How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[DesertFox]

 

 

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, kevinkin said:

I don't think much has changed other than the name of the KGB. So, this is not about the west. It's about who really runs Russia and who safe guards the control and use of WMD.

https://www.thoughtco.com/deep-state-definition-4142030

I wouldn't put both agencies on the same level of influence in the country. KGB was much larger, for one. Late Soviet system was very fossilized, with consecutive branches represented in central comitee having lot of internal sovereginity, habitually practicized by 2 generations; Military, Party,KGB etc. were self-contained circles with their own rites, worldview and strict hierarchies, sometimes to the point of inbreeding, like in case of Soviet Diplomacy- that's two. They were almost like feudal duchies that gathered in the form of odd aparatchik oligarchy- after Khrushchev, First Secretary was more a mediator than true chief. The Tzar was collective, unlike today.

Now the third thing is political ambitions of leaders and actual grasp they have over their appartus. Bortnikov seems like only a shadow of old, willfull chiefs of intelligence services of Soviet times. Naryshikn maybe? We saw him mumbling like a schoolkid in II.2024. Ofc. these gentlemen undoubtedly play they own games, but until now they were rather petty, about money/ personal rochades, not big politics. Hard to see them decisive.

So if we are about to see true, "kinmaking" politics to the level of detroning Putin being played by "factions", I would only count on maybe some medium, or even low level officers. Frankly I am not convinced that FSB has enough internal coherence, leadership and independence to play this kind of own, very risky political games. Some informal clans- maybe. But FSB as a whole? Call me skeptical. On other side, a lot of things could change during this 1,5 year that is not yet visible to amateurs with naked eye.

 

[kraze]

24 minutes ago, strac_sap said:

I've been wondering about this. Given the war why haven't all the heads been rolling? My assumption is that these are the loyalists around him, period. But I feel like this is the group that would understand this better.

As an aside, I noticed this in the US during Iraq in the early 2000's. Generals were not getting fired even when outcomes were bad. I recall an article that read something like: "Privates in the army are punished more for losing a rifle than Generals for losing a war." EDIT: Here is the article.

Because for heads to get rolling - they would need to admit they are losing to Ukrainians.

But since they are winning the war against whole NATO - no need to replace anyone.

[sburke]

T54s versus leopard 2s. Who wrote this alternate history crap, or is this some crazy scenario from the cesspool?

[FancyCat]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

More evidence that we're seeing a larger turf war between FSB and MoD underway.  Prig was probably just the opening salvo.  There's more to come, I suspect:

Steve

Igor Sushko is useless btw. just posts random bs.

 

 

 

 

[dan/california]

Someone recommended this ~five pages ago, and I just got around to listening to it. It is an excellent view of the upper level currents driving the war. In Particular it actually explains Scholz's change of heart pretty well.

[keas66]

4 hours ago, billbindc said:

Come on now, lads. Imagine trying to do Lend Lease with a nuclear armed opponent. 

I thought that was the entire basis of cold war NATO ? ( By that I mean 4 and half US Divisions stationed in  Europe - ~ 450,000+ men )

Edited June 29, 2023 by keas66

[chuckdyke]

Gave me some insight of tactics used.

 

[Teufel]

53 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

 

 

 

Pun on Rolling Stones song ”Sympathy for the Devil” - Please allow me to quote myself.

From post - June 23, 2023

”Prigozjin has friends in high places within the MoD, themselves disgruntled. Surovikin being the best example, promoted to, and demoted for, the mission impossible in Kherson. Man with colorful past of illegal arms trading, human rights violations in Syria and Chechnya. It’s not far-fetched to assume there are yet others that like Surovikin are unhappy with their MoD colleagues. Driven by perhaps nothing else than patriotic sentiment, ref Dmitri Polyakov whose is quoted with the sole motivationbeing “loyalty to the Russian people and not the system I served under”.”

Hate the expression “I told you so” but I can’t let this one slide, besides Family Guy and Loretta puts it like nobody else.

 

Who could’ve thought we’d be able to settle that discussion so damn quickly. Admit, I did not!

Edited June 29, 2023 by Teufel

[DesertFox]

You've got another thing coming...

 

 

[dan/california]

11 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

You've got another thing coming...

 

 

Finally!

 

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Frankly I am not convinced that FSB has enough internal coherence, leadership and independence to play this kind of own, very risky political games. Some informal clans- maybe. But FSB as a whole? Call me skeptical. On other side, a lot of things could change during this 1,5 year that is not yet visible to amateurs with naked eye.

Thanks for your perspective. Have to keep an eye on developments and maybe we can learn a bit more about Russian internal relationships after Prigs adventure. 

[JonS]

2 hours ago, strac_sap said:

Did he just use a crowbar to make sure the breach had closed? ...And make it seem normal?

It's a bit hard to see, but I would expect that it has a semi-automatic breech (closes itself once the round is seated properly), and he's using a rammer to seat the round.

