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Does Soviet tactics work in Combat Mission?


dbsapp

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3 minutes ago, Armorgunner said:

A vast numerical advantige, I would say (not in terms of quality). And at a strategic level, They were behind. But trust me, that was a war with no winners anyway!

Exactly. And that is why the US didn't attack, despite having serious advantage. The cost would be too high anyway. 

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18 minutes ago, dbsapp said:

Subs are good example, because till the very end of Cold War Soviet subs were too noisy and couldn't detect US or British subs, where as Western submarines could easily follow them remaining unnoticed. 

But since the Soviets had more of them. There would always been a few that could launch, right? And even if Western models were more soffisticated. I find it hard to belive that the numbers would have been 340-0 in kills, as you implied!

Edited by Armorgunner
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I read a translation of 'The Offensive' by Sidorenko. Before starting his chapter on assault formations and whatnot the author placed a BIG caveat at the front that this was all contingent on terrain, cover, concealment, opposing forces, etc. and a commander would be obliged to adjust his tactics to take advantage of local conditions. Placing an 'ideal' theoretical Soviet assault formation onto a less-than-ideal map is tying the Russians hands.

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1 hour ago, dbsapp said:

The mere fact that you are framing it as something bad undeniably shows your own bias and subjectivity. For sure, as a human being, I'm not free from certain bias as well, but believe me I'm trying to be as objective as I can.

Anyway, it's clear that having by the order of magnitude less nuclear warheads, nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, strategic bombers and so on and so on, and lagging behind in terms of military technologies  the USSR was absolutely in no position to be aggressive. So yes, its strategy and politics were defensive in nature. No matter how hard it to comprehend after years of brainwashing it's just a simple fact that can be easily shown with numbers in hand.  

The only thing that USSR has advantage in was tanks, which as all the conflicts showed, didn't mean that much. Especially they couldn't play any role in intercontinental nuclear war. Ironically enough, the only thing they were good for, was Western propaganda, that used all this scrap steel to make a scarecrow out of it. 

No it doesn't...what do they teach you kids in school these days?  Pointing out obvious biased and subjectivity does not automatically make one bias and subjective...what kind of logic is that?

You keep coming back to the nukes, which is a totally separate discussion but let's have it.  You own numbers demonstrate that the USSR was not content with a defensive set of options.  Nuclear deterrence is not a question of one-for-one.  All one needs to do is demonstrate that you have enough second strike capability to destroy an opponent and you have successful deterrence.  The USSR had 600 nuclear weapons in 1960 and almost 10k in 1985..why?  Well the West had exactly one card to play.  Based on conventional capability (remember all those Soviet tanks, guns and divisions) the West was very concerned that it was going to lose and had to have second/survivable strike capability to keep nuclear deterrence in play.  The Soviet Union which already had the conventional superiority was chasing strategically offensive options not defensive ones.  Of course the whole thing got farcical towards the end as both sides had enough to wipe each other out several times over.

So no, not "defensive only" by a long shot.  We had an aggressive empire which had actively tried to expand on the periphery for years, that already had conventional superiority in Europe chasing nuclear parity, if not superiority.  How does any of this smack of "defensive in nature"?  I argue the "brainwashing" is occurring at your end because I am willing to fully admit the West and US were doing the same thing globally.  The West was very offensive strategically, plenty of evidence to prove that one particularly in other dimensions of power; diplomacy, economic, information and definitely culture.  In the Europe, however, they were militarily defensive only because that was all they could afford to be.

In short from the western perspective the only thing keeping the Soviets at bay was the nuclear equation, which is a very precarious position to be in.  What is demonstrating your obvious bias (and agenda) is the fact that I will argue both sides, while you stick to Soviet "lambs and doves" armed with more tanks than god almighty as the victims here based solely on the fact that the USSR could not get its act together with respect to nuclear weapons...and it sure tried. 

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2 hours ago, Armorgunner said:

And @The_Capt Hand on the bibel. Did not Nato, and the US have plans. Both for offensive, and defensive operations? In the cold war, both sides had plans for every thinkable scenario. But after the Iron Curtain falled. Some of the Warsawapacts plans came out in the light. And the ones that got most attention, is the offensive ones.

 

Did not want to forget this one.  I have never heard of a conventionally offensive plan in the West for Europe but that does not mean one did not exist.  The issue here is one of posture and not planning.  The NATO war machine was defensive in posture through and through.  It did not have the numbers or capabilities to even come close to a reasonable strategic offensive in this theatre.  It would have seen us trying to attack a numerically superior force with shortening supply lines while ours got much longer.  The West had watched Napoleon and Hitler try it and fail gloriously so there was little to no appetite to take that one on.  Which hits the final nail in the "US/NATO were planning to invade and take all our goats" theory; political will.  There is no way the West could have convinced all the NATO states to even get involved, it would have broken the alliance to even try.  Hell NATO could barely hold itself together on a good day let alone propose dying in numbers to attack the Soviet Union.

