Centurian52

There was an interesting discussion on Soviet and Western tank comparative capabilities in "International Security" magazine between Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher on one side, and Steven Zaloga on the other side in 1988-1989. Those debates, that happened almost 35 years ago, resemble the discussions we have today on this forum.
First, Malcolm Chalmers (University of Bradford, UK)and Lutz Unterseher(Chairman of the European Study Group on Alternative Security Policy, Germany) published an article "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets". In this paper they compared Warsaw Pact and NATO tank armies both quantitively and qualitatively. They argued that, despite WP had slight advantage in number of tanks, qualitive advantage of NATO equipment closed the gap and even provided some superiority to NATO.
This article is a real goldmine for those who want to prove that Soviet tanks were inferior, but for the purpose of intellectual honesty I will cite it here and do their homework for them 🙂 It really translates CMCW underlying concept. Anyway, as we will see later, this claims were confronted  by Steven Zaloga. 
Authors estimated that  a ratio between Warsaw Pact and NATO tank numbers in Central Europe of 1.47:1 three days after mobilization, 1.41:1 after ten days, 1.24:1 after 40 days and 1.31:1 after four months.
The average Warsaw Pact tank weighs only 38 metric tonnes compared with 49 metric tonnes for NATO. While the Warsaw Pact has a 2.1:1 lead in numbers of tanks worldwide, therefore, it has a lead of only 1.6:1 in total tank tonnage.
NATO's comparative advantage is also stocks of older generation models. NATO has followed a policy of carrying out major upgrades to ensure that, although the bodies of these tanks are 20 or more years old, the technology is almost comparable to that on its most modern tanks. As a consequence, the quality gap between old and new-generation models is relatively small. In contrast older models of Pact tanksave not been significantly upgraded.
As Chalmers and Unterseher argued, NATO tanks had technological edge in almost every aspect.
They claim, that earlier Soviet tank models are far inferior to any post-1950 Western tank in the all round orientation capability which they give the crew. Soviet tanks have fewer and smaller viewing points on commanders' cupolas, and commanders still have to stick their heads out more in order to observe their surroundings. All Soviet tanks rely on "active" illumination of their nighttime surroundings with clumsy searchlights.
In Soviet tanks, the commander's and gunner's sights used in targeting generally exhibit a low level of sophistication. Soviet range-finding technology lagged for many years well behind that of the West.  The Soviets did not begin to incorporate the more accurate optical base-on-own-vehicle range-finders into some of their tanks  until 20 years after the U.S. had begun to do so.
With the introduction of its T-62 tank in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union pioneered the extensive use of a large caliber, smooth-bore gun. Muzzle velocities of kinetic energy rounds fired from these guns are high. But this advantage is largely wasted because of the gun's poor accuracy, a result of stability problems with the gun barrel and of inadequate quality control on ammunition production.
The difficulties caused by these cramped and dangerous conditions are such that Soviet tank crews must be less than 1.65 meters tall, a constraint that severely limits the recruiting pool for tank crews and could therefore have adverse effects on crew quality.
To conclude, USSR actual numerical advantage is relatively small, ranging from 1.24:1 to 1.64:1. But the qualitive difference transforms it into a NATO combat potential lead of between 1.06:1 and 1.42:1.
In 1989 well known tank expert Steven Zaloga published his answer in the same magazine ("The Tank Gap Data Flap"), where he called  Chalmers and Unterseher arguments "too one-sided and simplistic". In his words, they "in many respects  overstated their case".
