Soviet vs NATO tanks discussion in "International Security" magazine

[dbsapp]

There was an interesting discussion on Soviet and Western tank comparative capabilities in "International Security" magazine between Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher on one side, and Steven Zaloga on the other side in 1988-1989. Those debates, that happened almost 35 years ago, resemble the discussions we have today on this forum.

First, Malcolm Chalmers (University of Bradford, UK)and Lutz Unterseher(Chairman of the European Study Group on Alternative Security Policy, Germany) published an article "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets". In this paper they compared Warsaw Pact and NATO tank armies both quantitively and qualitatively. They argued that, despite WP had slight advantage in number of tanks, qualitive advantage of NATO equipment closed the gap and even provided some superiority to NATO.

This article is a real goldmine for those who want to prove that Soviet tanks were inferior, but for the purpose of intellectual honesty I will cite it here and do their homework for them  It really translates CMCW underlying concept. Anyway, as we will see later, this claims were confronted  by Steven Zaloga. 

Authors estimated that  a ratio between Warsaw Pact and NATO tank numbers in Central Europe of 1.47:1 three days after mobilization, 1.41:1 after ten days, 1.24:1 after 40 days and 1.31:1 after four months.

The average Warsaw Pact tank weighs only 38 metric tonnes compared with 49 metric tonnes for NATO. While the Warsaw Pact has a 2.1:1 lead in numbers of tanks worldwide, therefore, it has a lead of only 1.6:1 in total tank tonnage.

NATO's comparative advantage is also stocks of older generation models. NATO has followed a policy of carrying out major upgrades to ensure that, although the bodies of these tanks are 20 or more years old, the technology is almost comparable to that on its most modern tanks. As a consequence, the quality gap between old and new-generation models is relatively small. In contrast older models of Pact tanksave not been significantly upgraded.

As Chalmers and Unterseher argued, NATO tanks had technological edge in almost every aspect.

They claim, that earlier Soviet tank models are far inferior to any post-1950 Western tank in the all round orientation capability which they give the crew. Soviet tanks have fewer and smaller viewing points on commanders' cupolas, and commanders still have to stick their heads out more in order to observe their surroundings. All Soviet tanks rely on "active" illumination of their nighttime surroundings with clumsy searchlights.

In Soviet tanks, the commander's and gunner's sights used in targeting generally exhibit a low level of sophistication. Soviet range-finding technology lagged for many years well behind that of the West.  The Soviets did not begin to incorporate the more accurate optical base-on-own-vehicle range-finders into some of their tanks  until 20 years after the U.S. had begun to do so.

With the introduction of its T-62 tank in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union pioneered the extensive use of a large caliber, smooth-bore gun. Muzzle velocities of kinetic energy rounds fired from these guns are high. But this advantage is largely wasted because of the gun's poor accuracy, a result of stability problems with the gun barrel and of inadequate quality control on ammunition production.

The difficulties caused by these cramped and dangerous conditions are such that Soviet tank crews must be less than 1.65 meters tall, a constraint that severely limits the recruiting pool for tank crews and could therefore have adverse effects on crew quality.

To conclude, USSR actual numerical advantage is relatively small, ranging from 1.24:1 to 1.64:1. But the qualitive difference transforms it into a NATO combat potential lead of between 1.06:1 and 1.42:1.

In 1989 well known tank expert Steven Zaloga published his answer in the same magazine ("The Tank Gap Data Flap"), where he called  Chalmers and Unterseher arguments "too one-sided and simplistic". In his words, they "in many respects  overstated their case".

Although the authors spend a great deal of time pinpointing technical deficiencies in older Soviet designs like the T-55 and T-62, The Soviet forward deployed forces have been in the process of removing these older tanks from their units in favor of T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks. 

The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank design suffer from factual inaccuracies and Western biases in tank design. For example, their assertion that "all Soviet tanks rely on 'active' illumination" is simply false. All Soviet tanks do carry an active infrared search light for nighttime illumination, but the same is true for most NATO tanks produced up to the early 1980s, including the M60A3, Leopard 1 and Chieftain.

