Does Soviet tactics work in Combat Mission?

[Erwin]

My primary experience is with CMBS.  Still waiting for the bug update for CMCW.  Glad to hear one gets battalions to maneuver.

[chuckdyke]

It is a tactical game not a strategic one. Tactically a 100 ton tank with a 150 mm gun which shoots APDSFS with 10 times the speed of sound is brilliant it will be a logistics nightmare. That's why I think they didn't manufacture one. I think we should have a strategic game just for the logistics movement from which  CM type scenarios could be generated. 

[IICptMillerII]

23 minutes ago, Erwin said:

My primary experience is with CMBS.  Still waiting for the bug update for CMCW.  Glad to hear one gets battalions to maneuver.

There have been three patches released for Cold War since it came out 9 months ago. What are you on about?

Also, maybe being toxic about something you haven't even tried yourself isn't the greatest move. 

[chuckdyke]

Tactics work at least in WW2. Use the C2 and I think Soviet troops have as much common sense as anybody else. No radio? Troops need to be in hearing or visual contact. Don't reinforce losses.

Use fresh motivated units, they have the contact icon of the first group. Last thing the Germans saw is the Soviet unit at the back. Lack of radios mean the units need to be in visual distance of each other.

[Artkin]

1 hour ago, SergeantSqook said:

It's posts like this that really make me wonder if anyone on this forum actually plays CM

Thats pretty ironic, because if you played the older games you would know they run like crap 

[Ryujin]

3 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

Tactics work at least in WW2. Use the C2 and I think Soviet troops have as much common sense as anybody else. No radio? Troops need to be in hearing or visual contact. Don't reinforce losses.

To clarify I wasn't talking about target sharing or it not working in CM. Obviously any tactics will work fine in CM as you can never lose the ability to get info from or order a unit when they go out of C2. I'm talking about comparing real doctrine to CM tactics and why things in real doctrine can feel off in CM.

Your example actually works well for my point though. You're ordering around those squads with no contact to any command. Something a WW2 commander literally cannot do. Having telepathy tends to skew the perspective of real tactics when they're applied in CM. Real doctrine can't rely on that and so it tends to seem simplistic in CM where we get used throwing units spread all over and little need for pre-planning as we can instantly react to anything. 

 

[chuckdyke]

36 minutes ago, Ryujin said:

Having telepathy tends to skew the perspective of real tactics when they're applied in CM.

it depends on you. There is a mission statement or the commander's intent. Most units know what to do, MG fires at a spot in the forest the nearby, T34 fires too the protocol established before the battle. As Soviet you play a set piece battle.

 

36 minutes ago, Ryujin said:

Obviously any tactics will work fine in CM as you can never lose the ability to get info from or order a unit when they go out of C2.

I don't the units need to be in visual contact if they support each other. Reason why there is Iron difficulty in the game yes it is easy to ignore the C2 and it is easy to kid yourself. T34 need to see a unit firing before he can fire at the same target. Easy to let it fire without the nearby infantry giving the cue.  Troops can still have initiative when they are out of C2. Orders are to clear the woods and report back. They don't need a lieutenant to hold their hands.  

Edited January 3, 2022 by chuckdyke

[Lethaface]

3 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

it depends on you. There is a mission statement or the commander's intent. Most units know what to do, MG fires at a spot in the forest the nearby, T34 fires too the protocol established before the battle. As Soviet you play a set piece battle.

 

I don't the units need to be in visual contact if they support each other. Reason why there is Iron difficulty in the game yes it is easy to ignore the C2 and it is easy to kid yourself. T34 need to see a unit firing before he can fire at the same target. Easy to let it fire without the nearby infantry giving the cue.  Troops can still have initiative when they are out of C2. Orders are to clear the woods and report back. They don't need a lieutenant to hold their hands.  

As usual you seem to be missing the point that Ryujun was making: High Command might desire KISS doctrine / formal tactics, because they think/know anything more complex will not be executed in the correct fashion or at the wrong moment/place, especially when the **** hits the fan.

Of course a platoon leader can order one of his men to move inside a forest. But in CM, because we are all commanders in one we always have full knowledge and memory of all intents of all commanders. So how/what/where is always clear and otherwise can be answered by a lightspeed helpdesk. While on the field with the Company HQ vehicle burning after a TOW hit and no CO HQ available to give orders, Platoon HQ suddenly doesn't have any helpdesk available so he has simple order: Move, shoot and hurrah (all to be performed in direction of enemy)!

