How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Grigb]

It is crumbling slowly

Quote

The military IL-76 crashed near Ryazan.
On Friday night, an IL-76 plane of the Russian Ministry of Defense crashed on the outskirts of Ryazan. There were nine people on board - four of them were killed, the rest were hospitalized in serious condition. The military called the cause of the crash an engine malfunction. The media reported that the plane caught fire in the air.

The IL-76 military transport plane crashed into a field in the immediate vicinity of private residential buildings - in the Mikhailovsky Highway area in the meadows of the Pletenka River floodplain, a TASS correspondent reported at night from the crash site. The Defense Ministry later in the morning confirmed reports of a military plane crash, calling it a hard landing.

Hard landing...

[The_MonkeyKing]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

What made me a tad suspicious is that:

a) the launchers stand just next to each other. With 4 in whole country they would've spread them better I think

b) they let out a whole volley - given those are PGMs, and in short supply, what would be a viable target?

c) it is probably a matter of weird light from the launches, but this wheat looks a bit too ripe for this time of the year

 

indeed, must have been shot at one target. Major operation

 

[Huba]

6 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

indeed, must have been shot at one target. Major operation

 

Like somebody in the comments suggested, a small island with a lot of valuable equipment spread all over it sounds like a perfect target

[Aragorn2002]

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

even better:

 

Not sure that's better, but yeah, great to see.

[Bulletpoint]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

MLRS (?) launch gone wrong:

 

 

[paxromana]

14 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

 

 

Probably not ... even Acme has standards!

[Grigb]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

One of the Twitter comments said they said it doesn't sound real.  I think the story sounds a bit too polished, but I believe it.  From a practical sense they aren't going to go around changing all the prices on the thousands of items every few days.  I don't think any business here in the US would try to do it either.  Maybe change the prices on some of the most popular and wildly increasing products, then tell people to expect the price to be higher on the rest.

Whether this particular story is true or not, the price increases on consumer goods will continue to climb for quite a while.

Steve

It does have a certain feel of adjusted reality to better suite her narrative. Shortages of all there mentioned goods - buckwheat, sugar and pads are well known internet memes. They are similar to western toilet paper shortage meme.

It looks like dissatisfied by overall situation liberal woman decided to let steam off and poke nationalists with the problem of shortages. But for some reason she decided to improve her story with a bit of fiction.

My personal assessment is the situation in RU is like in this picture

RU consumer situation is relatively better than we expect given the circumstances.  Everything else is much worse than we expect. 

RU government considers the consumer situation to be critical for overall political stability (you can lie about everything else far longer than about what consumer see himself).  So, it employs various tricks and gimmicks to keep the situation above water. 

Everything else is much worse because I was told that almost every RU aspect of economy relies heavily on imported goods from West.

For example, I have close contact - top IT guy who works in RU Food industry (he did not manage to escape die to family reasons). He worked from sausage production to distribution of bottled water drinks and everything in between for top RU companies. 

Back in March he told me that RU Food Industry depended on Wester import like at least 80% and up to 90% in some cases. It simply cannot exist without West imports. He said right now industry was running on accumulated reserves and RU government pouring money and resources to patch it somehow. He expected that the whole situation would not last longer than August. 

Important disclaimer - take it with the grain of salt because while there is no question about his professional competence and knowledge, he is a [RU] liberal guy and he most probably massaged facts to better suit the [RU] liberal narrative. Still the RU economy dependence on western import is much greater than anybody thinks. As such, the overall situation is much worse than we expect.

[Grigb]

Sorry, I have not figured out how to embed tweets here yet. So, here is the link to interesting quote.

• For a month RU arty is noticeably decreasing volume of fire
• DNLR D-20 now doing most of the work
• Looks like majority of Msta guns either run out of tube resource or got broken.

