How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[billbindc]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

“No dumb bastard ever won a war by going out and dying for his country. He won it by making some other dumb bastard die for his country."

 

I've been banging on about Kerensky for the last 4 months to anyone who will listen. What Putin is doing is quite similar in effect. It's just a question of where the collapse point is...this offensive or the next one? 

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, paxromana said:

A formal Blockade requires a Declaration of War ...

Sure. But given the assistance NATO is providing already, combined with modern day blockage techniques (sanctions/freezing money flow etc..), war has been declared on Russia de facto. Today, a Declaration of War has really become semantics. But with US HIMARS raining death on Russians, does it really matter? Politicians will often use the excuse of needing a Declaration of War to provide any assistance - not just troops. I think formal Declarations of War are a thing of the past. Warfare does not fit into a defined box anymore. If the money flow into Russian can be stopped without a blockade so be it. But it could be used as the final nail in the coffin. 

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, billbindc said:

I've been banging on about Kerensky for the last 4 months to anyone who will listen. What Putin is doing is quite similar in effect. It's just a question of where the collapse point is...this offensive or the next one? 

I think there is a coherent argument that the Russian military is in collapse, the rate of that collapse is really the outstanding question.  Personally I see collapse a "a failure to be able to sustain option spaces".  Collapses come in many flavors, the dramatic cascade failures get all the ink but I think history demonstrates that these are really just the punctuation marks on a longer process of systemic degradation.

Russia has seen its option spaces continually shrink in the prosecution of this war.  They had the most options on 24 Feb, and ever since then it has been a slow and steady compression.  Some has been forced by the UA and some by Russia itself.  Examples:

- On 23 Feb 22 Russia had pretty broad options, which included to not-invade.  Then on the 24th those options began to shrink.  They committed pretty much their entire ready-force on one Hail Mary plan: no Lviv cut-off back up, no strategic erosion campaign fall back.

- By the end of March, they had lost all viable options in the North around Kyiv and their main effort.  So they politically weaseled into new "real" objectives, which was simply accepting and re-selling the reduced options they already had.

 -  By the summer, they had run out of strategic options that relied on manoeuvre.  Recall those maps with sweeping red arrows drawn all over them - those were utter fiction.  The RA had lost an ability to sustain that sort of warfare over the Spring.  So they were down to attrition and mass based options at Severodonetsk, making incremental gains while simply trying to hold on everywhere else.

- Enter the HIMAR campaigns, along with other capability and by Aug/Sep 22 Russia no longer had viable offensive options at the operational level. 

- Then they lost any an all options around Kharkiv and Kherson over the Fall.

They are literally down to symbolic tactical grinding at Bakhmut and holding on by their fingernails everywhere else.  Their force generation capability is slumping downward and their last option of nuclear weapons is a dead end.

All the while the UA develops capability and a broader array of options in an expanding portfolio.  Simple equation that says a lot about this war:

Capability x Speed/Agility/Precision = Options.  Options x Cognitive Advantage (Information) = Outcomes.

A whole lot is trending towards zero  for Russia.  As to when the whole thing starts failing fast...l that is the big question.  My money is the next major move by the UA is flank pressure to pull the RA east and west simultaneously.  Lotta opportunity on that Eastern flank and keeping pressure up south of Kherson - in my dreams an amphib action is on the table, but that is likely asking way too much (now there is one interesting CM campaign).  And then when the the RA is stretched thin in the middle, they will try to cut that corridor and separate the two.  A drive to Melitopol is the most likely, but there are other...wait for it...options.

With the strategic corridor cut the two AOs are now connected by land only thru that bridge Ukraine already damaged, and air/sea but those are not optimal if the UA hold the North Coast of the Azov Sea.  All traffic basically has to go around the back across the Black Sea while that big bridge gets HIMARsed - Crimea basically becomes another larger Kherson pocket on the wrong side of a water obstacle.  The UA can then squeeze until things turn purple.

Will this be enough for the political house to come down - unknown, but I definitely think it has potential.  Someone in the Russian power mechanism, as ponzi as it is, has to realize that one 70 year old losing a major land war is simply not worth it at some point.  

Edited January 3, 2023 by The_Capt

[billbindc]

5 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I think there is a coherent argument that the Russian military is in collapse, the rate of that collapse is really the outstanding question.  Personally I see collapse a "a failure to be able to sustain option spaces".  Collapses come in many flavors, the dramatic cascade failures get all the ink but I think history demonstrates that these are really just the punctuation marks on a longer process of systemic degradation.

Russia has seen its option spaces continually shrink in the prosecution of this war.  They had the most options on 24 Feb, and ever since then it has been a slow and steady compression.  Some has been forced by the UA and some by Russia itself.  Examples:

- On 23 Feb 22 Russia had pretty broad options, which included to not-invade.  Then on the 24th those options began to shrink.  They committed pretty much their entire ready-force on one Hail Mary plan: no Lviv cut-off back up, no strategic erosion campaign fall back.

