How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

 

Quote

The idea that Putin has leverage over Ukraine's grain exports in the Black Sea is - frankly - ridiculous. Russia exports 43% of its shipborne oil out of Black Sea ports (lhs, red). Western ships make up 75% of capacity on those routes (rhs, red). High time to lower the G7 cap...

 

[womble]

3 minutes ago, IanL said:

Except that really cannot happen. If things break up into small pieces the US really cannot guarantee anything to a tiny city state sized place land locked in the middle of a sea of other such places. So, the controlling war lord will have to do something else with the handful of nuclear warheads they picked up when they took over the the local air base from Moscow.

Apart from the dubious premise that "tiny city states" will be the outcome, are Russia's nukes actually that dispersed? I doubt that too. The security implications of "penny packet"ing them out are... significant. 

But beyond the matter of guarantees, what else can such a microstate do with 'em? They could sell 'em to Iran, but that way they don't get guarantees either, and "The West" can pay more than Iran or other "bad actors" who don't already have serviceable nukes. I don't think the concept makes the danger of proliferation much worse.

For "proper countries" which secede from the Russian Union, guarantees would have to be on the table, along with many other incentives (green ones).

[womble]

5 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

High time to lower the G7 cap...

Or just get Lloyds to stop insuring those bottoms, so no organised port will let them dock, and they won't be allowed through Suez/Panama.

 

[cesmonkey]

 

[DesertFox]

Robotyne, Zaporizhzhia

 

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1682062879632113675?s=20

[Carolus]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Now, as for the escort... sure, no NEW war vessels can come through the Bosporus Straights unless Turkey decides to break the neutrality arrangement.  Which it is not likely to do.  But there are already NATO vessels in 

NATO's current naval presence is more than adequate. 

Aye but I think the problem is the crew. No one wants to be the first to try it, if it is a civilian vessel, although everything you said is completely logical. And I don't think there will be any public assurances which would encourage a merchant man who just wants to able to be home by Christmas with all limbs.

This is a classic mafia scenario.

The bullies are actually much fewer and weaker than the neighborhood combined, but no one on the block wants to be the first to stand up to extortion because it could mean losing some teeth and a broken knee. And so the scam continues.

And the bickering among NATO and EU about weapons and membership access and letting warcrimes slide with a shrug projects weakness to outside observers, even though in reality the West has come together in a way it has not for 20 years. The problem is that politics is a lot about perception. 

At the moment, Western public messaging is simply not optimal.

Edited July 20, 2023 by Carolus

[Astrophel]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is more-or-less what I was suggesting, but the West wouldn't have to do it.  Look at this chart:

Egypt and India are considered to be allies by the Kremlin and they have MASSIVE need for this grain.  Does anybody think that Russia would sink an Egyptian or Indian flagged ship?  Putin is stupid, but he's also a bad bluffer.  He'd find some way to climb down instead of military confrontation.

Similarly, there's no way that Putin would strike a Spanish flagged vessel.  That would potentially trigger an Article 4 and 5 situation, which we have seen Putin avoid doing.

As for the other nations, less clear except that striking unarmed civilian vessels conducting food runs would not help Russia's cause.

Now, as for the escort... sure, no NEW war vessels can come through the Bosporus Straights unless Turkey decides to break the neutrality arrangement.  Which it is not likely to do.  But there are already NATO vessels in the Black Sea.  They don't have to be capable of defending themselves, they could be unarmed for all that matters.  All that matters is that they fly the NATO flag when they set sail.

NATO's current naval presence is more than adequate.  Here's a story about a naval exercise done just a few months ago with 30 NATO vessels (some of which no doubt aren't applicable):

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/03/30/nato-us-forces-join-romania-led-black-sea-military-drills/

Steve

Interesting data. The World Food Programme (WPF) claims to be feeding some 125 million people with over 50% purchased locally.  Presumably much of the rest is coming from russia/ukraine although I have not been able to establish how much, even approximately.  The countries paying for the WFP are "western" with USA by far the most generous, followed by Germany and EU.  Russia is 33rd on the list of donors (https://www.wfp.org/funding/2023).