Instead the US went the other way, outcompete and out spend, something they were very good at and the communist system was not or at least the Soviet version of communism -the jury is frankly still out on the Chinese system.  The US buried the Soviet Union in a contest it could not win and in fact fractured the the entire thing while trying.  I argue the USSR broke itself trying to sustain strategic offensive options.  If the USSR had simply said "ok we are defensive only" they could have buttoned up and spent a lot less and maybe survived for another 50 years...but that is my personal theory and would need a lot more time and study to prove.

Edited by The_Capt
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@Armorgunner @TheCaptain AFAIK (and if anyone knows better, please give me a link) the only time a Day 1 offensive into East Germany was contemplated was around the planning for Operation LIVE OAK in 1961. This op was essentially designed to reopen West Berlin in the event that the Berlin Crisis (that is, the construction of the wall) was the first step in a second Berlin Blockade. Kennedy instructed the Army to consider the possibility that a small patrol could push into East Germany, move along one of the agreed upon highways leading to West Berlin, and eventually move into the city. The Army came back and said basically 'no way the Soviets or the East Germans would let one American solider drive through to Berlin. If they go theyll have to fight.' They then outlined a brigade-to-multidivisional assault aimed at creating then supporting a recon in force towards West Berlin. But they emphasized that according to doctrine, were still at the tail edge of the Pentatomic era here, that force would HAVE to use nuclear weapons else it would be destroyed. Thus the option presented to Kennedy was 'nukes or not at all.' He picked not at all. I am not aware of any serious plans, discussions, wargames, or official documents which explored let alone prepared for a western attack on the east. 

This is different though, than a counteroffensive to 'liberate' Eastern Europe after having stopped a Soviet offensive. Virtually every US plan since 1945 envisioned that, after a period of defense and buildup, that the US/NATO would launch counterattacks into at least East Germany. Many wargames even envisioned that kind of thing. The Battle of Leipzig even features heavily into Team Yankee and The Third World War which that story is based on. This is different though from what the Soviets were planning which was an offensive from the outset. Hence my distinction between a day 1 attack (a planned offensive) vs. the vague hope of creating a counterattack on D+14 or D+21 or whatever later on. There should also be a line, IMO, separating the Day 1 offensive from what AirLand Battle envisioned. After all, AirLand Battle would only have worked if the Soviets were rolling forward. It was about blowing bridges and hitting columns on the march. Had the Soviets just dug in, there would have been little for the USAF to bomb. 

@dbsapp To your first point, determining the relative posture of the Soviet Army is possible through a number of things. First the formations that the Red Army assumed. Great example is the famous 'operation maneuver group,' which was the big innovation of the 70s and 80s to Deep Battle doctrine. The OMB is essentially an echeloned formation of tank and infantry armies designed to create, by prewar formation, the layout needed to execute a deep battle. The first echelon is designed simply to crack open the enemy's defensive zone and begin a tactical exploitation of the rear area. This is done with the heaviest units, in WWII parlance shock armies and tank armies. This isnt a naming convention kept into WWIII planning because as I recall each Soviet army was named after (or really just was) a famous army from WWII. These units were designed and supplied to fight a short heavy battle along the border areas, loosely defined and stretching as much as 50+km into the rear, and then defeating reserve forces as the moved up. By doctrine the first echelon in the OMB would begin an unopposed movement BEFORE the second echelon was inserted, but as I understand it there was some acceptance in WWII the SE was usually inserted early to help defeat the reserves. Once the SE was inserted, its job was simply to maneuver through the breakthrough and grab targets of value in the enemy interior. This is how something like 'Fifteen Days to the Rhine' would even be possible (if it was, it wasn't and IMO that was always a bit of a fantasy/propaganda plan). Defeat the enemy in the defensive zone with FE, maneuver and win the war with SE. Each OMG would have at least those two echelons, and several OMGs were deployed in Europe along each of the major invasion axis. Setting that aside other evidence could be found in how the Red Army trained, for maneuver or for defense, what was taught at service schools (Voroshilov lectures are important here), what their official doctrine is, and what its own generals were saying and thinking.