In fact Soviets introduced passive night gunner's sights using image intensification technology in the late 1960s with the T-64 and in the early 1970s with late model T-62s; they have been using them ever since. NATO enjoys a comfortable lead in second generation night sights using thermal imaging technology. About a third of NATO tanks have thermal imaging sights, and about 15 percent still rely on the older image intensification sights. But over half of NATO tanks still rely on older active infrared night sights or have no night fighting capability at all. The Soviets have been adopting thermal imaging sights at a much slower pace due to high cost, but over a third of their tanks now have passive image intensification night sights.

The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank fire controls reveals a distinct NATO bias in favor of long-range tank engagements. The use of ballistic computers, wind sensors, and other fire control improvements greatly increase tank gun accuracy at long ranges (over 1000 meters), but have little effect at close ranges. The Soviets feel that simpler fire controls are adequate due to the prevalence of "close-grain" terrain in Central Europe. In German border region, 55 percent of the terrain has sighting ranges of 500 meters or less, 28 percent from 500 to 1500 m, and 17 percent over 1500 m. 

Stadiametric sights, as used on the T-62 and earlier types, are not substantially inferior to advanced fire controls when using Armor Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) ammunition at ranges up to 1000 m, since the ballistic arc of the projectile is so flat. For example, U.S. Army trials suggest that at 500 m, a tank using a stadiametric sight has a 98 percent probability of hit, and a tank with a laser range finder has the same 98 percent probability.In any event, the tanks most likely to be encountered in the first weeks of a conflict in Central Europe, namely the T-64, T-72, and T-80, are all equipped with laser range finders and ballistic computers.

The authors' general conclusion that Warsaw Pact tanks are "much less capable" than comparable NATO tanks is a gross simplification. NATO tanks do enjoy substantial advantages during certain types of tank engagements, such as long-range duels, or night engagements where there is not enough ambient moonlight for image intensification sights to work. But under many average situations, such as tank combat at average (under 1000 m) ranges during daylight, NATO advantages rapidly diminish. 

To draw my own conclusion, I would say that both  Chalmers and Zaloga made strong arguments. It shows that there is no single, already scientifically proven point of view. The thing that we discussed here were debatable earlier and they remain debatable today (though we gain new knowledge and data since then ).   

In my opinion CMCW and CMBS designers have chosen the concept of force balance that is based on arguments as those that were proposed by Chalmers and Unterseher. This is their right of course, and they can provide some arguments to defense their position. 

But what Chalmers-Zaloga discussion showed is that this concept is far from being the only one.  There are other views that can be grounded in facts as well. Which one better for the purpose of game simulation, balance and - the last but not the least - fun, is up to game designers to decide and for players to evaluate. 

[The_Capt]

11 minutes ago, dbsapp said:

In my opinion CMCW and CMBS designers have chosen the concept of force balance that is based on arguments as those that were proposed by Chalmers and Unterseher. This is their right of course, and they can provide some arguments to defense their position.

Excellent post.  I gotta say that I do disagree with this part though, at least a bit.  Western Bias is a thing, don't get me wrong, so is Eastern bias.  Almost all of our sources are in English (we do use translated stuff when we can find it) and therefore are going to have that bias built in.

But as a Game Lead for CMCW, I gotta say I really agree with a lot of what Zaloga is saying and the game as modeled leans more in this direction.  Further it lines up with the single case analysis by Nordeen and Isby M60 vs T-62 Cold War Combatants 1956-92 almost exactly.  On pages 85 and 91 there are handy accuracy assessments that show exaclty what Zaloga is talking about, once you get under 1000m the disparity between NATO and Soviet tanks starts to evaporate. 

So what? Well as early as the Beta ARR it became apparent that for successful use of Soviet tanks you need:

- Mass - Soviets had lots of tanks so even at tactical level you need to manage for overmatch - the echoes what @Grey_Fox posted on the "other thread"

- Range - Get in close, do not play western style and try to play long range sniping-counter sniping because that will not work.

A Coy of T64s at 1000m versus a Coy of M60A1s (equal crew quality) is not a fair match up - I have run some basic test and am seeing 2 to 1 in favor of the Soviets, particularly if you open up the T64s and offset the ergonomic issues.

I think most of the Soviet-Frustration centers on employing western tactics on them. 