[chuckdyke]

2 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

As usual you seem to be missing the point that Ryujun was making: High Command might desire KISS doctrine / formal tactics, because they think/know anything more complex will not be executed in the correct fashion or at the wrong moment/place, especially when the **** hits the fan.

Of course a platoon leader can order one of his men to move inside a forest. But in CM, because we are all commanders in one we always have full knowledge and memory of all intents of all commanders. So how/what/where is always clear and otherwise can be answered by a lightspeed helpdesk. While on the field with the Company HQ vehicle burning after a TOW hit and no CO HQ available to give orders, Platoon HQ suddenly doesn't have any helpdesk available so he has simple order: Move, shoot and hurrah (all to be performed in direction of enemy)!

It is simple if it is not possible in RL don't do it. We play a game and as Soviet their tanks have the radios. Where do we stop? I use the artillery network as a communication channel. There is no other way we can access the field telephone network which must exist. Yes I can see what is going on from behind my screen. We can always use innovation. 

[BeondTheGrave]

Re: Simplicity vs complexity, people in the west tend to underrate the sophistication and complexity with which Soviet commanders would have tried to fight. At the level of a battalion, regiment, or division, the officer and staff would have been increasingly good. Well trained, motivated, professional. Their doctrine may have been simple, as really US doctrine was as well, but the tactical implementation would have been done IMO in a very nuanced fashion. The goal was to create a critical mass and a breakthrough through the NATO defensive zone, but it didn't mean just pounding up one highway from Berlin to Bonn. Likewise, I think we often overrate the complexity of the US/NATO doctrine, especially in the CMCW Active Defense era, because by the mid-80s US doctrine would become technologically complex. But through the CMCW timeframe US doctrine was just as focused on its own core concepts. Even at the tactical level architects like William DePuy were applying their own KISS principles to US doctrine. One of *the first* things DePuy worked on in 1973 after TRADOC was set up was pressuring the infantry schools to only train on one, his preferred, combat formation. He thought anything else was needlessly complex. 

Re: the realism of CMCW, no one battle is necessarily unrealistic. Thats really on the designer. While there are things I think are unrealistic about the Soviet campaigns, in the abstract big picture I think CMCW did a good job in following doctrine and making a realistic campaign. The most unrealistic factor of any scenario or campaign is the author's envisioned scenario. The ultimate challenge, and the biggest piece of unrealism IMO, is that CM tops out at battalion sized engagements. You can do more, and many WWII scenarios do, but in the CW timeframe having a regimental scale engagement would probably be pretty tough and pretty overwhelming. But IMO scenarios where the US and Red Army are facing off 1:1 represents if not an unrealistic engagement, than a failure of the Soviet commander to follow his own doctrine. From what I've read I think the Soviets would try to hit NATO battalions with multiple battalions in a regimental or multi-regimental sized attack, which would also attack from multiple directions to overwhelm and dismantle the defense. If that wasn't possible the attacking force would probably look to avoid combat, and likely this force generally would not be operating along the main axis. 

Anecdotally I was reading the Balck wargame report I linked in another thread last night, both he and Paul Gorman used battalion pairs as covering forces to check the advance of Soviet divisions(!!) while larger reserve forces of 4+ battalions were kept in reserve for the counter attack. Thats the essence of Active Defense. But how do you represent that in the CM engine? I mean you could take one of those two battalions and just pound the hell out of it with large soviet attacks in a campaign (could be pretty fun actually). But from the Soviet side or from the counterattacking US side? Thats harder. As I've said before and will say again, if the main attack is going in at a 1:1 numbers parity then theyve made serious mistakes in the approach and concentration for the battle. DePuy in some of his writing makes it clear, pit companies against single platoons, battalions against companies, etc to achieve success. 

[Lethaface]

44 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

Re: Simplicity vs complexity, people in the west tend to underrate the sophistication and complexity with which Soviet commanders would have tried to fight. At the level of a battalion, regiment, or division, the officer and staff would have been increasingly good. Well trained, motivated, professional. Their doctrine may have been simple, as really US doctrine was as well, but the tactical implementation would have been done IMO in a very nuanced fashion. The goal was to create a critical mass and a breakthrough through the NATO defensive zone, but it didn't mean just pounding up one highway from Berlin to Bonn. Likewise, I think we often overrate the complexity of the US/NATO doctrine, especially in the CMCW Active Defense era, because by the mid-80s US doctrine would become technologically complex. But through the CMCW timeframe US doctrine was just as focused on its own core concepts. Even at the tactical level architects like William DePuy were applying their own KISS principles to US doctrine. One of *the first* things DePuy worked on in 1973 after TRADOC was set up was pressuring the infantry schools to only train on one, his preferred, combat formation. He thought anything else was needlessly complex. 

