How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, stuxneet said:

Footage from an airsoft game, unfortunately 

The tip off for me that something wasn't right is the guy in distinctive Soviet/Russian camouflage.  Better to go into the field naked than wearing that crap

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

35 minutes ago, akd said:

Just to note, Oz is a reliable reporter and has extensive experience in ME and Ukraine.

 

And even if it was Russian, so what?  It has no more relevance than the half dozen non-Ukrainian languages I hear in Legion videos.  Volunteers speaking Serbian on the Russian side also don't mean the war is being run by Serbians.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Two mags in nowhere near enough to get out of a pickle.  The standard was the ability to defend yourself for about 20 mins until guns and/or air got into the game.  20 mins of sustained fire, enough to keep their heads down and not advancing on you turned out to be around 8-10 mags per person.  So upwards of 300 rounds.  

Infantry going out on offence carried a lot more. 

Best line I ever heard : “Where is the front line in this damned war? Wherever one of us is standing.”

Outside the wire everyone is infantry…to a point.  If you are not, you are a liability.

Context... the story was from Bahrain.  If they needed more than 2 spare mags in Bahrain something much bigger happened that probably a dozen mags wouldn't fix.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, dan/california said:

Almost exactly the same rake as Steve, but with a pretty good map.

This explanation (which I totally believe, BTW) is a combination of political interference for a "victory", long standing Russian MoD strategy for distracting attacks, and necessity.  Putin said "get an attack going", MoD decided a real one wasn't possible, but something to throw Ukraine off its game would be if they used whatever "crapola" troops they had sitting around.  They looked around, saw Avdiivka and a bunch of forces they care even less about than Russian forces, and so that's what happened.

As I said a couple of days ago, the most interesting aspect of this battle is not that they launched a meat wave attack (they do that all the time), it's that they launched an ARMORED meat wave attack backed up by copious amounts of artillery.  I'm speculating that the MoD *might* have learned that an unsupported meat wave isn't likely to do anything positive for their cause.  So this time they tried it with AFVs, artillery, and air.  It seems it did only marginally better than unsupported meat waves, but the costs are WAY higher to Russia.

Maybe they will learn from this that meat waves just don't work without some decent troops in the mix.

Steve

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, akd said:

Just to note, Oz is a reliable reporter and has extensive experience in ME and Ukraine.

The source of the story with supposed Russian language on this video seems to be UNIAN, one of Ukrainian unofficial media outlets. PsyOps probably all along.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Come on 'fess up, this guy is basically you, isn't he?

 

I am way better looking.

[The_Capt]

50 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Context... the story was from Bahrain.  If they needed more than 2 spare mags in Bahrain something much bigger happened that probably a dozen mags wouldn't fix.

Steve

Ah Bahrain….my bad, I read it as “Bagram.”  Bahrain was out of theatre.  We had a similar base in UAE near Dubai.  It was a place we turned our guns in and went shopping.  Shouldn’t be giving ammo to anyone in Bahrain unless they are an MP.

[chris talpas]

25 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I am way better looking.

How about during his Mountie days?

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-regular-ground-forces-order-battle-russian-military-101

This report contains two sections: an introductory essay on the regular Russian ground forces; and a fully sourced order of battle (ORBAT) of Russia’s regular ground forces down to the brigade and regiment echelon (with select independent battalions), including the army, ground forces controlled by the the navy, Airborne (VDV) units, and GRU Spetsnaz formations.

 

They set a date January 2023. So it is not perfectly current.

 

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2023

Defending Ukrainian forces are inflicting relatively heavy losses and suppressing Russian logistics near Avdiivka, likely slowing down the Russian pace of advance. A Russian milblogger claimed that the pace of Russian advance had slowed down and Russian forces are now focusing on “quality” attacks after Russian forces endured initial high equipment losses.[16] Geolocated footage published on October 12 shows that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge northeast of Avdiivka between Yasynuvata and Horlivka.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that the bridge’s destruction will negatively impact Russian logistics in the Avdiivka area and that Russian forces will likely face difficulties attempting to repair the bridge due to its proximity to the frontline.[18]

 

ISW has a ton of detail on the Russian operation around Avdivka. The short version is that the they don't think the Russians are going very far, or very fast, and have taken very heavy losses. They do voice the possibility that the Russians will continue trying.

[Battlefront.com]

Two rare restatements/retractions from ISW in today's report:

Quote

ISW is revising its assessment that Russian attacks around Avdiivka are local efforts intended solely to fix Ukrainian forces but is not prepared to assess the exact objectives and likely outcome of Russian efforts in the Avdiivka direction at this time.