In the end the technical realities of Soviet equipment are likely accurate (night vision argument accepted) while Zaloga adds context.  Although one thing I cannot rationalize is that if Soviets knew they were looking at the close game, why did they keep trying to put ATGMS on absolutely everything, even tanks?  A long game eventuality had to be in the calculus somewhere.

[BeondTheGrave]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

In the end the technical realities of Soviet equipment are likely accurate (night vision argument accepted) while Zaloga adds context.  Although one thing I cannot rationalize is that if Soviets knew they were looking at the close game, why did they keep trying to put ATGMS on absolutely everything, even tanks?  A long game eventuality had to be in the calculus somewhere.

I havn't read, so I dont know either way. But I read it as three things, all very much in support of another. First, if you accept your tanks are going to need to get in close to even the odds and bring their weight to bare there is a huge stretch of killzone between the treeline youre driving out of and the hillside you plan to use as a firing position. ATGMs help cover that gap. The 9K112 has, IIRC, about the same range as the AT-4 or about 4000m. I cant imagine many sightlines in West Germany are longer than 4km, and so a tank sitting in cover on the start line or advancing outside of their own fire envelop could return decent or at least annoying fire with any exposed NATO vehicle. Second, and just as important, a tank dug in along the same treeline would be able to execute its own long range defensive fire ala the Golan battles without having the guns or the training to replicate Israeli tactics. Now I know that we tend to assume that the Soviets would never have considered the defensive, but I think thats (partially) inaccurate. The US made little secret about the 'Active' nature of its own plans, and German politics precluded them losing much territory. Combined with World War Two experience, I think its pretty obvious to conclude that NATO would have heaped in major counterattacks against advancing units. Example, the Egyptians accurately predicted just that kind of response in the Sinai in 1973 and were ready for it. Adding ATGMs gives Soviets an important edge in the defensive battle, and TBH is one of the biggest problems their tanks have in the ranged engagement in CMCW. (Interesting experiment for a dev build: what if Soviet Tanks had their ATGMs modeled?) Lastly ATGMs help keep the old tanks relevant, why not keep the development process churning by building that capability into newer tanks? After all if youre a true Soviet believer youd probably have anticipated a replacement to the T-80 much earlier than actually occurred. 

Thats just my .02$, obviously without having the docs on hand who can say? My own gut feeling though is that militaries never 'accept the close fight' in some existential way. Like could you imagine if modern US tankers had to just 'accept' that the Russians or the Chinese totally outranged them by factor 3? In the short term guys on the ground might develop tactics to overcome that, but in the medium and long term the American solution would be to develop a new system or systems to cover that gap. We see that exact process, though troubled, with the Abrams. Seems reasonable to me that the Russians wanted to do the same thing and the ATGM systems were a good way to improve the long range capability without sacrificing other characteristics. 

[The_Capt]

48 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

Interesting experiment for a dev build: what if Soviet Tanks had their ATGMs modeled?

We did, for the T64 and T80s the AT 8 is onboard for the B series in game. And the M60A2 has that Shillelagh. 

I think that for offence, the Soviet approach may have been to try and strip off enemy armor at range and then close in with tanks.  Or maybe, as you point out, it was a defensive measure.  Soviets were ATGM crazy compared to the US, that is for sure.  

 

[BeondTheGrave]

@TheCaptainTBH I think seeing the M60A2 in game is what convinced me to make the purchase  cant believe I forgot to mention that. 

I think mostly your right, though from what I've read about the '73 War the emphasis for Arab tactics was on advancing quickly without stopping or shooting when crossing the exposed region. I wonder what a 4km+ ATGM would have done to Israeli firing positions had it been available, while the AT-3 was less effective up there (from what I've read) I could see a lot of sense in giving tanks their own very long range ATGM to do a sort of caterpillar or leapfrog type movement at extreme ranges. We like to talk a lot about how Israeli long range gunnery outclassed Syrian tanks on the first day, but their initial rush worked in the south and turned much of the subsequent fighting into the kind of knife fight type engagements youre calling for. Meanwhile in the Sinai, the Egyptians relied on trying to outsnipe Israeli M-60s and Shot Kals. IIRC even when they crossed over the canal and resumed the offensive on D+3 and on, Egyptians tanks often stopped to shoot it out with Israeli tanks. They suffered fewer overall losses in those engagements (because it was easier for them to pull back) but their exchanges were almost as lopsided as the Syrians, AND they took less ground. Perhaps a real life example of exactly the kind of phenomenon re: Soviet tactics you always discuss. 

