How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Holien]

Wonder where the missile ended up?

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-63327999

 

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, kevinkin said:

This reads like watching Klammer's 1976 Olympics downhill gold medal race. He was on the edge of disaster the entire time. Could this be the operational norm for Ukraine spread across 1000 miles of front? A modern version of Hutier tactics?  Apparently so even if these "special detachment"s need to be concentrated to affect a break through. Thanks again for the translation!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infiltration_tactics

To follow the sports analogy, one of my closest friend did luge in the Olympics.  He was bumped from a slot to race in the Olympics even though he was near the top (IIRC they had 4 slots).  The guy that they put into his slot had a lower overall average because he raced similarly to Klammer.  He broke all kinds of records for fastest times when he didn't crash, but he crashed OFTEN, which trashed his average time.  The coach decided to roll the dice on this guy putting in a spectacular, potentially gold winning performance, instead of crashing.  Whereas my friend would have likely done well but less likely to score a meddle.  It was a sound decision, but it didn't work out well.  The result was a crash and no metal hanging around necks for that particular event.

The carry over to this war is that both sides seem to be pursuing this sort of strategy at the tactical level to achieve breakthroughs.  On the Russian side this seems to be more likely to turn into a "crash", though through sheer numbers of attempts they have had some successes in exchange for piles of bodies in Ukrainian refrigerated cars.  Ukraine, on the other hand, has a much higher rate of success, however still encounters a lot of "crashes".  The horrible drone footage of the two Ukrainian BMPs being ambushed comes to mind way too easily.

Steve

[OldSarge]

12 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

OK, I'm happy to see all of those dusty M113s being put to good use.  However, I don't care where they are they shouldn't be spaced like that.  If this is near the front then I'd like to politely ask the local commander to slap himself a few times for allowing this.

Steve

That unit's commander needs to receive an honorary copy of CMCW, where he will be taught the value of not bunching up!

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, Taranis said:

Aerial incident over the Black Sea between a British plane and two Russian fighters

 

That's interesting - I'm going to have to keep a closer eye on ADS-B Exchange again.  I spent a lot of time watching for the first few months, and the Rivet Joints almost invariably had been flying (at least with transponder on) over NATO territory along the borders and rarely over the BS itself.  The only aircraft that were reliably flying over the BS while transmitting location were the GlobalHawks UAVs.   Flying over the BS probably gives a lot more signal from Crimea and the Russian supply lines through Kerch. 

[Butschi]

14 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

I think we sligthly slipped into echo chamber laughing at examples of Russian mobiks

Thanks, very true. I've recently reduced the time spent in this thread because I generally have the feeling it has devolved somewhat into a combination of memes, laughing at Russians and 'Murrican/NATO/Ukrainian weapons worshipping.

Re Russian mobiks: Do we know the Ukrainian side of the equation? I mean, being on the offensive doesn't say much about how sustainable the situation is, so looking at Russian effectiveness is only meaningful when also looking at, say, Ukrainian casualty rates.

[Battlefront.com]

I woke up this morning with some more thoughts about the "echo chamber" effect we need to avoid.  I wrote something quickly about this yesterday.

One of the problems with assessing strategic, or even operational, level capabilities and making predictions based on them is to understand how tactical engagements play out over time.  Assessments need to be based on average situations and average outcomes, not exceptional ones.

On average, Ukraine is outfighting Russia at the tactical level.  However, for any one specific battle we might very well see more problems on the Ukraine side than the Russian.  The better quality of Russian forces to start with, the more difficult it is for Ukraine to achieve its tactical goals and keep casualties low.

Kharkiv and Kherson are good compare and contrast situations.  In Kherson Russia has its best troops in place and gave them instructions months ago to create extensive defensive belts.  Russia even went so far as to provide the Kherson forces the materials necessary to do it!  This is not what happened in Kharkiv, in part because resources were drained from there and the Donbas to Kherson specifically and the south generally.

When Ukraine launched it's offensive into Kharkiv it encountered some reasonably competent Russian units.  Some of Ukraine's units were likely not all that good at offensive work as they so far haven't had experience with it.  Conversely, some of Russia's units had hardly any combat value to them and were easily brushed aside even when they did stay to fight and some of Ukraine's forces would give a NATO force a run for its money.