Although the authors spend a great deal of time pinpointing technical deficiencies in older Soviet designs like the T-55 and T-62, The Soviet forward deployed forces have been in the process of removing these older tanks from their units in favor of T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks. 
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank design suffer from factual inaccuracies and Western biases in tank design. For example, their assertion that "all Soviet tanks rely on 'active' illumination" is simply false. All Soviet tanks do carry an active infrared search light for nighttime illumination, but the same is true for most NATO tanks produced up to the early 1980s, including the M60A3, Leopard 1 and Chieftain.
In fact Soviets introduced passive night gunner's sights using image intensification technology in the late 1960s with the T-64 and in the early 1970s with late model T-62s; they have been using them ever since. NATO enjoys a comfortable lead in second generation night sights using thermal imaging technology. About a third of NATO tanks have thermal imaging sights, and about 15 percent still rely on the older image intensification sights. But over half of NATO tanks still rely on older active infrared night sights or have no night fighting capability at all. The Soviets have been adopting thermal imaging sights at a much slower pace due to high cost, but over a third of their tanks now have passive image intensification night sights.
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank fire controls reveals a distinct NATO bias in favor of long-range tank engagements. The use of ballistic computers, wind sensors, and other fire control improvements greatly increase tank gun accuracy at long ranges (over 1000 meters), but have little effect at close ranges. The Soviets feel that simpler fire controls are adequate due to the prevalence of "close-grain" terrain in Central Europe. In German border region, 55 percent of the terrain has sighting ranges of 500 meters or less, 28 percent from 500 to 1500 m, and 17 percent over 1500 m. 
Stadiametric sights, as used on the T-62 and earlier types, are not substantially inferior to advanced fire controls when using Armor Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) ammunition at ranges up to 1000 m, since the ballistic arc of the projectile is so flat. For example, U.S. Army trials suggest that at 500 m, a tank using a stadiametric sight has a 98 percent probability of hit, and a tank with a laser range finder has the same 98 percent probability.In any event, the tanks most likely to be encountered in the first weeks of a conflict in Central Europe, namely the T-64, T-72, and T-80, are all equipped with laser range finders and ballistic computers.
The authors' general conclusion that Warsaw Pact tanks are "much less capable" than comparable NATO tanks is a gross simplification. NATO tanks do enjoy substantial advantages during certain types of tank engagements, such as long-range duels, or night engagements where there is not enough ambient moonlight for image intensification sights to work. But under many average situations, such as tank combat at average (under 1000 m) ranges during daylight, NATO advantages rapidly diminish. 
To draw my own conclusion, I would say that both  Chalmers and Zaloga made strong arguments. It shows that there is no single, already scientifically proven point of view. The thing that we discussed here were debatable earlier and they remain debatable today (though we gain new knowledge and data since then ).   
In my opinion CMCW and CMBS designers have chosen the concept of force balance that is based on arguments as those that were proposed by Chalmers and Unterseher. This is their right of course, and they can provide some arguments to defense their position. 
But what Chalmers-Zaloga discussion showed is that this concept is far from being the only one.  There are other views that can be grounded in facts as well. Which one better for the purpose of game simulation, balance and - the last but not the least - fun, is up to game designers to decide and for players to evaluate. 

