Combatintman

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

Ok … so let’s start with what ChuckDyke said:
“Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”
He posted a video about the Battle for Binh Ba in South Vietnam 
Let’s see what I said in response:
“Binh Ba was hardly Hue, Fallujah, Berlin or Stalingrad though was it?  This was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties. The Australian Army lacks the size and experience to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village so MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
For those not familiar with Binh Ba, this is a contemporary map.  The grid squares are 1km so the total mapped area is 4km². 

Note that it does not fill that area.
Moving on then to the Australian Army’s own doctrinal publications as an example:
According to Land Warfare Publication-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments,
The urban environment is classified into the following zones:
a. the city core,
b. the core periphery,
c. commercial ribbons,
d. residential sprawl,
e. industrial areas,
f. outlying high-rise areas, and
g. shanty towns
This is just one reason I stated that Binh Ba was not an urban environment as it only has one of those characteristics.  The same publication cites the battles for Fallujah, Grozny, Hue and Stalingrad in its examples of urban combat.  That publication makes one reference to Binh Ba as the preface to Chapter 7 – Building Clearance as follows (my bold):
The battle was triggered shortly after 8.00am when a Centurion tank travelling through the village was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Initial intelligence suggested there were two Viet Cong platoons in the village. From the strength of the fire met by the company sent to deal with them, however, it was apparent that the enemy presence was much greater. There followed several hours of devastatingly fierce fighting. Twice tanks swept through the village, returning enemy fire by blowing open the walls of the houses. Then each house was cleared room by room by the infantry. By nightfall the village was still not secure and fighting continued in the area the following day. When the battle was finally over the enemy toll was 91 – at a cost of just one Australian life and eight wounded.
The battle of Binh Ba posed the perennial problem of the war in Vietnam – how to separate the enemy from innocent civilians. The occupation of towns and villages by the Viet Cong was a deliberate tactic designed either to ambush the relieving troops or to cause the Australians to use an excess of force.
Now ChuckDyke initially said (my bold):  “Here is something for house fighting and the difficulty of maintaining command and control during MOUT operations.”  My response said:  “MOUT is certainly not the appropriate descriptor here.”
Taking my argument that the Australian Army lacks the capability to do offensive operations against a well-prepared enemy in anything larger than a village let’s go back to LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments.  Its Combined Arms Scenarios section (Chapter 8 refers) shows a Company Team attack in the context of a Battlegroup.  The example imagery map for that scenario has the Battlegroup boundary covering three streets and 22 buildings.  Hold that thought …
The Australian Army is basically capable of deploying a division of three combat brigades.  This would be war of national survival stuff as its more recent deployments where the usual premise of ‘to deploy one, you need three’ comes into effect has been to deploy nothing bigger than a brigade.  Australian Army brigades sit in the three to four battalion range.  Being generous let’s say four battalions which gives you four battlegroups.  Keeping one in reserve, because it is good practice to have one then according to the example in the Australian Army’s official doctrine on urban operations, a brigade can conduct an offensive operation comprising nine streets with 66 buildings.  If we go for the war of national survival then, assuming one brigade is the divisional commander’s reserve, then that is 18 streets and 132 buildings.
Here is a map of Hue where some of the calculations above have been applied to illustrate the point:

The image below is the zoomed area that I have marked as a green rectangle in the overall city map.