Re: the realism of CMCW, no one battle is necessarily unrealistic. Thats really on the designer. While there are things I think are unrealistic about the Soviet campaigns, in the abstract big picture I think CMCW did a good job in following doctrine and making a realistic campaign. The most unrealistic factor of any scenario or campaign is the author's envisioned scenario. The ultimate challenge, and the biggest piece of unrealism IMO, is that CM tops out at battalion sized engagements. You can do more, and many WWII scenarios do, but in the CW timeframe having a regimental scale engagement would probably be pretty tough and pretty overwhelming. But IMO scenarios where the US and Red Army are facing off 1:1 represents if not an unrealistic engagement, than a failure of the Soviet commander to follow his own doctrine. From what I've read I think the Soviets would try to hit NATO battalions with multiple battalions in a regimental or multi-regimental sized attack, which would also attack from multiple directions to overwhelm and dismantle the defense. If that wasn't possible the attacking force would probably look to avoid combat, and likely this force generally would not be operating along the main axis. 

Anecdotally I was reading the Balck wargame report I linked in another thread last night, both he and Paul Gorman used battalion pairs as covering forces to check the advance of Soviet divisions(!!) while larger reserve forces of 4+ battalions were kept in reserve for the counter attack. Thats the essence of Active Defense. But how do you represent that in the CM engine? I mean you could take one of those two battalions and just pound the hell out of it with large soviet attacks in a campaign (could be pretty fun actually). But from the Soviet side or from the counterattacking US side? Thats harder. As I've said before and will say again, if the main attack is going in at a 1:1 numbers parity then theyve made serious mistakes in the approach and concentration for the battle. DePuy in some of his writing makes it clear, pit companies against single platoons, battalions against companies, etc to achieve success. 

Good points!

I also doubt that the majority of USSR unit commanders would mindlessly throw in their units in a mindless drive to the front. Even if that would have been the doctrine to the letter (which is not the case imo).

Although that's a different question from the issue of whether the knowledge that there would be limited command & control on the field during actual war, helped those that developed the doctrine to err on the side of simpler vs complexer teachings.

Anyway thanks for the links of Balck's report for Nato doctrine. I can also recommend Balck's memoirs (order in chaos), although he goes into limited depth about details about battles. It's a good glimpse into history from the eyes of a Prussian professional militair. 

 

[Erwin]

12 hours ago, IICptMillerII said:

being toxic about something

Excuse me...?  All I mentioned is that is that Soviet tactics required larger Battalion and larger forces.  What is "toxic" about that?  

 

Edited January 3, 2022 by Erwin

[Sgt Joch]

One point to keep in mind is that the western view of Russian tactics has been heavily influenced by German accounts of WW2, notably the notion of “human wave” attacks and that the Russians only won because of overwhelming numbers which makes you think that the Russians just used WW1 tactics. This is wrong IMHO.

As far as I can tell, the Russians used the same infantry tactics in 43-45 on attack as the Germans and Western Allies used, i.e., fire and movement, use of cover, short sprints, etc. The major difference is that the Russians were less concerned about casualties, so they would tend to press an attack when a U.S. commander would be more likely to stop and call in artillery.

[dbsapp]

1) Most of things that are described as integral part of Soviet doctrine - concentration of mass, numerical advantage over the enemy, max pressure on the most important points - are not unique to the Soviet military thinking. Indeed, they are common, I would even say trivial, for all military strategies since the ancient times. For example, see Schwerpunkt. Strangely  enough, this German word describes what is though to be Soviet doctrine. 

2) The rest of the alleged Soviet doctrine image is formed due to the well known patterns of the military propaganda. Enemy is portrayed as dangerous animal\insect - there are hordes of them, they are stupid, they are not afraid of casualties and ready to throw on you waves after waves of steel and cannon fodder. But  "our heroes" nevertheless can defeat them, because they are smarter, trained better and motivated better.

