there ...

Is artillery perfect in CMCW, I can't say because I haven't delved into it in minute detail.  There are enough threads out there that suggest it could be improved and I know that at least one indirect fire issue with the title is being seriously investigated.

[Lethaface]

On 12/25/2021 at 1:32 PM, dbsapp said:

In Soviet training missions they show how to concentrate your forces and to use them en masse under heavy artillery support, you gather momentum and rush with all you have in one focused blow. 

In the campaign and many other single scenarios it simply doesn't work. To deploy this tactics means to lose your forces quickly and to do little or no damage to the opponent. The peculiar thing with the Soviet campaign is that it literally asks you to do the opposite things you had learnt from Soviet training missions. What is required from you in the first mission of Soviet campaign is to carefully scout enemy tanks and TOW vehicles and call pinpoint artillery strikes on them.

Cold War Red Army is described as heavily dependent on artillery assets and massive artillery support to pin down the enemy. But in CM world  artillery strikes on areas simply don't do anything to the vehicles, the only application they have is to bombard towns or infantry positions. At best areal artillery strikes can kill one or two lightly armored vehicles, which is far from being enough to suppress enemy defense. Many times I called pinpoint strikes on single M60 tank to find out 10 or 15 minutes later that bombardment didn't scratch the tank, it seats in full health in Moon landscape among craters with no trees around. 

Although I also think that certain applications of artillery against AFVs (especially in CMBS) seems underwhelming at times, imo Soviet tactics / doctrine does 'work' or have application in CM.

But imo Soviet doctrine / tactics aren't to brainlessly rush into the enemy objective command & conquer style. Imo would the war actually have played out according to CMCWs backstory, I don't think many Soviet commanders will try to push a MRR blindly into a route where the whole recon / forward security element (or both) have become smoldering wrecks.

In my experience in CMCW the USA forces shine when used as one would use a scalpel or similar precision tools, which can be neatly used to cut away the strongest enemy assets while bounding forward under overwatch. Scout, smoke, shoot & scoot, suppress, flank, etc.. (aka recon pull). Engage enemy at distance with TOWs etc, cut off their head than move in for the kill.

The Soviet forces work better with the 'sledgehammer' approach. Choose a place for a main effort (imo ideally after your recon/forward security got a feel for the composition of enemy defenses), bombard the crap out of any potential strongpoints / defenses threatening your main effort. Setup strong firesupport positions (ATGMs, AGL, etc), isolate the main effort / objective by smoking off other parts of the battle field. Than fully commit to the push, move boldly from fire position to fire position and keep shooting anything vaguely suspicious. Continue shooting for good measure. (aka more like a command push).

The sledgehammer approach does usually produce casualties faster. But that's a different issue than the question of whether it 'works' in CM imo. It certainly works better for USSR forces than trying to play them like they are US forces (at least for me).

Of course all battles are different but some things are universal, which don't care about doctrines. Don't rush all your tanks into the open if there's a bunch of potent ATGMs / enemy tanks in good positions waiting for your to do exactly that. Whether your playing USSR, USA, modern or WW2; it will remain true.

Maybe you can get away with it if it if your rolling with a bunch of M1A2SEP against AT-3 Malyutka's or T-55s. But than you're not getting results because of good tactics anyway. 

[Simcoe]

42 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

Although I also think that certain applications of artillery against AFVs (especially in CMBS) seems underwhelming at times, imo Soviet tactics / doctrine does 'work' or have application in CM.

But imo Soviet doctrine / tactics aren't to brainlessly rush into the enemy objective command & conquer style. Imo would the war actually have played out according to CMCWs backstory, I don't think many Soviet commanders will try to push a MRR blindly into a route where the whole recon / forward security element (or both) have become smoldering wrecks.

In my experience in CMCW the USA forces shine when used as one would use a scalpel or similar precision tools, which can be neatly used to cut away the strongest enemy assets while bounding forward under overwatch. Scout, smoke, shoot & scoot, suppress, flank, etc.. (aka recon pull). Engage enemy at distance with TOWs etc, cut off their head than move in for the kill.