The important thing to focus on is what is the average situation and where does that lead Ukraine.  For Kharkiv it meant rapid advances at little cost relative to what Russia lost.  For Kherson it's meant a costly, grinding offensive.  In both cases Ukraine's tactical combat averages clearly are in their favor, but it is still costly to them.

What I think we're seeing now in Luhansk is that both the quantity and quality of Russian defenders has increased, while at the same time Ukraine's forces are tired from weeks of intense fighting.  Resources that might have gone to bolster the offensive are probably being diverted to Kherson and Bakhmut (on a smaller scale, for sure).  This is allowing Russia to stabilize the Luhansk front while at the same time seeing things go worse for them in Kherson.  The Kharkiv offensive was open ended so it is difficult to assess when it is "over" or how to evaluate it's performance (did Ukraine think they could take back all of the 2014 borders? If so, then they came up short).  The Kherson offensive, on the other hand, is clearly defined and we're all expecting it to be successfully completed before the winter kicks in.

Back to the echo chamber point...

I think it is correct to be confident of Ukraine's overall success in this war.  All the factors we've discussed favor Ukraine's ultimate victory.  However, it definitely is good to keep in mind that as crappy as we think the Russians are, and as crappy as they might in fact be, that doesn't mean 100% of them suck 100% of the time in 100% of the tactical engagements.  That is definitely not the case and Ukraine is learning that the hard way.  Unlike Russia, though, I think Ukraine has the force structure and mentality to apply those lessons while I have the opposite opinion of Russia being able to do the same.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

14 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Thanks, very true. I've recently reduced the time spent in this thread because I generally have the feeling it has devolved somewhat into a combination of memes, laughing at Russians and 'Murrican/NATO/Ukrainian weapons worshipping.

The impact of all the Mobik problems is real and definitely impacts Russia's ability to fight and at the same time keep its society together.  The fact that there's fodder for meme guys and jokes is a bonus.

14 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Re Russian mobiks: Do we know the Ukrainian side of the equation? I mean, being on the offensive doesn't say much about how sustainable the situation is, so looking at Russian effectiveness is only meaningful when also looking at, say, Ukrainian casualty rates.

This is true and it does seem that through a combination of moves the Russians have managed to firm up the Luhansk front.  At least for now.  Mobiks no doubt played some role in this and that means Putin's strategy had at least some impact on Ukrainian ops.  I still think it is fair to say that overall it was a short sighted plan with long term consequences, but as Putin was facing a complete collapse NOW he couldn't really afford to worry about longer term problems.

Assessing things in more detail is not really possible.   Ukrainian casualties don't really give a good picture of this either because we don't know how they are spread out.  Are the TD units taking more casualties than the regular units?  How many of Ukraine's casualties are due to mines?  How much to concentrated artillery?  How much to directed tactical fighting?  We can't possibly know, but the answers do indicate how much/little impact the Mobiks had on causing Ukrainian casualties.

I do think it's fair to say that the drunk, unwilling, even angry Mobiks without any training distracted us somewhat from recognizing that at least some of the Mobiks were not any or all of those things.  For sure some portion of the Mobiks, once mobilized, took on the traditional Russian machismo attitude fueled by cultural superiority over Ukrainians.  Even if they had no training, these type of Mobiks are more likely to fight and die than run away.  They're more likely to stay sober long enough to cause problems for Ukraine.  They're more likely to pull off sophisticated ambushes even if they wind up getting wiped out in the process due to other circumstances being suboptimal.

But as I wrote above, as long as the dominate result is lots of Russians getting killed without inflicting significant damage to Ukraine's forces in the process, then the partial mobilization can be, and should be, ridiculed as a horrible waste of manpower and equipment with no parallel on the Ukrainian side.

Steve

[Beleg85]

37 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Thanks, very true. I've recently reduced the time spent in this thread because I generally have the feeling it has devolved somewhat into a combination of memes, laughing at Russians and 'Murrican/NATO/Ukrainian weapons worshipping.

