How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[JonS]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

However, humans figure the puzzle out and once a defence starts to fail the losses start to stack up.

Omaha Beach is a good and well known example of this dynamic (puzzle solution hint: ignore the draws, and switch from mech assault tactics to light infantry infiltration)

Edited March 8, 2023 by JonS

[Vanir Ausf B]

Good write-up in the NYT on the regulatory and physical challenges the EU is dealing with on ammunition production.

__________

And NATO could ease certification regulations on the use of certain shells for certain guns. For example, he said, it is against German law to fire uncertified shells from German howitzers. These regulations are designed for safety, but they can also benefit manufacturers that produce shells to sell for guns they also make, similar to printer cartridges for particular printers.

Camille Grand, a former NATO assistant secretary general for defense investment, said that NATO estimated that 80 percent of 155-millimeter shells could be fired from any Western gun, despite restrictive certifications.

Ramping up production by 50 percent would be easy, he said, with more worker shifts, even if there are sometimes supply problems for key ingredients. But to increase production by 300 percent would require huge investments for new plants.

__________

(possibly paywalled): https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/08/world/europe/ukraine-eu-shells-ammunition.html

[dan/california]

https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2023/03/08/how-many-russians-have-been-killed-in-ukraine

Their guess if 65,000 kia, 250,000 total casualties. Permit to repeat my opinion that the Russian military is so bleeped up IT probably doesn't know.

[The_Capt]

58 minutes ago, billbindc said:

This is a great articulation of something I was inchoately working towards in my head. And as usual, it's here on this obscure (ish?) board rather than on the front page of the NY Times.

Well I am not a big proponent of predictions but since we are being compared to Kofman and crew, let me make one.  The RA is building up to another collapse - when and where are pretty much up in the air but we will be the first to know.  How is getting clearer by the day.

The only question is, "will it be a full strategic collapse or another operational one?"  My bet is on operational.  The RA is going to hold onto Donetsk and Luhansk (the cities) until the dirty end.  Crimea we have talked about.  But I know Steve has been aching for a strategic one for some time now, maybe his day has dawned. 

I am saying this because we are getting a lot of signals coming out of the RA war machine that it is starting to creak, and they sound a lot like last fall - in many ways worse.  Meanwhile the UA is getting breaching equipment, next-gen UAS and loitering munitions, and freakin JDAMs.

[dan/california]

 

 

36 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well I am not a big proponent of predictions but since we are being compared to Kofman and crew, let me make one.  The RA is building up to another collapse - when and where are pretty much up in the air but we will be the first to know.  How is getting clearer by the day.

The only question is, "will it be a full strategic collapse or another operational one?"  My bet is on operational.  The RA is going to hold onto Donetsk and Luhansk (the cities) until the dirty end.  Crimea we have talked about.  But I know Steve has been aching for a strategic one for some time now, maybe his day has dawned. 

I am saying this because we are getting a lot of signals coming out of the RA war machine that it is starting to creak, and they sound a lot like last fall - in many ways worse.  Meanwhile the UA is getting breaching equipment, next-gen UAS and loitering munitions, and freakin JDAMs.

So the Ukrainians take back most of the land bridge, But the Russians manage to hold Crimea, and most of the Donbas they have currently? At least I see that as the most likely scenario...

One idea that has been floating around my head is that the Ukrainians will push for Melitopol, and Mariupol at the same, or at least nearly the same time. It would be ambitious, but it would force LOT of Russian forces to retreat or risk being surrounded if it worked.

Edit: my other idea is foe them to hug the Dnipro on the left hand/eastern side of the river. So they would basically have Support from Himars and the longer ranged 155s on their flank all the way down to the gateway to Crimea.

Edited March 8, 2023 by dan/california

[Baneman]

3 hours ago, DesertFox said:

Yep, since of late nothing but Squirrel-Bratwurst here. Hmm delicious...

Damn you man! 

I'm on holiday in Hamburg, Travemünde and Berlin in 3 weeks time and already salivating about currywurst, bratkartoffeln and schweinhaxe. 