Anyway I think I fell off topic so I'll stop here. 

[THH149]

Agree with the sentiments here - don't try cold war defensive methods on the attack and don't try attacking methods on the defense - things go wrong.

To emphasise the maneuver orientation of the Soviets, scenario designers should strongly consider an exit objective.

About Zaloga, I heard that his stuff (Osprey?) was heavily biased, are they any good? 

 

[The_Capt]

Just to add/follow up to my first post on this whole Soviet/US force balance thing, I can't speak for CMBS but for CMCW the were never any secret meetings in dark rooms where we all went "Wow those Soviets are too good, we need to nerf them to maintain US superiority".  First off, I am not a US citizen so not really interested in some sort of US superiority myth.  Second, I have never seen or heard BFC promote the same, they are simply interested in trying to be as accurate as possible because it is core to the brand. 

Third, it would have been a really bad idea game-wise to do this.  Both CMSF2 and CMBS already demonstrate asymmetric superiority of the US inventory, well into the modern timeframe when the US Army has been unchallenged and at its height (how long that will last is a matter of rigorous debate).  Why on earth would we want another game that models that direction?  It is a big reason why we stayed away from the 1985-1991 timeframe.  We were looking for later Cold War balance that makes for a different gaming experience, more like the WW2 titles with modern kit. 

I can recall exactly one US weapon system we pushed to have beefed and that was DPICM, we really did not tinker under the hood for anything else.  We knew we had balance from the the very first Alpha scenario tests.

So I know there will be those that cry "lies, lies, it is all a BFC conspiracy", fine we can post facts and analysis here all day and they will remain unconvinced.   For everyone else, as I said we no doubt have western biases - it is almost unavoidable - however, we also remain open to credible facts that tell us we are missing something.

Edited February 9, 2022 by The_Capt

[arkhangelsk2021]

As a player, I think a very important consideration in making choices in the modeling, to not only be accurate, but to give an impression of being fair. This is all the more important if your model doesn't allow for perfect replication anyway, so you have decide how to circumnavigate the limitation.

One example I always like to bring up is the 2-crew BMP. I know it came from a Soviet manual. But the Soviet manual also assumes 50m wide frontages (thus the squad AOR is also only 50m wide), which I don't think many players obey strictly.
Further, even with with squad mounted I still suffer from a disadvantage b/c CM counts the commander and the BMP crew as two entities which means the interaction will never be as seamless as "one crew" even though that's what they are supposed to be. Finally, if I want to keep a spotter in the BMP, I have to peel off TWO people from my already small squad due to CM's limitations.

While acknowledging there's no perfect solution to this problem, I think the better circumnavigation would have been to use a 3-crew BMP even if it means giving another penalty to the squad - for example, maybe it can't split, which will be doctrinally correct in the CMCW period and even CMBS (there's a fire and a maneuver group, but they act in such close company it's equivalent to that Assault Command, so it doesn't have to be allowed to Split).

Because when you use a 2-crew BMP, even if it may be of less actual difference than I fear ... it's psychological. When an M113 or Bradley doesn't spot something, it's no one's fault. Every time a 2-crew BMP doesn't spot something, or it's late, it's hard not to have dark thoughts.

At least CM:CW finally got rid of that 9-footslogger Bradley.

Another thing is ... On-Map artillery. I don't think it's a huge problem that Soviet response times are slower, nor is it unrealistic. On the other hand, the Soviets also know that and compensate by attaching artillery down to company and battery commanders are up front with direct lines to their batteries to speed up the process. The artillery is pushed up much further forward, enough artillery calculations can be simplified for speed. 
But I can't do ANY of that in CM:CW, because only Mortars can be on-map. Oh, and I can't program fires either, so instead of a preplanned fire program smoothly (if inflexibly) switching to hitting deeper and deeper lines in turn, what happens is that the Artillery hits target 1, then takes a TEN-minute break before it hits Target 2, which I already knew I wanted to hit from the start but couldn't pre-program. Of course, the Americans can't pre-program either, but if your on-call delay is only three minutes you are hurt a lot less by it. You see how the "realism" acts in symbiosis with the game's limitations to really make things hard on the Soviets. Perhaps harder than it should be.