Well, given how muscovites wage this war it is natural to treat them as complete barbarians on any moral level. And NATO weapons indeed have very significant effect, especially Himars is being viewed by UA (including soldier I refered before) as gamechanger. But Kremlin can offset this by fuelling even more meat into grinder, so balance on the ground remains roughly similar albeit less favourable to Russians than before.

What was interesting in this relation was how difficult battle of Kupyansk was- descriptions of urban fights were really hair-rising, reminding Severdonetsk/Lysychansk. Before I viewed it more like clearing operation of panicked Russians, but it was fair and open fight with elite troops.

Edited October 20, 2022 by Beleg85

[sburke]

Russian fighter jet 'released a missile' near unarmed British surveillance plane, U.K. defense secretary says (msn.com)

Quote

 

“In light of this potentially dangerous engagement,” Wallace said he “communicated my concerns directly with Russian counterpart,” Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s chief of defense staff. 

“In my letter, I made clear that the aircraft was unarmed, in international airspace and following a pre-notified flightpath,” he said.

He added that Russia’s Ministry of Defense had replied “that they had conducted an investigation into the circumstances of the incident and stated it was a technical malfunction of the SU-27 fighter.”

 

Dang that is actually very believable.

 

[dan/california]

37 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Thanks, very true. I've recently reduced the time spent in this thread because I generally have the feeling it has devolved somewhat into a combination of memes, laughing at Russians and 'Murrican/NATO/Ukrainian weapons worshipping.

Re Russian mobiks: Do we know the Ukrainian side of the equation? I mean, being on the offensive doesn't say much about how sustainable the situation is, so looking at Russian effectiveness is only meaningful when also looking at, say, Ukrainian casualty rates.

I saw a quote from some bit of the Ukrainian military stating the casualty ratio Russian/AFU was about 6.5/1.  They went on to say that if they could get it up to 8/1 or 10/1 they thought the Russian morale would simply shatter. I would add that the Russian artillery is approaching a failure point. Between Himars on their ammo, Himars on the guns, especially the rocket launchers, the amount of ammo they have wasted, and simply wearing out their gun tubes the Russian's ability to maintain the volume of fire that is keeping them in this is about to go away. Once that really starts to bite my prediction is that the Russians will be out of everything except Crimea in a month.  

[Tenses]

35 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Thanks, very true. I've recently reduced the time spent in this thread because I generally have the feeling it has devolved somewhat into a combination of memes, laughing at Russians and 'Murrican/NATO/Ukrainian weapons worshipping.

Re Russian mobiks: Do we know the Ukrainian side of the equation? I mean, being on the offensive doesn't say much about how sustainable the situation is, so looking at Russian effectiveness is only meaningful when also looking at, say, Ukrainian casualty rates.

The equation is definitly important here. With more Russians it is natural that "efficiency" needs to be higher to keep the fighting sustainable for the Ukraine.

What is important here, what Steve also mentioned, that we don't know what are the causes of Ukraine losses but all of them needs to be winded down per Russian killed/POWed. I hope that we will reach a moment, where RU heavy artillery presence is severly limited, which would make things a lot easier. For this to happen, steady amount of 155 and HIMARS ammo are necessary as counter-battery is crucial in that.

With more mobiks there is also a serious problem with frontline lenght. Fights on the border and possible new push from Belarus are all in play and that degrades capacity on main vectors in Donbas and Lyhansk. For plus I hope that Kherson will be closed soon so that some of the units will be freed in order to strenghten other places.

In terms of urban warfare with fully occupied large cities, I don't think that Ukraine will even try to take them by force. It is probably beyond their capacity and costs are too high. They will instead proceed with full siege, if operational theater will allow this and wait for the enemy to break

[Battlefront.com]

17 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

What was interesting in this relation was how difficult battle of Kupyansk was- descriptions of urban fights were really hair-rising, reminding Severdonetsk/Lysychansk. Before I viewed it more like clearing operation of panicked Russians, but it was fair and open fight with elite troops.

This was not surprising to me.  The western part of the city fell quickly, as did the outskirts.  However, the eastern part took several days to clear, yet it didn't seem like Ukraine's offensive had lost its head of steam.  This indicated that the Russians were putting up at least some form of fight.  Once that fight was over, however, it returned to rapid advances because Russia simply didn't have the forces in depth to continue offering such resistance.