It would seem appropriate for WFP to change immediately away from russian supply, if they have not done so already.

[Tux]

4 hours ago, Billy Ringo said:

So worried about Russia's reaction,  Russia's red-lines and what might they do if "X" happens.

What about NATO's red-lines? EU red-lines? US red-lines?

They've bombed and killed citizens. Intentionally targeted civilian infrastructure and residential areas. Raped.  Tortured.  Kidnapped children.  Blown up dams resulting in the destruction of 1,000s of acres of prime farmland, blown up ports important to international shipping of food supplies and who knows what else.

Does NATO or the US even have red-lines? Are we so GD'md spineless to even dare state them publicly and hold the Russians accountable?

I've negotiated with major retailers for over 3 decades and one thing I've learned without exception--they'll keep asking for more until they are finally told NO.  A hard NO, and not before.   Maybe it's time to draw a hard line in the concrete, state it publicly and take control back from the Russians.

 

Apparently the West's 'boil the frog' strategy has been so successful even some of its own citizens haven't noticed how much they've committed...

Russia crossed a red-line on February 24th, 2022.  It's been discussed on this board that, despite the obvious failings in the Russian invasion plan, they probably would have eventually succeeded if they has been fighting against Ukraine alone.  Historic levels of Western support have turned that into what will almost certainly be a crushing defeat for Russia.  What about that makes you think Russia are getting away with anything at all, here?  What exactly do you think the Russians have control of?  They are still humans, they still have agency of their own and they do not seem to be in the mood to compromise.  They will therefore continue to do stuff we don't like for a while, yet.  That's life.  No stopping it.

1 hour ago, Carolus said:

And the bickering among NATO and EU about weapons and membership access and letting warcrimes slide with a shrug...

Fixed that for you.

EU membership is not a prize owed to anyone.  That's not how it works.  If you want to join you have to meet all the strict economic entry conditions, regardless of which war you just fought.  Being a good friend isn't enough; just ask Turkiye.

And I must have missed the bit where someone belonging to either NATO or the EU argued that we should let any warcrimes slide...?

 

Seriously, I get that the war is frustrating and we'd all like it to be over tomorrow but that just isn't going to happen.  Please, unless we have specific, realistic ideas to add to the discussion can we dial down the daily temper-tantrums and lashing-out at the West for not snapping its fingers and making the bad man go away?

 

Also, as a genuine aside, has anyone else noticed that parties who are accused of being "spineless" in almost any context often seem to end up winning?

[Billy Ringo]

8 minutes ago, Tux said:

What about that makes you think Russia are getting away with anything at all, here?  What exactly do you think the Russians have control of?  They are still humans, they still have agency of their own and they do not seem to be in the mood to compromise.  They will therefore continue to do stuff we don't like for a while, yet.  That's life.  No stopping it.
 

 Please, unless we have specific, realistic ideas to add to the discussion can we dial down the daily temper-tantrums and lashing-out at the West for not snapping its fingers and making the bad man go away?

Also, as a genuine aside, has anyone else noticed that parties who are accused of being "spineless" in almost any context often seem to end up winning?

I'm not going to get in a multi-thread pissing match so this reply will be it, but there are things that, in my opinion, could be done. 

1. Specific ideas: be very specific that if Russia bombs civilian living quarters or any infrastructure that has virtually no military value--then suitable weapons will be delivered that will target that particular source of the missile/drone etc. even if it is long range and not currently part of the NATO/US delivery assets.  I'm sure that's easier said than done, but at least give Ukraine the ability to target that particular Russian asset.

2. I'm no military historian, but I have to believe there have been civilizations/countries that meekly/spinelessly surrendered that now cease to exist. 

 

[Tux]

Well, I didn’t mean to start (and don’t wish to prolong) a ‘pissing match’ so I will also leave it at this.  Know also that it’s nothing personal.

1 hour ago, Billy Ringo said:

1. Specific ideas: be very specific that if Russia bombs civilian living quarters or any infrastructure that has virtually no military value--then suitable weapons will be delivered that will target that particular source of the missile/drone etc. even if it is long range and not currently part of the NATO/US delivery assets.  I'm sure that's easier said than done, but at least give Ukraine the ability to target that particular Russian asset.