I think it's little things like this that gives BFC a reputation in the opposite direction of Gaijin. And when players go into the game with that mentality, every unspotted T-62 is just bad luck, while every unspotted M60 is a conspiracy. 

[domfluff]

17 hours ago, The_Capt said:

In the end the technical realities of Soviet equipment are likely accurate (night vision argument accepted) while Zaloga adds context.  Although one thing I cannot rationalize is that if Soviets knew they were looking at the close game, why did they keep trying to put ATGMS on absolutely everything, even tanks?  A long game eventuality had to be in the calculus somewhere.

So a suggestion around that point:

Long ranges happen. Whether you're aiming for a close range engagement or not, you'll have to start at long range and move closer, so it's important to be able to contest at these ranges, even if it's not your ideal situation.

I suspect the main advantage of ATGMs for the Soviets are the limitations of their main gun FCS. Since the Soviets couldn't compete in microtechnology, there was no way for a Soviet FCS to match a US one of the same period, so a logical alternative was to rely on a human "FCS", and a man-guided weapon.

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, arkhangelsk2021 said:

As a player, I think a very important consideration in making choices in the modeling, to not only be accurate, but to give an impression of being fair. This is all the more important if your model doesn't allow for perfect replication anyway, so you have decide how to circumnavigate the limitation.

One example I always like to bring up is the 2-crew BMP. I know it came from a Soviet manual. But the Soviet manual also assumes 50m wide frontages (thus the squad AOR is also only 50m wide), which I don't think many players obey strictly.
Further, even with with squad mounted I still suffer from a disadvantage b/c CM counts the commander and the BMP crew as two entities which means the interaction will never be as seamless as "one crew" even though that's what they are supposed to be. Finally, if I want to keep a spotter in the BMP, I have to peel off TWO people from my already small squad due to CM's limitations.

While acknowledging there's no perfect solution to this problem, I think the better circumnavigation would have been to use a 3-crew BMP even if it means giving another penalty to the squad - for example, maybe it can't split, which will be doctrinally correct in the CMCW period and even CMBS (there's a fire and a maneuver group, but they act in such close company it's equivalent to that Assault Command, so it doesn't have to be allowed to Split).

Because when you use a 2-crew BMP, even if it may be of less actual difference than I fear ... it's psychological. When an M113 or Bradley doesn't spot something, it's no one's fault. Every time a 2-crew BMP doesn't spot something, or it's late, it's hard not to have dark thoughts.

At least CM:CW finally got rid of that 9-footslogger Bradley.

Another thing is ... On-Map artillery. I don't think it's a huge problem that Soviet response times are slower, nor is it unrealistic. On the other hand, the Soviets also know that and compensate by attaching artillery down to company and battery commanders are up front with direct lines to their batteries to speed up the process. The artillery is pushed up much further forward, enough artillery calculations can be simplified for speed. 
But I can't do ANY of that in CM:CW, because only Mortars can be on-map. Oh, and I can't program fires either, so instead of a preplanned fire program smoothly (if inflexibly) switching to hitting deeper and deeper lines in turn, what happens is that the Artillery hits target 1, then takes a TEN-minute break before it hits Target 2, which I already knew I wanted to hit from the start but couldn't pre-program. Of course, the Americans can't pre-program either, but if your on-call delay is only three minutes you are hurt a lot less by it. You see how the "realism" acts in symbiosis with the game's limitations to really make things hard on the Soviets. Perhaps harder than it should be.

I think it's little things like this that gives BFC a reputation in the opposite direction of Gaijin. And when players go into the game with that mentality, every unspotted T-62 is just bad luck, while every unspotted M60 is a conspiracy. 

Fair points:

- As to BMPs, well we did go with the manual/doctrine on dismounts.  This is the never-ending problem with all IFVs; is it a vehicle with supporting infantry, or infantry with a supporting vehicle?  I think the answer is to build in an option to have a 2 or 3 man crew based on situation, but the game is not built to model that right now, maybe in the future.

