Centurian52

The Maple Feline gave better answers to your current set of questions than I was about to. But if you have further game engine questions I recommend checking out AR's youtube channel. He knows things about the engine that never occurred to me even after 15 years of playing the games.
https://www.youtube.com/@AR-GuidesAndMore

I decided a while back to replace one of the house textures (the one with large grey blocks) with something a little different and ended up adding four new house skins along with two new modular building skins.  While I was working on the files, I also added basic weathering to the tile roofs for all buildings.  You can download the file from the link below and place it in your data/Z folder.  
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OjN0AcVIsFzEthIbAaTBq2CXrhVbLQTN/view?usp=sharing

Already subscribed!! Especially useful for me were the vids on mounting and dismounting and (especially) how to tell the blast command exactly which section you want blown up. Who knew?!?!

The Maple Feline gave better answers to your current set of questions than I was about to. But if you have further game engine questions I recommend checking out AR's youtube channel. He knows things about the engine that never occurred to me even after 15 years of playing the games.
https://www.youtube.com/@AR-GuidesAndMore

New batch of YPR-765 from Netherlands, equipped with more protected combat modules.
These Cold War YPR/M113 showed itself as perfect "combat taxi" - cheap - without surplus high-tech features, well-protected, well-offroad and with proper space inside for equipped soldiers. We need hundreds and thousands of them. 
 
 

Exactly this. To the lay man, nukes are just a weapons system. In reality, they sit within a long thought out and tested set of systems and assumptions that every nuclear power devotes a military and political bureaucracy to. The entire structure is to ensure that nobody, ever, destabilizes the system because destabilization almost certainly leads to use. 
When that system collapses in any country, we are all in a hell of a lot of trouble.

There is definitely software that can build an accurate 3D model of an area based on data gathered from a moving camera. That is not a capability that an image-recognition AI would normally have. It isn't hard to image pairing the 3D modeling capability with the image recognition capability. But remember the first rule of AI. What's hard is easy, and what's easy is hard.
You'd need extra logic to prevent it from spitting out an answer other than "yep, there's a tank at the location of that flat rectangle in the 3D model". You might solve that by building a 3D model recognition AI. But it probably won't always be possible or practical to build a full 3D model, so you'll want to retain the flat image recognition software. But there will be cases where the image recognition software will say an object isn't a tank, while the 3D model software will say that it is a tank and visa-versa. Which do you train the overall program to trust?
For now I think the answer is manned-unmanned teaming (swarms of unmanned platforms controlled from a single manned command platform). If what's hard for humans is easy for AI, and what's easy for humans is hard for AI, then having them work together just makes sense (at least until we can figure out how to make what's easy for humans easy for AI). I think manned-unmanned teaming is the route we're going down in the near-term. It allows us to use AI on the battlefield right now, without having to wait for it to get more advanced, while effectively compensating for the weaknesses of modern AI. And it seems like a natural mid point between a fully manned force and a fully unmanned force (it seems plainly obvious to me that fully unmanned is the way things will be done in the far future).
For sure our 6th gen fighter program is going for manned-unmanned teaming. But I think ground warfare is going to go down that route as well sooner or later. Imagine a tank platoon, or possibly even a tank company, in which all of the actual "tanks" are UGVs and the only manned platform is the HQ vehicle. Or an artillery battery in which all of the guns are UGVs, with their fire directed from a single HQ vehicle. I could even imagine a mortar platoon in which all of the tubes are mounted on UGVs controlled remotely by a specialist from the company HQ.

This, or other tricks like it, would work against modern AI*. We might find ways to teach AI to get wise to such tricks in the near-future (hard to guess how "near", but surely it can't be an impossible problem). So I guess a good question might be, are we discussing modern warfare (say, now to 5 years from now) or near-future warfare (say 10-20 years from now)? If we're talking modern warfare, then stupid-seeming tricks like this will almost certainly work very well against any AI that are put into the field. If we're talking near-future warfare, it's reasonable to assume that we'll have figured out how to make AI that doesn't fall for these sorts of tricks (probably, though the pace of technological development is notoriously difficult to predict, with some breakthroughs coming earlier than anticipated and others coming far later than expected).
*First rule of AI. What's hard is easy, and what's easy is hard. If it's prohibitively difficult for a human to do, chances are it's trivially easy for an AI to do. But if it's something that a human finds to be trivially easy (such as recognizing the difference between a tank, and a billboard with an image of a tank), there's a good chance it will stump a modern AI. The hard part of getting AI to work they way we want it to work isn't figuring out how to get it to do the things we think are hard. It's figuring out how to get it to do the things we think are easy.