Ok so, assuming the West has a weapon that can do as you say, surely the most likely Russian response would be to either ignore the threat or maybe even loudly call the West’s bluff, possibly with an extra wave of attacks on civilian infrastructure that they weren’t originally planning?  The West then delivers the specific-but-unnamed wunderwaffe and Ukraine use it to try and strike every base/platform that Russia launches civilian attacks from for the rest of the war.  Russia obviously do their damnedest to protect those bases and make a point of continuing the attacks and crowing about it to their citizens and the rest of the world.

Meanwhile the war goes on, to be won via the strategic military, political and economic damage caused by means which are already pretty much fully engaged.  And we all remain unhappy about it.

Quote

2. I'm no military historian, but I have to believe there have been civilizations/countries that meekly/spinelessly surrendered that now cease to exist. 

This sounds like a variation of the ‘Western European nations surrendered to the Nazis because they were too nice’ opinion we had a few pages ago.

[kevinkin]

15 hours ago, Tux said:

What about that makes you think Russia are getting away with anything at all, here?  What exactly do you think the Russians have control of? 

They control Crimea and a chunk of Ukraine to the north. They control the defenses for both for the foreseeable future. Russia in the present is getting away with a lot. No war crime trials, commercial flights, vacations, plenty of stuff for those that play by the rules while sending their poor youth to the front. Status quo for now. Happy Happy. And grandmother China is there if all else fails. 

15 hours ago, Tux said:

will almost certainly be a crushing defeat for Russia.

Russia has already been defeated geostrategically. That's conventional wisdom. They are facing new NATO members, they are under sanctions and otherwise in internal disarray. Good for the west. But they still hold non-negotiable land: Bad for Ukraine. 

15 hours ago, Tux said:

unless we have specific, realistic ideas to add to the discussion

How about a NATO no-fly zone over Ukrainian territory? No stomach for that. Well consider NATO donations have already killed Russians without which those troops would still be in the fight. 

BTW,  there never seems to be a discussion of Ukraine as a nation into the future. That is the entire point. If Ukraine evaporates as a nation and free society due to a prolonged war of attrition, what is this fight all about? Cool youtube videos and twitter posts? Putin is punting the ball to West. See what you can do. How about taking that ball and running with it?   

Edited July 21, 2023 by kevinkin

[NamEndedAllen]

Indepth article from a group of military analysts who spent time recently on the front lines. Quite specific takeaways from the larger article are below, in case you don’t want to read the full piece. Perhaps not as optimistic in tone as many posts, but good grist for the mill:

Franz-Stefan Gady, a senior fellow with the Institute for International Strategic Studies and the Center for New American Security, says after his visit to Ukraine it's clear the country is struggling with how to employ its forces.…Gady visited Ukraine with a group including Konrad Muzyka, an independent defense analyst focusing on Russia and Belarus and director of Rochan Consulting; Rob Lee, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Michael Kofman, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment and Principal Research Scientist, CNA.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/a-sobering-analysis-of-ukraines-counteroffensive-from-the-front

1.) By and large this is an infantryman’s fight (squad, platoon and company level) supported by artillery along most of the frontline. This has several implications.

1st: Progress is measured by yards/meters and not km/miles given reduced mobility. 

2nd: Mechanized formations are rarely deployed due to lack of enablers for maneuver. This includes insufficient quantities of de-mining equipment, air defenses, ATGMs etc. 

2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense and IMO [in my opinion] is the main cause for slow progress. 

3.) Ukrainian forces by default have switched to a strategy of attrition relying on sequential fires rather than maneuver. This is the reason why cluster munitions are critical to extend current fire rates into the fall: weakening Russian defenses to a degree that enables maneuver. 

4.) Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space and slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine’s ability to break through Russian defenses is Ukraine's inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale. Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There’s simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe. 

5.) The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses. Absent a sudden collapse of Russian defenses, I suspect this will remain a bloody attritional fight with reserve units being fed in incrementally in the coming weeks and months. 