Example of a rammer, for a different weapon:

https://www.thegunner.net/ccp8/index.php?app=ecom&ns=prodshow&ref=25pr-rammer-EC&sid=i879s5qnf5uz2d9g17et169y4820nt40

 

Edited June 30, 2023 by JonS

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

I wouldn't put both agencies on the same level of influence in the country. KGB was much larger, for one. Late Soviet system was very fossilized, with consecutive branches represented in central comitee having lot of internal sovereginity, habitually practicized by 2 generations; Military, Party,KGB etc. were self-contained circles with their own rites, worldview and strict hierarchies, sometimes to the point of inbreeding, like in case of Soviet Diplomacy- that's two. They were almost like feudal duchies that gathered in the form of odd aparatchik oligarchy- after Khrushchev, First Secretary was more a mediator than true chief. The Tzar was collective, unlike today.

Now the third thing is political ambitions of leaders and actual grasp they have over their appartus. Bortnikov seems like only a shadow of old, willfull chiefs of intelligence services of Soviet times. Naryshikn maybe? We saw him mumbling like a schoolkid in II.2024. Ofc. these gentlemen undoubtedly play they own games, but until now they were rather petty, about money/ personal rochades, not big politics. Hard to see them decisive.

So if we are about to see true, "kinmaking" politics to the level of detroning Putin being played by "factions", I would only count on maybe some medium, or even low level officers. Frankly I am not convinced that FSB has enough internal coherence, leadership and independence to play this kind of own, very risky political games. Some informal clans- maybe. But FSB as a whole? Call me skeptical. On other side, a lot of things could change during this 1,5 year that is not yet visible to amateurs with naked eye.

 

Well we have just more or less proven that the MOD is a factional mess and ninety plus percent of its combat power is in Ukraine dying. So if the FSB has lost it cohesion there is approximately nothing but habit holding the place together. 

[cesmonkey]

Somewhat interesting series of interviews with NCOs and junior officers of a recently-trained brigade in action on the southern front. English subtitles work fine.
 

 

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Well we have just more or less proven that the MOD is a factional mess and ninety plus percent of its combat power is in Ukraine dying. So if the FSB has lost it cohesion there is approximately nothing but habit holding the place together. 

FSB never had this legendary coherence and agency people attribute to it in the first place, at least not compared to old KGB. MoD is specific branch in terms of internal political wrestling for a number of reasons, including promotion of very mediocre personas by design. Also note, we have very little proven by this point-  rumours that several generals were perhaps more on board with Prigozhin than they should be, rumours of arrests, rumours of faltering loyalties. Against pretty solid evidence, that basically every senior figure in Russian government/military officially sided with president.

In this light, it is very interesting that we may actually observe now extensive PsyOps campaign on western (particulary US) behalf to push them into doing something more. ATACMS decisions (or just the fear of it), "leak" to journalists of Surovikin being supposedly silent Wagner member (I don't think RUssians will take the bait), a lot of comments by officials regarding situation in Russia- it seems Washington knows way more what is happening than perhaps Putin himself, and try to use this knowledge to levarage tensions at Kremlin.

Edited June 30, 2023 by Beleg85

[strac_sap]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

It's a bit hard to see, but I would expect that it has a semi-automatic breech (closes itself once the round is seated properly), and he's using a rammer to seat the round.

Example of a rammer, for a different weapon:

https://www.thegunner.net/ccp8/index.php?app=ecom&ns=prodshow&ref=25pr-rammer-EC&sid=i879s5qnf5uz2d9g17et169y4820nt40

 

My experience is a loader in an M60A3 (TTS) and on the M68 you push the full 105 mm in and the breach closes solidly behind it. I'm now googling why one needs a rammer for this type of breach. T54/55 uses same full round, so I'm assuming it is an age/maintenance issue. Definitely slows loading.

Edit: the 25 pdr uses a separate powder cartridge so needs a rammer.

Edited June 30, 2023 by strac_sap
clarify

[DesertFox]

 

 

[DesertFox]

Boom!

 

 

[JonS]

26 minutes ago, strac_sap said:

. T54/55 uses same full round, so I'm assuming it is an age/maintenance issue. Definitely slows loading.

Agreed. Definitely less than ideal.

Mind you, using a t-55 is already far from ideal.

[strac_sap]

13 minutes ago, JonS said:

Agreed. Definitely less than ideal.

Mind you, using a t-55 is already far from ideal.

Understatement. At least the AMX 10RC is fast. This is swiss cheese in the making. (I've enjoyed everyones quips about this thing). Won't lie, felt the same way about the M60 when I was a crewman in the reserves.

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, strac_sap said:

I've been wondering about this. Given the war why haven't all the heads been rolling? My assumption is that these are the loyalists around him, period.

Yes, this has been the trend of his for many years now.  Back in the earlier days of his regime he ran Russia more-or-less like a real government, though obviously not a democratic one.  This included pragmatic engagement with different opinions, especially on economics.  This is why Russia did, in fact, have a pretty impressive recovery from the horror show of the 1990s.  Don't get me wrong, it was still a ruthless and nasty environment, but it was still decently productive.

