How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Eddy]

15 minutes ago, Huba said:

Here's TheDrive article about it, probably as good as analysis as we can get at this time:
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraines-storm-shadow-missiles-are-a-big-problem-for-russia

Good article from the operational view. However I haven't seen much about the strategic level (might even be the grand strategy level - I get confused). Russia's theory of winning seems now to be based on

• War weariness within Ukraine
• The 'West' growing bored
• Russia sticks it out

There is no sign from what I gather of the first one. But what this does is clearly display that rather than material support from the West declining, it's actually increasing. And that comes a  couple of days after Blinken and Cleverly stating we are in this for long haul thus backing up their statements. There is no evidence, none whatsoever, that the West is rowing back on supporting Ukraine.

From the Russian point of view there must come a point where they start thinking 'oh crap, are assumptions about the West are wrong on this one'.

As for the third point, Russia sticks it out: it's hard to tell the damage that is being done to the Russian economy but it is pretty significant. That utter bilge from the IMF earlier this year about 2% growth was just that - bilge. I'm not convinced they can stick it out multi year. And that's just the economic domain, let alone capability, will etc.

Just for a laugh I'd like to see the UK announce another 14 Challengers sometime in about late August, just to ram home the message that we're not giving up on this one. We probably haven't got another 14 working Challengers but the Russkis don't know that!!

[dan/california]

3 minutes ago, Eddy said:

Good article from the operational view. However I haven't seen much about the strategic level (might even be the grand strategy level - I get confused). Russia's theory of winning seems now to be based on

• War weariness within Ukraine
• The 'West' growing bored
• Russia sticks it out

There is no sign from what I gather of the first one. But what this does is clearly display that rather than material support from the West declining, it's actually increasing. And that comes a  couple of days after Blinken and Cleverly stating we are in this for long haul thus backing up their statements. There is no evidence, none whatsoever, that the West is rowing back on supporting Ukraine.

From the Russian point of view there must come a point where they start thinking 'oh crap, are assumptions about the West are wrong on this one'.

As for the third point, Russia sticks it out: it's hard to tell the damage that is being done to the Russian economy but it is pretty significant. That utter bilge from the IMF earlier this year about 2% growth was just that - bilge. I'm not convinced they can stick it out multi year. And that's just the economic domain, let alone capability, will etc.

Just for a laugh I'd like to see the UK announce another 14 Challengers sometime in about late August, just to ram home the message that we're not giving up on this one. We probably haven't got another 14 working Challengers but the Russkis don't know that!!

The U.S. announcing a couple of Hundred ATACMs, 250 more Bradleys, and a hundred or so of the very latest model Abrams is the kind of kick that might push Russian morale over the edge. Of course the best way to announce anything is a an entire battalion of the equipment in question smashing a few kilometers of Russia's defensive lines.

[JonS]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Looks like Russians in some units have critical lack of artillery, probably in motor-rifle regiments of Territorial Troops, so old tanks are given to them instead artillery. 

Could be lack of guns, or lack of ammo, but either way this is bad for Russia. The lack of training these guys are getting pretty much excludes the possibility that they'll be able to sustain the "SP" part of "SPA", leaving them with a bunch of fragile metal pill boxes firing indirectly. Given the various capabilities that UKR has on hand, dealing with these "batterys" shouldn't present too many tactical challenges ... assuming they aren't just abandoned by their crews first.

Also, even in their nominal role of pseudo artillery, and assuming no UKR interference, they're going to be a bit pants - the crew is too small and the compartment too cramped to achieve much in the way of sustained and flexible fire support.

Long may this development continue.

[JonS]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Therefore, we have no pattern of behavior to draw conclusions from.  This [Bakhmut] could be a one off for all we know.

True, but ... the tide does seem to have changed all of a sudden. Instead of only defending against almost constant dry humping and slowly conceding ground, UKR seems to be now constantly heading east.

Edited May 11, 2023 by JonS

[Jiggathebauce]

If I recall correctly, Saddams army tried using tanks as Self propelled artillery against Iran to fairly poor results....

[Eddy]

Interesting RUSI article on the TDF in the early(ish) days. Think its from a guest writer. 

Ukraine’s Territorial Defence Forces: The War So Far and Future Prospects | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)

What stuck me was when the Russian's shifted to artillery intensive offensives, the poor sods where armed with mgs and ags and basically couldn't fight back. Now wonder some of them struggled.