6.) There is limited evidence of a systematic deep battle that methodically degrades Russian C2 [command and control]/munitions. Despite rationing on the Russian side, ammunition is available and Russians appear to have fairly good battlefield ISR [information, surveillance, reconnaissance] coverage. 

Russians also had no need to deploy operational reserves yet to fend off Ukrainian attacks. There is also evidence of reduced impact of HIMARS strikes due to effective Russian countermeasures. (This is important to keep in mind regarding any potential tactical impact of delivery of ATACMs [U.S.-produced Army Tactical Missile System]).

Russian forces, even if severely degraded and lacking ammo, are likely capable of delaying, containing or repulsing individual platoon or company-sized Ukrainian advances unless these attacks are better coordinated and synchronized along the broader frontline. 

7.) Quality of Russian forces varies. Attrition is hitting them hard but they are defending their positions well, according to Ukrainians we spoke to. They have been quite adaptable at the tactical level and are broadly defending according to Soviet/Russian doctrine. 

8.) Russian artillery rationing is real and happening. Ukraine has established fire superiority in tube artillery while Russia retains superiority in MRLSs in the South. Localized fire superiority in some calibers alone does not suffice, however, to break through Russian defenses. 

9.) An additional influx of weapons systems (e.g., ATACMs, air defense systems, MBTs, IFVs etc.) while important to sustain the war effort, will likely not have a decisive tactical impact without adaptation and more effective integration. 

Ukraine will have to better synchronize and adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tactically decisive in the long run. This is happening but it is slow work in progress. (Most NATO-style militaries would struggle with this even more than the Ukrainians IMO). 

10.) The above is also true for breaching operations. Additional mine clearing equipment is needed and will be helpful (especially man-portable mine-clearing systems) but not decisive without better integration of fire and maneuver at scale. 

Again, I cannot emphasize enough how difficult this is to pull off in wartime.

Monocausal explanations for failure (like lack of de-mining equipment) do not reflect reality. E.g., some Ukrainian assaults were stopped by Russian ATGMs even before reaching the 1st Russian minefield. 

11.) There is a dearth of artillery barrels that is difficult to address given production rates and delivery timelines.

12.) So far Ukraine’s approach in this counteroffensive has been first and foremost direct assaults on Russian positions supported by a rudimentary deep battle approach. And no, these direct assaults are not mere probing attacks. 

13.) There is evidence of tactical cyber operations supporting closing of kinetic kill-chains. That is cyber ISR contributing to identifying and tracking targets on the battlefield. Starlink remains absolutely key for Ukrainian command and control.

14.) Quality of Ukrainian officers and NCOs we met appears excellent and morale remains high. However, there are some force quality issues emerging with less able bodied and older men called up for service now. 

15.) The narrative that Ukrainian progress thus far is slow just because of a lack of weapons deliveries and support is monocausal and is not shared by those we spoke to actually fighting and exercising command on the frontline. 

16.) It goes without saying that in a war of attrition, more artillery ammunition and hardware is always needed and needs to be steadily supplied. Western support of Ukraine certainly should continue as there is still the prospect that the counteroffensive will make gains. But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination between units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. ... and Russians putting up stiff resistance. 

We asked Gady to drill a little deeper into a couple of the points he made.

On Tuesday, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley told reporters that the U.S. and allies have trained 17 brigade combat teams - 63,000 Ukrainian troops - in combined arms maneuver. More are in the pipeline.

But Ukraine is having trouble on the battlefield executing those coordinated maneuvers on a large scale because of the compressed training timelines while facing off against “one of the world’s most powerful militaries,” Gady told us.

Ukraine “is probably doing a lot of combined arms operations at smaller-unit levels, but I think it needs to scale this up,” he said. 

The U.S. is "probably expecting some sort of results with all the aid and the military hardware that it has provided," said Gady. "The basic idea here was to train Western-equipped mechanized arms brigades in combined arms maneuver. I think this approach has had some setbacks. I'm not sure that it has been a failure across the board. I think it just requires a more concerted effort."