If by "local" they mean the scope of individual attacks being more-or-less uncoordinated, then they did misspeak.  This was/is definitely a coordinated attack, not the usual bunch of rabble being shouted at to just attack something.

However, if by "local" they mean that new forces appeared from somewhere and took the lead on this attack, I stick to what I've said over the last few pages.  This seems to have been conducted, for the most part, using forces already allocated to the sectors of frontage they are attacking from.

This one I won't quibble with:

Quote

Russian implementation of lessons learned will vary and Russian forces have achieved some advances in the Avdiivka area which were likely enabled by more effective units, ISW’s October 11 assessment was likely overstated.

I meant to post something about this last night.  ISW's October 11 report almost read like someone accidentally copied and pasted from Rybar or some other RU mil blogger.  As a result I didn't believe it, which was difficult for me to reconcile with my otherwise high regard for ISW's analysis.  It made me question if I was maybe reacting negatively to their report because I don't have much faith that Russia is capable of major improvements on something (artillery for the most part) that they've thus far shown very little ability to improve.  And now they have basically said they "overstated" Russia's improvements.  That makes me feel better

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

ISW's report also had something else in it that I've been meaning to bring up here:

Quote

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on October 12 that the Russian military has recruited more than 357,000 contract, volunteer, and conscripted military personnel in total since January 1, 2023.[82] Medvedev expressed hope that Russian authorities will be able to maintain this recruitment pace. It is unclear exactly what categories of servicemen this number encompasses, despite Medvedev’s attempt to clarify. Medvedev notably claimed on September 26 that Russia had recruited over 325,000 contract personnel since January 1, updating Russian President Vladimir Putin’s prior claims of 300,000 personnel on September 15 and 280,000 personnel on September 12.[83]

Putting aside the fact that Medvedev is a lying sack of puss, the basics of what he stated is effectively true; Russia has managed to avoid a second mobilization because it's had sufficient numbers of volunteers.  It is absolutely astonishing that the pool of would-be volunteers has apparently grown since last year, despite the abysmal performance, massive casualties, not getting paid, not getting trained, not getting equipped, etc.

At the start of this year I said Putin was a fool for not doing another mobilization (from a military perspective, not political).  I guess the Russian people are the fools for going willingly.  This is not good.

I've always thought the most likely form of Russian collapse would come from economic causes rather than military losses, however I had hoped military losses would have a significant impact on civilian attitudes towards economic privation ("I can't afford food because of this stupid war!").  It seems the Russian male's willingness, even enthusiasm, to be treated like scum before dying pointlessly and then being disrespected in death is apparently a renewable resource for the Russian MoD.  Sadly, I am back to hoping for an economic collapse because I don't think Ukraine can kill enough Russians to end this war.

Steve

[kimbosbread]

18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

It seems the Russian male's willingness, even enthusiasm, to be treated like scum before dying pointlessly and then being disrespected in death is apparently a renewable resource for the Russian MoD.  Sadly, I am back to hoping for an economic collapse because I don't think Ukraine can kill enough Russians to end this war.

I wouldn’t call that a renewable resource. Vast, maybe.

Economic collapse is an interesting one. What does economic collapse even mean if Russia goes full North Korea where all the important people keep the same level of luxury?

I maintain that we need better sanctions (plus luxury Eldest Son) on the rich, and really seize all their stuff, ban the Muscovites from Thailand, make them unable to enjoy the rest of the world.

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

ISW's report also had something else in it that I've been meaning to bring up here:

Putting aside the fact that Medvedev is a lying sack of puss, the basics of what he stated is effectively true; Russia has managed to avoid a second mobilization because it's had sufficient numbers of volunteers.  It is absolutely astonishing that the pool of would-be volunteers has apparently grown since last year, despite the abysmal performance, massive casualties, not getting paid, not getting trained, not getting equipped, etc.

At the start of this year I said Putin was a fool for not doing another mobilization (from a military perspective, not political).  I guess the Russian people are the fools for going willingly.  This is not good.

I've always thought the most likely form of Russian collapse would come from economic causes rather than military losses, however I had hoped military losses would have a significant impact on civilian attitudes towards economic privation ("I can't afford food because of this stupid war!").  It seems the Russian male's willingness, even enthusiasm, to be treated like scum before dying pointlessly and then being disrespected in death is apparently a renewable resource for the Russian MoD.  Sadly, I am back to hoping for an economic collapse because I don't think Ukraine can kill enough Russians to end this war.