[Grigb]

Assessment regarding current RU push from Murz

Quote

I would crawl back to my bed by midnight, so that, falling asleep, I would find out that, yes, "there have been some tactical successes." The enemy, through the efforts of the 1st and 2nd AK NM Republics, was bent as much as possible -they stretched the front in the neck of the Lisichansk boiler, after which the damned Russians used their traditional mean trick, repeatedly tested on previous European integrators [UKR] - they threw fresh and fully combat-ready reserves at the most vulnerable area. [RU is throwing fresh reserves it was creating previously. Looks like we reached a decisive point of battle]

No one is  hiding that this is the 90th tank [division] from Chebarkul, which originally worked in the "O" group. Since since 2021, it has been commanded by a person familiar with the Theater of Operations, who took the enemy quite seriously and adequately and was closely engaged in the combat training of his people, the results of the 90th, formed quite recently, in 2016-2017, are very good. [For a note - Kantemir and Tamansk elite divisions seems to be much worse] Again, the "people's militiamen" of the Republics, who had been squeezing the neck of the boiler for several weeks, created all the conditions for people to ensure that they provided their respected partners with a fun life.

Will the AFU be able to stabilize the narrowed neck, relying on the industrial area of the Lisichansk refinery or not? Will they keep their positions in the cauldron, continuing to use the Seversky Donets as an anti-tank ditch, or will they still rush "out" to save at least some manpower?

Without knowing the exact layouts, you can only guess. I will cautiously assume that, with a very high probability, the AFU top will have a position "Hold on, we will counter-attack and return everything." To what extent it will be supported from below by those who, in fact, need to hold on - we'll see.

Given the need to rebuild logistics and compensate for the reserves of ammo burned in the Krasniy Luch [that big ammo explosion Murz war ranting about previously], taking into account other factors playing against ours, the boiler may fight for some time. I note that the isolation of highways to Lisichansk, of course, affects the tonnage of supplies that the group manages to deliver, but in no case does it completely block this flow. It's summer now, from Seversk to Lisichansk, enough good local roads have already been improved along the tree lines. Yes, it's slower than the highway, but it does exists.

"Other factors" are, for example, the fact that in order to reduce the rate of advance of our forces and the rate of destruction of enemy forces, the UKR first of all needs to transfer not large military groups, but air defense and electronic warfare systems capable of neutralizing fully or partially the concentration of UAVs that our artillery fire control has created in this area. [as I said LDNR forces have much more drones and integrated them much better  than regulars] And right now it [UKR AA and E] should already arrive. And then reserves will arrive to strengthen the narrowed "throat".

Another "other factor" that may  work, you will not see on ordinary electronic maps that faithfully show buildings, washings, plantings and woodlands. Terrain. Download the maps of general staff [famous detailed RU military maps] or install SASPlanet, look at the heights in this area. There is a rather steep ascent from Nikolaevka towards the refinery. If the AFU is thoroughly hooked on the refinery area and retains the supply of artillery ammunition and anti-tank weapons, then the strike to the boiler neck will "slide" to the left and will be delayed.

Let's see, in short. Our Drone operators have just called, they are carrying drone trophies and something from our quadrocopters for repair. Well, I, accordingly, will give them a gift from Anya.

 

[chuckdyke]

2 hours ago, Combatintman said:

Let's not go too far down that track - as I recall the M-113 owning side came second in that conflict.

Never lost a battle but lost the war. M113 doesn't depend on bridges. 

[Grigb]

Found interesting attempt of LDNR volunteers to publish first version of drone manual. I roughly translated it so you can get a snippet at LDNR drone operations. AFAIK originally it was UKR tactics but LDNR learned them and adopted. BTW as you can see, they started an unofficial program of training RU regulars. In square brackets my own comments.

@Battlefront.com FYI

Quote

 

Fundamentals of the combat use of commercial quadrocopters. Version 1.
06/23/2022

The Coordination Center for Assistance to Novorossiya [infamous logistical volunteer unit] organized and conducted two training events in the Belgorod region during two weeks of June. In two Russian formations (one artillery and one tank), we handed over 5 DJI Mavic 2PRO and ZOOM quadrocopters and trained 10 operators each. Based on our experience and communication with those who actively use copters in combat, we decided to write this text. We base it on the experience of using DJI brand quadrocopters, which are actively fighting on both sides of the front. In addition to DJI, copters manufactured by the American company Autel are also used, which are very close to DJI in their characteristics. To a greater extent, they are used by the AFU. Their distinctive feature is an orange body with black paws.