So in simple terms, according to the Australian Army's own doctrine, a brigade can conduct an attack on a small corner of a city.
My point about the capabilities of the Australian Army is based on having served in it and knowing what it can and cannot do which I think the argument presented above demonstrates.  It is no more an insult than saying the Australian Army cannot deploy a parachute battalion.  Why?  It doesn’t have one.  Facing up to reality and knowing your strengths and weaknesses is an important discussion to have.  Nations/militaries that overestimate their own capabilities and don’t challenge them generally end up coming second in wars.  I recall that the British Army claimed (and bored everyone to death) that they were the masters of limited war/COIN because of Borneo, Malaya, Northern Ireland and the killer tactic of wearing berets/soft hats only to end up having to eat humble pie in Basra.  There are few people in British military circles and veterans who served there who disagree with the assertion that Basra was an utterly miserable performance on the part of the British Army.  One of my friends was killed there by the way so I have little interest in denigrating the sacrifice of those whose lives were changed there.
On then to impugning the courage and sacrifice of veterans … Recalling that ChuckDyke said that my comments would not be welcome in an RSL (Returned Services League – a veteran’s association) I pointed out that I have been a member of it for 10 years.  Later ChuckDyke changes his position on the RSL and decides that it is not such a good thing after all because of the way it treated Vietnam Veterans.  A claim I don’t dispute, it is well documented, and it was not the organization’s finest hour.  Anyway – I think we can agree that his position on the RSL is inconsistent.  Whatever the argument, my membership subs help Australian veterans and while serving in the Australian Army I collected in Brisbane and Sydney for Legacy ... a veteran’s charity.
For my part, I have been and continue to be a member of the RSL.  I am also a member of the Royal British Legion … you’ve guessed it … another veteran’s association.  This month I have given the equivalent of three full working days (in addition to my day job and my hobby ‘job’ for Battlefront) collecting for the Poppy Appeal plus assisting with the organization of, and attending, a cross laying ceremony at the town church as well of course as attending Remembrance Day itself and participated in the RBL committee meeting at which this most important appeal and other issues affecting veterans were discussed.
One of those issues was our disgust that the County level RBL have decided that organizing the ANZAC service at the Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery on Cannock Chase is ‘too difficult.’  My branch is now taking it on and I am one of the lead members in this initiative.  The majority of the Commonwealth dead there are New Zealanders.  A country whose army I have never served in but the people commemorated there are fellow ANZACs.  Most of them died of Spanish Flu which the more ungenerous might say wasn’t a war death.  However, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission rightly designates them as war deaths and, incidentally, many of them had fought some hard actions on the Western Front before being brought back to the UK.  Hardly the behaviour of someone with no respect for the fallen.
Nowhere in the phrase "this was a skirmish over a non-descript village which didn't even fill a grid square in Vietnam involving no more than 500 combatants on both sides and 100 casualties," do I denigrate veterans.  Non-descript village is a fact is the number of casualties and participants on both sides. 
Anyway, I think I’ve made my point.

Its got airborne in it too ... you will enjoy it I'm sure.  Not as complex and innovative as your stuff but you knew that already ... 

My contribution, which is close to being finished, is discussed here ...
 

I have been a member of the RSL for 10 years and was in the ARA for eight with two tours of Afghanistan and one of Iraq under my belt champ.  I know what I am talking about and have had numerous discussions of a similar ilk with members of my profession and veterans in the RSL.

My contribution, which is close to being finished, is discussed here ...
 

I have been a member of the RSL for 10 years and was in the ARA for eight with two tours of Afghanistan and one of Iraq under my belt champ.  I know what I am talking about and have had numerous discussions of a similar ilk with members of my profession and veterans in the RSL.

I have been a member of the RSL for 10 years and was in the ARA for eight with two tours of Afghanistan and one of Iraq under my belt champ.  I know what I am talking about and have had numerous discussions of a similar ilk with members of my profession and veterans in the RSL.

I have been a member of the RSL for 10 years and was in the ARA for eight with two tours of Afghanistan and one of Iraq under my belt champ.  I know what I am talking about and have had numerous discussions of a similar ilk with members of my profession and veterans in the RSL.

I have been a member of the RSL for 10 years and was in the ARA for eight with two tours of Afghanistan and one of Iraq under my belt champ.  I know what I am talking about and have had numerous discussions of a similar ilk with members of my profession and veterans in the RSL.

I have been a member of the RSL for 10 years and was in the ARA for eight with two tours of Afghanistan and one of Iraq under my belt champ.  I know what I am talking about and have had numerous discussions of a similar ilk with members of my profession and veterans in the RSL.

This has been sat on my hard drive in an 'almost finished' state for a couple of years now.  Prompted by this thread:
I decided to finish it off.
Some tasters ...
Scenario Image:

Strategic Map:

Operational Map:

Tactical Map:

Overhead Comparison CM and Google Earth

Eye Level Comparison CM and Google Earth:

The basic premise is that Russia attacks the Suwalki Gap after a period of tension on the Russian and Belarusian borders with NATO (sound familiar anyone ...).  This mission is set in Lithuania's western border with the Kaliningrad Oblast where a US force has hurriedly deployed in response to a threat of a thrust east out of Kaliningrad in support of the Suwalki Gap attack.
The map is 3,328m x 1,920m ...
Watch this space ...

Its got airborne in it too ... you will enjoy it I'm sure.  Not as complex and innovative as your stuff but you knew that already ... 