To your second point though, I'm not sure what the focus on nuclear weapons were. By the 1970s the missile gap no longer mattered. Sure the US had more nukes, but both sides had more than enough to exterminate each other AND they both knew it. If anything, by the 1970s the issue had been somewhat neutralized. Both sides had taken the other so totally hostage that nuclear war was really unthinkable. And it really is a #bothsides issue. Both kept nuclear submarines off their coast, both deployed ICBMs that could hit any place on the surface of the earth with multimegaton warheads, if war came both Moscow and Washington would be destroyed. Sure the USSR's MRBMs couldn't hit Washington, but they could take out everything from London to Bonn and back. And who cares about MRBMs anyway, its pretty clear that was just a Reagan era pissing match. But none of this matters because CMCW is a tactical level battalion war game. What the rad count in Moscow is doesnt much matter to my pixeltruppen east of Alsfed. The radical pro-Soviet line is about as untenable, IMO, as the radical pro-US line. Both are rooted ultimately in what we would want to be the case, rather than what people were actually thinking and doing. 

Edited by BeondTheGrave
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6 minutes ago, dbsapp said:

LOL Maybe because US had 5500 when USSR had 600? 

IMG-20220104-004433-754.jpg

Ah, ok so we want to switch to contemporary.  You see all those orange dots labeled "Russian troops in occupied territories", ya think there is an ongoing trend here?  A trend that might just lead the West to thinking that Russian intentions are a little less than defensive?

Again the West is definitely not on the side of the angels all the time but the entire USSR/Russian addiction to invading things gets everyone on edge, which may very well be the desired effect but don't come on an internet forum and insult everyone by saying "oh no, they are being totally forced to do so because the mean old West".  

As to nukes, well what do you think is keeping modern Russia at bay right now?  That, and economic actions which would cripple it.  But we have to put up with these temper tantrums for a while yet, apparently.

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In the pre-Airland Battle 1980s a group of renegade Pentagon warplanners derided the NATO doctrine as little more than 'don't lose', but even their much more aggressive warfighting concept didn't progress beyond stabbing attacks into the attacking Russian forces. Nobody was thinking about preemptive attacks across the Warsaw pact border. Now, after the attacking Russian army was cut off from its supplies and annihilated there's no telling what the endgame would be. It all depends on how (miffed) Europe would be at being invaded and its citizenry slaughtered.

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2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ah, ok so we want to switch to contemporary.  You see all those orange dots labeled "Russian troops in occupied territories", ya think there is an ongoing trend here?  A trend that might just lead the West to thinking that Russian intentions are a little less than defensive?

Again the West is definitely not on the side of the angels all the time but the entire USSR/Russian addiction to invading things gets everyone on edge, which may very well be the desired effect but don't come on an internet forum and insult everyone by saying "oh no, they are being totally forced to do so because the mean old West".  

As to nukes, well what do you think is keeping modern Russia at bay right now?  That, and economic actions which would cripple it.  But we have to put up with these temper tantrums for a while yet, apparently.

Personally I find the X Article to be a useful way to consider the basic balance of the Cold War. While George Kennan was def a weirdo, and I personally dislike these 'racial' and 'grand historic' explanations for behavior, I think he does a good job highlighting that both recent and long term Russian history has proven to them that their near periphery can be a threat to them. After all, German Army's in Poland invaded Russia twice, caused a revolution once, and committed genocide a second time. Def something to be afraid of! Maxism-Leninism also provide the framework (expanding the Revolution) to justify messing with the Russian periphery. 

Taken together these factors pushed Stalin and his successors to take a fundamentally aggressive stance in the regions surrounding Russia. Kennan called it constant external pressure. Pressure to topple governments and turn a western backed or neutral ally into a Russian puppet, the only people Stalin could really trust. Kennan also suggested that fear of retaliation and escalation, especially towards outright war, made Moscow more gunshy about confrontation. That is if the US pushed back, Moscow would back down rather than risk confrontation. It was where the West backed off that the USSR would try to capitalize on the weakness and cement gains. Also factoring against action was that the USSR and its representatives LOVED the rules based order. We often, IMO, dont give the USSR enough credit for that. They loved whenever the west made rules and set precedents because maybe Moscow could take advantage of them later. But that also meant that sometimes Russians would use rules and the violations of international norms as an outlet to allow both sides to back down. 

What Kennan doesn't talk about but which is an interesting modification on that is Brezhnev and his eye for global politics. In the 60s and 70s the USSR shifted its gaze from Europe and the near periphery to decolonizing nations around the world where they could exacerbate anti-Imperialist sentiments and build ideologically sympathetic movements. It changes the focus from 'near periphery' to the 'global periphery.' 

Im not saying that Kennan totally nails the Cold War, he has his own faults, but thats the lens I always prefer to look at the conflict through. It also highlights how the USSR could say it has a defensive strategic outlook (Were surrounded!) but then take strategically aggressive actions, and plan for operationally aggressive acts. Ultimately the USSR was convinced that the Capitalist nations of the world would try to destroy it. Not only that but it was up to them to save the workers of the world. They had to protect the revolution until the internal contradictions of capitalism showed the global workers that they had more to gain by overthowing their ruling class and joining with the USSR than by supporting the capitalist system. 