This, or other tricks like it, would work against modern AI*. We might find ways to teach AI to get wise to such tricks in the near-future (hard to guess how "near", but surely it can't be an impossible problem). So I guess a good question might be, are we discussing modern warfare (say, now to 5 years from now) or near-future warfare (say 10-20 years from now)? If we're talking modern warfare, then stupid-seeming tricks like this will almost certainly work very well against any AI that are put into the field. If we're talking near-future warfare, it's reasonable to assume that we'll have figured out how to make AI that doesn't fall for these sorts of tricks (probably, though the pace of technological development is notoriously difficult to predict, with some breakthroughs coming earlier than anticipated and others coming far later than expected).
*First rule of AI. What's hard is easy, and what's easy is hard. If it's prohibitively difficult for a human to do, chances are it's trivially easy for an AI to do. But if it's something that a human finds to be trivially easy (such as recognizing the difference between a tank, and a billboard with an image of a tank), there's a good chance it will stump a modern AI. The hard part of getting AI to work they way we want it to work isn't figuring out how to get it to do the things we think are hard. It's figuring out how to get it to do the things we think are easy.

This, or other tricks like it, would work against modern AI*. We might find ways to teach AI to get wise to such tricks in the near-future (hard to guess how "near", but surely it can't be an impossible problem). So I guess a good question might be, are we discussing modern warfare (say, now to 5 years from now) or near-future warfare (say 10-20 years from now)? If we're talking modern warfare, then stupid-seeming tricks like this will almost certainly work very well against any AI that are put into the field. If we're talking near-future warfare, it's reasonable to assume that we'll have figured out how to make AI that doesn't fall for these sorts of tricks (probably, though the pace of technological development is notoriously difficult to predict, with some breakthroughs coming earlier than anticipated and others coming far later than expected).
*First rule of AI. What's hard is easy, and what's easy is hard. If it's prohibitively difficult for a human to do, chances are it's trivially easy for an AI to do. But if it's something that a human finds to be trivially easy (such as recognizing the difference between a tank, and a billboard with an image of a tank), there's a good chance it will stump a modern AI. The hard part of getting AI to work they way we want it to work isn't figuring out how to get it to do the things we think are hard. It's figuring out how to get it to do the things we think are easy.

Well, if a cavalryman can put his mechanised steed down...

I'd include 1939 in that range. There's something about the near-peer combat in Poland that sets it apart from the peer vs peer fighting in France. I also just want to see the Polish in action with their own uniforms and equipment, before the loss of their country forced them into a Commonwealth force structure.