3) All of this "Soviet invasion" nonsense was pushed on poor European and American populations when US\NATO had absolute advantage in terms of number of nukes, missiles, carriers etc. 

To cite former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara "Blundering into Disaster" (1986) the balance of nuclear warheads was as follows:

1965:

US - 5550, Soviet Union - 600

1970:

4000 and 1800 respectively 

1975:

8500 and 2800 respectively

1980:

10100 and 6000

1985:

11200 and 9900

If you count number of aircraft carriers, military bases and air fleet the differences would be striking. And we are not taking into consideration the technological advantage, which was enjoyed by US\NATO.

Do you think that under these circumstances "hordes of Soviet tanks" were going to invade Europe? The second question is what they were going to do next. Basically "Europe invasion" was the road to nowhere and in no way could help Soviet Union to keep it safe or to defeat US. 

 

 

 

 

 

[BeondTheGrave]

17 minutes ago, dbsapp said:

1) Most of things that are described as integral part of Soviet doctrine - concentration of mass, numerical advantage over the enemy, max pressure on the most important points - are not unique to the Soviet military thinking. Indeed, they are common, I would even say trivial, for all military strategies since the ancient times. For example, see Schwerpunkt. Strangely  enough, this German word describes what is though to be Soviet doctrine. 

2) The rest of the alleged Soviet doctrine image is formed due to the well known patterns of the military propaganda. Enemy is portrayed as dangerous animal\insect - there are hordes of them, they are stupid, they are not afraid of casualties and ready to throw on you waves after waves of steel and cannon fodder. But  "our heroes" nevertheless can defeat them, because they are smarter, trained better and motivated better.

3) All of this "Soviet invasion" nonsense was pushed on poor European and American populations when US\NATO had absolute advantage in terms of number of nukes, missiles, carriers etc. 

To cite former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara "Blundering into Disaster" (1986) the balance of nuclear warheads was as follows:

1965:

US - 5550, Soviet Union - 600

1970:

4000 and 1800 respectively 

1975:

8500 and 2800 respectively

1980:

10100 and 6000

1985:

11200 and 9900

If you count number of aircraft carriers, military bases and air fleet the differences would be striking. And we are not taking into consideration the technological advantage, which was enjoyed by US\NATO.

Do you think that under these circumstances "hordes of Soviet tanks" were going to invade Europe? The second question is what they were going to do next. Basically "Europe invasion" was the road to nowhere and in no way could help Soviet Union to keep it safe or to defeat US. 

To your first point, it shouldn't be at all surprising if you accept that the Soviet doctrine of the 70s and 80s was basically a modernized and streamlined version of the Deep Battle doctrine of late-World War Two. Glantz certainly argues this. And where did Soviet Deep Battle come from? Marshall Tukhachevsky, who so deeply involved in the USSR/Weimar exchange program that they ended up shooting him as a spy. The blitz and DBD have very similar intellectual roots because for a while the Russians and Germans were looking off the notes of one another. 

To your third point though I strongly disagree. I understand and even agree with your point that the USSR was unlikely to take the strategic offensive in Europe. We can prove this easily since we all can agree that CMCW is fantasy and not actual history! But the fact of the matter was that despite that defensive strategic posture, the Soviets maintained a consistently offensive operational posture. IF! war had come, it would have been Soviet tanks rolling westward, not NATO tanks rolling eastward. This was the case from the end of WWII through till 1990. NATO doctrine and war planning was totally incapable of taking a day 1 offensive. When Kennedy pitched the idea of opening up Berlin military in 1961 he was immediately shot down on the grounds that the Army simply couldn't do it, and certainly without nukes. That is, AFAIK, the most seriously an operational offensive was every considered in W Europe by a member of NATO. By the 1970s this situation was reinforced by political trends in the rest of NATO which were moving towards a 'live with it' mentality for the Cold War. The Soviets, meanwhile, trained to take offensive action. They built forces up in offensive formations (the infamous Operational Maneuver Group is not a defensive scheme) and they trained relentlessly to seize territory. Their doctrine, for multiple sources, also is offensive in nature. 

Strategically youre right, and I think thats the #1 reason why the Cold War never went hot. But by the 1970s and 80s the closing of the missile gap, IMO, made the idea of conventional war more likely and palatable than ever. Had that war come, the war depicted by CMCW, it would have involved Soviet tanks crossing into West Germany, not German tanks moving into the East. That was the only way. Thankfully the Soviets were quite reasonable in their thinking and never took up that standard, but they could have. They certainly had plans to do so. I dont think saying otherwise is a tenable position TBH. 