Gady however was quick to emphasize that “no Western type of military can really do this sort of combined arms operations at scale, with the exception of the United States. But even the United States Armed Forces would have a very difficult time breaking through these defensive layers because no Western military in the world currently has any experience in breaching the types of defenses in depth that the Russians put up, in the south and east of Ukraine.”

[Carolus]

4 hours ago, Tux said:

Fixed that for you.

I have been weighing if I should respond at all, because I think you might have had a grumpy day when you wrote that.

But I assure you, it was a mere misunderstanding from your side:

NATO bickered about membership, EU bickered about weapons, ammo and financial support. Summarized, the entities NATO and EU bickered about the topics of membership, weapons etc. which is all I said.

That an EU membership is somehow supposed to be mandatory or deserved does not follow from that statement.

Quote

And I must have missed the bit where someone belonging to either NATO or the EU argued that we should let any warcrimes slide...?

Well I have not said that NATO and EU are arguing for letting warcrimes slide - (although Hungary might want to have a word here), I said they are letting warcrimes slide, de facto. 

Are there maybe good reasons for that? Sure. But that does not change the reality of the situation.

Quote

Please, unless we have specific, realistic ideas to add to the discussion can we dial down the daily temper-tantrums and lashing-out at the West for not snapping its fingers and making the bad man go away?

Strangely you seem to have missed a very obvious one from my post:

Improved public messaging

Leave the bickering to the backrooms, agree on common press statements. 

Don't make it look like one country has to pull the others forward by the armpit hairs when it comes to increasing support. Pretend that it was a shared and mutually agreed decision.

I would add:

Actually develop a strategy and a goal so that planned steps can taken for that goal and backup plans be made for alternative goals when the primary goal becomes unobtainable. Because I am not convinced there is an overall strategy yet in the West. The West is largely reacting instead of acting. In a non-military "above strategic level" way, Russia has the intiative because the West is still digesting the sucker punch of Feb 22. 

We don't want Ukraine to lose, we don't want Russia to lose too hard. How hard is too hard? The answer to that question is measured in dead and tortured Ukrainians while the clock ticks.

We don't even know if there is a "boiling the frog" strategy or if it is merely our interpretation.

We could already have re-trained Ukrainian pilots. Should F16 have been delivered already- no I am not saying that. Maybe the frog does not have the appropriate temperature yet, if there is indeed planning and intent behind when which equipment is being provided.

But the primary time constraint (pilot training) would be overcome. They could be getting more flight hours in while waiting. Once the "Go" signal arrives, things could happen really fast. Instead, pilot training starts next month.

That is just one example, of course. I don't want to seem to be focused on airplanes, because it is not like the F16 will be militarily decisive. But it is symptomatic for the lack of rather simple foresight and planning I am missing from the Western elites, the kind of decisions I would expect from a mediocre middle manager for his company department.

I could add more points, but this post is already long and rambling, and not  focused on the topic of the military situation on the ground. But to conclude: no, I do not think that seeing the need for improvement equates to a 'temper tantrum" or the wish for a magic trick. I would rather caution against complacency when real human lives are at stake.

Edited July 20, 2023 by Carolus
corrections and typos

[Offshoot]

First recorded use of cluster munitions by Ukraine?

Don't know if it's the same place or if the writer has Tiger tank syndrome, but:

 

Edited July 21, 2023 by Offshoot

[cesmonkey]

51 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

First recorded use of cluster munitions by Ukraine?

Don't know if it's the same place or if the writer has Tiger tank syndrome, but:

 

FYI. This appears to be the telegram post that NOELREPORTS translated:

https://t.me/obrazbuduschego2/14813

[Kinophile]

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/19614

[Sojourner]

Ukrainians using cluster munitions quite effectively

John Kirby, Coordinator for Strategic Communications at the National Security Council in the White House, has confirmed to the media that US-supplied cluster munitions are already being deployed on the battlefield in Ukraine.  

Kirby said that the Ukrainians are using cluster munitions properly, and they are having an impact on Russian defence formations and Russian defensive manoeuvring. "We have gotten some initial feedback from the Ukrainians, and they’re using them quite effectively."