- On Map Arty.  I get Soviet arty response times resentment, but they are based again on Soviet doctrine, it is their C2 system being modeled.  I have no doubt the Soviets were capable of far more nuanced artillery approaches, during both world wars Russian artillery was very good.  In-game spotters can be pushed forward and times can be tweak based on experience.  As to on map guns; well that does not make a lot of sense on a 5x3 map when the D-30 effective range is 15 kms, as were most tubes in that era.  Having guns on map would happen, particularly if things went badly, but as a matter of standard procedure it would only make sense if the maps were about 3-4 times the size they are now...again, not this engine unfortunately.  

What is weird about this Soviet-US debate is that in-game result are not really matching the complaint.  I am seeing plenty of Total Soviet Victories on YouTube streams, hell I even managed a marginal win against Bil in the AAR.  Usually Hapless last game stream only had a "Minor US Victory".  We have some Matrix tourneys coming up so we will be watching these to see if the game actually slants towards the US, because right now I am not seeing it to be honest.

[AlexUK]

19 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Fair points:

- As to BMPs, well we did go with the manual/doctrine on dismounts.  This is the never-ending problem with all IFVs; is it a vehicle with supporting infantry, or infantry with a supporting vehicle?  I think the answer is to build in an option to have a 2 or 3 man crew based on situation, but the game is not built to model that right now, maybe in the future.

- On Map Arty.  I get Soviet arty response times resentment, but they are based again on Soviet doctrine, it is their C2 system being modeled.  I have no doubt the Soviets were capable of far more nuanced artillery approaches, during both world wars Russian artillery was very good.  In-game spotters can be pushed forward and times can be tweak based on experience.  As to on map guns; well that does not make a lot of sense on a 5x3 map when the D-30 effective range is 15 kms, as were most tubes in that era.  Having guns on map would happen, particularly if things went badly, but as a matter of standard procedure it would only make sense if the maps were about 3-4 times the size they are now...again, not this engine unfortunately.  

What is weird about this Soviet-US debate is that in-game result are not really matching the complaint.  I am seeing plenty of Total Soviet Victories on YouTube streams, hell I even managed a marginal win against Bil in the AAR.  Usually Hapless last game stream only had a "Minor US Victory".  We have some Matrix tourneys coming up so we will be watching these to see if the game actually slants towards the US, because right now I am not seeing it to be honest.

I'd much prefer three man crew in bmp. 

[domfluff]

As an aside, I do think it's ironic that this comment about US bias was on a youtube video that might have included some of the most positive and pro-Soviet tactical discussion that I've ever heard in relation to Combat Mission. Or at least that was my intent when I was recording my part of it.

I'm aware that Hapless is personally still not currently 100% convinced that the Soviet approach can work, and that the deficiencies and limitations can be overcome in the context of a Combat Mission Quick Battle.

I am convinced that the Soviets can work, and work well in that context, particularly in the 1979-1980 period. The more advanced kit you add (broadly, the more thermals you add, but there's more to it than that), the harder time the Soviets will have, and the less like Cold War and the more like Shock Force the game becomes. In addition, the better Soviet kit in this earlier period exceeds the capabilities of US kit by all of the most basic measures (mobility, firepower, armour, etc.), and quite a few of the softer ones as well (the RPG-7 is an incredibly important and versatile weapon in this time period, the Soviet man-portable ATGMs are equally effective to TOW in practical terms, but significantly more agile. The BMP has a ludicrous amount of firepower in one space. The mentality is quite different - you need to be proactive, and your role as top-level commander is more difficult, because more weight is being put onto you to conceive and manage the battle on the large scale.


I've never wanted to leave a dismount in the BMP for spotting. This is not doctrinal, and it's also not a good idea, since you need to make the use of the limited squad that you have. BMPs shouldn't dismount at all in an ideal situation, and when they do dismount (close terrain, strong AT opposition) it's vitally important that the squad and BMP remain within close supporting distance of each other, within four action spots. The infantry are your eyes, and when the BMP is fighting in this supporting role, it's primarily going to be area-firing at partial contacts or suspected positions. "Fighting mounted" doesn't mean using the firing ports as a primary weapon, and nor is it primarily an NBC concern - dismounting takes time, and the one thing the Soviets really lack is time.

