How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[LongLeftFlank]

4 hours ago, Huba said:

There should be around 100 MGS that are just being withdrawn from US service, right? These are armed with full power 105mm guns with very modern FCS, nothing to sneeze at I guess. Also there are TOW launchers, mortars, command vehicles, basically a whole ecosystem based on these vehicles (if US is willing to supply these too). Not proper heavy mechanized force, but I'm sure Ukrainians will find a great use for them

Eggshells with hammers though.  I'd guess they end up in an indirect fire role rather than head to head against anything with antiarmour capability....

A decade ago I played MGS in a reverse slope QB vs. a force of Syrian T62s (I was trying to model a possible French QRF intervention in Libya).  Didn't end well at all.

[fireship4]

4 hours ago, danfrodo said:

What do y'all think of this?  Are we happy?  Do we like strykers for UKR?  I have used them a lot in CMBS.  They are better than M113s & pickup trucks for sure, but what big advantages do we expect to get from these?  What firepower packages would be sent??

Modern, in production, can carry 9 soldiers, thermal RWS, paving the way for 30mm... looks good if you want to mechanise your infantry.

How many men are in the average UKR squad these days anyway?  9 has always felt a little brittle.  One or two casualties seems to make a 9 man squad of two fire teams substantially less effective.  I suppose you could argue any squad dealing with casualties becomes ineffective to some extent, and the smaller the better?  The other direction is more toward a 12 person or 3 fire team squad perhaps, but then whither transport?  The only vehicles that I can think of which could hold substantially more than 9 are the USMC AAVP-7A1, with space for 21(!?) passengers, and its replacement based on the Iveco SuperAV, holding 13 (just in time for the squad size increase from 13 to 15).

Edited January 10, 2023 by fireship4

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

Today it is not convicts who fight, at least not predominantly- Wagnerite League assaults town in the centre while flanks are stormed by VDV and other regulars. Definitelly they concentrated elite forces for this assault, signals were already for several days. Even heard (unconfirmed) rumours both sides used heavily and lost more than one air assets today. And this is just several kms of front.

Yup, in wider strategic sense they are unfortunatelly blooding Ukrainians. Never said it will not do some job for Russians, however scale is extremelly difficult to assess now.

Speaking of which:

 

It is military malpractice for Russia to use its experienced infantry for anything except cadre for new units, and dedicated trainers. If they want to pay by the meter with some of their last decent troops I wouldn't be in a hurry to interrupt them. I realize the bill for the Ukrainians is brutal, but it has been every day of this bleeping war. 

 

Edited January 10, 2023 by dan/california

[Vet 0369]

21 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

Please refer to my previously response above.

Oh crap! Apparently I forgot to hit “reply.” It was such a good response too. Anyhoo, long story short, on a personal level, I’m very happy, while on a “professional” military level, I’m horrified that no one seems to be thinking of the spare parts logistical nightmare all these “donations” of different designs  are going to cause.

[kevinkin]

4 hours ago, dan/california said:

Not as good as more Bradley's but well worth sending if the Pentagon has them to give.

I think they will go through most (hopefully not) of the Bradley's first - other than perhaps specialty Stryker's. Love em or hate em, they have become a key part of US Army's mission. We have talked about training. Right now I see Ukraine like the guy simultaneously balancing ten spinning dishes on sticks. Too much too soon might just get in the way. In fact we might see M1's before Strykers. Ah, the old breakthrough tank. The Stryker would be a great part of a fast reaction force at the new border once one is established and might go on sale as part of the 2024 model year. Heck, they have a lot of premium features to choose from. 

[Vet 0369]

Way off topic, but I was just on the “Few Good Men”web site in the Mods section, and it looks like the site might have been hacked on 3 January. It’s all in Russian or another Slavic Cyrillic text.

[MikeyD]

The French decision was easy enough. They could supply Ukraine as many AMX-10s as they want because they're already manufacturing its replacement for their own army. I forgot the name... EBRC Jaguar, I think. AMX-10 looks cool but its 41 years old and its foreign resale probabilities were probably low.

CM players should be aware of the pitfalls of using vehicles that look kind'a like tanks as though they were tanks. You usually get abruptly and violently reminded that they aren't tanks after all.

[G.I. Joe]

19 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

Oh crap! Apparently I forgot to hit “reply.” It was such a good response too. Anyhoo, long story short, on a personal level, I’m very happy, while on a “professional” military level, I’m horrified that no one seems to be thinking of the spare parts logistical nightmare all these “donations” of different designs  are going to cause.

I keep coming back to the logistical and training headaches the huge assortment of donated and captured equipment in the Ukrainian forces must be causing too. I really am at a loss to think of a good historical parallel... honestly, the Rebel Alliance in the timeframe between the battles of Yavin and Endor (or Scarif and Jakku if we want to cast a slightly wider net and include the new continuity) almost feels like a better comparison than anything in real life.

