How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Beleg85]

And early analysis of Avdiivka battle from Tatarigami:

 

[Haiduk]

UKR Naval Forces press-service issued official statement, that UKR naval drones attacked twice patrol ship "Pavel Derzhavin" and resque sea tug of BSF "Professor Nikolay Muru", which arrived to tow damaged patrol ship and also was attaked herself. Press-service didn't confirm attack on "Buyan" missile corvette and nothing told about allegedle attack on "Alrosa" submarine, claimed by SBU, who in cooperation with Naval Forces conducted drone strike operations. 

More and more Russian TGs write now that attack of UKR naval drones took place at all 2-3 days ago. According their statements attacks more likely were conducted by new underwater drones ("Marichka"?). Looks like these were deep underwater detonations, which hit hulls of ships with water hammer. "Pavel Derzhavin" for short time got damage of propeller controls, "Nikolay Muru" was disabled and needed assist of other tugboat. One of TGs claimed "Pavel Derzhavin" lost two sailors, which fell overboard in moment of explosion and drowned.

According to UKR official statement "Pavel Derzhavin" now left Sevastopol and heading likely to Feodosia, where Russians moved part of ships. Most of large ships now based in Novorossiysk and come to Sevastopol only for misiles reloading, because of Novorossiysk hasn't proper infrastructure for this.

On the photo "Professor Nikolay Muru" resque sea tug (pr.22870, comissioned in 2014). Black Sea had four vessels of this type. One of them "Vasiliy Bekh" was sunk with two "Harpoon" missiles in 2022 near Zmiinyi island.

  

On the screen of video after incident - tugboat approaches to disabled "Nilolay Muru" (right)

 

Edited October 14, 2023 by Haiduk

[Eddy]

On 10/6/2023 at 1:25 PM, The_Capt said:

Thanks guys.  Guess who got tagged to do a Future of Joint Warfare piece at work?  Yep, the guy who won't shut up about it.  If Steve was particularly profit driven he would charge a membership fee for this thread.

Not sure if this will be relevant to what you've been tasked with but Jack Watling from RUSI has a new book out - 'The Arms of the Future':

The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the 21st Century: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century (New Perspectives on Defence and Security): Amazon.co.uk: Jack Watling: 9781350352957: Books

I've just got it on kindle and only read the intro so far, but it looks promising. Judging by his RUSI articles it hopefully may be of some use.

[Vanir Ausf B]

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Dynamic of daily artillery shots. It's claimed now in first time Ukraine makes more daily shots than Russia. The source is unknown

Have you heard anything about UKR 105mm ammunition supply? It seems to be running low. At least the 80th Air Assault Brigade is running low.

_________

“Miron”, an artillery commander stationed near Bakhmut, told The Telegraph: “The British L119 is a nice gun, very comfortable to work with and accurate to fire. But we don’t have enough shells for it – last week, we fired only five shells all week.

“It is catastrophically limited. When we are in battle, we are having to weigh up very carefully whether we should use a shell or not.”

https://www.yahoo.com/news/british-howitzers-fall-silent-ukraine-103240001.html

Edited October 14, 2023 by Vanir Ausf B

[Haiduk]

Russians pointed out UKR became to use "daring helicoter attacks" on extremaly low altitude on Zaporizzia front - they entering to the sector in Robotyne area, then turn west, fly and work at positions near Kopani. Author advices to comamnder to solve this problem, deploying MANPADs on forward positions.

Captured Russian VDV troopers near Verbove

 

Edited October 14, 2023 by Haiduk

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I don't think you'd argue with me qualifying your last remark in the way I'm about to...

The actions of Avdiivka, Kupyansk-Lyman, 2023 winter offensive, and the countless counter attacks have not fundamentally changed Russia's options in a positive way.  However, it seems that with each one of these failed actions Russia's options have been reduced.  So the qualification I'd offer is "are Russia's options spaces fundamentally IMPROVED in these latest actions... nope".

I will keep hammering away on this point because I'm still not sure it's being fully appreciated by commentators out there.  The Avdiivka offensive is the first major offensive Russia has launched that did not involve "premiere" line (like 1st Guards Tank Army) or "elite" (VDV, Spetsnaz, Marines) units.  Why not?  Because they've been burnt up leading previous attacks and defensive actions.  Further, the regular line units are in such a sorry state that not only can't they conduct meaningful offensive operations on their own, they seem incapable of defending even with historically strong prepared positions.  Hence (all?) of Russia's "elite" units being committed to the defense of the south.