This really came to an end after many of his picks likely lost the 2011 election and official results were most likely falsified in many cases.  Putin was always happy to let voters decide to elect his people, but once they started to dare to elect others... well now, that's a different story!  His government officially declared most of the evidence showing voter irregularities was generated by the CIA and that was that.

Since that time Putin has increasingly reduced the chances of results being other than what he wants.  Lots and lots of examples of rolling back democratic principles that were not all that strong to begin with.  Since COVID it got worse.

The war seems to have been the final move towards a late stage autocracy where paranoia about losing power becomes the defining feature of the regime.  As one expects, this means loyalty is now pretty much the only reason people have positions of power.  If someone is loyal and can perform their job, then it's an unexpected bonus

One example of this is in 2014 he convened a gathering of some sort to discuss what he was about to do to Ukraine.  He had outside input, though of course he picked what he wanted to hear.  For the 2022 invasion he didn't let anybody know about it until about 2 days before he invaded.  This included many senior members of the government.  Paranoia about leaks maybe made it worse, but I don't think he was interested in opinions since he decided a year earlier to make this war a reality.

Steve

[The_MonkeyKing]

9 hours ago, womble said:

Wikipedia says there are 3700 ATACMS manufactured in total. A lot of those are "awaiting upgrade" though, and I can't offer a guess how useful the unupgraded ones would be to UKR at this point.

Good point. I know that the US has only a few hundred in service and those are equipped with the "unitary warhead". 

Those "old" stored cluster ATACMS would be the thing Ukraine needs. 

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

I wouldn't put both agencies on the same level of influence in the country. KGB was much larger, for one. Late Soviet system was very fossilized, with consecutive branches represented in central comitee having lot of internal sovereginity, habitually practicized by 2 generations; Military, Party,KGB etc. were self-contained circles with their own rites, worldview and strict hierarchies, sometimes to the point of inbreeding, like in case of Soviet Diplomacy- that's two. They were almost like feudal duchies that gathered in the form of odd aparatchik oligarchy- after Khrushchev, First Secretary was more a mediator than true chief. The Tzar was collective, unlike today.

Now the third thing is political ambitions of leaders and actual grasp they have over their appartus. Bortnikov seems like only a shadow of old, willfull chiefs of intelligence services of Soviet times. Naryshikn maybe? We saw him mumbling like a schoolkid in II.2024. Ofc. these gentlemen undoubtedly play they own games, but until now they were rather petty, about money/ personal rochades, not big politics. Hard to see them decisive.

So if we are about to see true, "kinmaking" politics to the level of detroning Putin being played by "factions", I would only count on maybe some medium, or even low level officers. Frankly I am not convinced that FSB has enough internal coherence, leadership and independence to play this kind of own, very risky political games. Some informal clans- maybe. But FSB as a whole? Call me skeptical. On other side, a lot of things could change during this 1,5 year that is not yet visible to amateurs with naked eye.

 

My admittedly superficial take on this stuff, based a lot on historical parallels, is that the war has changed the dynamic within the entire power structure.  Prior to the war the inept higher and mid levels of the regime were content to not stick their nose in where it didn't belong because doing so would put their self enrichment in jeopardy.  This was by Putin's design and for sure there were some pretty high profile examples of what happens when you fall out of favor with Putin.

I have no doubt in my mind that the war is changing the thinking and, perhaps, behavior of people in positions of authority.  I bet the majority of meaningful decision makers in the MoD and FSB realize that this war is lost and they need to start preparing themselves for what comes after.

The FSB and MoD might still be extremely fractured, but there are likely far more cliques within each thinking they have to do something to protect themselves from the results of this war.  It's also less likely that the MoD or FSB will rat out their own because they do see this as a large conflict.  Meaning, if something like 10% of an organization is working against Putin's interests, there's a pretty good chance that the other 90% won't do anything to counter them.  In fact, some portion of the 90% will passively/timidly help the 10%.  It could be as small as not filing a report with a certain piece of info or overlooking something someone said. 

So, with that...

The fact is that the FSB knew about this plot and did nothing meaningful to warn Putin in time to head it off.  It is also improbable to think the MoD knew nothing about it ahead of time, so they too let things happen.  Take all the possible reasons for this and it's probable that a prevailing and common element is people see the need for dramatic change.  They don't want Putin gone, but they don't want events to continue heading in the same direction.  Their futures are at stake, possibly their lives too.

Putin still seems to be restrained by SOMETHING.  The most logical something is powerful groups within his own regime.  It doesn't have to be the entire MoD or entire FSB, in fact that is unlikely, it just has to be a group that Putin agrees needs to be listened to for whatever reason.

Steve

[MikeyD]

54 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I bet the majority of meaningful decision makers in the MoD and FSB realize that this war is lost

If you go back to the very beginning of this thread you will find multiple leaked accounts of FSB agents telling the world 'THIS WASN'T OUR FAULT!' , followed by accounts of Putin ruthlessly purging FSB dissenters and leakers. Whether the FSB is pro- or anti-war, they retain an institutional memory of Putin stomping on them.