Steve

We have been slow, cheap  and stupid about ramping up munitions production. With the second shoe already dropping in the Middle East, and China weighing its chances daily, it is time get serious about that. I am talking about cost plus contracts for tens of millions of rounds of 155, tens of thousands of rounds of GMLRS, and, and, and. What passes for the world order is hanging by a thread, and anybody that thinks you can negotiate with any of our opponents without credible deterrence is not paying attention. Credible deterrence was not any of the first seven ways I wanted to put that BTW.

[Lethaface]

Another ship seem to have issues with smokers in Sevastopol: 

 

[poesel]

An article that explains why Russia has so many volunteers and why their death is not a (perceived) problem for the Russian society.

TL;DR: the volunteers are often poor, drunkards & violent and their death is a net social plus for their mothers/wives due to the relative high pay and the bonus the relatives get on their death. The money and the new state of 'veteran' mother/wive allows them to climb the social ladder.

Article in German.

https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/russlands-krieg-laeuft-auf-eine-soziale-saeuberung-der-gesellschaft-hinaus-ld.1758471

[Haiduk]

56 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

Another ship seem to have issues with smokers in Sevastopol: 

 

Alas, all ok with this ship. This was not missile corvette, but pr.22160 patrol ship. It's just coincided - likely technical issue (oil went to engine, causing a dense smoke from the stack) + underwater explosion during anti-sabateur training

[Lethaface]

42 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Alas, all ok with this ship. This was not missile corvette, but pr.22160 patrol ship. It's just coincided - likely technical issue (oil went to engine, causing a dense smoke from the stack) + underwater explosion during anti-sabateur training

thanks for clarification, too bad! 

In that case strange why they blur the lower side of the foto , or was it Ukr asset that made the foto?.

[hcrof]

so it seems something was attacked? A warship and a tug damaged? 

According to rybar it was possibly a fully submersible drone that was lurking outside the harbour waiting for ships to leave. That is a scary thought - a self deploying, fully guided naval minefield outside your harbour...

 

Edit: how do you even defend against that? If Russia does regular sweeps for mines they are vulnerable to drone attacks, if they only sweep just before they want to leave harbour they telegraph their intentions and are also vulnerable to drone attacks. If they don't sweep they get hit by mines...

Edit 2: and if the mines (submersible drones) can move then they can just move away from the minesweepers and then reposition later. Russia would need to run a full anti-submarine warfare operation against a few $50k drones that can just be easily replaced. All those ships and helicopters tied up chasing ghosts while more drone ships or Neptune missiles are waiting to strike...

Edit 3: and think of the costs of anti-submarine warfare. Aviation fuel, sonar buoys, wear and tear etc. To try and find a $50-100k drone that might not even be there. 

Edited October 13, 2023 by hcrof
Extra point

[Bulletpoint]

22 hours ago, TheVulture said:

With the Russian attacks on Avdiivka, I can imagine two main scenarios:

* Russia feels comfortable with their defensive situation around Tokmak so they can afford the forces for the attack

* Russia's position around Tokmak is precarious and this is an attempt to relieve pressure by either faking the idea they have sufficient reserves,  or  Hitler-esque belief in the decisive nature of offensive action to solve problems.

What are the key bits of evidence to look for in the coming days that might indicate one way or the other?

The key evidence will be whether the frontline starts to move in either direction.

[Offshoot]

29 minutes ago, hcrof said:

That is a scary thought - a self deploying, fully guided naval minefield outside your harbour...how do you even defend against that?

It's low cost and not without precedent, just need a few more.

[akd]

Russian BMP runs over own dismounts trying to flee, then gets hit by RPG at close range (I think):

 

Edited October 13, 2023 by akd

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

ISW's report also had something else in it that I've been meaning to bring up here:

Putting aside the fact that Medvedev is a lying sack of puss, the basics of what he stated is effectively true; Russia has managed to avoid a second mobilization because it's had sufficient numbers of volunteers.  It is absolutely astonishing that the pool of would-be volunteers has apparently grown since last year, despite the abysmal performance, massive casualties, not getting paid, not getting trained, not getting equipped, etc.

At the start of this year I said Putin was a fool for not doing another mobilization (from a military perspective, not political).  I guess the Russian people are the fools for going willingly.  This is not good.

I've always thought the most likely form of Russian collapse would come from economic causes rather than military losses, however I had hoped military losses would have a significant impact on civilian attitudes towards economic privation ("I can't afford food because of this stupid war!").  It seems the Russian male's willingness, even enthusiasm, to be treated like scum before dying pointlessly and then being disrespected in death is apparently a renewable resource for the Russian MoD.  Sadly, I am back to hoping for an economic collapse because I don't think Ukraine can kill enough Russians to end this war.