No. It will not lead to the eventual end of international law. International law might come to an end eventually, but it will not be because we stayed high. If anything, it might come to an end because we went low.
I think you are missing some very basic fundamentals about this war, the relative strength of modern day Russia and the west, how the modern world works in general, and a few realities of warfare.
1. It isn't about going high or low. Russia is making gains in Ukraine right now because there was a gap in western aid, not because the west is sticking to the high road. Now that fresh aid is on the way Russia's window to make significant gains is going to come to a close, even if they keep going low. It will not reopen unless there is another gap in western aid. It has absolutely nothing to do with going high or low. Russia going low is not giving them an advantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is. Us going high is not putting Ukraine at a disadvantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is.
2. The west is massively more powerful than Russia. The US GDP in 2022 was ten times the Russian GDP. The combined members of NATO (including the US) have twenty times the Russian GDP. If you add in our Pacific and Asian allies it comes out to thirty times the Russian GDP. Now, as we have been painfully learning over the last two years, overwhelming economic superiority does not instantly or automatically translate to a superiority in military industrial production. But, as I expect Russia to very painfully learn over the next (I'm throwing out a guess here, based largely on the mediocrity principle, that we're right smack dab in the middle of this thing) two years, it does translate to a greater potential to expand military industrial production. And it translates to greater economic endurance. Russia cannot keep up current levels of spending forever. The west can keep up current levels of aid to Ukraine (or even many times the current levels of aid in monetary terms) pretty much forever. So the west absolutely has the capability to enable Ukraine to win. The only factor is western will to continue supporting Ukraine, and to hopefully expand support for Ukraine. Provided that western will to support Ukraine doesn't break, it is impossible for Russia to win even if they go low and we stay high. Going low or high isn't even a factor.
3. Going high isn't just about principle, it's where our strength comes from. I mean that literally, not in the vague feel-good sense in which the power of love somehow enables the heroes of a story to overcome impossible odds. Our strength (both military and economic) is literally derived from our alliances, our credibility, and the rules based international order. The United States has a massive network of alliances. You may notice that China and Russia, both of which are far more willing to go low, come up a little short on allies.
4. Going low doesn't actually work. This may be a bit difficult to grasp, particularly since we've been inundated with pessimists who think they're realists for so many years. But just because something is dirty or unethical doesn't make it effective. As one example, Russian assassinations on British soil were probably a factor in why the British have been so enthusiastic in providing support for Ukraine (the small amount of material they've provided has more to do with a lack of material to provide than with a lack of will to provide it). As another example, I have been reading about increasing use by the Russians of chemical weapons in Ukraine. These are outlawed in warfare under international law, so is about as clear a case of going low as you could imagine. But there are reasons why it was so much easier to outlaw the use of chemical weapons in warfare than it was to outlaw the use of, for example, cluster munitions. Chief among them is that cluster munitions are extremely effective, while chemical weapons aren't particularly effective. It was easy to outlaw chemical weapons because their cruelty is far out of proportion to their battlefield utility. They're better than nothing, but they're difficult to maintain and generally less effective than an equivalent amount of HE would have been. The fact that Russia has resorted to using chemical weapons is a sign of desperation, not a sign that these are actually effective weapons. So far I believe all of the recent Russian advances have been credited to artillery and local air superiority, not to their use of chemical weapons.

Even if this approach didn't backfire, which it almost certainly would, we would be winning by defeating the whole point of winning. I think most people here, myself included, want Ukraine to win for Ukraine's sake. But from the West's perspective the whole point of supporting Ukraine is to uphold international law. You can't uphold international law by breaking international law. We would be "winning" by maximizing the defeat of our own political objectives, giving us an outcome even worse for us than if we had lost.

Clearly he's hinting that we're getting CM:Succession Wars with Battlemechs....finally.