This article does not pretend to cover the topic in any way. No wonder we pointed out that this is the first version of the article. We consider it necessary to tell the most basic things. To read books, you need to know the alphabet. This text is nothing more than an alphabet for a potential operator. But we will definitely expand and supplement it.

I. Tasks solved by quadrocopters.

It is very important to determine in advance what exactly you are going to do with the UAV and what result you intend to achieve at the same time. Based on the achieved result, we roughly divide the tasks of the UAV into three types. They are not rigid and can flow into each other during the battle. Again, you should not just fly over the field, you should influence its course and outcome.

So, the types of tasks:

1. Artillery reconnaissance and fire correction. The result of artillery reconnaissance is the coordinates of the target in the desired coordinate system. The enemy from the beginning uses the coordinate system WGS 84, we use SK-42. Artillery correction implies that you observe the explosions of our shells near the target and make appropriate adjustments if necessary.
2. Reconnaissance of the area. The result of such reconnaissance is the detection of the enemy, traces of his presence and other facts about which the relevant units should be warned. For example: the crew of the UAV can support the movement of the column on the vehicles and here the most important thing is a timely warning that something suspicious is happening at some distance to the left or right of the route.
3. Control of the battle using the UAV. The crew of the UAV can help the unit commander to see the situation from above in real time and manage forces and means in real time. Important note. In order to command from above, it is important to train personnel to act according to clear guidelines. After all, there is no point in shouting "Run to the right", because everyone has their own "right" from above.

II. A set of additional equipment for the successful use of quadrocopters.

Experienced operators have already formed wishes for a set of equipment, which should be together with the bird itself.

• Additional rechargeable batteries. In total, there should be at least 5 batteries with the copter. It happens that experienced crews make 20 sorties per day. On one battery, this is in no way possible.
• Spare screws.
• A tablet and a protective case for the tablet. There are different opinions here. Someone prefers a smartphone for flying, someone prefers a remote control with a screen (DJI calls it a Smart Controller), but we provide all our drones with tablets. We believe that the map is still better visible on it [additionally phone is too small to see details during urban battles] .
• Tablet holder. It is convenient to mount a smartphone on the standard remote control. A special holder is needed for the tablet.
• Sun visor. There are special visors that can be equipped with a tablet so that even in the bright sun you can see what is happening on it. Do not forget that tablets also differ from each other in image quality.
• microSD memory cards 3 pieces per set. With a capacity of 32 or 64 GB, with UHS-I, U3 and Class 10, with an adapter to SD. It is better to equip memory cards with a USB card reader. A card is inserted into it, and it is connected to the computer via USB. Not all laptops are now equipped with a standard card reader. The cards themselves are inserted into the quadcopter and allow you to bring high-quality video from flights.
• Car charging for batteries.
• Cigarette lighter. A device that allows using car charging to be powered directly from a car battery.
• USB Type-C (m) — USB (m) cable. And you can also have a spare such cable.
• Micro USB (m) — USB (m) cable. Stock also won't hurt.
• A good backpack for storing and carrying all equipment.

iii. Software.

For effective work with DJI brand UAVS, DJI Pilot software is most suitable, it allows you to get the largest amount of data for operational decision-making by the operator, however, this software is compatible only with the industrial line of equipment from this manufacturer, which is about 2 times more expensive with similar TTX.

By trial and error, a set of several software packages was assembled to solve the main tasks:

DJI GO. Standard copter control software, operation is possible only when connected to the remote control. It is possible to demolish the height limit of 500m, remove no-fly zones, and reflash under the American FCC communication standard in order to increase the range. The simplest tool, except for the need for a scientific record (albeit formal) and the requirement for a minimum knowledge of English by the operator.

litchi. An application with advanced functionality for copters that support DJI GO. Everything is more interesting here. It's in Russian. This is a huge plus for the workers' and peasants' army. Shows the coordinates of the board in real time (WGS 84). It has a conditional grid on the screen that allows you to quickly determine the distance depending on the height. There is a diagonal (simply put, a crosshair) that serves as a target designation when lowering the camera strictly down. Automatic flight on points without communication with the operator is implemented.

