domfluff

I do think its going to be tough to quantify how "realistic" this is, or even what this is actually showing.
There's a quote around real world marksman accuracy, and how the same person who is 90% accurate on a range, is 9% accurate on exercise and 0.9% accurate in real conditions. If you're talking such small numbers to begin with, then judging the influence of comparatively minor factors becomes ever more difficult.
Having said that, cm generally rewards being taken seriously, and assuming that the model reflects reality. It's similar to bogging - tests have indicated that speed has no effect on bogging, but I'm not personally convinced by the clarity of those results.
So yeah, try to keep your guys unexhausted. Its generally a good idea, and I would be unsurprised if there weren't knock on effects in surprising and untested directions (do exhausted troops have lower morale?, etc.)

I do think its going to be tough to quantify how "realistic" this is, or even what this is actually showing.
There's a quote around real world marksman accuracy, and how the same person who is 90% accurate on a range, is 9% accurate on exercise and 0.9% accurate in real conditions. If you're talking such small numbers to begin with, then judging the influence of comparatively minor factors becomes ever more difficult.
Having said that, cm generally rewards being taken seriously, and assuming that the model reflects reality. It's similar to bogging - tests have indicated that speed has no effect on bogging, but I'm not personally convinced by the clarity of those results.
So yeah, try to keep your guys unexhausted. Its generally a good idea, and I would be unsurprised if there weren't knock on effects in surprising and untested directions (do exhausted troops have lower morale?, etc.)

In mechanical terms, the most obvious one is that it restricts their movement. Since there's often reasons why you need to move *right now* (e.g., incoming mortars), it's generally a good idea to keep them fit and happy.

I do miss Bil's blog. It remains the best route to start taking CM seriously, and the platoon level drills aren't complete, which is a bit of a shame.

 

In all of the Soviet warplans that we know of, NATO was the aggressor. They still all involve the Soviets rolling over Europe (so going on the offensive), but the stated cause was always external pressures.

Whether that's purely for political reasons is another question - to steal the Falklands as something easy to work with, I'm not sure the leadership would appreciate a scenario which ran: "owing to your mismanagement of economic policy, your rule has become unpopular, so you're looking for a quick win to shore up the credibility of your regime". 

Point being that regardless of the real reasons why Soviet forces could rumble through Europe, the end result would look pretty similar, I think.

@Bil Hardenberger I ran Miles through your Squad Attack scenario:
 

I was impressed by both his ability to estimate both the enemy disposition, as well as failing to do anything about that (whilst providing a good learning opportunity along the way).

@Bil Hardenberger I ran Miles through your Squad Attack scenario:
 

I was impressed by both his ability to estimate both the enemy disposition, as well as failing to do anything about that (whilst providing a good learning opportunity along the way).

@Bil Hardenberger I ran Miles through your Squad Attack scenario:
 

I was impressed by both his ability to estimate both the enemy disposition, as well as failing to do anything about that (whilst providing a good learning opportunity along the way).

In mechanical terms, the most obvious one is that it restricts their movement. Since there's often reasons why you need to move *right now* (e.g., incoming mortars), it's generally a good idea to keep them fit and happy.

Area fire goes all over the action spot. Targeted fire will only happen when they can physically see someone to shoot at, and they will stop firing when they cower out of sight.
 
In all things there's a degree of wiggle room and variance, and if they spot something whilst area firing they might target it, but that's essentially the distinction.
Worth noting that with any targeted fire you're telling them to open up with everything (if you let them find their own targets they'll be more conservative), so inevitably area fire will consume ammo faster, since they're opening up, and won't lose sight of the target.

Area fire goes all over the action spot. Targeted fire will only happen when they can physically see someone to shoot at, and they will stop firing when they cower out of sight.
 
In all things there's a degree of wiggle room and variance, and if they spot something whilst area firing they might target it, but that's essentially the distinction.
Worth noting that with any targeted fire you're telling them to open up with everything (if you let them find their own targets they'll be more conservative), so inevitably area fire will consume ammo faster, since they're opening up, and won't lose sight of the target.

So, on this point.

I've convinced myself that Soviet (and therefore Russian) tactical and operational art is built on sound principles. They may not necessarily be the best solution, but I believe they're based on a sensible, logical foundation, and are a workable solution to the problems they have been faced with.