No. It will not lead to the eventual end of international law. International law might come to an end eventually, but it will not be because we stayed high. If anything, it might come to an end because we went low.
I think you are missing some very basic fundamentals about this war, the relative strength of modern day Russia and the west, how the modern world works in general, and a few realities of warfare.
1. It isn't about going high or low. Russia is making gains in Ukraine right now because there was a gap in western aid, not because the west is sticking to the high road. Now that fresh aid is on the way Russia's window to make significant gains is going to come to a close, even if they keep going low. It will not reopen unless there is another gap in western aid. It has absolutely nothing to do with going high or low. Russia going low is not giving them an advantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is. Us going high is not putting Ukraine at a disadvantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is.
2. The west is massively more powerful than Russia. The US GDP in 2022 was ten times the Russian GDP. The combined members of NATO (including the US) have twenty times the Russian GDP. If you add in our Pacific and Asian allies it comes out to thirty times the Russian GDP. Now, as we have been painfully learning over the last two years, overwhelming economic superiority does not instantly or automatically translate to a superiority in military industrial production. But, as I expect Russia to very painfully learn over the next (I'm throwing out a guess here, based largely on the mediocrity principle, that we're right smack dab in the middle of this thing) two years, it does translate to a greater potential to expand military industrial production. And it translates to greater economic endurance. Russia cannot keep up current levels of spending forever. The west can keep up current levels of aid to Ukraine (or even many times the current levels of aid in monetary terms) pretty much forever. So the west absolutely has the capability to enable Ukraine to win. The only factor is western will to continue supporting Ukraine, and to hopefully expand support for Ukraine. Provided that western will to support Ukraine doesn't break, it is impossible for Russia to win even if they go low and we stay high. Going low or high isn't even a factor.
3. Going high isn't just about principle, it's where our strength comes from. I mean that literally, not in the vague feel-good sense in which the power of love somehow enables the heroes of a story to overcome impossible odds. Our strength (both military and economic) is literally derived from our alliances, our credibility, and the rules based international order. The United States has a massive network of alliances. You may notice that China and Russia, both of which are far more willing to go low, come up a little short on allies.
4. Going low doesn't actually work. This may be a bit difficult to grasp, particularly since we've been inundated with pessimists who think they're realists for so many years. But just because something is dirty or unethical doesn't make it effective. As one example, Russian assassinations on British soil were probably a factor in why the British have been so enthusiastic in providing support for Ukraine (the small amount of material they've provided has more to do with a lack of material to provide than with a lack of will to provide it). As another example, I have been reading about increasing use by the Russians of chemical weapons in Ukraine. These are outlawed in warfare under international law, so is about as clear a case of going low as you could imagine. But there are reasons why it was so much easier to outlaw the use of chemical weapons in warfare than it was to outlaw the use of, for example, cluster munitions. Chief among them is that cluster munitions are extremely effective, while chemical weapons aren't particularly effective. It was easy to outlaw chemical weapons because their cruelty is far out of proportion to their battlefield utility. They're better than nothing, but they're difficult to maintain and generally less effective than an equivalent amount of HE would have been. The fact that Russia has resorted to using chemical weapons is a sign of desperation, not a sign that these are actually effective weapons. So far I believe all of the recent Russian advances have been credited to artillery and local air superiority, not to their use of chemical weapons.

Remove the vowels, and Wales will be included by virtue of the name sounding Welsh!

Blueballed once again!
C'mon Battlefront, tell us already!!!!
In the meantime, really looking forward to this Battlepack.

No. It will not lead to the eventual end of international law. International law might come to an end eventually, but it will not be because we stayed high. If anything, it might come to an end because we went low.
I think you are missing some very basic fundamentals about this war, the relative strength of modern day Russia and the west, how the modern world works in general, and a few realities of warfare.
1. It isn't about going high or low. Russia is making gains in Ukraine right now because there was a gap in western aid, not because the west is sticking to the high road. Now that fresh aid is on the way Russia's window to make significant gains is going to come to a close, even if they keep going low. It will not reopen unless there is another gap in western aid. It has absolutely nothing to do with going high or low. Russia going low is not giving them an advantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is. Us going high is not putting Ukraine at a disadvantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is.
2. The west is massively more powerful than Russia. The US GDP in 2022 was ten times the Russian GDP. The combined members of NATO (including the US) have twenty times the Russian GDP. If you add in our Pacific and Asian allies it comes out to thirty times the Russian GDP. Now, as we have been painfully learning over the last two years, overwhelming economic superiority does not instantly or automatically translate to a superiority in military industrial production. But, as I expect Russia to very painfully learn over the next (I'm throwing out a guess here, based largely on the mediocrity principle, that we're right smack dab in the middle of this thing) two years, it does translate to a greater potential to expand military industrial production. And it translates to greater economic endurance. Russia cannot keep up current levels of spending forever. The west can keep up current levels of aid to Ukraine (or even many times the current levels of aid in monetary terms) pretty much forever. So the west absolutely has the capability to enable Ukraine to win. The only factor is western will to continue supporting Ukraine, and to hopefully expand support for Ukraine. Provided that western will to support Ukraine doesn't break, it is impossible for Russia to win even if they go low and we stay high. Going low or high isn't even a factor.
3. Going high isn't just about principle, it's where our strength comes from. I mean that literally, not in the vague feel-good sense in which the power of love somehow enables the heroes of a story to overcome impossible odds. Our strength (both military and economic) is literally derived from our alliances, our credibility, and the rules based international order. The United States has a massive network of alliances. You may notice that China and Russia, both of which are far more willing to go low, come up a little short on allies.
4. Going low doesn't actually work. This may be a bit difficult to grasp, particularly since we've been inundated with pessimists who think they're realists for so many years. But just because something is dirty or unethical doesn't make it effective. As one example, Russian assassinations on British soil were probably a factor in why the British have been so enthusiastic in providing support for Ukraine (the small amount of material they've provided has more to do with a lack of material to provide than with a lack of will to provide it). As another example, I have been reading about increasing use by the Russians of chemical weapons in Ukraine. These are outlawed in warfare under international law, so is about as clear a case of going low as you could imagine. But there are reasons why it was so much easier to outlaw the use of chemical weapons in warfare than it was to outlaw the use of, for example, cluster munitions. Chief among them is that cluster munitions are extremely effective, while chemical weapons aren't particularly effective. It was easy to outlaw chemical weapons because their cruelty is far out of proportion to their battlefield utility. They're better than nothing, but they're difficult to maintain and generally less effective than an equivalent amount of HE would have been. The fact that Russia has resorted to using chemical weapons is a sign of desperation, not a sign that these are actually effective weapons. So far I believe all of the recent Russian advances have been credited to artillery and local air superiority, not to their use of chemical weapons.