[Thewood1]

One thing to keep in mind is the story that missile-capable tanks were reserved for platoon commanders in Soviet tank formations.  That was due to missile and fire control costs.  So that cuts missile armed tanks by a third to a quarter.  I'll see if I can find the source.  I think it was the Osprey book on the T-64 and a doc on steelbeasts.com.

[MikeyD]

In our timeframe the Soviets had a robust (one might say massive) electronics warfare capability controlled at Division level. It doesn't get used much in-game because its just not 'fun' to be cut off from your air and artillery assets, not to mention cutting your command lnks. EW use in Ukraine in 2014 really made the Pentagon sit up and take notice. It might be instructive to bring your favorite scenario into the editor, turn the Russian EW up to max, then replay to see what a difference it would make. Russians wouldn't have to worry about incoming cluster munitions, in that event.

[Megalon Jones]

32 minutes ago, MikeyD said:

In our timeframe the Soviets had a robust (one might say massive) electronics warfare capability controlled at Division level. It doesn't get used much in-game because its just not 'fun' to be cut off from your air and artillery assets, not to mention cutting your command lnks. EW use in Ukraine in 2014 really made the Pentagon sit up and take notice. It might be instructive to bring your favorite scenario into the editor, turn the Russian EW up to max, then replay to see what a difference it would make. Russians wouldn't have to worry about incoming cluster munitions, in that event.

When playing solo QMB I tend to turn up the EW all the way up for both sides.  I just assume that the air would be filled with tons of electronic noise making communication difficult.

[Gkenny]

7 hours ago, Thewood1 said:

One thing to keep in mind is the story that missile-capable tanks were reserved for platoon commanders in Soviet tank formations.  That was due to missile and fire control costs.  So that cuts missile armed tanks by a third to a quarter.  I'll see if I can find the source.  I think it was the Osprey book on the T-64 and a doc on steelbeasts.com.

While I'm not too sure about that, I do know that soviet command variants of tanks for company level and above (K variants, which we don't have in game for some reason despite having BMP variants) did not carry the ATGMs in order to save space for the extra communications equipment.

[arkhangelsk2021]

9 hours ago, Thewood1 said:

One thing to keep in mind is the story that missile-capable tanks were reserved for platoon commanders in Soviet tank formations.  That was due to missile and fire control costs.  So that cuts missile armed tanks by a third to a quarter.  I'll see if I can find the source.  I think it was the Osprey book on the T-64 and a doc on steelbeasts.com.

As far as Osprey is concerned, 

Quote

 

Total production of the T-64B family was about 4,200 tanks plus another 1,200 T-64B1.

 

So there were more missile tanks than non-missile ones, at least according to Zaloga, but that begs the question of whether there was a point in making a minority of tanks that can't fire missiles.

Steelbeasts does claim the exact opposite:

Quote

 

The modeled T-64B variant reflects a later 1981 modernization with replacement of the gun by a 2A46M1, yet another stabilizer upgrade and mounting 902A "Tucha-1" smoke grenade launchers on either side of the gun. Originally manufactured in two versions, the base T-64B and the T-64B1, which lacks the ability to fire the AT-8, the base model only represents 1/3 of total production.

Note that the fielding of two different models of T-64B results from Soviet doctrine involving the role of gun-launched ATGMs. As missiles such as the AT-8 are intended for use against enemy attack helicopters and ATGM platforms rather than enemy tanks, their use is restricted to command elements only. For scenario designers this means that a typical Soviet tank company (ten tanks) only has four tanks capable of firing the AT-8: the company commander (T-64BK) and each platoon leader (T-64B x 3) while the rest of the company used the T-64B1. To replicate this, scenario designers should divide existing T-64B platoons in the Mission Editor, remove all AT-8 ammunition on the wing tanks, and recombine the platoons.

 

 

Edited February 10, 2022 by arkhangelsk2021
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[DMS]

20 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- As to BMPs, well we did go with the manual/doctrine on dismounts.  This is the never-ending problem with all IFVs; is it a vehicle with supporting infantry, or infantry with a supporting vehicle?  I think the answer is to build in an option to have a 2 or 3 man crew based on situation, but the game is not built to model that right now, maybe in the future.