What was great about the account you posted here is that it's our first low level explanation of the comparatively slow grind in the eastern part of the city vs. the lightning fall of the western part.

BTW, NYT did a good article on Kupyansk and how it largely avoided damage when the initial Russian takeover as well as the Ukrainian liberation.  Most of the destruction that's happened to Kupyansk has been "temper tantrum" artillery strikes by Russia as part of their standard mentality of "if we can't have it, nobody will".

Steve

[chrisl]

19 minutes ago, sburke said:

Russian fighter jet 'released a missile' near unarmed British surveillance plane, U.K. defense secretary says (msn.com)

Dang that is actually very believable.

 

I suspect that the "technical malfunction" was PEBSAC related, and they've agreed publicly on the statement.  There are probably some harsher words in the background.

[Battlefront.com]

11 minutes ago, Tenses said:

The equation is definitly important here. With more Russians it is natural that "efficiency" needs to be higher to keep the fighting sustainable for the Ukraine.

What is important here, what Steve also mentioned, that we don't know what are the causes of Ukraine losses but all of them needs to be winded down per Russian killed/POWed. I hope that we will reach a moment, where RU heavy artillery presence is severly limited, which would make things a lot easier.

Yup.  For example, if 75% of all Ukrainian casualties are caused by artillery, and artillery is degraded significantly (even if it is just running out of ammo), then that means soon the total Ukrainian casualties will decrease rather significantly.  Conversely, whatever tally of Russian casualties that results from non-artillery causes will will go up.

Russia is not exactly a "one trick pony", but it is absolutely heavily dependent upon artillery for both offensive and defensive operations.

11 minutes ago, Tenses said:

With more mobiks there is also a serious problem with frontline lenght. Fights on the border and possible new push from Belarus are all in play and that degrades capacity on main vectors in Donbas and Lyhansk. For plus I hope that Kherson will be closed soon so that some of the units will be freed in order to strenghten other places.

It is likely Russia will not lose 100% of its forces in Kherson, therefore we also have to keep in mind that they too will have some quantity to reinforce other sectors of the front.  But they are likely to be very under equipped as I expect much of their heavy stuff will need to be left behind. Certainly any ammo stockpiles will be.

11 minutes ago, Tenses said:

In terms of urban warfare with fully occupied large cities, I don't think that Ukraine will even try to take them by force. It is probably beyond their capacity and costs are too high. They will instead proceed with full siege, if operational theater will allow this and wait for the enemy to break

I saw some discussion about this by expert types and they point out that Ukraine doesn't want to see Kherson turned into Mariupol.  So they will not want to engage in street by street fighting for that reason alone.

Steve

[Ts4EVER]

32 minutes ago, chrisl said:

I suspect that the "technical malfunction" was PEBSAC related, and they've agreed publicly on the statement.  There are probably some harsher words in the background.

I just picture the plane flying and the missile just randomly falling out. "LAUNCH DETECTED"

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Back to the echo chamber point...

I think it is correct to be confident of Ukraine's overall success in this war.  All the factors we've discussed favor Ukraine's ultimate victory.  However, it definitely is good to keep in mind that as crappy as we think the Russians are, and as crappy as they might in fact be, that doesn't mean 100% of them suck 100% of the time in 100% of the tactical engagements.  That is definitely not the case and Ukraine is learning that the hard way.  Unlike Russia, though, I think Ukraine has the force structure and mentality to apply those lessons while I have the opposite opinion of Russia being able to do the same.

Correct. What I mean about echo chamber was more about general attitude of people commenting this war, not necessarly on this board- I don't know about West, but especially on the "Eastern Flank" countries common people are subconsciously afraid of Russian menace, and for a reason. So one of strategy is to laugh them off. The problem with that groupthinking is it can go too much the other way into neglecting enemy, and that was what interviewed soldier constantly warned against.

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Assessing things in more detail is not really possible.   Ukrainian casualties don't really give a good picture of this either because we don't know how they are spread out.  Are the TD units taking more casualties than the regular units?  How many of Ukraine's casualties are due to mines?  How much to concentrated artillery?  How much to directed tactical fighting?  We can't possibly know, but the answers do indicate how much/little impact the Mobiks had on causing Ukrainian casualties.