Even if this approach didn't backfire, which it almost certainly would, we would be winning by defeating the whole point of winning. I think most people here, myself included, want Ukraine to win for Ukraine's sake. But from the West's perspective the whole point of supporting Ukraine is to uphold international law. You can't uphold international law by breaking international law. We would be "winning" by maximizing the defeat of our own political objectives, giving us an outcome even worse for us than if we had lost.

No. It will not lead to the eventual end of international law. International law might come to an end eventually, but it will not be because we stayed high. If anything, it might come to an end because we went low.
I think you are missing some very basic fundamentals about this war, the relative strength of modern day Russia and the west, how the modern world works in general, and a few realities of warfare.
1. It isn't about going high or low. Russia is making gains in Ukraine right now because there was a gap in western aid, not because the west is sticking to the high road. Now that fresh aid is on the way Russia's window to make significant gains is going to come to a close, even if they keep going low. It will not reopen unless there is another gap in western aid. It has absolutely nothing to do with going high or low. Russia going low is not giving them an advantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is. Us going high is not putting Ukraine at a disadvantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is.
2. The west is massively more powerful than Russia. The US GDP in 2022 was ten times the Russian GDP. The combined members of NATO (including the US) have twenty times the Russian GDP. If you add in our Pacific and Asian allies it comes out to thirty times the Russian GDP. Now, as we have been painfully learning over the last two years, overwhelming economic superiority does not instantly or automatically translate to a superiority in military industrial production. But, as I expect Russia to very painfully learn over the next (I'm throwing out a guess here, based largely on the mediocrity principle, that we're right smack dab in the middle of this thing) two years, it does translate to a greater potential to expand military industrial production. And it translates to greater economic endurance. Russia cannot keep up current levels of spending forever. The west can keep up current levels of aid to Ukraine (or even many times the current levels of aid in monetary terms) pretty much forever. So the west absolutely has the capability to enable Ukraine to win. The only factor is western will to continue supporting Ukraine, and to hopefully expand support for Ukraine. Provided that western will to support Ukraine doesn't break, it is impossible for Russia to win even if they go low and we stay high. Going low or high isn't even a factor.
3. Going high isn't just about principle, it's where our strength comes from. I mean that literally, not in the vague feel-good sense in which the power of love somehow enables the heroes of a story to overcome impossible odds. Our strength (both military and economic) is literally derived from our alliances, our credibility, and the rules based international order. The United States has a massive network of alliances. You may notice that China and Russia, both of which are far more willing to go low, come up a little short on allies.
4. Going low doesn't actually work. This may be a bit difficult to grasp, particularly since we've been inundated with pessimists who think they're realists for so many years. But just because something is dirty or unethical doesn't make it effective. As one example, Russian assassinations on British soil were probably a factor in why the British have been so enthusiastic in providing support for Ukraine (the small amount of material they've provided has more to do with a lack of material to provide than with a lack of will to provide it). As another example, I have been reading about increasing use by the Russians of chemical weapons in Ukraine. These are outlawed in warfare under international law, so is about as clear a case of going low as you could imagine. But there are reasons why it was so much easier to outlaw the use of chemical weapons in warfare than it was to outlaw the use of, for example, cluster munitions. Chief among them is that cluster munitions are extremely effective, while chemical weapons aren't particularly effective. It was easy to outlaw chemical weapons because their cruelty is far out of proportion to their battlefield utility. They're better than nothing, but they're difficult to maintain and generally less effective than an equivalent amount of HE would have been. The fact that Russia has resorted to using chemical weapons is a sign of desperation, not a sign that these are actually effective weapons. So far I believe all of the recent Russian advances have been credited to artillery and local air superiority, not to their use of chemical weapons.