The Soviet forces work better with the 'sledgehammer' approach. Choose a place for a main effort (imo ideally after your recon/forward security got a feel for the composition of enemy defenses), bombard the crap out of any potential strongpoints / defenses threatening your main effort. Setup strong firesupport positions (ATGMs, AGL, etc), isolate the main effort / objective by smoking off other parts of the battle field. Than fully commit to the push, move boldly from fire position to fire position and keep shooting anything vaguely suspicious. Continue shooting for good measure. (aka more like a command push).

The sledgehammer approach does usually produce casualties faster. But that's a different issue than the question of whether it 'works' in CM imo. It certainly works better for USSR forces than trying to play them like they are US forces (at least for me).

Of course all battles are different but some things are universal, which don't care about doctrines. Don't rush all your tanks into the open if there's a bunch of potent ATGMs / enemy tanks in good positions waiting for your to do exactly that. Whether your playing USSR, USA, modern or WW2; it will remain true.

Maybe you can get away with it if it if your rolling with a bunch of M1A2SEP against AT-3 Malyutka's or T-55s. But than you're not getting results because of good tactics anyway. 

I think  this hits the nail on the head. I don't think it's a matter of whether Soviet doctrine works 100% like the simulations but playing to the TO&E and letting the strategy flow from there.

US

• Tons of binoculars, forward observers at the platoon level.
• Less artillery, more air power
• Tanks (to me) have worse spotting at least until thermal imaging and have terrible hull down positions
• more organic infantry AT access
• APC's are useless besides transporting troops

The US wants to keep you at a distance, observed while you bombard them with air support. They want to use small, flexible, independent units to make their own space and take ground.

Soviet

• barely any binoculars, you get maybe one or two forward observers
• More artillery, less air
• Tanks have decent spotting, high speed, low silhouette
• Less organic AT access
• APC's can help support infantry

Soviets need their entire battalion to function to make one set piece attack after gaining as much intel as possible

 

Maybe certain aspects of Soviet doctrine doesn't work but it looks pretty close to me just with TOE.

 

[Halmbarte]

1 minute ago, Simcoe said:

I think  this hits the nail on the head. I don't think it's a matter of whether Soviet doctrine works 100% like the simulations but playing to the TO&E and letting the strategy flow from there.

US

• Tons of binoculars, forward observers at the platoon level.
• Less artillery, more air power
• Tanks (to me) have worse spotting at least until thermal imaging and have terrible hull down positions
• more organic infantry AT access
• APC's are useless besides transporting troops

The US wants to keep you at a distance, observed while you bombard them with air support. They want to use small, flexible, independent units to make their own space and take ground.

Soviet

• barely any binoculars, you get maybe one or two forward observers
• More artillery, less air
• Tanks have decent spotting, high speed, low silhouette
• Less organic AT access
• APC's can help support infantry

Soviets need their entire battalion to function to make one set piece attack after gaining as much intel as possible

 

Maybe certain aspects of Soviet doctrine doesn't work but it looks pretty close to me just with TOE.

 

Great summary and to build on that point about AT assets. 

Sov platoons have different AT assets than an American platoon, although in a lot of ways the RPG-7 is better than a 66mm LAW and you have more HEAT ammo than the US  has. BMPs bring their organic ATGMs and BTR companies have the frequently under rated AT-7 and they bring a lot of them.

The thing that is frequently missing is scale. The Sov should never be sending a infantry platoon off by themselves, devoid of long range AT weapons. If it's an important objective then send a company and support them adequately with FOs or other assets. 

H

 

[Lethaface]

25 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

I think  this hits the nail on the head. I don't think it's a matter of whether Soviet doctrine works 100% like the simulations but playing to the TO&E and letting the strategy flow from there.

US

• Tons of binoculars, forward observers at the platoon level.
• Less artillery, more air power
• Tanks (to me) have worse spotting at least until thermal imaging and have terrible hull down positions
• more organic infantry AT access
• APC's are useless besides transporting troops

The US wants to keep you at a distance, observed while you bombard them with air support. They want to use small, flexible, independent units to make their own space and take ground.