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, G.I. Joe said:

I keep coming back to the logistical and training headaches the huge assortment of donated and captured equipment in the Ukrainian forces must be causing too. I really am at a loss to think of a good historical parallel... honestly, the Rebel Alliance in the timeframe between the battles of Yavin and Endor (or Scarif and Jakku if we want to cast a slightly wider net and include the new continuity) almost feels like a better comparison than anything in real life.

that is the best post I've seen in ages, well played

[fireship4]

According to The Warzone, in an article about rumours around planned Western tank provision, the Stryker is not suited to winter conditions, being replaced in Alaska by the BvS10 Beowulf/CATV.

Edited January 10, 2023 by fireship4

[chrisl]

7 hours ago, sburke said:

damn you.  Now I can't sleep wondering if my yard gnome is actually Kadyrov...

There's at least a movie short in that, ending in you bashing the gnome to bits.

[Huba]

2 hours ago, fireship4 said:

The only vehicles that I can think of which could hold substantially more than 9 are the USMC AAVP-7A1, with space for 21(!?) passengers, and its replacement based on the Iveco SuperAV, holding 13 (just in time for the squad size increase from 13 to 15).

US should absolutely announce some AAV7 in one of the future packages, if only to mess with the heads of RU on the other bank of Dnipro.

 

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Fridman is good, read his “Russian Hybrid Warfare” too.  I have no doubt Russia undertakes different strategies and concepts in pursuits of its interests.  However, the components of strategy are largely universal.  That is because we all live under the same rules of physics, in linear time and have finite resources.  Strategies can take many different approaches, but the essential components need to be present to constitute a strategy in itself.  An end state/vision, method or approaches and resources remain at the core of any strategy.  Overlaying things like narrative, position and posture - context and buy in, these are all the qualitative manoeuvre room one has in developing strategy.

It looks like we're in agreement then?  My point is that in the West we frown upon someone saying their strategy is to throw as much crap at the wall as possible THEN figure out what to do about it.  Russia seems to be very comfortable with it.

Hmm.  It is interesting to contemplate that one of the reasons the February invasion failed so badly is because Putin tried to execute a Western style plan with Soviet style resources, instead of a Soviet style plan with Soviet style resources.  And once that Western style plan failed completely, Russia has gone back to more traditional Soviet style strategizing.  Namely, attrition, terror, and bluster to see if any combination of it gets them out of the pickle they are in.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

This.  It is that fumbling that constitutes a lack of coherent strategy.  There is no Plan B and they are waiting/hoping for something to work.  A bad strategy is at least a plan. It appears Russia is waging a strategy of exhaustion but is exhausting itself faster than its opponent.  

Correct.  This gets back to the difference between a bad plan poorly executed vs. a bad plan well executed.  Russia is, for the most part, executing a bad plan very poorly.  If the strategy is to attrit and wear down the collective enemy (which includes the West), then it should be trying to figure out ways to do that while at the same time preserving it's ability to stay in the fight long enough to get the result it is looking for.  Instead we have months of Bakhmut.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

But, we have repeatedly noted, they do not have time.  And if they are playing for time then why exhaust so many resources in useless displays?  Strategies of exhaustion tend to be asymmetric and extremely defensive.  Slow cuts and nips to drag things out.  But Russia is exploding all over the place.  This is not “bad strategy” it is broken.

Russia went into this war disorganized and institutionally weak.  As you've pointed out many times, that's not something that can be remedied in the short term.  So they are working with what they have to work with, which means whatever they plan on doing is going to be poorly implemented.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think @billbindc’s point is the closest to one that makes sense to be honest.  The strategy, if we can call it that, is scrambling for regime survival and frantically trying everything in the hopes it will work.  It is not deliberate, it is reactionary and impulse driven.  It is a strategy in the same sense lighting one’s self on fire and running through the woods is a strategy.  Why are you running?  Because I am on fire!

I agree with billindc's assessment this is all about regime survival.  I think it's been that way since March, but it's only becoming fully apparent to us now because it's gone on for so long.

However, I disagree with you that what Russia is doing now is not part of a deliberate plan.  Many of the things Putin has done, such as murdering potential threats and international saber rattling, are standard "go to" actions when he's run up against opposition  Engaging in warcrimes and mass scale devastation are standard Soviet and Russian practices (most recently Syria).  Exercising drastic state control over the economy, in particular banking, are not only unsurprising but have been temporarily effective.  Energy blackmail, bribery, interfering with Western internal politics, and exploiting fissure within the west are also tried and true tools Russia has used.