[Halmbarte]

33 minutes ago, Sgt Joch said:

One point to keep in mind is that the western view of Russian tactics has been heavily influenced by German accounts of WW2, notably the notion of “human wave” attacks and that the Russians only won because of overwhelming numbers which makes you think that the Russians just used WW1 tactics. This is wrong IMHO.

As far as I can tell, the Russians used the same infantry tactics in 43-45 on attack as the Germans and Western Allies used, i.e., fire and movement, use of cover, short sprints, etc. The major difference is that the Russians were less concerned about casualties, so they would tend to press an attack when a U.S. commander would be more likely to stop and call in artillery.

The Germans taught the Sov Army how to fight in WWII. It was a pass/fail course with failure = dead. 

By the end of the war the red army is pulling off sophisticated operational deep maneuver warfare that's up to Heer early war standards, while the Germans are executing Stalinesque 'not one step back' tactics that waste their army. 

H

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, BeondTheGrave said:

IF! war had come, it would have been Soviet tanks rolling westward, not NATO tanks rolling eastward. This was the case from the end of WWII through till 1990.

And now we get to why I find the OP questionable in intent.  @dbsapp  has demonstrated, repeatedly, this pro-Russia/Soviet line.  Sure the Soviet Union (and now Russia) are totally innocent of any offensive actions and are totally defensive if you are willing to forget:

- 55k tanks and about 50k tubes and rocket systems all pretty much pointing West.  Anyone with a basic understanding of military force ratios can see that those are offensive postures.  They had actual plans for western invasion scenarios.  If the Soviet Union never was intent on a European invasion then why all the hardware?  Just cause?

- Proxy Wars in just about every corner of the globe - and no, they were not all started by the US/NATO

- the crushing of any dissidents or counter-narratives, a trend that continues to this day.

- A long history of invasion - Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and, of course, Afghanistan.  The West is not innocent of these either (we call them interventions) but both Russia and the Soviet Union were (and are) egregious in the "near abroad" by any standards.

- The hybrid/grey/espionage/subversive actions that were endemic of the Cold War and again are still with us today.

  No sale.  I am not saying we in the West are a clean as new driven snow, far from it but the whole "we are only defending our poor huddled selves from the nasty West" is so laughable as to be trite.  The Soviet Union was a great power and like all great powers was interested in keeping that power at all costs.  It was not an innocent grass roots movement just "trying to save the children from the US", it was a massive war machine capable of, and clearly demonstrating intent to throw down if it had to or if it saw a clear strategic gain to made.  The fact that it could not keep up is a bitter pill to swallow but try a larger glass of water.

   The Soviet doctrine in CMCW is built on what we understood it to be based on decades of research, spying and analysis.  Unless someone can some up with direct and substantiated Soviet era primary sources that differ, I am very untrusting of any counter-narratives coming to light in this current strategic environment.  

[dbsapp]

21 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

And now we get to why I find the OP questionable in intent.  @dbsapp  has demonstrated, repeatedly, this pro-Russia/Soviet line. 

The mere fact that you are framing it as something bad undeniably shows your own bias and subjectivity. For sure, as a human being, I'm not free from certain bias as well, but believe me I'm trying to be as objective as I can.

Anyway, it's clear that having by the order of magnitude less nuclear warheads, nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, strategic bombers and so on and so on, and lagging behind in terms of military technologies  the USSR was absolutely in no position to be aggressive. So yes, its strategy and politics were defensive in nature. No matter how hard it to comprehend after years of brainwashing it's just a simple fact that can be easily shown with numbers in hand.  

The only thing that USSR has advantage in was tanks, which as all the conflicts showed, didn't mean that much. Especially they couldn't play any role in intercontinental nuclear war. Ironically enough, the only thing they were good for, was Western propaganda, that used all this scrap steel to make a scarecrow out of it. 

[Armorgunner]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

 

- 55k tanks and about 50k tubes and rocket systems all pretty much pointing West.  Anyone with a basic understanding of military force ratios can see that those are offensive postures.  They had actual plans for western invasion scenarios.  If the Soviet Union never was intent on a European invasion then why all the hardware?  Just cause?