No. It will not lead to the eventual end of international law. International law might come to an end eventually, but it will not be because we stayed high. If anything, it might come to an end because we went low.
I think you are missing some very basic fundamentals about this war, the relative strength of modern day Russia and the west, how the modern world works in general, and a few realities of warfare.
1. It isn't about going high or low. Russia is making gains in Ukraine right now because there was a gap in western aid, not because the west is sticking to the high road. Now that fresh aid is on the way Russia's window to make significant gains is going to come to a close, even if they keep going low. It will not reopen unless there is another gap in western aid. It has absolutely nothing to do with going high or low. Russia going low is not giving them an advantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is. Us going high is not putting Ukraine at a disadvantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is.
2. The west is massively more powerful than Russia. The US GDP in 2022 was ten times the Russian GDP. The combined members of NATO (including the US) have twenty times the Russian GDP. If you add in our Pacific and Asian allies it comes out to thirty times the Russian GDP. Now, as we have been painfully learning over the last two years, overwhelming economic superiority does not instantly or automatically translate to a superiority in military industrial production. But, as I expect Russia to very painfully learn over the next (I'm throwing out a guess here, based largely on the mediocrity principle, that we're right smack dab in the middle of this thing) two years, it does translate to a greater potential to expand military industrial production. And it translates to greater economic endurance. Russia cannot keep up current levels of spending forever. The west can keep up current levels of aid to Ukraine (or even many times the current levels of aid in monetary terms) pretty much forever. So the west absolutely has the capability to enable Ukraine to win. The only factor is western will to continue supporting Ukraine, and to hopefully expand support for Ukraine. Provided that western will to support Ukraine doesn't break, it is impossible for Russia to win even if they go low and we stay high. Going low or high isn't even a factor.
3. Going high isn't just about principle, it's where our strength comes from. I mean that literally, not in the vague feel-good sense in which the power of love somehow enables the heroes of a story to overcome impossible odds. Our strength (both military and economic) is literally derived from our alliances, our credibility, and the rules based international order. The United States has a massive network of alliances. You may notice that China and Russia, both of which are far more willing to go low, come up a little short on allies.
4. Going low doesn't actually work. This may be a bit difficult to grasp, particularly since we've been inundated with pessimists who think they're realists for so many years. But just because something is dirty or unethical doesn't make it effective. As one example, Russian assassinations on British soil were probably a factor in why the British have been so enthusiastic in providing support for Ukraine (the small amount of material they've provided has more to do with a lack of material to provide than with a lack of will to provide it). As another example, I have been reading about increasing use by the Russians of chemical weapons in Ukraine. These are outlawed in warfare under international law, so is about as clear a case of going low as you could imagine. But there are reasons why it was so much easier to outlaw the use of chemical weapons in warfare than it was to outlaw the use of, for example, cluster munitions. Chief among them is that cluster munitions are extremely effective, while chemical weapons aren't particularly effective. It was easy to outlaw chemical weapons because their cruelty is far out of proportion to their battlefield utility. They're better than nothing, but they're difficult to maintain and generally less effective than an equivalent amount of HE would have been. The fact that Russia has resorted to using chemical weapons is a sign of desperation, not a sign that these are actually effective weapons. So far I believe all of the recent Russian advances have been credited to artillery and local air superiority, not to their use of chemical weapons.