[womble]

The isolation of the mobik probably starts in their training period, if they have one. Given the "training methods" traditional to the RA, and the, ahem, "accelerated timescale", there's probably little or no cultivation of the attitudes that lead to the development, once deployed to unit, of the "bond between squadmates" that remains the primary motivation to fight of an infantryman. And there's no leadership at the low level with the competence to compensate.

This might contribute to the execrable treatment of casualties, fatal and otherwise: there just isn't any motivation to waste any effort on the guys around you, since you barely know them from Adam.

Both sides have been using tanks for indirect fire, so the Russians digging deeper into their reserves to find (temporarily) mobile HE chuckers that don't need new barrel linings isn't really a surprise. Putting artillery guys in the vehicle might be a good way of getting more effect out of the platform, or it might be an indication that they haven't anything better to serve.

If the UK is sending 10 score Storm Shadow, the US commitment of ATACMS can't be far behind. What temperature is the frog-water at now?

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Situation inside Bakhmut

UKR troops has retaken Industrial college. Heavy clashes for sсhool and kindergarden on Korsunskoho street. 

UKR troops pushed off Russians from part of Ivanivskyi forest SW Ivanivske village (southern part of forest was under Russian control). Wagners threw there own "core" units to stabilze situation

Also in Bakhmut area was destroyed Pantsyr-S1. First strike missed, but probably slightly damaged it, secons was successful

 

Looks like the Pansir was in Adriivka when it was first attacked while being towed.  The only thing I like seeing more than a multi-million Dollar piece of Russian equipment being towed is watching it burn.

Steve

[JonS]

10 minutes ago, Jiggathebauce said:

tanks as Self propelled artillery

Oh, tanks as SPA is definitely a thing. But generally you'd only do it from a position of strength - ie, your tanks don't have anything better they could be doing. Like, tanking.

Its generally a waste of resources (vehicles, crew, ammunition) in the short term, and bad for the tanks in the medium term - those cannons really aren't designed to be used at high rates of fire for long periods. The barrels wear out, and the trunions get knackered. But if all the enemy tanks are dead, and you need to add a bit of weight in order to break though somewhere ... eh, why not?

That, of course, is not the position the Russians find themselves in.

[billbindc]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Interesting!!  This morning I was looking a the map and thinking a medium sized push towards Soledar would be a good idea.  I was thinking of a coordinated push from the southwest and northeast might cause significant panic.  I was thinking the timing would be best after the main counter offensive started, but if Ukraine sees an opportunity to push back from the southwest now... who am I to say that's wrong?

OK, so in the last three days we've seen significant counter attacks against Russian positions in the south and now north, with ongoing push backs within Bakhmut itself.

Still to early to know what this is all about, but my sense is Ukraine is "testing the waters" along the whole front.  Things seem to be favorable, so hopefully we'll see more soon.

BTW, this fits in with my concept of the strategic plan for this counter offensive.  Poke Russian forces in the eyes in the Donbas, force them to divert resources there, launch the main counter offensive elsewhere, let that drain resources, then hit in the Donbas again.

I'm liking what I see so far. [cross posted with Haiduk's second update.  Let me say I am liking this even more!]

Steve

My attempt at pith has been to say that the UA will lean on a lot of doors to see which are rotten and then start kicking them in. 

[Centurian52]

So, based on what I'm seeing, this is my prediction.

• Limited objective Ukrainian counterattacks across the entire frontline will continue over the next few weeks, increasing in scale and tempo. This will force the Russians to think short-term, disperse whatever they have left in reserve, and increase panic among Russian soldiers.
• Shortly before the main offensive kicks off we are going to see smoking accidents in Russian ammo dumps and command centers all over Ukraine, throughout the entire depth of the Russian occupied territory (probably not limited to the intended area of the main offensive, unless Ukraine needs to closely husband a limited supply of Storm Shadows).
• I'm thinking the offensive itself could be on a broader front than I had previously imagined, possibly stretching from Melitopol to Mariupol.
• Once Ukrainian forces have cleared out the Russian air defenses between them and the coast (Storm Shadow is not immune to interception), the Kerch bridge has a series of smoking accidents until a sizeable section of it drops.
• As the Russians scramble to respond to the main offensive the pace of opportunistic attacks in Luhansk and Donetsk increase, carving out more and more territory, with the objectives becoming less and less limited.
• As the Russian frontline in Zaporizhia collapses, the Ukrainians get more aggressive with their bridgehead in Kherson, possibly pushing to beat as many Russian units as possible to the neck of Crimea.
• The offensive may temporarily stall at the neck of the Crimean peninsula. But without any reinforcements, and with Ukrainian pressure forcing the Russians to expend ammo faster than it can be sealifted in, resistance in Crimea collapses within another month.
• Another wave of emergency mobilization, the limited scale of the attacks in the region, and the fact that it will take time for Ukraine to reorient their main offensive forces, may allow the Russians to stabilize the situation in Luhansk and Donetsk. A follow up offensive later this year or early next year is needed to finish the Russians off.