Soviet

• barely any binoculars, you get maybe one or two forward observers
• More artillery, less air
• Tanks have decent spotting, high speed, low silhouette
• Less organic AT access
• APC's can help support infantry

Soviets need their entire battalion to function to make one set piece attack after gaining as much intel as possible

 

Maybe certain aspects of Soviet doctrine doesn't work but it looks pretty close to me just with TOE.

 

 

Good points, although I do like the .50 on the M113 for infantry support. And in my experience spotting is a bit better for US tanks (even without Thermals), but unbuttoned there's probably not much difference between the non-thermal units.
Another thing is the c2 network, I think the US forces can send info through the chain faster, which also helps them on the point of flexibility. 

[MikeyD]

Before working on the Cold War title I worked on the CMRT Fire and Rubble module. So I got to first play with the late war Russian offensive doctrine of "We've got 4x more of everything and we're coming straight at you!" Or, as Stalin said, quantity has a quality all its own. The Seelow Heights bloodbath is often discussed but that had been preceded by the Vistula-Oder offensive where the Germans had been virtually steamrollered and Poland taken in a matter of weeks. Its interesting that the US zone of operations is in a part of West Germany least likely to be the focus of the main Soviet assault. The Fulda operation would probably be just to tie down the Americans while the main show takes place to the north. 

[Simcoe]

1 hour ago, Lethaface said:

 

Good points, although I do like the .50 on the M113 for infantry support. And in my experience spotting is a bit better for US tanks (even without Thermals), but unbuttoned there's probably not much difference between the non-thermal units.
Another thing is the c2 network, I think the US forces can send info through the chain faster, which also helps them on the point of flexibility. 

For the M113 I found the gunner was killed too easily.
 

In the NTC at least I found the Russians getting quicker spots but I'm about to start the US campaign and that opinion may change. 

Wholeheartedly agree on your last point. Look at the sheer number of radios in a US company combat team. Compare that too the Soviets who have a only a few radios in an entire battalion!(For infantry at least) I like how it emphasizes their difference in mechanized infantry tqctics.
 

The US wants to dismount and get the land under observation. Soviets don't want their infantey to dismount unless absolutely necessary. And they want their APC's to do the heavy lifting.

[Simcoe]

1 hour ago, MikeyD said:

Before working on the Cold War title I worked on the CMRT Fire and Rubble module. So I got to first play with the late war Russian offensive doctrine of "We've got 4x more of everything and we're coming straight at you!" Or, as Stalin said, quantity has a quality all its own. The Seelow Heights bloodbath is often discussed but that had been preceded by the Vistula-Oder offensive where the Germans had been virtually steamrollered and Poland taken in a matter of weeks. Its interesting that the US zone of operations is in a part of West Germany least likely to be the focus of the main Soviet assault. The Fulda operation would probably be just to tie down the Americans while the main show takes place to the north. 

Both are interesting points but I'm not sure what connects them. On your first point, I think playing the Russian campaigns for F&R > CW > BS is a great walk through of Russian doctrine. You can point a straight line from SMG wielding tank riders to BTR's to the current age.
 

On your second point. Would the German AO be the one to get the brunt of Soviet forces then? Or the British?

[Halmbarte]

19 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

For the M113 I found the gunner was killed too easily.
 

In the NTC at least I found the Russians getting quicker spots but I'm about to start the US campaign and that opinion may change. 

Wholeheartedly agree on your last point. Look at the sheer number of radios in a US company combat team. Compare that too the Soviets who have a only a few radios in an entire battalion!(For infantry at least) I like how it emphasizes their difference in mechanized infantry tqctics.
 

The US wants to dismount and get the land under observation. Soviets don't want their infantey to dismount unless absolutely necessary. And they want their APC's to do the heavy lifting.

The Sov APCs and IFVs are part of the squad and aren't intended to be separated. 

Although I still tend to dismount Sov troops before I expect to make contact and move the infantry forward with the tanks or at least in front of the BMP/BTRs. I really hate losing a whole squad and neither the BMP or BTR will keep out much more than a pointy stick. 

H

[Phantom Captain]

2 minutes ago, Halmbarte said:

The Sov APCs and IFVs are part of the squad and aren't intended to be separated. 