Steve

I think we may be missing something important here.  If Russia has a bottomless supply of manpower...why the restraint?  Why have they not simply mobilized 1 million or 2 million men?  Based on attrition rates 325k is enough to keep current manning levels, allowing for some troop rotations.  It is not going to fundamentally shift the mass calculus at the front in a direction where dumb mass may actually start to work again.

Why?  Quality control in the RA?  We know that isn't true.  The RA is giving these guys pretty rudimentary training and stuffing them in.  Replacing trained veh and systems crews is going to remain a core problem - Russia does not have China training 60k troops for them.

As to collapse.  Loss numbers are likely too low.  I am not sure strategic collapse in Russia based on body count was viable, at least not in a shorter term.  We went through this before - Russia would likely need to lose around 1-2 million men before everyone in that nation loses someone in their personal circle...and even then that might not be enough.  The reason to kill Russian's is to trigger operational systemic collapse, which then sets up for military strategic collapse...or at least withdrawal.  People are a core component of military capability, a critical means if you will.  Erode that and the system will fail.  Operational failures build up and eventually lead to strategic ones.

Ukraine's problem right now is engineering another Russia operational failure.  We are seeing the collision of Denial and Precision.  Ukraine is challenged to upscale enough precision to create positive forces multiplication, while Russia relies on good old dumb mass Denial to sustain theirs.  I stand by my theory that the only way may be for Ukraine to open up another offensive in a sector the RA has pulled from in order to sustain the fight in the middle.  If they can do that, they may be able to engineer another operational collapse.  But can they do this?  Can they leverage surprise in a highly illuminated battlefield?  Has Russia cut a deal with China to get strategic ISR? - oh my, there is a shoe to drop. 

Most people are squawking over tactical systems but Russia being plugged into a Chinese C4ISR backbone would fundamentally shift this war.  We won't see that on X or any other platform, but we will see its effects.  I personally do not see China as that invested.  To take capability they have to protect and project in their own sphere would be no small thing and a significant escalation.

We ain't done yet but the UA needs to pull something off soon or we are going to see things lock up.  RA may try to pretend it is on the offensive again, but I think that part is done.  They will dig in harder.  Plant more minefields over the winter.  And then we may be looking at some hard choices.  Or they could break tomorrow, leading to cascade failure in an already mauled and fragile system - it goes slow until it goes fast. 

 

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I think we may be missing something important here.  If Russia has a bottomless supply of manpower...why the restraint?  Why have they not simply mobilized 1 million or 2 million men?  Based on attrition rates 325k is enough to keep current manning levels, allowing for some troop rotations.  It is not going to fundamentally shift the mass calculus at the front in a direction where dumb mass may actually start to work again.

Why?  Quality control in the RA?  We know that isn't true.  The RA is giving these guys pretty rudimentary training and stuffing them in.  Replacing trained veh and systems crews is going to remain a core problem - Russia does not have China training 60k troops for them.

As to collapse.  Loss numbers are likely too low.  I am not sure strategic collapse in Russia based on body count was viable, at least not in a shorter term.  We went through this before - Russia would likely need to lose around 1-2 million men before everyone in that nation loses someone in their personal circle...and even then that might not be enough.  The reason to kill Russian's is to trigger operational systemic collapse, which then sets up for military strategic collapse...or at least withdrawal.  People are a core component of military capability, a critical means if you will.  Erode that and the system will fail.  Operational failures build up and eventually lead to strategic ones.

Ukraine's problem right now is engineering another Russia operational failure.  We are seeing the collision of Denial and Precision.  Ukraine is challenged to upscale enough precision to create positive forces multiplication, while Russia relies on good old dumb mass Denial to sustain theirs.  I stand by my theory that the only way may be for Ukraine to open up another offensive in a sector the RA has pulled from in order to sustain the fight in the middle.  If they can do that, they may be able to engineer another operational collapse.  But can they do this?  Can they leverage surprise in a highly illuminated battlefield?  Has Russia cut a deal with China to get strategic ISR? - oh my, there is a shoe to drop. 

Most people are squawking over tactical systems but Russia being plugged into a Chinese C4ISR backbone would fundamentally shift this war.  We won't see that on X or any other platform, but we will see its effects.  I personally do not see China as that invested.  To take capability they have to protect and project in their own sphere would be no small thing and a significant escalation.