So the fragmentation bug has been logged but I was wondering if information about this had also been logged as a bug or linked to the fragmentation ticket? It seems related to the fragmentation bug as the impact on armor (track only damage) is also occurring here. However in this case it is triggered by a direct impact on the vehicles ERA.

Issue
When artillery shells impact an ERA block it shows the same effect as an air burst or near miss. Damage will only be done to the tracks and no other tank systems are effected. In the attached images/file you can see an Oplot take a hit to the ERA directly adjacent to the main gun and suffer only track damage.

Test
Game: Black Sea
Artillery: 203mm 2S7M
Target: Oplot

images and saved game

https://we.tl/t-J0iGUhNcgn

https://imgur.com/a/ynY0LkL

This sounds perfectly plausible. The main weakness of pistols is that they have a very limited effective range, but sub-50 meters is practically point-blank. Also this is about where it becomes damn near impossible to see anything through a sniper scope (very narrow field of view, so a regular un-scoped rifle would be much better at this range). Although frankly any bolt-action rifle will struggle at this range, which is the big selling point of sub-machineguns.

Greetings I wanted to let everyone know that we at Developer Dialogue released a new episode where we sat down with the founder and Project Lead of the Combat Mission game series, Stephen Grammont. In this episode we discuss his latest game release, Combat Mission Cold War. We dive into every aspect of the game, from why cover the Cold War now, to why the Steam release was a few months delayed. We then finish off the podcast talking about the possibility and difficulty developing a Combat Mission Vietnam.   If you guys are interested you can listen to it here: https://youtu.be/vnHZjRtXmGQ   Or on your favorite Podcast app: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/.../developer.../id1524192396 Google Podcasts: https://www.google.com/podcasts... Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/33DiH9pCrcV9bVw4WeDWmS Spreaker: https://www.spreaker.com/show/developer-dialogue

This is something I am a bit interested in for the later Cold War era, the relationship between German Generals, Nazis, and the US Army has always been....... weird. After all we forced many of them to write us histories while they were in prison camps, histories which were pretty influential in how the civilian community has gone on to remember WWII and especially the Eastern Front. From what I've read of both documents and of writing on the subject, the US Army was pretty uncritical when it came to the Nazis. There is even an infamous Military Review article which is very flattering to Joachim Piper and has, as I recall, one line in it about all the bad stuff he did. The interviews with Hermann Balck I linked in that other thread are also interesting, I've always gotten the vibe from reading the interview transcripts that what theyre really saying is that the Russians are incapable of being good soldiers, Germans are inherently good soldiers, etc. Balck also definitely takes the line in his memoir that Berlin and the rear area troops were responsible for the brutality not the troops on the line. Thats not really true (see the work of Omar Bartov who takes down that specific myth). Yet the US Army took those lessons seemingly uncritical and really adopted the German lessons from fighting the Soviets without any comment on all the nasty parts of WWII on the Eastern front. Also no comment on the fact that the Germans lost(!!!) and why that may have been the case. Its interesting stuff.
Back on schedule @marais the Amazon page suggests he has some SHOCKING revelation about the Bundeswehr. Is that just selling fluff or does he seem to have something to say there? Is it just 'the Germans were really good?' Also for those who have read it, where do you think this falls on the memoir to scholarship spectrum? Sometimes you get these guys who do this annoying thing where they want to contribute to bigger questions about a subject, but are too lazy to do more research so they just take their own direct experience and apply it writ large to the whole Army or the whole system. Or just ignore everything they didn't directly engage with. It makes me wary of these kinds of books sometimes. Do you think he does a good job of striking a balance? 
If his big revelation re: the Germans is that 'they had learned lessons from WWII and that made their doctrine good' I hate to break it too him, but the US also did that, both AD & AirLand Battle were directly based off WWII experiences generally, German experiences specifically, and were written in combination with German doctrine. The 1980s HDV 100/100 and FM 100-5 were very similar, and DePuy was PROUD that he had gotten the Germans to rewrite the 1970s version of HDV 100/100 to make it like Active Defense. I wonder how much of 'German doctrine is good!' stems from biases developed during WWII and the 1950s, applied to the 1970s & 80s. My own work looks to conclusively show that German and American doctrine werent all that different in theory, and were written jointly together at multiple levels. So why would someone like Storr rate the US and Germany differently, as often happens? (I dont want this to sound rotely nationalistic, but rather why the Germans get elevated so highly) Is it that their WWII experiences look good and carried their reputation through the Cold War? Or that they were still doing something nobody else was? If there were I havn't figured it out. 

Oh boy, don't get me started on dismounted TOW! Served in Finland where that was the main method of using it.
We had 7 guys hauling the whole system (TOW2 with thermals) + couple missiles. With highly drilled squad (yes squad not team) it took 3 minutes to set it up. Same amount to disassemble. Man, i've spent my  years in reserves (20 years now) trying to think how to move it around faster, sleds or something. Maybe even carry it assembled and hope we don't break anything vital. Because if we'd end up into sights of opponent while in firing positions we are not moving anywhere and are going to be practically ground meat. Whole dis-/assembly process is such a hassle with guys running here and there while delivering/retriveing their pieces from firing position and getting into their close defense positions.
There were guys issued with Russian AT-4, those were whole another beast on this aspect. 3 man teams could operate them and if ****e hit the fan they could just pick it up and run, or hobble. No even close to similar hassle we had to have. I never had change to work with them, but our officers were kinda envious of how fast they were to move around.
Did complain about this with Shock Force once Marine pack was released and dismounted TOW was introduced, and Steve had it changed. I think they made it 3 and 7 minutes... It became practically stationary weapon system at that point.
We didn't have but one missile per squad to fire and it was reserved for gunner (i was squad leader) so i can't much talk about it's reliability or how it was to fire, but at times you heard that someone had mechanical with missile.
Yes, powerlines and large bodies of water are an issue, causing wires to short circuit. Also sun (if firing directly at sun). I don't see how undergrowth should be an systemic issue, wire is inside missile unwinding itself as missile flies along so if everything goes along well there should not be problem. But it's 20 years so maybe i've forgot something.