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31 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 

Instead the US went the other way, outcompete and out spend, something they were very good at and the communist system was not or at least the Soviet version of communism -the jury is frankly still out on the Chinese system.  The US buried the Soviet Union in a contest it could not win and in fact fractured the the entire thing while trying.  I argue the USSR broke itself trying to sustain strategic offensive options.  If the USSR had simply said "ok we are defensive only" they could have buttoned up and spent a lot less and maybe survived for another 50 years...but that is my personal theory and would need a lot more time and study to prove.

Don´t disagree on that, at all  :)

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16 hours ago, Artkin said:

Thats pretty ironic, because if you played the older games you would know they run like crap 😂

Get a better computer, man, idk

 

Wait I thought you saying the games run like crap was just me cherry-picking in the first place?

Can you fill me in on your narrative, I'm getting confused.

Edited by SergeantSqook
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33 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

  The NATO war machine was defensive in posture through and through.  It did not have the numbers or capabilities to even come close to a reasonable strategic offensive in this theatre.  It would have seen us trying to attack a numerically superior force with shortening supply lines while ours got much longer. 

 

But I think, at the time. The Soviet looked at themselfs, in a defensive position also (Underdogs in nukes). And if NATO attacked, they would respond with nukes. If their soil were treatened, at least. That was their thought, I belive! 

 

Ofcourse that was not their "made in steel" strategy from 45-91. But I´m pretty shure, Soviet didn´t want war. If they did not see it inevintable!

 

Well, well! We dont know! And I think we are lucky, that we don´t.  :)

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16 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

While George Kennan was def a weirdo, and I personally dislike these 'racial' and 'grand historic' explanations for behavior, I think he does a good job highlighting that both recent and long term Russian history has proven to them that their near periphery can be a threat to them.

Well the guy did invent the American version of political warfare and with respect to the USSR and Russia, he probably saved us from bumbling into a nuclear holocaust.  It was Kennan that championed the overall grand strategy of containment as opposed to outright confrontation, which was brilliant in the day.  He started the idea of a choke hold which the US finally landed in the 80s. 

I agree with the assessment that Russia is always "about Russia", one could hold a mirror up to US foreign policy on that point.  As a nation it is essentially the leftovers; all the parts no one else really wanted.  That is harsh but true, not Asian, not European and definitely not Persian or Arab.  All the bits people really did not want to bother with got pushed into a confederation that has only ever functioned when authoritarian rule is in place.  It holds itself together through strongmen and paranoia (another lesson the West could draw from) and this is historically consistent from the czars, to the communist party, to whatever Putin and his crew are.

The Soviet Union (and Russia) need the West (as you note) as the external thing to keep it together internally.  That and the WW2 instilled doctrine of the best defence is to bleed out your opponent on someone else's soil kind of underpin the whole Soviet/Russian enterprise.

Finally, your point on the Cold War battle of "isms" is also on point and that is what is different from today with respect to Russia at least.  This was an ideological conflict with both sides seeing themselves as bringing light to the world, on one side democracy and the other communism.  This made for an interesting wild card as it got layered on national baggage on both sides.  The Cold War was definitely a game and both sides knew it but it also got scary sometimes.  

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13 minutes ago, Armorgunner said:

But I think, at the time. The Soviet looked at themselfs, in a defensive position also (Underdogs in nukes). And if NATO attacked, they would respond with nukes. If their soil were treatened, at least. That was their thought, I belive! 

 

Ofcourse that was not their "made in steel" strategy from 45-91. But I´m pretty shure, Soviet didn´t want war. If they did not see it inevintable!

 

Well, well! We dont know! And I think we are lucky, that we don´t.  :)

I honestly think the Soviet believed that the best defence was a good offense.  I think their efforts were focused on the global spread of communism and their own power on its back but they were not going to employ WW3 to make it happen as it would have likely been the end of it all.   

Of course in CMCW we are "what if-ing" the start of that dark path in a game.  A path we definitely got close to but I am also glad we never took.

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7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I honestly think the Soviet believed that the best defence was a good offense.  I think their efforts were focused on the global spread of communism and their own power on its back but they were not going to employ WW3 to make it happen as it would have likely been the end of it all.   

Of course in CMCW we are "what if-ing" the start of that dark path in a game.  A path we definitely got close to but I am also glad we never took.

That they wantet a global spread of communism I can I agree on :D . And I love CMCW, and the "What if" feeling about it. You did a good job there!

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