The software "Geodesist" is used for the operational conversion of coordinates from the international WGS 84 to the Russian Army standard Gauss-Kruger SK42.

BY "offlineMaps". A simple application that allows you to save a large amount of maps to your smartphone and adjust artillery systems using a convenient ruler indicating the azimuth and distance from the gap to the target. A special value is in specifying the coordinates of the selected point immediately in the SC42.

IV. Fundamentals of software application for various tasks.

Task:
covering the column
for the purpose of reconnaissance of the terrain along the course of movement at a distance of 1km.
BY DJI GO

Technology: The operator moving in the column carries out visual observation of the terrain in real time using a copter moving in front of the column. The nuances include the need to periodically update the home point, so that in case of signal loss, you do not lose the board.

Task:
escort of a walking group.
ACCORDING to litchi + the need for stable radio communication with the group

Technology: The operator conducts the group online, highlights the goals, transmits visual landmarks by radio.

Task:
guidance of art systems.
BY litchi + BY "Geodesist"

Technology: The operator searches for the target, then removes the coordinates from the device screen using the software "Geodesist" (on another device!!! Smartphone or tablet) translates them to SK42 and sends them to the fire control point.

Task:
adjustment of artillery systems.
BY litchi + BY "offlineMaps"

Technology: During the operation of the artillery system, the operator, indicating the places of breaks on the software, receives corrections for azimuth and distance from the target and transmits them to the fire control point.

Task:
collection of intelligence data
in the conditions of operation of electronic warfare.
BY litchi

Technology: In areas where positioning signals are suppressed, it is critically important to fly at a minimum altitude, while the radius of the communication channel between the flight operator is significantly narrowed. Based on this, the operator builds an autonomous flight task with one pass over the target at maximum speed and minimum permissible altitude. Data analysis is carried out after the return of the board.

V. DJI Aeroscope drone detection platform.

The Ukrainian side is actively using the DJI– DJI aeroscope drone detection tool in the area of its implementation [it is somewhat questionable as UKR reports that China disabled their Aeroscopes]. The peculiarity of this system is that it shows the coordinates of all copters of this brand and the location of operators in a zone from 5 to 30 km, depending on the version (stationary or portable). [According to UKR report It shows only reported coordinates. GPS of control device can be and must be spoofed. Drone PGS sometimes can be blocked] A system of minimizing threats from this equipment has been developed jointly with existing operators, but it is the most dangerous for the operator. This system does not allow you to intercept control (as well as all the electronic warfare tools used), however, immediately after turning on the copter at its location and the location of the operator, they begin to work actively. The only reasonable reaction of the operator, if they started shooting at him shortly after turning on the remote, is to turn off the remote and hide. [Seems RU behind UKR regarding mitigating the risk of Aeroscopes]. Unfortunately, there are no life-saving firmware from Aeroscope, although there is a lot of talk about them. DJI, as a drone manufacturer, has indeed created a means of detecting them.

VI. Conclusion.

At the moment, the KTSPN [the above volunteer organization] is preparing several more training courses on copters for various units of the Russian army.

 

 

[FancyCat]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

Sorry, I have not figured out how to embed tweets here yet. So, here is the link to interesting quote.

• For a month RU arty is noticeably decreasing volume of fire
• DNLR D-20 now doing most of the work
• Looks like majority of Msta guns either run out of tube resource or got broken.

Copy and paste the tweet, then press enter and it will auto embed.

 

Is this the entire frontline or just in a portion of the front?

[Grigb]

16 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Is this the entire frontline or just in a portion of the front?

Looks like LDNR portion and specifically are around Severodonetsk. Got a feeling that they are exhausted and seeing no much progress they threw in reserves they had for after penetration exploitation.

[The_Capt]

9 hours ago, JonS said:

From one random guy on the internet to another, our difference is, I think, that you see the infantry/recce guys doing infantry stuff then supplementing that with some fires task, while I read the same vignette as a couple of infantry guys doing fires stuff throughout.