Part of that is the centralisation, and part of that centralisation is the huge assumption that your centralised commander is highly competent. So much rests on their shoulders, that they can't just be good at their job, they have to be excellent.

River crossings are complex - there's a reason why it's *the* classical tactical problem. I believe that leaning towards amphibious vehicles makes a huge amount of sense in the context of the operational scheme of things, but whether that translates into something actually workable in practice, when you have to involve layers of less-than-perfect leaders and corruption, is a different story.

I do think that there might be an answer to John Curry's "Why Cold War Warsaw Pact Tactics Work in Wargaming" which he doesn't mention in his essay - that a wargame (professional or otherwise) is generally going to involve far fewer people than the real thing. That wargaming is inherently centralised, and that the pieces can work together extremely effectively.

https://20thcenturywargaming.wordpress.com/2013/06/16/why-cold-war-warsaw-pact-tactics-work-in-wargaming/

So... yeah. I do think the Soviet/Russian focus on river crossing is really important - and you can see that in current Ukraine. What I'm less convinced is that this army (or the one who went into Georgia, or the one who went into Chechnya, and perhaps, maybe, earlier ones still) can actually perform this to any reasonable degree of success. 

Ah yes that old chestnut which the Americans in particular were, quite rightly, thoroughly bored to death of.  For some reason the British Army decided it was the master of counter-insurgency in the early 2000s because of the master tactic of wearing berets/soft hats in Northern Ireland.  Funny old thing was that in my two tours there (1989-1990 and 1992-1995), every time I left a patrol base I was required to wear a helmet.
There is a lot more to it clearly, the security force footprint in Northern Ireland was massive compared to the deployments in Basra and Helmand.  Off the top of my head there were at least eight regular battalions, about six or seven Ulster Defence Regiment Battalions, and god knows how many RUC of various hues at any one time.  Then of course the opposition was smaller than anything faced in either Basra or Helmand, was less liberally armed and not prone to employing suicide bombers.
Add to that the environment in Northern Ireland was familiar and well-known with handy things like accurate census records, vehicle licensing offices, property/land ownership records, telephone books and no massive linguistic, religious or cultural differences on the scale of those seen in Basra and Helmand.
Then there is the border - while there was certainly quite rightly a lot of sympathy in the Republic of Ireland for the nationalist cause, the Gards (Gardai - RoI Police Force) and Irish Defence Force were helpful in their dealings with us and the Republic of Ireland was a benign neighbour compared to Pakistan or Iran in the Afghan and Basra contexts.  The border was; therefore, relatively secure, particularly when compared to Afghanistan and Iraq.
I remember running pre-deployment training for both theatres and the number of people who looked at me blankly when I talked about 'Charlie 1s' (a form that was filled out by patrols in NI every time a vehicle stop was made with details such as make colour model VRN driver details, location of the stop etc).
Masters of COIN indeed - although coming second in Basra and Helmand was personally disappointing for me, I hope that the particular COIN competence trope has been thoroughly killed off in grown up circles in the British military and that lessons have been learned.

That line made me think of something else. Obviously there's a risk of clutching at straws, and trying to justify the cold war mentality as being about something real, rather than a waste of time, but if we assume that's not the case, and the above is accurate:

This reminds me of a conversation around the British army in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout the Cold War, it's been a common statement that the British infantryman has the benefit of experience in patrolling Northern Ireland - that they had all of the potentially-mundane-but-still-vital experiences of being deployed and operating as a team, in a potentially hostile situation. That's the same army that went into the Falklands, and that experience has been suggested as one of the reasons why Goose Green was saved from being a complete disaster. Certainly the army would have gained some solid, practical COIN experience.

The conversation around the more recent deployments was that the army went into them assuming that they had this same institutional knowledge of counterinsurgency operations - without acknowledging that this really belonged to the previous generation, and that experience just wasn't embedded anymore, and an awful lot of it had to be relearned, quickly.

So, yeah, I wonder. I wonder if there might be many Soviet principles which are based on a sound foundation, and may at one point have actually worked extremely well... but now aren't matched by the depth of experience to be practical.

That line made me think of something else. Obviously there's a risk of clutching at straws, and trying to justify the cold war mentality as being about something real, rather than a waste of time, but if we assume that's not the case, and the above is accurate:

This reminds me of a conversation around the British army in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout the Cold War, it's been a common statement that the British infantryman has the benefit of experience in patrolling Northern Ireland - that they had all of the potentially-mundane-but-still-vital experiences of being deployed and operating as a team, in a potentially hostile situation. That's the same army that went into the Falklands, and that experience has been suggested as one of the reasons why Goose Green was saved from being a complete disaster. Certainly the army would have gained some solid, practical COIN experience.