We ain't done yet but the UA needs to pull something off soon or we are going to see things lock up.  RA may try to pretend it is on the offensive again, but I think that part is done.  They will dig in harder.  Plant more minefields over the winter.  And then we may be looking at some hard choices.  Or they could break tomorrow, leading to cascade failure in an already mauled and fragile system - it goes slow until it goes fast. 

 

The reinforcement I've come to in the past couple of months is that my vision for collapse doesn't seem to be on the table due to the near "death cult" aspect of the Russian culture.

The concept I saw was, as you put it, an operational failure of force regeneration.  Basically, kill Russians faster than they can volunteer thus triggering another mass mobilization which, it seems, has negative political ramifications for Putin's regime.  In this way it isn't necessary to kill or maim 1-2 million, maybe only another 100-200 thousand. 

There was reason to think this was possible last year as the first mass mobilization a) was necessary and b) definitely caused stress within the political sphere (and economic too as they grabbed trained workers).  Putting 10s of thousands of prisoners into the front was also an indicator that volunteerism was lower than what was needed.  Heading into 2023 I thought they were headed for the same sort of situation, but to my astonishment that did not happen.

I think the regime has hit upon (for now) the right combination of elements to sustain volunteerism.  Inherent flaws in Russian culture, Propaganda (Great Patriotic War Part 2), coercion, actually paying out financial benefits, ability to provide basic equipment, and nearly full on Fascist lockdown of dissent have all combined to produce the flow of volunteers that they did not have towards the end of 2022.  How long is this sustainable?  For sure it will break down at some point, but it seems it isn't 2023 and I'm going to guess not 2024 either.

Which means we are back to the hopes of Ukraine achieving another significant operational breakthrough of the Russian frontlines.  Unfortunately, Russia's ability to continually throw bodies into Ukraine's offensives is problematic.  One thing precision does not solve for is when there is an endless number of targets to destroy.  It's all fine and dandy to kill 20 guys with one shell, but if there's another 20 to occupy the same position before it is cleared by friendly forces, then progress is slowed.

Steve

[The_Capt]

12 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The reinforcement I've come to in the past couple of months is that my vision for collapse doesn't seem to be on the table due to the near "death cult" aspect of the Russian culture.

The concept I saw was, as you put it, an operational failure of force regeneration.  Basically, kill Russians faster than they can volunteer thus triggering another mass mobilization which, it seems, has negative political ramifications for Putin's regime.  In this way it isn't necessary to kill or maim 1-2 million, maybe only another 100-200 thousand. 

There was reason to think this was possible last year as the first mass mobilization a) was necessary and b) definitely caused stress within the political sphere (and economic too as they grabbed trained workers).  Putting 10s of thousands of prisoners into the front was also an indicator that volunteerism was lower than what was needed.  Heading into 2023 I thought they were headed for the same sort of situation, but to my astonishment that did not happen.

I think the regime has hit upon (for now) the right combination of elements to sustain volunteerism.  Inherent flaws in Russian culture, Propaganda (Great Patriotic War Part 2), coercion, actually paying out financial benefits, ability to provide basic equipment, and nearly full on Fascist lockdown of dissent have all combined to produce the flow of volunteers that they did not have towards the end of 2022.  How long is this sustainable?  For sure it will break down at some point, but it seems it isn't 2023 and I'm going to guess not 2024 either.

Which means we are back to the hopes of Ukraine achieving another significant operational breakthrough of the Russian frontlines.  Unfortunately, Russia's ability to continually throw bodies into Ukraine's offensives is problematic.  One thing precision does not solve for is when there is an endless number of targets to destroy.  It's all fine and dandy to kill 20 guys with one shell, but if there's another 20 to occupy the same position before it is cleared by friendly forces, then progress is slowed.

Steve

Ok, my next question then is, what is driving that threshold of Russian volunteerism?  Putin knows he can pull 300-400k you dumb young men out of society and push them to go die in a useless war.  Why not 500k?  Why not 1M?  There is a reason there that make the risk too high...what is it?

As to precision v mass - well we are back to corrosive warfare.  The theory of corrosive warfare is essentially rapid, precise attrition that surpasses an adversary's system resilience, and ability to adapt.  So it is not about killing 20 guys in a hole with precision...it is which 20 guys.  By hitting key nodes that comprise an operational system - C2, ISR, enablers, sustainment; the entire systems ability to hold up its own weight begins to fail.  This is different than front end attrition where we kill 20 guys until they run out of of guys.  In corrosive warfare we kill 20 of the right guys in the system chain.  We kill them faster than an opponent can deal with.

Now does the theory work?  Good question. It has in the past but this is a competitive space.  

Edited October 13, 2023 by The_Capt