Edited May 11, 2023 by Centurian52

[Huba]

Here's Koffman's take on today's events:

 

[Battlefront.com]

39 minutes ago, JonS said:

True, but ... the tide does seem to have changed all of a sudden. Instead of only defending against almost constant dry humping and slowly conceding ground, UKR seems to be now constantly heading east.

I see it the same way, but I keep telling myself to take deep breaths and wait a bit before declaring the initial phase of the counter offensive underway.  It's very difficult to remain skeptical that something significant is underway.

14 minutes ago, billbindc said:

My attempt at pith has been to say that the UA will lean on a lot of doors to see which are rotten and then start kicking them in. 

I think they are going to have more doors to choose from than they have boots to kick with.

Whatever is happening, it started to play out 2 days ago and it appears there is more to come.  I expect we'll see something else happen tomorrow and perhaps the day after.  At that point Ukraine will likely strike MUCH harder or it will continue on with the current strategy of small, alternating pushes.  Why?  Because I am sure Russian command is already in crisis mode.  Thin lines of troops is bad enough, but thin lines of retreating troops is a much bigger concern.  They will try and do something to put a stop to it before it gets out of hand. 

If Russia does move in significant new forces Ukraine might have achieved it's primary objective (distraction and commitment) and settle things down.  However, if Ukraine has more in mind for this sector they will likely want to strike harder sooner before the inevitable reinforcements have a chance to acclimate.  So I think we'll know within 1-3 days what's going on.

Steve

[Centurian52]

20 minutes ago, womble said:

If the UK is sending 10 score Storm Shadow, the US commitment of ATACMS can't be far behind. What temperature is the frog-water at now?

I think you've got to be right. Surely the US is out of excuses for not sending ATACMS at this point.

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, Huba said:

Here's Koffman's take on today's events:

 

Cool.  Looks like we're not alone in our thinking!  Last year about this time if I found myself saying the same thing as Kofman I'd reassess because I'd likely be wrong.  But I have to say, Kofman has really "smartened up" (as we say around here) since last Fall.  Which is good because his voice carries a lot of weight.

Steve

[Kinophile]

7 minutes ago, Centurian52 said:

I think you've got to be right. Surely the US is out of excuses for not sending ATACMS at this 

8 minutes ago, Centurian52 said:

I think you've got to be right. Surely the US is out of excuses for not sending ATACMS at this point.

 

Pentagon: "Aha. Challenge accepted, sur!" 

[kevinkin]

https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230511-zelensky-says-ukraine-needs-time-before-counter-offensive

Not much to make of this. There is a nice map in the article. 

"The donation of these weapons systems gives Ukraine the best chance to defend themselves against Russia's continued brutality," UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said.

Let's not read too much into "defend" and "not ready".

[Kinophile]

And to y'all who thought us micks were an irrelevant afterthought on the *** end of Europe...well, Putin thinks we're important! 

Um Actually...not a good thing..... 

 

[danfrodo]

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Or cut Svarove group logistic, bypassing line of defense through Russian territory?

I suggested this here a few months.  Any look at the northern end of the front suggests this.

I don't think this is 'the counteroffensive'.  The ground is dry and the RU units are exhausted in many areas.  Good time to kill russians.  Hopefully, as suggested above, Putin panics and sends more & more to stabilize an unimportant part of the line.  These small actions are teaching RU that no part of the line is safe, forcing them to spread their forces.

Taking own the kerch bridge and facilities in Sevastopol would greatly hinder logistics in crimea and the landbridge, so using Storm Shadows for that seems like a good idea.  I wonder what % of the landbridge supplies comes from the east vs the south?  

Good day of reports today, w little attacks in multiple places and RU bloggers already wetting their pants.  I think they'll be running out of clean pairs of dry pants soon.  

Just got back from a 'pinning' ceremony for graduating nursing students at Montana State U.  They first honored the three ROTC nurses, who will head for further training then be deployed.  Occurred to me these three could be tending to wounded UKR soldiers in some NATO country before summer ends.