- By the end of March, they had lost all viable options in the North around Kyiv and their main effort.  So they politically weaseled into new "real" objectives, which was simply accepting and re-selling the reduced options they already had.

 -  By the summer, they had run out of strategic options that relied on manoeuvre.  Recall those maps with sweeping red arrows drawn all over them - those were utter fiction.  The RA had lost an ability to sustain that sort of warfare over the Spring.  So they were down to attrition and mass based options at Severodonetsk, making incremental gains while simply trying to hold on everywhere else.

- Enter the HIMAR campaigns, along with other capability and by Aug/Sep 22 Russia no longer had viable offensive options at the operational level. 

- Then they lost any an all options around Kharkiv and Kherson over the Fall.

They are literally down to symbolic tactical grinding at Bakhmut and holding on by their fingernails everywhere else.  Their force generation capability is slumping downward and their last option of nuclear weapons is a dead end.

All the while the UA develops capability and a broader array of options in an expanding portfolio.  Simple equation that says a lot about this war:

Capability x Speed/Agility/Precision = Options.  Options x Cognitive Advantage (Information) = Outcomes.

A whole lot is trending towards zero  for Russia.  As to when the whole thing starts failing fast...l that is the big question.  My money is the next major move by the UA is flank pressure to pull the RA east and west simultaneously.  Lotta opportunity on that Eastern flank and keeping pressure up south of Kherson - in my dreams an amphib action is on the table, but that is likely asking way too much (now there is one interesting CM campaign).  And then when the the RA is stretched thin in the middle, they will try to cut that corridor and separate the two.  A drive to Melitopol is the most likely, but there are other...wait for it...options.

With the strategic corridor cut the two AOs are now connected by land only thru that bridge Ukraine already damaged, and air/sea but those are not optimal if the UA hold the North Coast of the Azov Sea.  All traffic basically has to go around the back across the Black Sea while that big bridge gets HIMARsed - Crimea basically becomes another larger Kherson pocket on the wring side of a water obstacle.  The UA can then squeeze until things turn purple.

Will this be enough for the political house to come down - unknown, but I definitely think it has potential.  Someone in the Russian power mechanism, as ponzi as it is, has to realize that one 70 year old losing a major land war is simply not worth it at some point.  

Great analysis as usual. I've been wondering for a while why anyone would expect the UA to attempt to militarily seize Crimea. Potential escalation issues aside, it's bottlenecked to a Ukrainian attack from the West and bottlenecked for Russian supplies to the East. It's a perfect sink for Russian resources if Ukraine can cleave the front North of it.

[FancyCat]

10 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Great analysis as usual. I've been wondering for a while why anyone would expect the UA to attempt to militarily seize Crimea. Potential escalation issues aside, it's bottlenecked to a Ukrainian attack from the West and bottlenecked for Russian supplies to the East. It's a perfect sink for Russian resources if Ukraine can cleave the front North of it.

Sink sure except that would unduly harm the civilian population of Crimea, being blockaded and turned into a sink and drain on Russia. End of the day, the destruction of the Russian military is to facilitate the liberation of Crimea and Donbas, and I have no doubt Ukraine is worried about Putin and/or Western reluctance at harming Russia in the long run for it to stay a true sink of Russian resources.

not surprising but still, some organizers of pro-Russian rallies in Germany are linked to the Russian government.

 

 

[FancyCat]

On that note, are there any deeper analysis of how hard it would be to take Crimea? I remain unconvinced that Crimea isn’t militarily infeasible for invasion, I mean historically, it’s been common for Crimea to fall. 

 

[Billy Ringo]

25 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

On that note, are there any deeper analysis of how hard it would be to take Crimea? I remain unconvinced that Crimea isn’t militarily infeasible for invasion, I mean historically, it’s been common for Crimea to fall. 

 

What does the general population of Crimea want?  Do they want to be governed by Russia? Ukraine?  Independent on their own? 

I'm not suggesting they just take a vote and let that stand, but---if Ukraine were to push into Crimea would the local population support or reject those advances?  That would seem to be a major factor with regards to Ukraine's abiity to take over Crimea.

[womble]

39 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Sink sure except that would unduly harm the civilian population of Crimea, being blockaded and turned into a sink and drain on Russia.

Just like Kherson? 

4 minutes ago, Billy Ringo said:

What does the general population of Crimea want?  Do they want to be governed by Russia? Ukraine?  Independent on their own? 

I get the impression that they just want to be left alone, for the most part. Though it probably depends on whether you include all the military settlers that have been planted since the Little Green Men took over. It might also be relevant to consider the wishes of those Ukrainians of whatever ethnic distinction who have been displaced since Putin took control. I'd imagine that the UKR leadership can find enough support among the various Crimean Constituencies to justify inflicting at least as much privation on the current civilian population in Crimea as they did at Kherson.