Well when you put it that way it seems like a silly thing to get heated up over.  

Pulling this back to the topic at hand; what this vignette does show is effective integration of systems within the UA- indirect fires, infantry/recce and ISR - no matter what we call it.  This has been a theme since pretty early on, while the RA has noted shortfalls doing the same.

This gets me thinking about metrics again and the tension between old ones and new ones.  We discussed firepower and mass, which has been the primary driver in a lot of mainstream assessment.  To which I added smartness and distribution.  We should now add integration to that list - which is not new in the least but must be part of the mix when assessing forces.

Finally, this seems to be a quality in the UA at the operational and strategic levels as well.  While the RA has seemed disjointed and counter-purpose: this is like watching the biggest guy in the bar trying to fight while having a seizure.  So building a working theory here - the UA was able to apply friction/attrition on the RA operational system, which was already prone to self-dislocation, and widened those fractures to the point of breaking across all levels of warfare.  The UA did so by distributing the forces they had across a very wide area in a self-synchronizing C2 model, empowered with significant ISR advantage, and integrated those systems...frankly brilliantly...in order to overwhelm/overheat the Russian system.

This forced the RA to concentrate mass to pre-mechanized warfare levels, largely artillery/EW/AD based, in order to re-establish equilibrium in a much smaller area.  Further ceding initiative to the UA, who now appear to be doing lateral c-moves to push and pull Russian forces horizontally...further stressing their system.

So What?  What is critical here is "how fast can the Russian's learn", or "Can the Russians learn fast enough?"  A major LOO/objective in the UA op design has to be "keep Russians stupid", which I would pay good money to get a peek at.

[Harmon Rabb]

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

It is crumbling slowly

Hard landing...

I know the video is in the BBC link but here is a video of the crash for those who missed it.

 

Edited June 24, 2022 by Harmon Rabb
Found another video posted by Visegrád 24.

[dan/california]

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/06/24/world/russia-ukraine-war-news#ukraine-says-it-will-withdraw-from-the-city-of-sievierodonetsk

Headline pretty much says it...

[Beleg85]

Ok, so it seems battle of Severdonetsk is over. Not sure, though, if it is wise to announce publically this withdrawal now.

https://kyivindependent.com/national/ukrainian-troops-withdraw-from-embattled-sievierodonetsk-fierce-fighting-continues-in-donbas

I am very curious what historians will tell about this battle once more will be known. We can only guess why it developed- if it was deliberate trap for Russians, effects of cunning strategy or simply refusal to give ground by local Ukrainians. It is unclear who fooled whom- if it was LPR brigades and Rosgvardia attacking, it could actually overall benefit Russian side and give some time to reorganize their regular forces. Bur perhaps it was also a way to give Russiand bloody nose, distract RU artillery fire and wear down their barrels and ammo on target without strategic value.

This was probably heaviest urban fighting since Mariupol, but video materials were also surprisingly scarce. Probably several thousand troops thought in it at any given time, but we will mostly see it through lenses of International Legion fighters, for whom this engagement was (in all probablitiy) a truly formative one.

 

 

Edited June 24, 2022 by Beleg85

[Huba]

Some more news about the boats donated to UA in last support package:

The "medium force protection" boats probably mean those:

https://www.marinelog.com/shipbuilding/shipyards/shipyard-news/navy-picks-lake-assault-boats-for-force-protection-medium-boats-contract/

Rather too small for Snake Island assault, so most probable use will be for patrolling and clearing out the lower Dnipro and it's outlet.

Edited June 24, 2022 by Huba

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Ok, so it seems battle of Severdonetsk is over. Not sure, though, if it is wise to announce publically this withdrawal now.

I think it was a political decision. RU started to spread info that UKR command intends to sacrifice the defenders and that the situation of defenders is hopeless. It seem UKR command countered RU claims with a clear public statement.

RU propagandists like to play on UKR public mistrust of UKR officials. I personally believe that at least half of the internal conflict between government and people as well as corruption image of UKR government is caused by incessant RU propaganda. It is like one of their main propaganda strategy - Yes, our RU government is corrupt but yours is worse, here is tons of fakes to back it up! That's why all RU channels as well as RU sites must be blocked everywhere you have sizable RU population.  

