Any lessons from current Ukraine invasion mean anything to a 1982 Warsaw Pact attack?

[Sequoia]

Or would it all be pure conjecture to relate today's events back 40 years?

Edited March 3, 2022 by Sequoia
spelling

[The_Capt]

Not pure conjecture in my opinion.  The Russian military, particularly its ground forces still have the roots of Soviet doctrine in their makeup.  However, they have adapted somewhat in the intervening years.  At the operational level (so the wiki map), that is a very Soviet style attack plan.  It aims to overwhelm an opponent with multiple axis of advance in a single very mass based push.   A series of objectives in depth and avoiding cities and urban combat where possible.

A the tactical level, however, things get a little weird.  Russia abandoned the MRR/TR model in favor of the BTGs which a far more combined arms integrated, looking more like western Battlegroups.  Even with these new structures the Soviet system would see a series of echelon attacks along this major axis, that did not happen.  In a lot of cases the advances just appeared to have stalled (e.g. the long lines of vehicles along single roads), tactically what we are seeing does not have the tempo or velocity of a Soviet style attack. 

[Stardekk]

Nothing to learn from this war about the Soviet way of war except doctrine and tactics. But you can not tell if they work because Russian troops have extremly low more and non existant logistics. Plus its 2022, not 1982 so some weapons are desgined to counter soviet doctrine such as Javelin

[The_Capt]

It is kinda like listening to William Shatner cover an Elton John song (I…am….a…Rocket, man).  I mean the words kinda match up but what the hell….?

[Bulletpoint]

I think the only lesson learnt here is that if you attack without logistics and a proper plan, and with extremely poor morale, you're not going far.

[IICptMillerII]

It is way too early to glean any meaningful insight at this point. All info coming out of the war right now is sketchy at best. It’s going to take a while to truly confirm most of that information. This war needs its own post mortem first before it can be applied (if at all) to our hypothetical one. 

[Halmbarte]

3 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

I think the only lesson learnt here is that if you attack without logistics and a proper plan, and with extremely poor morale, you're not going far.

If your plan is heavily dependent on the defending army throwing down their weapons and their leadership buggering off to the West you're going to run into severe problems when those two things don't happen. 

H

[Centurian52]

There is also a difference of terrain to consider. I believe Ukraine gets significantly muddier around this time of year than Central Europe ever does. I have heard that the mud goes at least part of the way to explaining the slow advance and long columns of crowded vehicles along single roads, since it may be the case that those vehicles are physically unable to go off of the roads without becoming bogged down (the convoy doctrine I've read (which is admittedly WW2 American doctrine, not Cold War/modern Soviet/Russian doctrine) directs that vehicles should be moved off of the road and into concealment during halts). This may also partially explain why the Russians have made more progress in the south, which I understand doesn't get quite as muddy as the north.

[Bobjack1240]

Also, the Soviets would have liberally used nukes. If the Russians did that, some would still be intercepted by Ukrainian S-300s, but the Russians would have been more successful.

[Bobjack1240]

Also, Soviet Category A formations were much better trained than the Russian troops that were sent into Ukraine. Unlike a lot of the regulars who were told a variation of the following based off of interviews of Russian POWs: "it's a training exercise, it's a peacekeeping mission in Donetsk/ Luhansk, or they'll welcome you as liberators because you're de-nazifying Ukraine" (the VDV and other more elite formations were probably told what they were getting into, they were just poorly lead), the Soviet GSFG troops knew that they would have to engage the full might of NATO. They knew nukes would be used by both sides on a tactical level.

[MikeyD]

You look at the current conflict and think 'Old Soviet doctrine dictated you operate in battalion-size units, but here we're seeing two tanks and three trucks alone on a deserted stretch of road?' The application to Cold War is - would Soviet doctrine survive contact with the enemy? That actually argues in favor of CMCW because the battlefield would likely break down into a series of CM-scale engagements.

[Simcoe]

I don't have any good analysis but it's a strange feeling, playing the Soviet campaign and watching your AFV's strafed and obliterated by artillery if they stay in the same spot for longer than a couple minutes. Then watching the same happen to both sides in Ukraine. It's even worse because at least you can keep your vehicles moving in Combat Mission but that doesn't even help you in real modern warfare.

Modern warfare seems to be fought by artillery observers/air controllers/Drone operators. Ground forces are just there to claim the rubble.

 

 

[Grey_Fox]

11 hours ago, Simcoe said:

I don't have any good analysis but it's a strange feeling, playing the Soviet campaign and watching your AFV's strafed and obliterated by artillery if they stay in the same spot for longer than a couple minutes. Then watching the same happen to both sides in Ukraine. It's even worse because at least you can keep your vehicles moving in Combat Mission but that doesn't even help you in real modern warfare.

Modern warfare seems to be fought by artillery observers/air controllers/Drone operators. Ground forces are just there to claim the rubble.

 

 

Don't forget that the freedom of movement in Ukraine right now is mainly restricted to roads due to the spring thaw. 

If you limit your movements to roads in CM, you'll find yourself in a similar position.

Edited March 11, 2022 by Grey_Fox

[Bobjack1240]

Soviet doctrine would survive contact with the enemy in a purely conventional operation.

 

Besides the training/troop quality issues I mentioned earlier, the Russians in Ukraine also had serious logistical issues that hindered most of their progress. Compare this with the Soviets who had logistical infrastructure in place for a prolonged war. There wouldn't have been Soviet tanks stuck along stretches of road running out of gas or ammo.