In the past Putin has used these same tools and yielded favorable results.  So much that many people thought of him as being exceptionally successful.  The difference between past and present is that Putin picked a fight that Russia could not win if Ukraine and the West stood up to it.  Now all it can do is apply old formulas with old tools to situations that neither are designed to handle.

Putin has backed Russia so badly into a corner, it either keeps playing the old game the old ways or surrenders. Surrendering = death to the regime, so it's left with playing the old game the old way.  And doing it poorly on top of it all.

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think to call what Russia is doing as strategy is to stretch the definition to the point of breaking.  Technically any human venture can be viewed as a strategy but when we are talking about a war I think the bar is slightly higher.  Russia continues to demonstrate that “fumbling around for Plan B” is Plan B. 

I still disagree.  A bad strategy is still a strategy if it contains certain elements of forethought, resource alignment, and coordination.  A badly executed strategy is still a strategy.  Russia's predicament right now is that it appears incapable of either pursuing a better strategy or implementing their existing one more competently.  Which means the regime is stuck deliberately conducting a war in a way that is unlikely to result in it retaining power long term. 

Steve

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, G.I. Joe said:

I keep coming back to the logistical and training headaches the huge assortment of donated and captured equipment in the Ukrainian forces must be causing too. I really am at a loss to think of a good historical parallel... honestly, the Rebel Alliance in the timeframe between the battles of Yavin and Endor (or Scarif and Jakku if we want to cast a slightly wider net and include the new continuity) almost feels like a better comparison than anything in real life.

I suspect the Chinese Nationalist Army circa 1937-40 had a fascinating collection of bits of everything built since 1895. That might be worth reading up on sometime after Ukraine wins. I don't the first thing about that army....

[Huba]

Just one of the sources. President's aide Jacek Kumoch declared yesterday that PL can transfer 10 surplus Leo2A4 to Ukraine - hopefully the Leo2 coalition is being formed to storm the Chancellery and finally make it happen. Leo2 will come from 1st Armored Brigade from Warsaw.

 

[Kinophile]

36 minutes ago, fireship4 said:

According to The Warzone, in an article about rumours around planned Western tank provision, the Stryker is not suited to winter conditions, being replaced in Alaska by the BvS10 Beowulf/CATV.

Very interesting 

[Huba]

3 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I suspect the Chinese Nationalist Army circa 1937-40 had a fascinating collection of bits of everything built since 1895. That might be worth reading up on sometime after Ukraine wins. I don't the first thing about that army....

Polish Army of the Polish - Bolshevik war vintage was also a rag-tag combination of leftovers from every major participant of the Great War. It took 2 decades to somehow sort it out after the war, but during the conflict we managed reasonably well.
It seems that Ukraine is happy with any equipment of which there's at least a battalion, keeping some uniformity of a given brigade's logistics. Now how they manage on the high level is very interesting - and there's zero information about it, though I hear rumors that there's A LOT of driving up to the PL border

[dan/california]

41 minutes ago, fireship4 said:

According to The Warzone, in an article about rumours around planned Western tank provision, the Stryker is not suited to winter conditions, being replaced in Alaska by the BvS10 Beowulf/CATV.

I think a lot of that could be cured if they really thought about the fluids involved, it might increase the wear on some things. Depending on the part of Alaska it might be a lot colder than Ukraine, as well.

[Battlefront.com]

OK, here's an intellectual game we've not played in a while!  What realistic options do people think Russia could pursue to achieve a better outcome than what it is doing now?  Keep in mind that regime preservation is the ultimate goal, so any strategic shift that puts the regime more at risk is not likely viable.

Steve

[dan/california]

 

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

OK, here's an intellectual game we've not played in a while!  What realistic options do people think Russia could pursue to achieve a better outcome than what it is doing now?  Keep in mind that regime preservation is the ultimate goal, so any strategic shift that puts the regime more at risk is not likely viable.

Steve

The best path to REGIME survival is Putin's demise. Blame it all on him, get out of Ukraine with bad grace, and claim it is politically impossible to concede anything on reparations/warcrimes. Hope you can sell enough oil, metals, and fertilizers to make it through. They have been very slow to figure that out.

 

[fireship4]

16 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

"What realistic options do people think Russia could pursue to achieve a better outcome than what it is doing now?  Keep in mind that regime preservation is the ultimate goal..."

I will give you my grimdark take: the regime may be at risk by loosing a small war, which cannot justify full mobilisation of the economy and great sacrifice of the people (enough to get them to turn on their masters as the least worst option).

So perhaps they will turn it into a big war, which justifies full mobilisation and full totalitarianism, and which they can safely loose, or hold to a stalemate, or until China divides their opponent's attention further.

 

10 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The best path to REGIME survival is Putin's demise. Blame it all on him, get out of Ukraine with bad grace, and claim it is politically impossible to concede anything on reparations/warcrimes. Hope you can sell enough oil, metals, and fertilizers to make it through. They have been very slow to figure that out.