 

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

This one is also interesting:
https://twitter.com/TpyxaNews/status/1540245902924939268?s=20&t=RnxXAjzlMamFTryW9_wtkQ

Looks like the GPS guided munitions used in Afghanistan?

Steve

[cesmonkey]

In this video at about the ten minute mark, the general being interviewed says the primary advantage of the Pzh 2000 to the Ukrainians, compared to other systems, is it's fast ability to shoot and scoot.  Thereby, it can be more-prudently employed closer to the front lines bringing more of the Russian artillery units in range of counter-battery fire.

Anyone know how much better the Pzh 2000 is at quick shoot and shoot compared to the other artillery Ukraine now has?
 

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

9 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Looks like the GPS guided munitions used in Afghanistan?

Steve

Yes, the HIMARS footage is not from UKR. Just for reference from Afghanistan 

[acrashb]

26 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

What is critical here is "how fast can the Russian's learn", or "Can the Russians learn fast enough?"  A major LOO/objective in the UA op design has to be "keep Russians stupid", which I would pay good money to get a peek at.

That's my key point, slowing the RA OODA loop and maintaining 'ours' - Ukraine as backed by the West.  Slowing it: killing so many RA officers is a good start, they are the central nervous system.  Baiting Putin into rash decisions (e.g., cutting gas to Germany) is another area to leverage; any geopolitical distractions put friction into the RA OODA.   Further reduction of observational sources, from battlefield ISR reduction (stingers taking out drones) to removing RA sigint and humint assets, which we've seen going on.

Maintaining the UA OODA: continual pressure on and change of the battlefield, so that as the RA is adapting to one thing another is coming on line and there is no significant operational pause for the RA to mentally regroup during.  Continual feeding of new weapon systems from the West.  Continual additional training / tactics adaptation.  Continual ISR to feed the first O. So the UA needs the rear area relatively non-disrupted, which by the slowed pace of successful missile attacks seems to be happening.

And so on.  I'm concerned about a stalemate if the RA learns quickly enough.

[The_Capt]

9 minutes ago, acrashb said:

That's my key point, slowing the RA OODA loop and maintaining 'ours' - Ukraine as backed by the West.  Slowing it: killing so many RA officers is a good start, they are the central nervous system.  Baiting Putin into rash decisions (e.g., cutting gas to Germany) is another area to leverage; any geopolitical distractions put friction into the RA OODA.   Further reduction of observational sources, from battlefield ISR reduction (stingers taking out drones) to removing RA sigint and humint assets, which we've seen going on.

Maintaining the UA OODA: continual pressure on and change of the battlefield, so that as the RA is adapting to one thing another is coming on line and there is no significant operational pause for the RA to mentally regroup during.  Continual feeding of new weapon systems from the West.  Continual additional training / tactics adaptation.  Continual ISR to feed the first O. So the UA needs the rear area relatively non-disrupted, which by the slowed pace of successful missile attacks seems to be happening.

And so on.  I'm concerned about a stalemate if the RA learns quickly enough.

Slowing is one aspect but I also think they can influence the RA OODA loop to make bad decisions quicker.  I also suspect, as you note, this has been what has been happening at the strategic level all along...in fact if the Russian political OODA loop slowed down it may perform better.

Doing it on the battlefield may be killing the right leaders and leaving the impulsive and weak ones in place.  This is an extension of where we wound up in COIN/GWOT...leave the idiots in charge, take out the talent.  Otherwise you risk positive Darwinian pressure on your opponent, when you want negative pressure.

I also suspect this is where cyber could come in.  If you could corrupt the data, then the Russian system has to work harder through it to create knowledge.  Or conversely shape it so the Russian see what they want to see and act impulsively on it - Bil H does this to me all the time.

The Russians do have a history of being able to learn quickly in war, especially when they are losing - thing is, I do not think they are willing to admit or recognize that they are losing.