Now I can't wait! 

Edit : sorry, very off topic, I know, but German food is so awesome. 

 

 

Edited March 8, 2023 by Baneman
Insincere apology (because you can't apologise for German food)

[dan/california]

Another of those creaking noises...

[Thomm]

Some days ago, in Dresden, I ordered a Saxon cabbage strudel with potatoes for dinner, because I was kind of tired of eating meating all the time.

To my surprise, and delight, I found out that it was filled with white sausage!

Sneaky Germans!

[TheVulture]

Thinking in terms of a Ukrainian offensive in the south, how much is the rail line from Donbas to Crimea a meaningful factor these days? While a push to Melitopol looks like top of the wishlist, getting to Tokmak is half the distance, and would sever that rail connection. But I've no idea how much of a practical difference it would make to Russian logistics.

[DesertFox]

30 minutes ago, Baneman said:

Damn you man! 

I'm on holiday in Hamburg, Travemünde and Berlin in 3 weeks time and already salivating about currywurst, bratkartoffeln and schweinhaxe. 

Now I can't wait! 

Edit : sorry, very off topic, I know, but German food is so awesome. 

 

 

If you are in Hamburg, Travemuende or surroundings, try to get hold of a nice portion of Nordseekrabben (North Sea shrimps). Either served with scrambled eggs or on dark bread. You can´t get something more delicious than that.

[billbindc]

Just now, DesertFox said:

If you are in Hamburg, Travemuende or surroundings, try to get hold of a nice portion of Nordseekrabben (North Sea shrimps). Either served with scrambled eggs or on dark bread. You can´t get something more delicious than that.

Ok...I'll be in Belfast next week. What am I eating grognards?

[sburke]

Lithuania foreign minister on Amanpour now discussing how do the Baltics view Russia and how the west is just beginning to understand.

'When we see Bucha and Irpin, we think about our cities,' says Lithuanian FM | CNN

[Baneman]

2 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

If you are in Hamburg, Travemuende or surroundings, try to get hold of a nice portion of Nordseekrabben (North Sea shrimps). Either served with scrambled eggs or on dark bread. You can´t get something more delicious than that.

I have been promised turbot in Travemünde, but will try to fit your recommendation in. 

[danfrodo]

I'm gonna put my spring/summer offensive cards on the table.  Here's what I think UKR will do. 

Assumptions:

1.  most of RU excess combat power (armor & arty) is currently in Donbas front.  By excess, I mean power beyond what's needed to hold that front if it's relatively quiet.

2.  That excess combat power could be ~quickly moved toward either Svatove front or Melitopol front since centrally located.

3.  UKR will want to get that excess combat power committed to either extreme of the front and attack at the other end

So I think UKR will:

1.  attack toward Melitopol, since that's what Putin will most fear.  The attack must be powerful enough and look real enough for Putin to start freaking out -- always good to have the dictator deciding military movements.  Putin would overcompensate his excess combat power to the far western extreme of the line.

2.  Once Putin commits, UKR will attack at the other extreme of the line along Svatove-Starobilsk line.  RU will have to move its excess combat power the maximum distance to reach  the area for support.

3.  If Starobilsk is taken, UKR goes on defensive here, since have cut major RU supply line.  

4.  UKR resumes attack on the western extreme toward Melitopol.  

The problem is that this requires splitting offensive force.  But the key is that the split forces will not be facing RU reserves, which are at the other end of the line.  When RU reserves show up & things get hard, the other end of the line attacks. 

Maybe UKR does not have enough combat power for this, but attack #1 might go one for a month starting in May before attack #2 starts in June or July, giving more time for the new units to become available.  

TheCapt et al should have a field day with this.  I am actually interested in finding out just how bad an idea this is and why, but it's the best I have right now. 

Edited March 8, 2023 by danfrodo

[Peregrine]

3 hours ago, DesertFox said:

"It’s really bad. I think they are trying to surround us" 

I am eating squirrel and these guys are getting steak dinners walking to their trench.