The conversation around the more recent deployments was that the army went into them assuming that they had this same institutional knowledge of counterinsurgency operations - without acknowledging that this really belonged to the previous generation, and that experience just wasn't embedded anymore, and an awful lot of it had to be relearned, quickly.

So, yeah, I wonder. I wonder if there might be many Soviet principles which are based on a sound foundation, and may at one point have actually worked extremely well... but now aren't matched by the depth of experience to be practical.

MOS's excellent thread on how C2 works in-game.

The main purpose (but not only purpose) of the command and control model in CM is to share spotting contacts. Existing spotting contacts help units spot faster, so you always, always should start an engagement with the maximum amount of information available to the engaging units.

Essentially, spots share vertically. If you have a platoon, and squad 1 has the spot, but you need squad 3 to get it, then that information will travel:

Squad 1 -> Platoon HQ, then from the Platoon HQ down to Squad 2 and Squad 3.

This is "vertical", since it goes up and down the TO&E formation.

Platoon HQs talk to company HQs, and company HQs talk to battalion HQs. That means the further separated you are, the longer it'll take to spread. It's also why dedicated recce elements tend to be embedded high in the org chart, so that there's minimal steps from them to the company HQs.


In addition to this vertical sharing, there is horizontal sharing, where any two units will share within 4 action spots (32m). That's close audio range, so that's two unit who can talk to each other. Two units of any kind will share regardless of organisation, and taking advantage of this mechanic is what the XO teams are for, since you have a unit who has a direct line of communication with the top-level HQ unit, and can be given a direct communication to a supporting asset (typically tanks or atgm teams or whatever).
 

So, on this point.

I've convinced myself that Soviet (and therefore Russian) tactical and operational art is built on sound principles. They may not necessarily be the best solution, but I believe they're based on a sensible, logical foundation, and are a workable solution to the problems they have been faced with.

Part of that is the centralisation, and part of that centralisation is the huge assumption that your centralised commander is highly competent. So much rests on their shoulders, that they can't just be good at their job, they have to be excellent.

River crossings are complex - there's a reason why it's *the* classical tactical problem. I believe that leaning towards amphibious vehicles makes a huge amount of sense in the context of the operational scheme of things, but whether that translates into something actually workable in practice, when you have to involve layers of less-than-perfect leaders and corruption, is a different story.

I do think that there might be an answer to John Curry's "Why Cold War Warsaw Pact Tactics Work in Wargaming" which he doesn't mention in his essay - that a wargame (professional or otherwise) is generally going to involve far fewer people than the real thing. That wargaming is inherently centralised, and that the pieces can work together extremely effectively.

https://20thcenturywargaming.wordpress.com/2013/06/16/why-cold-war-warsaw-pact-tactics-work-in-wargaming/

So... yeah. I do think the Soviet/Russian focus on river crossing is really important - and you can see that in current Ukraine. What I'm less convinced is that this army (or the one who went into Georgia, or the one who went into Chechnya, and perhaps, maybe, earlier ones still) can actually perform this to any reasonable degree of success. 

So, on this point.

I've convinced myself that Soviet (and therefore Russian) tactical and operational art is built on sound principles. They may not necessarily be the best solution, but I believe they're based on a sensible, logical foundation, and are a workable solution to the problems they have been faced with.

Part of that is the centralisation, and part of that centralisation is the huge assumption that your centralised commander is highly competent. So much rests on their shoulders, that they can't just be good at their job, they have to be excellent.

River crossings are complex - there's a reason why it's *the* classical tactical problem. I believe that leaning towards amphibious vehicles makes a huge amount of sense in the context of the operational scheme of things, but whether that translates into something actually workable in practice, when you have to involve layers of less-than-perfect leaders and corruption, is a different story.