It's difficult to identify a turning point in a war like this, but the Avdiivka attack will likely be seen as an indicator that the war has fundamentally changed in favor of Ukraine.  I predict that no future Russian set piece attack will come out better than the shambles we just witnessed.  Avdiivka, in my view, confirms that Russia is done as an offensive player in this war.  I don't think they can reconstitute their forces in a way that will ever change this equation short of freezing the conflict for several years.  Even then, I'm not sure that sort of thing would work out either.

It is important to state that what I just said does not imply that the opposite is true for Ukraine.  Just because Russia is spent as an offensive force doesn't necessarily mean Ukraine will see success on the offense.  It could be that neither side is capable of large scale offensive ops leading to a stalemate.  I don't see any reason to conclude that about Ukraine, just saying that just because Russia keeps flipping "heads" doesn't mean Ukraine automatically flips "tails".

Steve

Could not agree more loudly (we should start a podcast...seems to be the rage).  The fundamental question every one needs to ask when seeing an phenomenon in this war is:

What does this do to the options?

Unless it shifts options in favour, or against a side, then it is likely "just an effect".  Effects stack up eventually forcing decision (even negative ones), which are the roadmaps of options.  But options are bigger than any tactical action or exchange...until they are not.  So, and this goes for the "Ukraine fanbois" and "Doomsday Club", the question we need to ask every time we see something is the one above.  Are Ukraine's options expanding, sustaining or shrinking?  Are Russia's?  How does "this" matter to those options?

If we see an RA attack, well does it actually indicate an increase in Russian options spaces?  Does the attack yield better operational options?  Is all it doing is trying to sustain the options the RA already have?

We need to stop seeing an event through narrow lenses of "killed" or "ground taken/lost".  Past troop numbers and equipment.  Is it decisive (in either direction)?  Does it impact options?

Here I agree with Steve.  Avdiivka is the RA sustaining options, at best.  The UA offensive has not yielded options expansion...that we can see.  Have they eroded the RA enough that opening up another offensive is an option?  I do not know.  Evidence is that the UA operations have not yielded a fundamental shift in their options, but are they compressing the RAs?  Have they compressed the RA military options to the point that Offense is off the table?

I will leave that to you guys to discuss and figure out, but I do recommend keeping that lens and metric in mind before we make any sweeping judgements on any given event.

[The_Capt]

20 minutes ago, Eddy said:

Not sure if this will be relevant to what you've been tasked with but Jack Watling from RUSI has a new book out - 'The Arms of the Future':

The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the 21st Century: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century (New Perspectives on Defence and Security): Amazon.co.uk: Jack Watling: 9781350352957: Books

I've just got it on kindle and only read the intro so far, but it looks promising. Judging by his RUSI articles it hopefully may be of some use.

Thanks for this.  Someone already tagged it for me, but now it is rising up my reading list.

[Haiduk]

25 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Have you heard anything about UKR 105mm ammunition supply? It seems to be running low. At least the 80th Air Assault Brigade is running low.

_________

“Miron”, an artillery commander stationed near Bakhmut, told The Telegraph: “The British L119 is a nice gun, very comfortable to work with and accurate to fire. But we don’t have enough shells for it – last week, we fired only five shells all week.

“It is catastrophically limited. When we are in battle, we are having to weigh up very carefully whether we should use a shell or not.”

https://www.yahoo.com/news/british-howitzers-fall-silent-ukraine-103240001.html

This guy is platoon commander of L119 in 46th air-assault brigade

https://twitter.com/denintern

I remember he complained about 105 mm shortage, but long time ago. His last posts havn't nothing about this

[Haiduk]

One more pr.22160 patrol ship allegedly "Sergey Kotov" in dry dock of Novorossiysk. Damaged or planned docking

 

Edited October 14, 2023 by Haiduk

[Kinophile]

Tatarigami again on Avdiivka, in depth look. 

 

[danfrodo]

Daily dose of confirmation bias.  Good summary of where things are today but not much new.  Both sides stuck in defensive warfare, or denial as TheCapt would say.  RU launched brilliant, massive offensive operation that cleverly reduced the amount of food, ammo & fuel need by RU forces in the Andiivka area, though did lead to a shortage of body bags.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/10/14/2199143/-Ukraine-Update-Ukraine-has-the-upper-hand-but-it-s-a-defensive-slugfest?pm_campaign=front_page&pm_source=top_news_slot_1&pm_medium=web

[dan/california]

Russia has a lot of artillery, they don'y have an infinity of it. That little difference may yet matter.

[kimbosbread]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Could not agree more loudly (we should start a podcast...seems to be the rage).  The fundamental question every one needs to ask when seeing an phenomenon in this war is:

What does this do to the options?