Edited May 11, 2023 by danfrodo

[sburke]

34 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I see it the same way, but I keep telling myself to take deep breaths and wait a bit before declaring the initial phase of the counter offensive underway.  It's very difficult to remain skeptical that something significant is underway.

Steve

Even if it isn't and it is just some brigade level push to take advantage of Russian exhaustion, the effect it is having on the enemy is fascinating.  If UA does start pushing in multiple locations and present the RA with several problems to solve, the impact on RA morale is going to increase a lot as well as likely causing even more backstabbing within Russian leadership.

[MikeyD]

I frankly don't know what to expect. The term 'counter-offensive' could mean taking back territory 40km around Bakhmut to get it out of artillery range. Or it could mean driving to the Sea of Azov and dividing the Russian occupied territory in half. Or eliminating the Russians from the Ukrainian Black Sea coast up to Crimea. We don't really know what the scale of the undertaking will be.

[Artkin]

Ukraine has about 10 brigades of new equipment to burn through. Theyve already lost quite a few new toys. Leave some for reserve, and maybe we can expect 5-6 fresh brigades concentrating on one small part of the front. While it collapses then the rest of the UAF will push the Russians back. That's my assumption. What can Ukraine accomplish with 5-6 fresh brigades?

[sross112]

2 hours ago, womble said:

The isolation of the mobik probably starts in their training period, if they have one. Given the "training methods" traditional to the RA, and the, ahem, "accelerated timescale", there's probably little or no cultivation of the attitudes that lead to the development, once deployed to unit, of the "bond between squadmates" that remains the primary motivation to fight of an infantryman. And there's no leadership at the low level with the competence to compensate.

This might contribute to the execrable treatment of casualties, fatal and otherwise: there just isn't any motivation to waste any effort on the guys around you, since you barely know them from Adam.

 

What I read from it is a lack of professional first line leadership (NCOs). I know it is something that we discussed here from day one as the RA just never had what the western forces would consider a capable NCO corps. To me that explains a lot of what we see beyond just the Mobik. Mobiks with proper leadership would probably be a much greater obstacle for the UA. Good NCOs would result in properly sited defenses and heavy weapons, developed fighting positions, ongoing training or increase in individual soldiering skills, and a much higher morale.

The limited initial training is definitely a problem for them, but the lack of effective leadership at the lowest levels is really telling. 

[NamEndedAllen]

2 hours ago, sburke said:

Even if it isn't and it is just some brigade level push to take advantage of Russian exhaustion, the effect it is having on the enemy is fascinating.  If UA does start pushing in multiple locations and present the RA with several problems to solve, the impact on RA morale is going to increase a lot as well as likely causing even more backstabbing within Russian leadership.

The endless speculations and inescapable, pulse-rate-rising “Are we there yet?!” flood at every report from the front permits the REAL plan to be revealed here,for the first time. The UA will keep ratcheting up the suspense with local actions across the board, announcements by the Allies of more NATO weapons delivered, more hints from the government…”it’s coming…”, UNTIL:

The old guys in Russian HQs and Moscow simply cannot take it any longer. Heart attacks now down leader after leader. Generals collapse. Putin allegedly seen on a stretcher with an oxygen mask. The country panics. Leadership everywhere is collapsing in fear, jumping out of windows, dropping cigarettes. The State Duma and the Federation Council lack quorums, and the ones who do show up are screaming at each other on Russian tv. And then…

The Russian troops at the front realize something wonderful, and say “Frack it. This sucks. let’s just go home.”

Zelensky starts hinting at delivering aid to the stricken Motherland…friendly annexation of interested Russian Republics - ancient beloved Kyiv as new Capitol of the Russian Federation. Kazakhstan, Armenia and Belorussia say, “Hmmm…let’s talk”. The CSTO countries announce a meeting, to be held in Kyiv if Zelensky would be willing to host. Biden announces USA sanctions could be phased out “If conditions are met”. 

The UA units remain alert, in position, but for the first time in years no deaths are reported along the front lines. Counter Offensive ends.

 

 

Edited May 12, 2023 by NamEndedAllen

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, Artkin said:

Ukraine has about 10 brigades of new equipment to burn through.

Hi, I am not doubting your assessment. But I would like to see a listing of this and how it is structured into maneuver elements. It would help me wrap my brain around the possible operations that can be expected this summer. Yes, it's May 12 now. No need to jump through hoops to get an OOB. Maybe others have something handy.