 

I´m to the bone, a true anti Soviet believer. But in the 60th, and 70th. Soviet know that they had, to have a large numerical superiority. And in "Big Mac Index" I think their numerically superior force, was not more expensive for them. 

 

And @The_Capt Hand on the bibel. Did not Nato, and the US have plans. Both for offensive, and defensive operations? In the cold war, both sides had plans for every thinkable scenario. But after the Iron Curtain falled. Some of the Warsawapacts plans came out in the light. And the ones that got most attention, is the offensive ones.

 

War was probably close, a few times. But I think, neither side really wanted it! But at the time, we all belived that the other side wanted war. And a strong Army/Air Force/Navy, was the only thing preventing the opposit side, to make a move! I´m glad, that the trigger needed to start things, never happend. Because in the nuclear armsrace age, anything bad could had happend!

 

Just my thoughts, and by no means any offence to you

Edited January 3, 2022 by Armorgunner

[Halmbarte]

4 minutes ago, Armorgunner said:

I´m to the bone, a true anti Soviet believer. But in the 60th, and 70th. Soviet know that they had, to have a large numerical superiority. And in "Big Mac Index" I think their numerically superior force, was not more expensive for them. 

 

And @The_Capt Hand on the bibel. Did not Nato, and the US have plans. Both for offensive, and defensive operations? In the cold war, both sides had plans for every thinkable scenario. But after the Iron Curtain falled. Some of the Warsawapacts plans came out in the light. And the ones that got most attention, is the offensive ones.

 

War was probably close, a few times. But I think, neither side really wanted it! But at the time, we all belived that the other side wanted war. And a strong Army/Air Force/Navy, was the only thing preventing the opposit side, to make a move! I´m glad, that the trigger needed to start things, never happend. Becouse in the nuclear armsrace age, anything bad could had happend!

 

Just my thoughts

Every competent military has plans for everything, even an invasion by the armies of Middle Earth*. Just because the USN had plans for a naval war against the UK** didn't signal the intent. 

H

*Tip of the hat to C Stross: https://www.amazon.com/Nightmare-Stacks-Laundry-Files-Novel-ebook/dp/B016JPTNZW/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0

**https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Red 

[Armorgunner]

1 minute ago, Halmbarte said:

Every competent military has plans for everything, even an invasion by the armies of Middle Earth*. Just because the USN had plans for a naval war against the UK** didn't signal the intent. 

H

*Tip of the hat to C Stross: https://www.amazon.com/Nightmare-Stacks-Laundry-Files-Novel-ebook/dp/B016JPTNZW/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0

**https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Red 

The first seven words, I completely agree with. The rest ???

[Armorgunner]

16 minutes ago, dbsapp said:

 

The only thing that USSR has advantage in was tanks, which as all the conflicts showed, didn't mean that much. 

What about IFV´s, and Artillery? And Subs, if we go down below?

 

All is year dependent offcourse. Coldwar was from 1945-1991

Edited January 3, 2022 by Armorgunner

[dbsapp]

@BeondTheGrave At least you got my point.

I wouldn't overemphasize "Soviets offensive operational posture". I'm not even sure how to define "offensive posture". What was the posture of dozens of US silent nuclear submarines with ballistics missiles swimming near Russian northern cost? Or  military bases in Japan? Or ballistic missiles in Turkey? As for "infamous Operational Maneuver Group" why not recall infamous Able Archer maneuvers that were perceived in Moscow as the last step in concealed preparations for first nuclear strike? 

[dbsapp]

11 minutes ago, Armorgunner said:

What about IFV´s, and Artillery? And Subs, if we go down below?

 

All is year dependent offcourse. Coldwar was from 1945-1991

To put it simply, USSR may had some numerical (not qualitatively) advantage in tactical equipment (like IFVs and artillery), but was inferior both numerically and qualitatively in the most important area - strategic arms. 

Subs are good example, because till the very end of Cold War Soviet subs were too noisy and couldn't detect US or British subs, where as Western submarines could easily follow them remaining unnoticed. 

[Armorgunner]

4 minutes ago, dbsapp said:

To put it simply, USSR may had some numerical (not qualitatively) advantage in tactical equipment (like IFVs and artillery), but was inferior both numerically and qualitatively in the most important area - strategic arms. 

 

A vast numerical advantige, I would say (not in terms of quality). And at a strategic level, They were behind. But trust me, that was a war with no winners anyway!