Of note is that soldier meant those ca. 50 KIA a day describing only Kharkiv front at the high of the offensive. Unfortunatelly we know that casualties in Kherson were also significant. Even very siginificant, especially due to artillery. But it is also true that on both fronts Ukrainian determination is unshaken and actually increased, and more and more soldiers finish training in EU countries every month. In previous interview they discussed what will happen if RU uses tactical nukes, and sgt. replied that some Ukrainian soldiers told him it is may even be for better, as international situation will clear out. Reportedly TDF were not less determined than regulars.

In ther words- they will not stand down, regardless of what Putin will throw at them.

 

On other note, interview with author of famous video:

 

Edited October 20, 2022 by Beleg85

[dan/california]

49 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Correct. What I mean about echo chamber was more about general attitude of people commenting this war, not necessarly on this board- I don't know about West, but especially on the "Eastern Flank" countries common people are subconsciously afraid of Russian menace, and for a reason. So one of strategy is to laugh them off. The problem with that groupthinking is it can go too much the other way into neglecting enemy, and that was what interviewed soldier constantly warned against.

I think there are a lot of positive trendsBut that is a reason to do even more, not less. Not just more, but much more. Do not give the Russians a chance to recover and find/train more competent people at any level. Run them clean out of Ukraine and crush their army for a generation. And if the Russians do get a clue somewhere maximum support will give the Ukrainians the ability to deal with it. 

The Russian attacks on the Ukrainian electrical infrastructure are the worst sort of state terrorism, and everything possible should be done to stop them. But they have almost no effect on the military situation. They are just one more reason to have  the eventual peace make The Treaty of Versailles look like a slap on the wrist in terms crippling long term  sanctions and reparations. Russia should never see another computer chip until and unless they damned near disarm.

Edited October 20, 2022 by dan/california

[poesel]

Three bits on the economic side of things. The outlook is not so good for Ukraine (all in German)

A report on a tile factory in Slovyansk:

https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/parlamentswahlen-wirtschaftliche-lage-der-ukraine-ist-100.html

A general report about Ukraine's financial situation:

https://www.n-tv.de/wirtschaft/Ukraine-droht-den-Krieg-finanziell-zu-verlieren-article23631060.html

More numbers:

https://www.gtai.de/de/trade/ukraine/wirtschaftsumfeld/finanzhilfen-kommen-nur-langsam-in-der-ukraine-an-847876

 

When this war ends, it won't be Ukrainians marching into Moscow. So, who will force Russia to pay for all this?
Keeping up the sanctions is the only lever, and I'm not sure if it's long enough.

Edited October 20, 2022 by poesel

[dan/california]

21 minutes ago, poesel said:

Three bits on the economic side of things. The outlook is not so good for Ukraine (all in German)

A report on a tile factory in Slovyansk:

https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/parlamentswahlen-wirtschaftliche-lage-der-ukraine-ist-100.html

A general report about Ukraine's financial situation:

https://www.n-tv.de/wirtschaft/Ukraine-droht-den-Krieg-finanziell-zu-verlieren-article23631060.html

More numbers:

https://www.gtai.de/de/trade/ukraine/wirtschaftsumfeld/finanzhilfen-kommen-nur-langsam-in-der-ukraine-an-847876

 

When this war ends, it won't be Ukrainians marching into Moscow. So, who will force Russia to pay for all this?
Keeping up the sanctions is the only lever, and I'm not sure if it's long enough.

The ~300 billion in Russian assets frozen in Western central banks come immediately to mind. It won't cover anything like the whole bill, but should make enough of a start to get Ukraine into a positive recovery cycle IF they really win, and IF the Russians stop launching random missiles at power stations. I will point out that Germany and Japan managed impressive postwar recoveries after being absolutely flattened, and they had to deal with a great deal of hard feelings and guilt. No one is mad at the Ukrainians except the Russians, and they are not going to be consulted on this matter.

[chrisl]

It appears that it’s being treated by NATO as escalation and stronger signals are being provided in the form of fighter escorts for the Rivet Joints.  Given the way modern fighters function, Russian aircraft could probably take a shot at an RJ, miss, and then be shot down without ever detecting the escort.