I do think that there might be an answer to John Curry's "Why Cold War Warsaw Pact Tactics Work in Wargaming" which he doesn't mention in his essay - that a wargame (professional or otherwise) is generally going to involve far fewer people than the real thing. That wargaming is inherently centralised, and that the pieces can work together extremely effectively.

https://20thcenturywargaming.wordpress.com/2013/06/16/why-cold-war-warsaw-pact-tactics-work-in-wargaming/

So... yeah. I do think the Soviet/Russian focus on river crossing is really important - and you can see that in current Ukraine. What I'm less convinced is that this army (or the one who went into Georgia, or the one who went into Chechnya, and perhaps, maybe, earlier ones still) can actually perform this to any reasonable degree of success. 

I think a better match is likely to be a map game, like this:
http://www.wargaming.co/professional/details/britisharmy1956.htm

CMO is great, but the focus is not on the ground stuff, and won't give you a good idea of the kind of time/motion and engineering challenges involved here, and whether it would be possible to do this kind of thing in three days.

Clearly the data in the above is all derived from WW2 stuff, so it's not an exact match, but it'd be where I'd start if I wanted to get a feel for that.

In terms of more commercial stuff, https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/191989/next-war-poland is probably the best/most popular at the moment.

MOS's excellent thread on how C2 works in-game.

The main purpose (but not only purpose) of the command and control model in CM is to share spotting contacts. Existing spotting contacts help units spot faster, so you always, always should start an engagement with the maximum amount of information available to the engaging units.

Essentially, spots share vertically. If you have a platoon, and squad 1 has the spot, but you need squad 3 to get it, then that information will travel:

Squad 1 -> Platoon HQ, then from the Platoon HQ down to Squad 2 and Squad 3.

This is "vertical", since it goes up and down the TO&E formation.

Platoon HQs talk to company HQs, and company HQs talk to battalion HQs. That means the further separated you are, the longer it'll take to spread. It's also why dedicated recce elements tend to be embedded high in the org chart, so that there's minimal steps from them to the company HQs.


In addition to this vertical sharing, there is horizontal sharing, where any two units will share within 4 action spots (32m). That's close audio range, so that's two unit who can talk to each other. Two units of any kind will share regardless of organisation, and taking advantage of this mechanic is what the XO teams are for, since you have a unit who has a direct line of communication with the top-level HQ unit, and can be given a direct communication to a supporting asset (typically tanks or atgm teams or whatever).
 

In all of the Soviet warplans that we know of, NATO was the aggressor. They still all involve the Soviets rolling over Europe (so going on the offensive), but the stated cause was always external pressures.

Whether that's purely for political reasons is another question - to steal the Falklands as something easy to work with, I'm not sure the leadership would appreciate a scenario which ran: "owing to your mismanagement of economic policy, your rule has become unpopular, so you're looking for a quick win to shore up the credibility of your regime". 

Point being that regardless of the real reasons why Soviet forces could rumble through Europe, the end result would look pretty similar, I think.

Oh, and CMO is fantastic for that, obviously - there's a reason why it's one of the COTS wargames that various parties have been using.

I think a better match is likely to be a map game, like this:
http://www.wargaming.co/professional/details/britisharmy1956.htm

CMO is great, but the focus is not on the ground stuff, and won't give you a good idea of the kind of time/motion and engineering challenges involved here, and whether it would be possible to do this kind of thing in three days.

Clearly the data in the above is all derived from WW2 stuff, so it's not an exact match, but it'd be where I'd start if I wanted to get a feel for that.

In terms of more commercial stuff, https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/191989/next-war-poland is probably the best/most popular at the moment.

And no, the spread won't be shifted in the wind direction, because you're simulating humans firing the thing. Each round is fired individually, and wind speed is taken into account. The adjustment won't be perfect, but that's the reason why windage adjustment exists:



(US 60mm M2 mortar)

The lever/spring assembly here allows you to tilt it left and right to adjust.

To give this way more effort than it's worth:

Pedantically, the wind doesn't affect "Accuracy", it affects "Precision".



Accuracy is a function of the skill of the mortar team and FO - the more accurate they are, the fewer spotting rounds they'll need to be on-target. The wind will still affect this during the spotting phase, but you're not going to be able to show that as succinctly as in the above screenshots.

Each round is going to be affected by the wind, which will increase its Circular Error Probability - the precision of each round will go down, and the resultant impact pattern will be much wider. This will also be affected by the skills of the operators, as well as things like the barrel temperature.

Now, that's being incredibly pedantic. In normal usage, it's only really important to understand that the wind will make artillery scatter rounds over a wider area, which I think is a reasonable interpretation of the original question.