[Fenris]

 

[Haiduk]

Some unclear hints in UA twitter about some UKR actions around Bakhmut. Maybe we will know soon what it was...

[Kinophile]

24 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Ok...I'll be in Belfast next week. What am I eating grognards?

Spuds. 

Enjoy and no you don't get dessert. 

[Kinophile]

4 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Some unclear hints in UA twitter about some UKR actions around Bakhmut. Maybe we will know soon what it was...

I suspect any staggered withdrawal will be "hidden"  behind apparent local offensive(s), which will switch to staged rear guard actions as the bubble contracts. 

[cesmonkey]

An interesting, wide-ranging, and sometimes very down-in-the weeds interview with Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Budaievskyi, who currently serves as Chief of Section of International Partners, Cooperation, and Development in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. 

 

[Kinophile]

43 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Another of those creaking noises...

The deep irony of course being that in prison they'll still be vulnerable to being "volunteered"  for combat,  and the Russian state being the vindictive a$$holes with long memories that they are..., well... 

[The_Capt]

14 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

I'm gonna put my spring/summer offensive cards on the table.  Here's what I think UKR will do. 

Assumptions:

1.  most of RU excess combat power (armor & arty) is currently in Donbas front.  By excess, I mean power beyond what's needed to hold that front if it's relatively quiet.

2.  That excess combat power could be ~quickly moved toward either Svatove front or Melitopol front since centrally located.

3.  UKR will want to get that excess combat power committed to either extreme of the front and attack at the other end

So I think UKR will:

1.  attack toward Melitopol, since that's what Putin will most fear.  The attack must be powerful enough and look real enough for Putin to start freaking out -- always good to have the dictator deciding military movements.  Putin would overcompensate his excess combat power to the far western extreme of the line.

2.  Once Putin commits, UKR will attack at the other extreme of the line along Svatove-Starobilsk line.  RU will have to move its excess combat power the maximum distance to reach  the area for support.

3.  If Starobilsk is taken, UKR goes on defensive here, since have cut major RU supply line.  

4.  UKR resumes attack on the western extreme toward Melitopol.  

The problem is that this requires splitting offensive force.  But the key is that the split forces will not be facing RU reserves, which are at the other end of the line.  When RU reserves show up & things get hard, the other end of the line attacks. 

Maybe UKR does not have enough combat power for this, but attack #1 might go one for a month starting in May before attack #2 starts in June or July, giving more time for the new units to become available.  

TheCapt et al should have a field day with this.  I am actually interested in finding out just how bad an idea this is and why, but it's the best I have right now. 

Not bad at all to be honest.  I think they will one-two split as well.  Not sure as to sequencing as it could be conditions based, but if your force is in good shape while theirs is stressed, and you can maul there LOCs from afar, putting stress at two points makes sense.  Creates dilemma and forces your opponent to swing quickly from one AO to the other - this is playing to RA weaknesses.  It copies the model of Kharkiv and Kherson but it works and what is the RA going to do about it?  If they slack off in the east they are looking at getting supply lines cut from the North, if they ignore the middle they get the land bridge cut and now have two non-contiguous theatres to contend with.

Grinding directly back towards Donetsk in the Donbas is a waste of time.  They could try a bold river crossing south of Kherson but that is a tall order and risky.  And then we get into wild amphib and/or airborne type stuff but the UA is likely not there with the specialized stuff.

I think Haiduk is onto something with the idea of leading with current inventory and then break out with western kit - they gotta use it and show the world they are using it but they also do not want to trash it.

[womble]

5 hours ago, sburke said:

mmmm sguirrel.

 

Squirrel sausages are nommy. Mm-mm-mmmm.

[Haiduk]

8 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I suspect any staggered withdrawal will be "hidden"  behind apparent local offensive(s), which will switch to staged rear guard actions as the bubble contracts. 

Hints were not about withdrawal %)

Edited March 8, 2023 by Haiduk

[sburke]

2 minutes ago, womble said:

Squirrel sausages are nommy. Mm-mm-mmmm.

How to Eat Squirrel ? Find Out Here Squirrel Arena