[FancyCat]

11 minutes ago, womble said:

Just like Kherson? 

I feel like Ukraine did not attempt to severely cut off Russian forces in Kherson from retreating. Not a lot of vehicles captured in Kherson. Was very orderly, the retreat. I wonder if consideration for the civilian population and the idea of it being better for the Russians to retreat rather than be forced into being cut off and making a last stand was a factor.

Assuming it’s all true and the photos really are of the hockey arena that was hit, chalk a 0 for Russia hitting a ammo dump.

 

 

[Vanir Ausf B]

2 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Sure. But given the assistance NATO is providing already, combined with modern day blockage techniques (sanctions/freezing money flow etc..), war has been declared on Russia de facto. Today, a Declaration of War has really become semantics. But with US HIMARS raining death on Russians, does it really matter? Politicians will often use the excuse of needing a Declaration of War to provide any assistance - not just troops. I think formal Declarations of War are a thing of the past. Warfare does not fit into a defined box anymore. If the money flow into Russian can be stopped without a blockade so be it. But it could be used as the final nail in the coffin. 

You can cut and paste the no-fly zone debate. Bottom line is that NATO is a collective action organization, i.e. a blockade would have to be agreed to by all member nations. There is no chance of that.

[womble]

18 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

I feel like Ukraine did not attempt to severely cut off Russian forces in Kherson from retreating.

I don't think UKR has enough seapower to interdict the retreat of Russian forces from Crimea, so "same as Kherson". Timescales might expand: it's a larger area, and who knows how long it would take to exfil the forces there via Sevastopol. Or maybe we haven't seen the full distance UKR is prepared to go to get rid of Russians. Maybe the game would be worth the candle.

[Zeleban]

 

Mashovets said that Russia is planning a second attack near Kemennaya in order to push the Ukrainian Armed Forces across the Zherebets River.

In the Kremennaya area, the enemy continues to try to "solve the unpleasant situation" that has developed for him northwest and southwest of the city. The situation escalated so much that two commanders of the CAA, the 20th and 41st, arrived at the command post of the 144th Motor Rifle Division and the 90th Tank Division, which include units and subunits of the Russian troops, which are now engaged in intense battles in the Kremennaya area.

 

The meaning of this whole situation lies in the fact that in the last weeks of last year, west of Kremennaya, the enemy tried to break through in the direction of the Liman, as a result of which, west of Kremennaya, between Chervonopopovka in the north and Dibrova in the south, a kind of “tongue” appeared in the direction of Yampolevka.

In turn, the Ukrainian troops continue to confidently hold the forest area and the nearest clearings to the west and northwest of Krasnopovka, while significantly pressing the enemy from the south, in the area of Dibrova.

Thus, it became clear that any military man, looking at a map with such a situation, would come to a completely obvious conclusion that the enemy either had to give up trying to break through towards the Liman and even to the line along the river. Stallion and withdraw your forward units to Kremennaya, or somehow drive Ukrainian troops out of the area northwest and west of Chervonopovka and the area between Dibrova and Seversky Donets.

Otherwise, sooner or later, the Ukrainian troops will cut off this "tongue" and cordon off to the west of Kremennaya a significant part of the tactical group of enemy troops operating in the Kremennaya area.

Somewhere in mid-December, this bright thought finally visited the heads of the leaders of the Group of Forces "West" and they, as befits the ardent supporters of the "unsurpassed Soviet military school", formulated an appropriate plan, developed a plan for how, where, when and by what forces and the means to achieve the desired.

Judging by what we have seen over the last three weeks of last year, the Russians' intention was as follows:

force the Armed Forces to withdraw from the area northwest of Krasnopopovka

go on a wide front to the line along the Zherebets River

completely occupy the forest area between Dibrova and Seversky Donets, at the same time knocking out Ukrainian troops from Belogorivka.

[Zeleban]

The method by which it was planned to achieve this also seemed quite logical.

First, by attacks in the direction of Ploschanka - Makeevka and Krasnopopovka - Nevskoye, push back the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the line BEHIND the Zherebets River in the Makeevka - Nevskoye section.

Then by attacks in the direction of Yampolevka and Terny, create conditions for operations along the river to the south (towards Torskoye and Zarechna).

And at the final stage - to strike from Dibrova in a southwestern direction and take Belogorovka.

The further task, obviously, was to "return to Liman." Which, in combination with simultaneous attacks on the section between Serebryanka and Soledar, should ultimately “somehow compensate” for the autumn failures with Izyum and Liman.