To some extent, but without the legitimacy of 'elections', or a perceived betrayal by the leader (something easily imaginable as his obituary, but not easily wielded as a pretext for deposal at this point) or their unlucky assassin, to be righted by a suitable hero, for which office there would be many candidates, to whom a breakup might be a viable alternative, the country is liable to fall apart.

Edited January 10, 2023 by fireship4

[chrisl]

2 minutes ago, fireship4 said:

I will give you my grimdark take: the regime may be at risk by loosing a small war, which cannot justify full mobilisation of the economy and great sacrifice of the people (enough to get them to turn on their masters as the least worst option).

So perhaps they will turn it into a big war, which justifies full mobilisation and full totalitarianism, and which they can safely loose, or hold to a stalemate, or until China divides their opponent's attention further.

I don't think Xi would tolerate a big war - it's bad for Chinese business.  Sure, they can sell stuff to Russia for Russia to fight the war, but Russia is *way* down on the China trading partners list and doesn't really have the kind of money to make up for the loss of western trade that would result.

Unless Putin can get Ukraine to stop fighting, it's a tough job, even if he has excellent internal propaganda.  I think the best he can do is try to freeze things with what he holds of the Donbas and Crimea and make a big show of the Russian BS fleet in Sevastopol.  But if Ukraine won't stop working to take back Ukraine, that's hard to sell - there will be Ukrainian images of Russian Black Sea ships sinking and people will know people who are still getting killed in the Donbas.  Maybe give up on the Donbas and leave it to Ukraine to sort out whether they want to deal with the "rebels" there, and put up a defense of Crimea until Ukraine manages to blow the Kerch bridge.  If he's lucky he'll be dead of old age or Po tea by the time that happens.  Even if RU holds the land bridge, they won't be able to reliably use it with the combination of ISR and long range weapons that can cut it off, so the only value in keeping it is propaganda.

[fireship4]

4 minutes ago, chrisl said:

I don't think Xi would tolerate a big war - it's bad for Chinese business.  Sure, they can sell stuff to Russia for Russia to fight the war, but Russia is *way* down on the China trading partners list and doesn't really have the kind of money to make up for the loss of western trade that would result.

Hasn't that boat already sailed?  I get the impression the West is decoupling from China as a manufacturing centre, and that the current order of globalisation is changing.  Perhaps war can be averted, but I wonder if the West will continue with Farostpolitik in either case - some have come to see it as selling rope to their hangman.

[sburke]

50 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

In the past Putin has used these same tools and yielded favorable results.  So much that many people thought of him as being exceptionally successful. 

I can't help but think of Miles Bron (Edwrd Norton) in the glass onion and Benoit Blanc's (Daniel Craig) appraisal.

Blanc admits that he mistakenly "assumed Miles Bron [to be] a complicated genius" when the truth was so much simpler: "Miles Bron is an idiot."

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, fireship4 said:

Without wishing to begin a discussion outside the topic, I will simply say I have not read anything thus far by Mr. Science on the subject

First page of a Google search will give you something to think about:

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/shut-and-listen/201806/humans-cant-plan-long-term-and-heres-why

https://phys.org/news/2020-08-humanity-doomed-term-experts-discuss.html

https://www.vox.com/2014/12/18/7414105/procrastination-future-planning

I also suggest going to any public budget hearing in your local municipality if you want to see classic short term thinking at work.  Oh, and if you paid any attention to the housing market crash, you'd know that long term thinking wasn't in the minds of either borrowers or lenders.  Maybe you heard of Bernie Madoff?  Not many long term thinkers in his portfolio.

Long term planning is just not our species' forte.

4 hours ago, fireship4 said:

The last point would depend on who you are in the system.  A totalitarian system may plan far into the future, and furthermore have that plan actualised more readily and directly than a democratic one. 

Ah, now this is on topic There are examples of totalitarian regimes seeming to do well because they can ignore/suppress short term interests and focus long term.  But they also plan poorly for the future, which is why they fail so quickly relative to other forms of government.

Take Russia for example.  Putin provided Russians with enough bobbles and bling to convince them that their lives were getting better to allow the regime to rob their people blind.  For decades Russia was able to pull this off in part because it thought long term about regime survival.  However, it did not plan well for the day when all that theft would ruin the economy and/or Putin's eventual death.  As both of these things became more apparent and closer at hand, what did the Putin regime do?  This war.  I'd suggest this is a good example of bad long term planning, not good.

Most Western democracies, even with their poor long term planning, are doing better and have lasted longer than Russia's regime.  Which calls into question how good Russia's long term planning is

4 hours ago, fireship4 said:

However, were you to post some screen-shots of a new CM3 engine I might agree to disagree.

Nice try

Steve