This has been sat on my hard drive in an 'almost finished' state for a couple of years now.  Prompted by this thread:
I decided to finish it off.
Some tasters ...
Scenario Image:

Strategic Map:

Operational Map:

Tactical Map:

Overhead Comparison CM and Google Earth

Eye Level Comparison CM and Google Earth:

The basic premise is that Russia attacks the Suwalki Gap after a period of tension on the Russian and Belarusian borders with NATO (sound familiar anyone ...).  This mission is set in Lithuania's western border with the Kaliningrad Oblast where a US force has hurriedly deployed in response to a threat of a thrust east out of Kaliningrad in support of the Suwalki Gap attack.
The map is 3,328m x 1,920m ...
Watch this space ...

This has been sat on my hard drive in an 'almost finished' state for a couple of years now.  Prompted by this thread:
I decided to finish it off.
Some tasters ...
Scenario Image:

Strategic Map:

Operational Map:

Tactical Map:

Overhead Comparison CM and Google Earth

Eye Level Comparison CM and Google Earth:

The basic premise is that Russia attacks the Suwalki Gap after a period of tension on the Russian and Belarusian borders with NATO (sound familiar anyone ...).  This mission is set in Lithuania's western border with the Kaliningrad Oblast where a US force has hurriedly deployed in response to a threat of a thrust east out of Kaliningrad in support of the Suwalki Gap attack.
The map is 3,328m x 1,920m ...
Watch this space ...

I have been a member of the RSL for 10 years and was in the ARA for eight with two tours of Afghanistan and one of Iraq under my belt champ.  I know what I am talking about and have had numerous discussions of a similar ilk with members of my profession and veterans in the RSL.

This has been sat on my hard drive in an 'almost finished' state for a couple of years now.  Prompted by this thread:
I decided to finish it off.
Some tasters ...
Scenario Image:

Strategic Map:

Operational Map:

Tactical Map:

Overhead Comparison CM and Google Earth

Eye Level Comparison CM and Google Earth:

The basic premise is that Russia attacks the Suwalki Gap after a period of tension on the Russian and Belarusian borders with NATO (sound familiar anyone ...).  This mission is set in Lithuania's western border with the Kaliningrad Oblast where a US force has hurriedly deployed in response to a threat of a thrust east out of Kaliningrad in support of the Suwalki Gap attack.
The map is 3,328m x 1,920m ...
Watch this space ...

This has been sat on my hard drive in an 'almost finished' state for a couple of years now.  Prompted by this thread:
I decided to finish it off.
Some tasters ...
Scenario Image:

Strategic Map:

Operational Map:

Tactical Map:

Overhead Comparison CM and Google Earth

Eye Level Comparison CM and Google Earth:

The basic premise is that Russia attacks the Suwalki Gap after a period of tension on the Russian and Belarusian borders with NATO (sound familiar anyone ...).  This mission is set in Lithuania's western border with the Kaliningrad Oblast where a US force has hurriedly deployed in response to a threat of a thrust east out of Kaliningrad in support of the Suwalki Gap attack.
The map is 3,328m x 1,920m ...
Watch this space ...

This has been sat on my hard drive in an 'almost finished' state for a couple of years now.  Prompted by this thread:
I decided to finish it off.
Some tasters ...
Scenario Image:

Strategic Map:

Operational Map:

Tactical Map:

Overhead Comparison CM and Google Earth

Eye Level Comparison CM and Google Earth:

The basic premise is that Russia attacks the Suwalki Gap after a period of tension on the Russian and Belarusian borders with NATO (sound familiar anyone ...).  This mission is set in Lithuania's western border with the Kaliningrad Oblast where a US force has hurriedly deployed in response to a threat of a thrust east out of Kaliningrad in support of the Suwalki Gap attack.
The map is 3,328m x 1,920m ...
Watch this space ...

Airspace deconfliction ... Hot ROZs (decided not to Google that in order to keep the wife off my back) etc would be planned at formation level from memory.  With all that in place it would be (put simply) knowing that the ROZ was either 'hot' or 'cold' which I think would be either determined by the JTAC or communicated to the JTAC from the relevant formation.  In Afghanistan you could pretty much guarantee that there would be buckshee fast air allocated on the ATO to orbit for ECAS/ad hoc tasking in addition to anything that had been specifically committed to any given unit/operation.  So if they were needed they could just be whistled up and, as Afghanistan isn't that big, they wouldn't take long to rock up.  I recall on my first Afghanistan tour that the Danish recce squadron attached to Task Force Helmand got about 21,000lb of ordnance dropped from a B-52 onto some Talibs who were giving them bother on one of their trips up to Now Zad which was certainly not planned CAS.