I do suspect the Russians are close to burning out.  We have been calling it for some time but the signs were there before all this and after nearly two months of intense combat the Russian forces have to seriously be eroded.  There are signs along the front that in other areas they have already moved to operational defence, they are only able to really push in that one sector.  The key indicator will be if Putin declares "victory" if they can clear the Luhansk Oblast.  I do not see them having the gas to take all of Donetsk as well, unless the UA suffers a major set-back.

[Bil Hardenberger]

On 6/23/2022 at 1:47 AM, Battlefront.com said:

Here's a treat.  I got to ask some questions from a friend who just spent 3 days and nights with a Ukrainian infantry company and the battalion recon platoon somewhere in the south.  He fielded questions from others and of those I am going to summarize the most relevant/interesting ones for us.

First, this unit is not a typical unit.  It started off as a TD unit fighting around Kyiv and after that the personnel decided they wanted to take it up a notch so they applied to become a special forces (SSO) unit and in May they obtained official status as such.  They are technically a Regiment, but in reality they are probably Battalion sized (this is my guess).

Here are some of the most interesting bits that I have simplified and reorganized a bit to make it an easier read for this thread:

Q: It seems that Ukrainians have fluid command and control.  Is this true?
A: With the qualification that SSO is not a standard UAF unit, yes, they are definitely decentralized.  Company CO receives generalized orders such as defend here, attack there, and so on. How to do all that was left totally up to him. Platoon commanders were extremely independent and free to open fire, position weapons and men, set up positions, as they saw best. I also so sergeants talking to company grade officers effectively as equals.

Q: Did you see combined arms operations as recognized in the West?
A: Yes. At the level I was at it was a couple of recon guys using two drones, a smart phone, and a tablet to figure out where the target was and feed its location into the firing system. As they explained it to me, if it was a serious target, the Company CO or the the battalion FDC would automatically push getting that target hit by artillery, of which several batteries from several brigades (all in range, theoretically) were on call in general support of fire missions. But since the targets that day were individual fighting positions, the company mortars dealt with it.

Q:  How does the Recon Platoon fit into combined arms?
A: I saw enlisted members of a recce platoon directly involved, in the field, in identifying a target, feeding that data into the system, and adjusting fires. It took them a couple of minutes to work out exactly right grid location they wanted because it was hard at some points to see into the woodline with the drones. The time lapse from first called shot to spotting round strike was less than a minute and at least half of that was round flight.

Q: The front is long and thinly manned.  Do they do a lot of missions behind the lines?

A: The unit I was with doesn’t normally do behind-the-lines missions. They’re not demolitions experts or professional partisans, they’re special mission light infantry. They might get picked to do some kind of infiltration assault, but for the most part the closest they get to behind-the-lines is ground patrols in the gray zone, and every once in a long while sneaking up on a Russian position.

Q:  Do they conduct night ops?
A:  I saw video of and eventually talked with a couple of participants in a 6-man night patrol. They had hand-held thermals, they went pretty deep (800 m.) beyond friendly lines, they got engaged and they broke contact, and they brought back a casualty. It was very clear from the company CO that active, aggressive patrolling is something he wants done and that the battalion is doing across its front. It’s considered very dangerous work so they don’t seem to go out unless every meter of the patrol route is pre-screened by drones. (caveats - this is a dedicated recon unit within a SSO formation, so not necessarily typical).

Q: What sort of drones were in use and how were they used?
A: They were using cheapo Chinese drones. I remember Mavis was one of the manufacturers. They have access to drone support from higher echelons but it’s not always available and for their tactical needs they only need to fly out a couple of kilometers, maximum. They seemed to operate a pair of drones in the air at a time, one to poke around literally between tree branches, and a second to overwatch. Their SOP is constant surveillance so they continually rotate drones for battery changes.