…

I will leave that to you guys to discuss and figure out, but I do recommend keeping that lens and metric in mind before we make any sweeping judgements on any given event.

Very well put! When people complain about Bakhmut, this is a useful way to think about it… Russia burned through some of their better offensive forces, and lots of artillery, thus reducing their options for offense in the future. And the political option space unfortunately got bleaker as well, with Putin getting rid of a potential Rival.

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Thanks for this.  Someone already tagged it for me, but now it is rising up my reading list.

My copy just arrived!

[cesmonkey]

2 hours ago, Haiduk said:

"daring helicoter attacks"

There was a video the other day from RFE, from eastern Urkaine:

 

[Eddy]

12 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

My copy just arrived!

2 chapters in - all killer and no filler (for those of us of a certain age ). It's excellent so far.

[Letter from Prague]

1 hour ago, cesmonkey said:

There was a video the other day from RFE, from eastern Urkaine:

 

Any lower and the helicopters will also start to harvest the wheat.

[Vet 0369]

On 10/11/2023 at 4:05 PM, Haiduk said:

 So, "veterans" laughed at this and told, this is usual practice for all brigades in much or less degrees, just conditions of war forced us to act by a rule of US Marines, where each marine in first order is rifleman, anf only then has own speciality.

This “Old Marine” Agrees 100%! It works for us!

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, Haiduk said:

UKR Naval Forces press-service issued official statement, that UKR naval drones attacked twice patrol ship "Pavel Derzhavin" and resque sea tug of BSF "Professor Nikolay Muru", which arrived to tow damaged patrol ship and also was attaked herself. Press-service didn't confirm attack on "Buyan" missile corvette and nothing told about allegedle attack on "Alrosa" submarine, claimed by SBU, who in cooperation with Naval Forces conducted drone strike operations. 

More and more Russian TGs write now that attack of UKR naval drones took place at all 2-3 days ago. According their statements attacks more likely were conducted by new underwater drones ("Marichka"?). Looks like these were deep underwater detonations, which hit hulls of ships with water hammer. "Pavel Derzhavin" for short time got damage of propeller controls, "Nikolay Muru" was disabled and needed assist of other tugboat. One of TGs claimed "Pavel Derzhavin" lost two sailors, which fell overboard in moment of explosion and drowned.

According to UKR official statement "Pavel Derzhavin" now left Sevastopol and heading likely to Feodosia, where Russians moved part of ships. Most of large ships now based in Novorossiysk and come to Sevastopol only for misiles reloading, because of Novorossiysk hasn't proper infrastructure for this.

On the photo "Professor Nikolay Muru" resque sea tug (pr.22870, comissioned in 2014). Black Sea had four vessels of this type. One of them "Vasiliy Bekh" was sunk with two "Harpoon" missiles in 2022 near Zmiinyi island.

  

On the screen of video after incident - tugboat approaches to disabled "Nilolay Muru" (right)

 

Interesting concept with the underwater drones being used to create a "water hammer" effect.  Minor, fairly easily repaired damage, doesn't seem to be worth doing when the same effort, skill, and luck could do something to sink it.  Because I think Ukrainians are super smart, there must be a reason for what they are doing.  Naval warfare is not my area so I'd love to know more about this sort of thing.

That said, these sorts of attacks do send a strong message that Russian shipping is vulnerable and not welcomed in the area.  That is of value.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Not surprising, Ukraine saw the Avdiivka attack coming.  Russian OPSEC for an operation on this scale would be difficult to maintain:

Quote

US and Ukrainian officials reported on October 12 and 13 that they anticipated the Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka and expressed confidence in Ukrainian defenses. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby reported on October 13 that the new Russian offensive operations near Lyman and Avdiivka “did not come as a surprise.”[1] Kirby stated that the US is confident that Ukrainian forces will repel these Russian attacks.[2] Kirby also reported that Russian forces appear to be using human wave tactics, wherein the Russian military uses masses of poorly trained and equipped Russian soldiers to attempt to advance - the same practice Russian forces used during their failed winter offensive in winter 2023.[3] ISW has additionally observed Russian forces using higher than usual numbers of armored vehicles in ongoing operations.[4] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov similarly reported on October 12 that Ukrainian forces knew about and prepared for the Russian attack near Avdiivka and that Russian forces did not form sufficient reserves to attack along the entire frontline, but only in certain sectors.[5] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian mines are slowing Russian advances near Avdiivka, indicating Ukrainian prior preparations for the attack.[6]

The part I like about this is that Ukraine saw it coming and, apparently, did very little to prepare for it. Yes, I'm sure they moved some extra artillery and munitions into place, probably beefed up ISR, etc. but not much more than that.  Seems Ukraine said "toss a few extra mines out front and that should do it".  They had that little regard for Russian capabilities. 