Although I still tend to dismount Sov troops before I expect to make contact and move the infantry forward with the tanks or at least in front of the BMP/BTRs. I really hate losing a whole squad and neither the BMP or BTR will keep out much more than a pointy stick. 

H

Haha!  But this is exactly what happens when you use them as the Soviets would.  I am learning to stop thinking in CM "casualty terms" and just grit my teeth and realize I am GOING to lose men.  Horribly.  It's pretty excruciating watching a whole squad (the screams!) brew up in a BMP and just shrugging my shoulders and continuing on.

[Simcoe]

1 hour ago, Phantom Captain said:

Haha!  But this is exactly what happens when you use them as the Soviets would.  I am learning to stop thinking in CM "casualty terms" and just grit my teeth and realize I am GOING to lose men.  Horribly.  It's pretty excruciating watching a whole squad (the screams!) brew up in a BMP and just shrugging my shoulders and continuing on.

In a world of man portable ATGM's there are zero ways to guarantee you won't take losses. You can monitor a tree line for hours but once that vehicle comes into view it's over. 

When losing a BMP. It's important to think about how useful the infantry are without the BMP. I've moved toward using the BMP as a tank first and APC second. Losing the infantry inside isn't super important.

[Phantom Captain]

18 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

In a world of man portable ATGM's there are zero ways to guarantee you won't take losses. You can monitor a tree line for hours but once that vehicle comes into view it's over. 

When losing a BMP. It's important to think about how useful the infantry are without the BMP. I've moved toward using the BMP as a tank first and APC second. Losing the infantry inside isn't super important.

#Truth

On your second point, I have very much adapted this way and learned this from CMBS.  Using the BMP-3M as an integrated part of a squad pays dividends and is so part of the Russian Army's strength in BS.  Soviet squads do have a nice bit of punch though both in the AT context and anti-personal.  That RPG-7 is a nice little equalizer for sure.  I am not a fan of losing either my IFVs or my infantry but, as stated, have come to terms with it way more as the Soviets!

[Halmbarte]

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

In a world of man portable ATGM's there are zero ways to guarantee you won't take losses. You can monitor a tree line for hours but once that vehicle comes into view it's over. 

When losing a BMP. It's important to think about how useful the infantry are without the BMP. I've moved toward using the BMP as a tank first and APC second. Losing the infantry inside isn't super important.

Right, you do what you need to to accomplish the mission. 

But given somewhat open terrain, I'll lead with tanks 1st then infantry. The tanks might be able to take a hit and still be mission capable but the BMP or BTRs will not. A burning APC with a dead squad inside isn't helping accomplish the mission. A burning APC with 9 pairs of eyeballs outside to see where that TOW or ATGM came from is still being useful. 

H

[George MC]

3 hours ago, Simcoe said:

In the NTC at least I found the Russians getting quicker spots but I'm about to start the US campaign and that opinion may change. 

 

Worth minding the 'Soviets' in the NTC cam[paign are all set to 'veteran' or 'crack'+ so hot on spotting. Regulars or below will be less so.

Given you've been through the NTC crucible you might be pleasantly surprised with 'normal' Soviet units

[Simcoe]

18 minutes ago, Halmbarte said:

Right, you do what you need to to accomplish the mission. 

But given somewhat open terrain, I'll lead with tanks 1st then infantry. The tanks might be able to take a hit and still be mission capable but the BMP or BTRs will not. A burning APC with a dead squad inside isn't helping accomplish the mission. A burning APC with 9 pairs of eyeballs outside to see where that TOW or ATGM came from is still being useful. 

H

Very true it's a bit more nuanced than my earlier statement. Let's say you are trying to take a hill with the US in the flank. You want to put your infantry on that hill but a BMP can provide over watch for your tanks as they move across open ground and they can maneuver(with support fires to cover them) onto that hill like a tank. Just saying you don't need to baby them as much as an M113.

[Simcoe]

10 minutes ago, George MC said:

Worth minding the 'Soviets' in the NTC cam[paign are all set to 'veteran' or 'crack'+ so hot on spotting. Regulars or below will be less so.