No. It will not lead to the eventual end of international law. International law might come to an end eventually, but it will not be because we stayed high. If anything, it might come to an end because we went low.
I think you are missing some very basic fundamentals about this war, the relative strength of modern day Russia and the west, how the modern world works in general, and a few realities of warfare.
1. It isn't about going high or low. Russia is making gains in Ukraine right now because there was a gap in western aid, not because the west is sticking to the high road. Now that fresh aid is on the way Russia's window to make significant gains is going to come to a close, even if they keep going low. It will not reopen unless there is another gap in western aid. It has absolutely nothing to do with going high or low. Russia going low is not giving them an advantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is. Us going high is not putting Ukraine at a disadvantage on the battlefield, the gap in western aid is.
2. The west is massively more powerful than Russia. The US GDP in 2022 was ten times the Russian GDP. The combined members of NATO (including the US) have twenty times the Russian GDP. If you add in our Pacific and Asian allies it comes out to thirty times the Russian GDP. Now, as we have been painfully learning over the last two years, overwhelming economic superiority does not instantly or automatically translate to a superiority in military industrial production. But, as I expect Russia to very painfully learn over the next (I'm throwing out a guess here, based largely on the mediocrity principle, that we're right smack dab in the middle of this thing) two years, it does translate to a greater potential to expand military industrial production. And it translates to greater economic endurance. Russia cannot keep up current levels of spending forever. The west can keep up current levels of aid to Ukraine (or even many times the current levels of aid in monetary terms) pretty much forever. So the west absolutely has the capability to enable Ukraine to win. The only factor is western will to continue supporting Ukraine, and to hopefully expand support for Ukraine. Provided that western will to support Ukraine doesn't break, it is impossible for Russia to win even if they go low and we stay high. Going low or high isn't even a factor.
3. Going high isn't just about principle, it's where our strength comes from. I mean that literally, not in the vague feel-good sense in which the power of love somehow enables the heroes of a story to overcome impossible odds. Our strength (both military and economic) is literally derived from our alliances, our credibility, and the rules based international order. The United States has a massive network of alliances. You may notice that China and Russia, both of which are far more willing to go low, come up a little short on allies.
4. Going low doesn't actually work. This may be a bit difficult to grasp, particularly since we've been inundated with pessimists who think they're realists for so many years. But just because something is dirty or unethical doesn't make it effective. As one example, Russian assassinations on British soil were probably a factor in why the British have been so enthusiastic in providing support for Ukraine (the small amount of material they've provided has more to do with a lack of material to provide than with a lack of will to provide it). As another example, I have been reading about increasing use by the Russians of chemical weapons in Ukraine. These are outlawed in warfare under international law, so is about as clear a case of going low as you could imagine. But there are reasons why it was so much easier to outlaw the use of chemical weapons in warfare than it was to outlaw the use of, for example, cluster munitions. Chief among them is that cluster munitions are extremely effective, while chemical weapons aren't particularly effective. It was easy to outlaw chemical weapons because their cruelty is far out of proportion to their battlefield utility. They're better than nothing, but they're difficult to maintain and generally less effective than an equivalent amount of HE would have been. The fact that Russia has resorted to using chemical weapons is a sign of desperation, not a sign that these are actually effective weapons. So far I believe all of the recent Russian advances have been credited to artillery and local air superiority, not to their use of chemical weapons.

ISW was reporting as far back as March that Russia was planning large scale information operations that would continue through May. So I'm not surprised.

I'm completely with you there. Refineries are obviously legitimate military targets, and I am struggling to understand why there is any controversy in Ukraine attacking them. I have never understood our prohibition on Ukraine using western weapons to attack targets inside internationally-recognized Russian territory (we don't care about what Russia thinks is Russian territory). But that isn't what Carolus was suggesting.