Q: What were your general impressions of the quality of the soldiers you saw?
A:  Skill levels are, in general high, but likely not necessarily recognizable as professionals trained in peacetime as this is a mobilized unit in time of war. I saw very credible fighting positions dug nice and deep. I saw crew-served weapons in logical locations, rational fields of fire, and AT weapons sensibly piled up. I saw a recce platoon scour a woodline with drones meter by meter and spend the better part of an hour reviewing footage to try and figure out what was inside. I saw soldiers call the company commander by his first name and I saw food and water piled pretty haphazardly, but the M2 Browning was in perfect condition and the Company CO considered it his single most powerful weapon.  Soldiers were lax about wearing body armor during the day as it is hot and Russians tended to shell in the mornings.

Uniforms were clean and before eating people washed their hands. In the recce platoon there was lots of after market add ons and field items, a couple of guys looked very special forces and high end. In the line platoons, less so. Physical fitness, lean and healthy-looking. Only a few guys looked to be in their latter 30s or older. No baby faces. Not built up and muscular like you see with some NATO units who spend a lot of time on base lifting weights.

The company CO was young but he knew his business and tactics, and he relied a lot on senior soldiers - basically, older guys functioning like sergeants - to keep things running. Systems functioned, vehicles came and went, stuff went in and out of the supply room, recon data was crunched and plans made, and the company CO's job was basically oversight and final decision. Attitude was they were there to do their jobs and they did them without micromanagement.

Q: How is their morale holding up?

A: Morale seemed fine to me. Everyone is sure Ukraine is going to win, it’s just a question of how long it will take. The enemy is dangerous but it is very possible to beat him, even easy a lot of the time. Everyone is in the same boat: everyone has relatives or friends who were or are in occupied territory, or had to evacuate, or had home or property damaged by the Russians. It’s absolutely clear what they’re fighting for. Some griping about how higher command is stupid, but you can’t have an army without that. The common complaint was there’s just not enough artillery ammunition to kill the Russians when they find them.

 

Q:  Do personnel get leave or R&R?
A: definite “no”. There’s no rule against asking for leave but basically no one asks because units are short-handed and it’s not like this is training, this is a war and another man off the line is help to the Russians. So no one asks. The company CO told me guys mostly got breaks either when the unit is in a quiet sector and they’re just in passive defense, and then it’s possible to rotate say a platoon at a time back to battalion or regiment for showers and so forth, or, another new weapons system is in the pipeline and soldiers get pulled off the line to go to training. It is a pretty sustainable approach as long as you are not trying to beat the other guy with high-intensity warfare.

Q:  What's going on with Ukrainian reinforcements/replacements?  There's so many stated to be under arms, but it doesn't appear that they are at the front in huge numbers.  Where are they?
A: Either getting trained or more likely waiting for a training slot. The army has a replacements system but it’s priority-driven and infantry isn’t a training priority with artillery and crew-served weapons operators being much more badly needed, and also, the army is trying hard to pool enough replacement to build new brigades rather than feed replacements into the ones that exist. It’s basically down to limited training capacity, everyone says there are enough volunteers. But the Ukrainian army is trying pretty hard not to send untrained people into combat. TD units getting into big fights is something they want less, not more of.

 

Q: How do they think the summer's fighting will go?  Do they expect to just hold on, or do they think they'll attack in a significant way?
A: The general opinion is offensive possibilities depend on availability of heavy weapons and ammunition, particularly artillery. The key to any serious offensive is suppressing and destroying the RF artillery. Everyone from private to company commander pointed out to me that the Russians have about 3-5 times more artillery and 8-15 times more artillery ammunition.

They seemed absolutely confident that if the RF artillery could be dealt with, the UAF would advance and probably the RF infantry would break apart. By that same token, pretty much everyone I talked to seemed quite sure UAF human wave attacks to gain ground would be idiotic, and UAF high command would never order it.

All in all my impression was this was a unit that would fight and take casualties for some time, and the specialists (mortar, recce, crew-served) were probably at least as competent as NATO counterparts, and very likely more so because they’ve got a ton of live ammo experience. But they were so spread out and the command pressure so limited, that I wonder if they could maneuver as a single company. I have no proof but I guess they would need to practice quite a bit before maneuvering as part of a battalion.

 

Steve, thanks for this post... just finished reading it, and it has some real nuggets that are applicable to my "day job".  Thank your buddy for his insights, and.. more detail like this please.   

Bil