 

IRL solution was to keep platoon leader assistant in BMP as commander of platoon BMPs while PL is dismounted. 

Here is the video. Since 21:15 is episode when PL orders PL assistant (who stays in BMP and controls all platoon BMPs) to suppress machine gun. 

21:15

 

[domfluff]

A clearer idea of how that works, and why the implementation in Black Sea and Cold War is what it is:






Leaving behind the Platoon Sergeant in one of three BMPs is a thing which is done, for coordination and especially to man the radio. It's not done for spotting, and doesn't need to be - that's a very different thing.

Edited February 10, 2022 by domfluff

[zmoney]

Am I the only one that doesn’t see much difference in opinion between the two opposing sides in the OP post? That NATO tanks are better at spotting and NATO tanks have better FCS’s??? Both sides admitted this. I believe IRL and in game terms the M60 is a superior tank to anything the Soviets have T62 and before. Once T64 is introduced I believe the Soviets have better tanks until the Abrams, Leopard and Chieftain come out.

 

I think this plays out in game as well. Currently I’m in a PBEM where my opponent is utilizing the M60 and I the T64. Even though he has a numerical advantage I am absolutely winning the tank battle. I’d say spotting is about 50-50, sometimes I spot first sometimes he does. In fact first kill went to my tanks which spotting an M60 in a wood line and KO’ed it with the first shot at about 800+ meters. The only issue I have seen with either game is the Bradley in CMBS seems a little too resilient to 30mm rounds. 

[Combatintman]

2 hours ago, zmoney said:

Am I the only one that doesn’t see much difference in opinion between the two opposing sides in the OP post? That NATO tanks are better at spotting and NATO tanks have better FCS’s??? Both sides admitted this. I believe IRL and in game terms the M60 is a superior tank to anything the Soviets have T62 and before. Once T64 is introduced I believe the Soviets have better tanks until the Abrams, Leopard and Chieftain come out.

 

I think this plays out in game as well. Currently I’m in a PBEM where my opponent is utilizing the M60 and I the T64. Even though he has a numerical advantage I am absolutely winning the tank battle. I’d say spotting is about 50-50, sometimes I spot first sometimes he does. In fact first kill went to my tanks which spotting an M60 in a wood line and KO’ed it with the first shot at about 800+ meters. The only issue I have seen with either game is the Bradley in CMBS seems a little too resilient to 30mm rounds. 

Not so sure about Chieftain - Chieftain gunnery was pretty steam driven until the later marks of the tank came out.  If we get the Brits in a future module I will be interested to see how it performs.  I'm hoping that the 120mm gun and heavy armour will give it a good chance against the T-64 and T-80 but I'm not sure.

[domfluff]

Chieftain was pretty much the biggest and scariest thing around... for a brief period in the sixties (and assuming it didn't have to move all that much). The heaviest Soviet armour was arrayed against it for a reason.

Chieftain should have heavier armour than an M60 and have better penetration, at least compared to the earlier ammunition types.

Whether that "heavier armour" will be noticeable versus the 115mm/125mm, and whether the penetration will be noticeable versus the T-64+ I'm a lot less certain.

[Codreanu]

Chieftain seems like an overall worse version of the M60 to me in this time frame. More armor but not enough to matter so it just adds a lot of extra weight, bigger gun but only firing APDS. According to Tankograd the T-72A should be impervious to L15A5 APDS even at point blank range unless you hit the lower front plate which is pretty much how M735 performs in game.

[domfluff]

We'll see how it shakes out.

One interesting distinction is that where US doctrine is pretty much defined by TOW (kill zones are at TOW range and more or less stop at Dragon range before packing up and falling back, with the M60s floating in the middle of those), the BAOR was really built around Chieftain, and the range and power of the 120mm. (Similarly, the Germans being built around Leopard and Marder, and the focus on mobility to create depth).

I suspect it will be impressive in isolation (or at least compared to the M60A1), but any advantages might well be lost when compared to the better Soviet armour. I expect it' might be a  major problem for T-62 and T-55 though.

[The_Capt]

And can we talk about the Centurion?  Is this thing the T55 of NATO in our timeframe?