This really is a significant event.  Ukraine largely defeated the Russian winter offensive with already deployed forces, so this has been done before.  However, this time the Russians tried for a more concentrated, precise offensive with significant investments in armor, artillery, and air... yet Ukraine still defeated it largely with its standing forces. 

Compare this to what happens when Ukraine goes on the offensive.  Russian lines crack and additional units have to be rushed into place to prevent a breakthrough.  Even in the most heavily reinforced positions the world has seen since WW2.  Ukraine's offensives are slowed down and stalled out, but not with existing forces and not without heaps of losses.

Very stark comparison.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

And because we haven't recently mentioned how badly this war is impacting Russia's power within the "near abroad", ISW has this summary of something making its way through the news:

Quote

Armenia ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 14, obliging Armenia to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin if he enters Armenia due to the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrant, directly after Putin’s efforts on October 13 to claim that the Russia-Armenia relationship is not deteriorating.[21] Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed the corresponding degree as well as a statement recognizing the ICC’s jurisdiction on October 14 following the Armenian parliament‘s vote to ratify the statute on October 3.[22] Ratifying the Rome Statute notably legally obliges Armenia to arrest Putin on behalf of the ICC, which issued a warrant for Putin’s arrest on March 17, 2023, for illegally deporting Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Russia.[23] Armenia’s ratification of the Rome Statute comes one day after Putin boasted about the strength of Russia-Armenia relations during the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Member States.[24]

Steve

[kluge]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Interesting concept with the underwater drones being used to create a "water hammer" effect.  Minor, fairly easily repaired damage, doesn't seem to be worth doing when the same effort, skill, and luck could do something to sink it.  Because I think Ukrainians are super smart, there must be a reason for what they are doing.  Naval warfare is not my area so I'd love to know more about this sort of thing.

Water is incompressible. The force from an underwater explosion is transferred more or less directly through water with minimal loss of energy. As such, a near miss underwater produces nearly the same effect as a direct hit.

A small surface drone with a similar sized payload does less damage because a portion of the energy from the explosion is transmitted through the air, which cushions the blast by virtue of its compressibility. Thus, the best place to hit a ship is below the waterline, where there is no air.

Additionally an underwater explosion will generate a bubble as it pushes water outwards. The bubble eventually collapses, and as it does so the water that takes up the space no longer supports the ship. In certain scenarios where a ship is heavy enough and there is a large enough bubble, the ship will bend as the bubble collapses. This is referred to as "breaking the back" of a ship. The impact of this is somewhat mythologized and often gets blown out of proportion, but is nonetheless noteworthy because at the end of the day it's extra stress on a ship that wouldn't be produced with an above water explosion.

[Aragorn2002]

10 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

There was a video the other day from RFE, from eastern Urkaine:

 

Imagine what these men could do with Apache or Tiger attack helicopters.

[mosuri]

2 hours ago, kluge said:

Additionally an underwater explosion will generate a bubble as it pushes water outwards. The bubble eventually collapses, and as it does so the water that takes up the space no longer supports the ship. In certain scenarios where a ship is heavy enough and there is a large enough bubble, the ship will bend as the bubble collapses. This is referred to as "breaking the back" of a ship. The impact of this is somewhat mythologized and often gets blown out of proportion, but is nonetheless noteworthy because at the end of the day it's extra stress on a ship that wouldn't be produced with an above water explosion.

And this is why navies already in WW2 had torpedoes that were set to run under their targets and detonate with magnetic triggers.

Didn't work out perfectly in the beginning, Germans had trouble in the Norwegian campaign and everyone knows the multitude of problems the US Navy had with Mark 14. But the intent was clear.

[paxromana]

1 hour ago, Aragorn2002 said:

Imagine what these men could do with Apache or Tiger attack helicopters.

Get shot down only slightly less easily?

I thought we'd agreed that Attack Helicopters ... indeed, any Helicopter near the front ... was now more a liability than an asset?

Edited October 15, 2023 by paxromana

[Letter from Prague]

47 minutes ago, paxromana said:

Get shot down only slightly less easily?

I thought we'd agreed that Attack Helicopters ... indeed, any Helicopter near the front ... was now more a liability than an asset?

I mean they are mostly using them as flying Grads. Maybe if they had a stack of Hellfires they would be flying HIMARS.