CMCW module?
Phillipines 1898.

Hello,
to whom it may concern.
A Video about the subject named in the title.
I love the Soviet Campaign. After the starting phase of the first scenario can really hit you hard in the face, I like about the second scenario that you have some free space to develope your approach. I went with the plan with the least amount of engagement.
Kind Regards,
Michael H.
 
 
 

That's because the games aren't currently capable of taking advantage of the full power of modern computers. They are well optimized, and will run reasonably well even on a potato. But there is no noticeable improvement in their performance on even the most powerful gaming PCs. Engine 5 will probably address this.

That's because the games aren't currently capable of taking advantage of the full power of modern computers. They are well optimized, and will run reasonably well even on a potato. But there is no noticeable improvement in their performance on even the most powerful gaming PCs. Engine 5 will probably address this.

That's because the games aren't currently capable of taking advantage of the full power of modern computers. They are well optimized, and will run reasonably well even on a potato. But there is no noticeable improvement in their performance on even the most powerful gaming PCs. Engine 5 will probably address this.

Hopefully, what Steve said will address this:

Throw grenades command
Improved draw distance (not playing cold War at the moment as big maps are not showing trees etc at distance). 
Acquire with option to specify amount (I don't think I would use a put back command much and disadvantage of extra complexity may outweigh benefit). 
Colour all teams of same squad - if I have terminology right (I know colour blind people won't benefit but majority will). 
More options for road angles. 
Hotkey to select last way point of currently selected unit - would greatly speed up issuing orders. 
Better handling of sounds. When I am playing, I am pretty sure some sounds cut out, and with sound mods it becomes unplayable due to delays in sound (on both old Macbook Pro and current Macbook Air). 
M1 native version.
More flexibility in uniforms mixing. 
Better building targeting. 
I am hoping 2022 announcement delayed because Engine 5 to ve released with all the above imminently😁

LOL  The video also shows many older tanks that had sloped armour to show that others had thought of it before the T-34 but presumably had different ideas.  The video points out that sloped armour, heat-treated armour and other steel quality and production issues need to be considered.
It really is an amusing and fun video with some very provocative premises.  I recommend the commitment of 50 odd minutes to watch it.  

What blasphemy! Don't you know that the T-34 was made of pure stalanium and invented the concept of angles!

Common wisdom confirmed by some vets here is that they would carry about 400-500 rounds max when about to enter combat.  But, yes, once one also adds on all the extra stuff, it feels like most inf in CM can be overloaded - but with little discernible movement penalties. 
In the modern titles if a squad carries too many Javelins they may no longer be able to move FAST.  And an WW2 HMG team reduced to one or two guys loaded with a couple thousand rounds may only move MOVE.

Let me start by saying that those of you who find Blinkov's military analyses with its frog puppet jarring are going to really have an issue with Lazer PIg. That said, if you can get past the bizarre front end and a super abundance of NSFW language throughout, there is a wealth of material here on the realities of the T-34, not the propaganda, self-serving analyses, rigged tests, erroneous assumptions and writings of lazy historians. This makes that long online piece called The Myth of T-34 Superiority seem like a passing thought by comparison, slaughtering sacred cows, "known facts", "reliable data" and other structures built not just on sand, but weak sand at that, with wild abandon, even using statements by Stalin about major T-34 reliability problems. Some long time CM hands talk about depicting Tiger and Panther reliability by reducing the percentage actually available for battle, but that seems highly unfair when you learn that in a 500 km road march, HALF of all the T-34s broke down en route. The Russian crew survival rates were shocking if a. tank was hit and penetrated. Russian figures in Dunn's Hitler's Nemesis showed that when a tank was destroyed, so generally were all the crew members killed or incapacitated by wounds.  This became a huge problem for the Red Army which, unlike the British at GOOD WOOD, who had plenty of replacement tanks and crews with a pretty high overall survival rate (typically 1-2 casualties per tank knocked out), the Russians were being forced to replace the tanks and the crews. This is but one of many topics discussed in this wide-ranging, take no prisoners hour-long video. Frankly, I wish it had been longer, for as deep as it went, there simply wasn't time to really get deeply into various maters. If you've ever heard of the expression "drinking from the fire hydrant", you can experience that by watching this most impressive video. There is a wealth of material, too, in the comments and Lazer Pig's replies. Net net, I believe you will never again look at the T-34 quite the same way again.
 