Source: Reuters, reported by European Pravda

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/20/7412264/

[Artkin]

32 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/19614

Add it to CMBS!

[billbindc]

Highly useful. : 

 

https://theins.ru/en/politics/263596

[Battlefront.com]

46 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Highly useful. : 

 

https://theins.ru/en/politics/263596

That was an interesting read!  Thanks.

OK, so this view has most people generally clueless about what was about to happen, even within Wagner's top ranks.  However, there is also evidence that some people knew something at least just ahead of the start.  And like we speculated here, were sympathetic or apathetic, neither of which is a sign of regime strength.

The lack of organized resistance to the march was pretty evident even in real time.  This article, however, indicates that a combination of fear, sympathy, and apathy was not counter balanced by loyalty to Putin's regime.  In fact, the article indicates that there was almost no displays of support for the regime amongst the security and military apparatus at all.  Which is no doubt why Chechens wound up in Moscow.

While all of this seems familiar to me from conversations here, the article does not theorize that there was any sort of formal alliance between various power blocs and Prig.  In their view it really was Prig leading the charge and he ceased when he thought he had a better deal from Putin than he would have got fighting in the streets of Moscow.  The recent crack down by Putin does seem to indicate this is more true than I have thought.  Still, the article does mention large segments of the power structures being supportive of a leadership change, so it seems unlikely none of them jumped in to gain an advantage as Prig marched.

Steve

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

That was an interesting read!  Thanks.

OK, so this view has most people generally clueless about what was about to happen, even within Wagner's top ranks.  However, there is also evidence that some people knew something at least just ahead of the start.  And like we speculated here, were sympathetic or apathetic, neither of which is a sign of regime strength.

The lack of organized resistance to the march was pretty evident even in real time.  This article, however, indicates that a combination of fear, sympathy, and apathy was not counter balanced by loyalty to Putin's regime.  In fact, the article indicates that there was almost no displays of support for the regime amongst the security and military apparatus at all.  Which is no doubt why Chechens wound up in Moscow.

While all of this seems familiar to me from conversations here, the article does not theorize that there was any sort of formal alliance between various power blocs and Prig.  In their view it really was Prig leading the charge and he ceased when he thought he had a better deal from Putin than he would have got fighting in the streets of Moscow.  The recent crack down by Putin does seem to indicate this is more true than I have thought.  Still, the article does mention large segments of the power structures being supportive of a leadership change, so it seems unlikely none of them jumped in to gain an advantage as Prig marched.

Steve

I think that Grozev and Weiss aren't going to speculate on what they can't nail down. I'd personally say that a formal alliance isn't the sort of thing these folks do but the outlines look pretty clear (Rosneft, Dyumin, Zolotov). Not acting to defend Putin, for the big players, amounts to the same thing as actively attacking him in the end. As I see it, the damage to Putin's regime is illustrated far more by what we don't see than what we do. To use the famous trope: 

[Rokko]

21 hours ago, Offshoot said:

Reporting from Ukraine covered this fight around a coal mine in a recent video

 

Thanks for this, I always ignored this Youtube channel because of these goofy thumbnails, but the content is pretty good.

15 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Hard to tell the totality of the destruction, but assuming quite a few vehicles retreated I'd say this was a major attack relative to others.  There's enough clear destruction to show that it was at least 1x Tank Plt and 2x Mech Inf Plts.  Presuming 30% casualties this means it was an entire mech infantry heavy BTG sized attack.

Noteworthy for sure.

Steve

Interestingly, there is also footage from the Russian side. The drone/telegram channel operator was allegedly later killed in that cluster munitions strike video from yesterday.

https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1681979245126463491?s=20

Also: Not a good week for minor Russian e-celebs in general, it seems:

 

Edited July 21, 2023 by Rokko

[The_MonkeyKing]

15 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

 

here is the second part:

Edited July 21, 2023 by The_MonkeyKing

[Astrophel]

Eighteen months ago, the thought of Ukraine "scaling offensive combat operations" against the full might of the russian armed forces was unthinkable.  We should have some patience.