 

Also, the Egyptians in 1973 were able to sort of successfully use Soviet doctrine until they overextended and moved ahead of their SAM umbrella.

[Simcoe]

11 hours ago, Grey_Fox said:

Don't forget that the freedom of movement in Ukraine right now is mainly restricted to roads due to the spring thaw. 

If you limit your movements to roads in CM, you'll find yourself in a similar position.

Shudders.

[BeondTheGrave]

I've been thinking about one thing today about lessons from the modern invasion applied to the Cold War. I have read several histories (and wargames, tbf) that basically dismissed the FRG's Heimatgeschutzbrigaden as militia that would focus on protecting rear areas, or fighting off VDV landings, or policing cities. But most say they would definitely NOT participate to a meaningful extent in frontline combat. But looking at the Ukrainian TD, I wonder if thats true. I havn't read any documents on how the HGBs would have been used, but the Ukrainian model would have been interesting. Imagine cut off HGtruppen, wearing armbands and civy clothes, rolling around in M113s with LAWs and Panzerschrecks laying ambushes across the Germany countryside. They could also form a semi-trained and equipped core for local resistance groups. Assuming for a conventional war this would have interesting implications for contesting dispersed Soviet columns. The more they disperse the more the HG can muck with them. The more they concentrate, the bigger a target the column becomes for NATO Active Defense operations. 

[Combatintman]

30 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

I've been thinking about one thing today about lessons from the modern invasion applied to the Cold War. I have read several histories (and wargames, tbf) that basically dismissed the FRG's Heimatgeschutzbrigaden as militia that would focus on protecting rear areas, or fighting off VDV landings, or policing cities. But most say they would definitely NOT participate to a meaningful extent in frontline combat. But looking at the Ukrainian TD, I wonder if thats true. I havn't read any documents on how the HGBs would have been used, but the Ukrainian model would have been interesting. Imagine cut off HGtruppen, wearing armbands and civy clothes, rolling around in M113s with LAWs and Panzerschrecks laying ambushes across the Germany countryside. They could also form a semi-trained and equipped core for local resistance groups. Assuming for a conventional war this would have interesting implications for contesting dispersed Soviet columns. The more they disperse the more the HG can muck with them. The more they concentrate, the bigger a target the column becomes for NATO Active Defense operations. 

Those suckers had tanks at the end of the Cold War from my recollection - whenever we did CPXs the classic counterpen operations that we would do close to Endex generally featured a Heimatschutzbrigade rolling up some Sovs.

[BeondTheGrave]

5 minutes ago, Combatintman said:

Those suckers had tanks at the end of the Cold War from my recollection - whenever we did CPXs the classic counterpen operations that we would do close to Endex generally featured a Heimatschutzbrigade rolling up some Sovs.

As I recall they were stood up with M48s, M113s, and leftover hand-me-downs from the 1950s and 60s that the US didn't want to pay to dispose of. But by the end of the Cold War they had mostly been reequipped with Heer hand-me-downs. 

[sawomi]

There was (is?) also 'Gladio', but...

Quote

...the BND built up its branch of Gladio, but discovered after the fall of the German Democratic Republic that it was fully known to the Stasi early on.

-> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Gladio#Germany

 

[Hacketäuer]

Yes, it is 2022 not 1982 but a lot of shortcomings that the experts predicted throughout the cold war would hinder soviet advances, show today in the russian army. F.E. the lack of low-level initiative and leadership. Some frontline troops appear hardly aware of the situation they are in. Mission command is a far cry in such circumstandes. Just like in Afghanistan and Chechnya we see troops attacking without proper recon, tanks and APC´s bunched up without infrantry support and overall poor logistics. 

[MG TOW]

2 hours ago, Hacketäuer said:

Yes, it is 2022 not 1982 but a lot of shortcomings that the experts predicted throughout the cold war would hinder soviet advances, show today in the russian army. F.E. the lack of low-level initiative and leadership. Some frontline troops appear hardly aware of the situation they are in. Mission command is a far cry in such circumstandes. Just like in Afghanistan and Chechnya we see troops attacking without proper recon, tanks and APC´s bunched up without infrantry support and overall poor logistics. 

I have to wonder with the presence of political commissars in 80's if some of the modern Russian military shortfalls due to corruption, training, or inept practices would have been prevented, or at least mitigated. 

[A Canadian Cat]

13 hours ago, Pilaf said:

I have to wonder with the presence of political commissars in 80's if some of the modern Russian military shortfalls due to corruption, training, or inept practices would have been prevented, or at least mitigated. 

I don't think political commissars were some paragon of virtue. Where do you think corruption and inept practices came from?

[MG TOW]

1 hour ago, IanL said:

I don't think political commissars were some paragon of virtue. Where do you think corruption and inept practices came from?

I don't think political commissars were some paragon of virtue either. Who would right? Rather I'm inquiring if they (political officers, party observers) did provide a separate layer of oversight the military chain of command had no control over. During the cold war this may have resulted in military units being equipped better and trained compared to current day.

[A Canadian Cat]

47 minutes ago, Pilaf said:

During the cold war this may have resulted in military units being equipped better and trained compared to current day.

Absolutely no.

[Hacketäuer]

If anything I would expect only negative effects on military aspects from direct political influence. I am not an expert on that, but from what I have read the classical political commissars were an early WW2-thing only.