Regards,

John Kettler

A very small request would be the ability to sort scenarios chronologically.

The implication is that he was about to publish a 2022 one, so presumably Elvis has some stuff to show off.

I just found this video on youtube and thought it might fit well here, although it probably has not much new information for most of you:
 

I feel like that standard for calling someone "toxic" needs to a bit higher than them saying something that is "harmful to the title's reputation". I don't think anything should be immune from criticism. Although I am curious as to what bugs he's referring to. There are ongoing arguments about which stuff is modeled correctly, but those aren't the same thing as actual bugs (and I'm of the opinion that those things are already modeled about right). There were a handful of actual bugs early on, but those have been ironed out (the floating track on the bmp comes to mind). Perhaps he meant "big update"? 'i' and 'u' are right next to each other on the keyboard so it would be an easy typo to make, and "waiting for the big update" makes more sense than "waiting for the bug update". Or perhaps he's referring to the promised performance improvements with Engine 5 (although that isn't specific to CMCW)? In any case, it's best to ask for clarification before being too harsh on someone.

I feel like that standard for calling someone "toxic" needs to a bit higher than them saying something that is "harmful to the title's reputation". I don't think anything should be immune from criticism. Although I am curious as to what bugs he's referring to. There are ongoing arguments about which stuff is modeled correctly, but those aren't the same thing as actual bugs (and I'm of the opinion that those things are already modeled about right). There were a handful of actual bugs early on, but those have been ironed out (the floating track on the bmp comes to mind). Perhaps he meant "big update"? 'i' and 'u' are right next to each other on the keyboard so it would be an easy typo to make, and "waiting for the big update" makes more sense than "waiting for the bug update". Or perhaps he's referring to the promised performance improvements with Engine 5 (although that isn't specific to CMCW)? In any case, it's best to ask for clarification before being too harsh on someone.

I feel like that standard for calling someone "toxic" needs to a bit higher than them saying something that is "harmful to the title's reputation". I don't think anything should be immune from criticism. Although I am curious as to what bugs he's referring to. There are ongoing arguments about which stuff is modeled correctly, but those aren't the same thing as actual bugs (and I'm of the opinion that those things are already modeled about right). There were a handful of actual bugs early on, but those have been ironed out (the floating track on the bmp comes to mind). Perhaps he meant "big update"? 'i' and 'u' are right next to each other on the keyboard so it would be an easy typo to make, and "waiting for the big update" makes more sense than "waiting for the bug update". Or perhaps he's referring to the promised performance improvements with Engine 5 (although that isn't specific to CMCW)? In any case, it's best to ask for clarification before being too harsh on someone.

We seem to have gone a bit off topic....
Let's get back on track!
Has anyone been surprised by how the Soviets play?
Has anyone found that certain tactics work that would not be allowed in the manual?
How do they fair in PBEM's?

I've been surprised by how good Soviet infantry and IFVs are. I mean obviously the BMP is pretty good, but even the BTR is basically the same as an M113 except better in every way lol. 
But even the infantry squads, theyre not as dominant in the long range engagements as a US team with 2 M60s and a Dragon, but in a shorter range fire fight their infantry is QUITE potent. I actually think that infantry vs. infantry the Soviets have a lot of advantages and it makes an interesting tactical pairing. One which is often overshadowed by the real stars of the CMCW show, the tank battles. 
A BMP squad with its IFV making a dismounted attack doesnt have as many toys as a heavy US platoon with an M113, but the Soviet squad has its own strengths and can deal a lot of damage. Plus the attached BMP brings a LOT to the table both in the anti-infantry and anti-tank role.