[Tux]

9 hours ago, Carolus said:

I have been weighing if I should respond at all, because I think you might have had a grumpy day when you wrote that.

To be honest, while I would always try to avoid letting that spill over into a post on this thread of all places, you might not be entirely wrong.  I appreciate the consideration.

 

9 hours ago, Carolus said:

But I assure you, it was a mere misunderstanding from your side:

NATO bickered about membership, EU bickered about weapons, ammo and financial support. Summarized, the entities NATO and EU bickered about the topics of membership, weapons etc. which is all I said.

That an EU membership is somehow supposed to be mandatory or deserved does not follow from that statement.

Noted and I now understand where you're coming from.  I think the fact that people on this thread have previously opined that Ukraine should be yanked into NATO and the EU as soon as the war is over probably primed me to interpret what you wrote the wrong way.

 

9 hours ago, Carolus said:

Improved public messaging

Leave the bickering to the backrooms, agree on common press statements. 

Don't make it look like one country has to pull the others forward by the armpit hairs when it comes to increasing support. Pretend that it was a shared and mutually agreed decision.

I would add:

Actually develop a strategy and a goal so that planned steps can taken for that goal and backup plans be made for alternative goals when the primary goal becomes unobtainable. Because I am not convinced there is an overall strategy yet in the West. The West is largely reacting instead of acting. In a non-military "above strategic level" way, Russia has the intiative because the West is still digesting the sucker punch of Feb 22. 

We don't want Ukraine to lose, we don't want Russia to lose too hard. How hard is too hard? The answer to that question is measured in dead and tortured Ukrainians while the clock ticks.

We don't even know if there is a "boiling the frog" strategy or if it is merely our interpretation.

We could already have re-trained Ukrainian pilots. Should F16 have been delivered already- no I am not saying that. Maybe the frog does not have the appropriate temperature yet, if there is indeed planning and intent behind when which equipment is being provided.

But the primary time constraint (pilot training) would be overcome. They could be getting more flight hours in while waiting. Once the "Go" signal arrives, things could happen really fast. Instead, pilot training starts next month.

That is just one example, of course. I don't want to seem to be focused on airplanes, because it is not like the F16 will be militarily decisive. But it is symptomatic for the lack of rather simple foresight and planning I am missing from the Western elites, the kind of decisions I would expect from a mediocre middle manager for his company department.

I could add more points, but this post is already long and rambling, and not  focused on the topic of the military situation on the ground. But to conclude: no, I do not think that seeing the need for improvement equates to a 'temper tantrum" or the wish for a magic trick. I would rather caution against complacency when real human lives are at stake.

Again I better understand your thought process now but I still struggle with it a bit:

• We actually have no real idea whether the West have a coherent strategic plan or not because, if they did, it would be idiotic of them to publicise it.
• Even the impression of 'reacting instead of acting' may be a part of such a plan.  'Remain calm and mature, forestall any attempts by Russia to portray us as the aggressors and seal the deal as regards Russia's utter political isolation on the matter by letting the world see how they act'.  Maybe.
• Maybe Ukrainian F-16 pilots in fact are trained and ready to go and there are other good reasons why they will not yet be deployed.
• All of the above relates to the fact that we are dealing not only with a dearth of the information we'd like but we are only receiving the information which people let on.  And when they tell us they tell the world so there may be good strategic reasons to downplay how much they have actually already invested.  Or not.

Now despite what it might sound like above, I'm not advocating for us all to become philisophical solipsists.  We do have information and we do have brains and we can and do use those things to point out, for example, that the 'boiling the frog' strategy seems pretty clearly to have been deliberate:  There has been a steady, almost regular pattern of particular equipment first being openly denied to Ukraine, then being repeatedly asked for by Ukraine, then being hinted at for a month or two before finally being announced as part of the next aid package (sometimes clearly a significant time after it was actually sent).  Each time regarding slightly more potent/emotive equipment.  Either this is a deliberate pacing strategy or it is the weirdest combination of repeatedly 'trying to avoid sending stuff' and then 'quickly being persuaded to send said stuff' I've ever seen.

Edited July 21, 2023 by Tux
Formatting and the typo.