 

[acrashb]

4 hours ago, Butschi said:

Thanks, very true. I've recently reduced the time spent in this thread because I generally have the feeling it has devolved somewhat into a combination of memes, laughing at Russians and 'Murrican/NATO/Ukrainian weapons worshipping.

Re Russian mobiks: Do we know the Ukrainian side of the equation? I mean, being on the offensive doesn't say much about how sustainable the situation is, so looking at Russian effectiveness is only meaningful when also looking at, say, Ukrainian casualty rates.

The 'devolution' of the thread is partly inevitable, as net-new news (vs. more pictures of HIMARS) that can be thoughtfully analyzed dries up.  This is a combination of better OPSEC all around, less movement of the front line, and overall 'groundhog day' syndrome.

The last well-analyzed net-new event was the Kersch bridge attack.

On top of that, everyone likes to identify with a winner, and much like in high school football games one's emotional state is amplified by cheerleading.

By far the most popular post I have done, "winning" the day with likes, was the long Putin table photoshopped as partly collapsed (Kersch bridge analogue).  Posts where I spend some time and try to add something useful - not nearly as popular.  Others see the same effects and end up posting memes etc.

Avoiding group-think / echo-chamber is a long-standing problem in business.  "lateral thinking", "paradigm shift", "six hats" - all attempts to breakout of the assumed box.  None have been terribly successful, but I find deliberate "lessons learned" exercises to be helpful, as the facilitator deliberately leads identification and assessment / ranking / actioning of "what went less well" (I avoid negative words like 'failed').  Not sure how to do that on a forum, except to encourage the occasional red-team / emperor has no clothes remark.  Harking back to the "Remember you are mortal" role in ancient Rome, or the court jester's privilege in medieval times.

Volunteers?

So the mobiks have had at least partial success in plugging lines and reducing effectiveness of 'dagger' attacks.  At least I think so.  And if the human cost is terrible, how does that affect the goals of Russian leadership?  Short-term, not at all.  Longer term, it puts more levers into the fracture lines of their society and power structures.

The Ukraine side we can only do educated guesses at.  If we assume that infantry losses have some correlation to equipment losses, the Oryx site provides some indications about how the UA infantry is doing.  Reducing the pace of (land) advance implies either slackened fighting or increased attrition. I think the latter, based on continued loss rates.  For example, the Russian army has, incredibly, lost about 400 tanks in the last six weeks.

Edited October 20, 2022 by acrashb

[cesmonkey]

More on the politics of aid to Ukraine:

GOP leaders McConnell, McCarthy headed for collision on Ukraine aid
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/3696451-gop-leaders-mcconnell-mccarthy-headed-for-collision-on-ukraine-aid/

With GOP skeptics of Ukraine aid poised to gain seats in Congress, lawmakers look to lock in a huge military assistance package
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/gop-ukraine-skeptics-poised-gain-congress-lawmakers-look-lock-billions-rcna53167

[Bannon]

4 hours ago, chrisl said:

I suspect that the "technical malfunction" was PEBSAC related, and they've agreed publicly on the statement.  There are probably some harsher words in the background.

I’m not even sure what “technical malfunction” means. A missile just fell off the pylon? There has got to be more to this story.

Edited October 20, 2022 by Bannon
My comment wasn’t clear

[danfrodo]

20 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

More on the politics of aid to Ukraine:

GOP leaders McConnell, McCarthy headed for collision on Ukraine aid
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/3696451-gop-leaders-mcconnell-mccarthy-headed-for-collision-on-ukraine-aid/

With GOP skeptics of Ukraine aid poised to gain seats in Congress, lawmakers look to lock in a huge military assistance package
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/gop-ukraine-skeptics-poised-gain-congress-lawmakers-look-lock-billions-rcna53167

They are not Ukraine skeptics.  They are enablers of authoritarianism.  They love Putin, they love Orban.  Let's not play word games.  They don't care about spending, or war, they care about supporting dictators.

[MSBoxer]

22 minutes ago, Bannon said:

I’m not even sure what this means. A missile just fell off the pylon? There has got to be more to this story.

PEBSAC =Problem Exists Between Seat and Computer 

When I was in I.T. we used 

PEBSAK =Problem Exists Between Seat and Keyboard