Given you've been through the NTC crucible you might be pleasantly surprised with 'normal' Soviet units

Very much looking forward to that. Those guys can hit a moving M-150 1,000 meters away. *shudders*

[Combatintman]

On 12/29/2021 at 5:40 PM, Simcoe said:

On your second point. Would the German AO be the one to get the brunt of Soviet forces then? Or the British?

The NORTHAG Centre of Gravity was said to be the Minden Gap and the crossing over the River Weser at Bad Oeynhausen which was pretty much on the 1 (GE) Corps and 1 (BR) Corps boundary.  Either of the two corps could have been on the wrong end of the GSFG/WGF main effort but I suspect the Germans would have got more of the good news from the Soviets than the Brits mainly because of where the 2nd operational echelon (20 GA) was located (NE of Berlin).

[DMS]

On 12/29/2021 at 8:59 PM, Halmbarte said:

Although I still tend to dismount Sov troops before I expect to make contact and move the infantry forward with the tanks or at least in front of the BMP/BTRs. I really hate losing a whole squad and neither the BMP or BTR will keep out much more than a pointy stick. 

This is right way. Mounted attack was conducted against weak enemy without strong AT defence. During usual attack against strong enemy infantry was moving behind tanks, BMPs stayed behind and moved by leaps from one position to another. (This is written in company/battalion manual 1982)

[Ryujin]

On 12/29/2021 at 12:04 PM, Phantom Captain said:

Haha!  But this is exactly what happens when you use them as the Soviets would.  I am learning to stop thinking in CM "casualty terms" and just grit my teeth and realize I am GOING to lose men.  Horribly.  It's pretty excruciating watching a whole squad (the screams!) brew up in a BMP and just shrugging my shoulders and continuing on.

When comparing how tactics work in CM, also worth noting that a lot of doctrine is done for command and control reasons, not necessarily disregard for casualties or theoretical best tactics. Command and control really isn't a factor in CM, you have prefect instant command of everyone and real time accurate information. You can dismount a radio-less squad and coordinate them with no problems, where as dismounting and spreading is going drastically reduce control for an actual soviet commander. Once you dismount and push out those infantry, trying to react or change orders is going to be a long, difficult process which is a big part of why soviets wouldn't want to dismount if they could avoid it.

[Erwin]

One issue re Soviet tactics is that in RL wouldn't the Soviets be maneuvering in larger formations than we usually see in CM scenarios?  eg:  In Battalion strength or more rather than company.  That would allow a lot more firepower to be focused on NATO positions to overcome them linearly.  And also a lot more casualties to be tolerated.

[Simcoe]

55 minutes ago, Erwin said:

One issue re Soviet tactics is that in RL wouldn't the Soviets be maneuvering in larger formations than we usually see in CM scenarios?  eg:  In Battalion strength or more rather than company.  That would allow a lot more firepower to be focused on NATO positions to overcome them linearly.  And also a lot more casualties to be tolerated.

In the campaign and most scenarios where you play the Soviets you have a full Battalion. You're right though about casualty tolerance

[IICptMillerII]

1 hour ago, Erwin said:

One issue re Soviet tactics is that in RL wouldn't the Soviets be maneuvering in larger formations than we usually see in CM scenarios?  eg:  In Battalion strength or more rather than company.  That would allow a lot more firepower to be focused on NATO positions to overcome them linearly.  And also a lot more casualties to be tolerated.

Every. Single. Soviet campaign mission is a battalion level action, and the final battle is a regimental action. And all of them are on large maps that accommodate the force size. Most of the US missions are battalion level as well. The training scenarios for the Soviets are all battalion level actions, and a good number of the independent scenarios are battalion and larger actions as well.
The record is so beyond broken at this point. Have you even played Cold War? Sheesh.

Edited January 2, 2022 by IICptMillerII

[SergeantSqook]

5 hours ago, Erwin said:

One issue re Soviet tactics is that in RL wouldn't the Soviets be maneuvering in larger formations than we usually see in CM scenarios?  eg:  In Battalion strength or more rather than company.  That would allow a lot more firepower to be focused on NATO positions to overcome them linearly.  And also a lot more casualties to be tolerated.

It's posts like this that really make me wonder if anyone on this forum actually plays CM