 

But these beautifully drawn plans collapsed during the first week of the offensive. It was not possible to take Makiivka, and in the Chervonopopovka area there was a general embarrassment, the Armed Forces of Ukraine not only held their positions, but also threw back enemy units almost to the very road P-66 Svatovo - Kremennaya, which generally put the situation in the Kremennaya area for the Russians in the position of "almost without pants".

The enemy also failed to break through, neither to Zarechnoye, nor to Belogorovka, and even to the Serebryanskoye forestry. The desired "line of defense along the river. Zherebe" also turned out to be a super-difficult task.

The offensive was carried out by forces of units of the 41st CAA specially deployed to this direction (74th and 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade - up to 4-5 BTGrs in total). Two tactical groups of these brigades were able to please their superiors only by the fact that, as a result of numerous attacks, they finally managed to completely push back the Armed Forces of Ukraine from all over Chervonopopovka (on the southwestern outskirts of which the foreard units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had reached a little earlier).

 

In turn, units of the 144th Motor Rifle Division from the 20th CAA, which were supposed to break through to Zarechnoye and Torskoye, and also go from the north to Serebryanka and thus contribute to the fall of Belogorovka, not only did not complete their tasks, but were forced to the south Dibrova retreat to Kremennaya (respectively, Belogorovka also survived).

The enemy command was not even helped by the "intensification of efforts" by bringing into battle separate companies of the 76th and 7th air assault divisions (neither near Dibrova, nor near Ploschanka). Moreover, gradually the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the south crept up to Dibrova itself and created quite real conditions for “cutting off the tongue”.

The situation began to escalate just a couple of days before the New Year. Even the scandal that its commander, Lieutenant General Sergei Ryzhkov, made to his subordinates in Rubizhnoye at the command post of one of the brigades of the 41st CAA, did not help. Throwing office supplies at subordinate colonels and numerous idiomatic sayings about them rather had the opposite effect.

 

Yesterday, as far as I understand, the Russian command in the direction of Kremennaya again decided to "try again." Time will tell what will come of this, but it seems to me that now the Russians have even less chances for a “breakthrough into the Liman” than in early December. But let them try...

[kevinkin]

1 hour ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

NATO is a collective action organization

That's true. Maybe just drop the name NATO and go it alone with willing partners. In 2023, Naval Blockage as a trigger for a formal declaration has far less meaning for me. In the end a blockade  might save lives all around. We want to cripple the Russian economy, a blockade would be a last resort tool if they don't stop fighting. 

Edited January 3, 2023 by kevinkin

[Yet]

3 hours ago, FancyCat said:

On that note, are there any deeper analysis of how hard it would be to take Crimea? I remain unconvinced that Crimea isn’t militarily infeasible for invasion, I mean historically, it’s been common for Crimea to fall. 

 

Im sure the Capt can do this better but heh. I'll give my view.

there were many sources saying that the local pro Ukranian Crimeans:

- fled Crimea

- were sent to live their lives somewhere deep in Russia

- were sent to the front 

-is minority and severely supressed

These activities dont need 21st century adaptation, so judging by the history I trust RU still posesses the qualities not to **** this up. Therefore i dont expect Ukr can count on much support from a broad, strong pro Ukr population in Crimea. 

Next to that Ukr will need a combined attack to be successful taking Crimea. Perekop is the most logical target, but very easy defendable and expected. Other ways to get troops in are by riverboats/hoovercrofts in the north, by maritime assault in the west, or by paratroopers.  For that to be succesfull you need to OR accept very heavy losses, or need to have corroded the RU navy to nonexisting or to have aircontrol. Therefore its not impossible to take Crimea, but the question is how long it takes to wind the situation in such a state that the losses are acceptable to make it feasable. 

 

 

Edited January 3, 2023 by Yet

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think there is a coherent argument that the Russian military is in collapse, the rate of that collapse is really the outstanding question. 

Yup!  I've been saying this since March   As you outlined, there are many forms of collapse.  People tend to focus on the most dramatic type, which is what I refer to as catastrophic collapse.  We have not seen that yet in this war, but as I've argued many times they were within a hair's width of it at least 3 times so far.  If they had tried to hold out a few days or weeks more around Kyiv, Kharkiv (the first counter offensive), or Kharkiv we would have seen catastrophic collapse for sure.  I've also argued that Kharkiv (second time) was more of the Russians being overrun rather than collapse, but one can argue it was a collapse.

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Personally I see collapse a "a failure to be able to sustain option spaces". 

That works for me, but I also see it as "a steady, systematic reduction of military options and past achievements".  If one plotted graphs of Russian military resources, unit quality, officers, training times, age of equipment, territory held, ammunition stocks, aircraft, naval activities, etc. all of these lines would be decidedly downward trending since Spring of 2022 (at the very least).

There is nothing, I mean absolutely nothing, that would show anything other than a steep decline.  Even the missile terror strikes on Ukrainian civilians, when viewed as a campaign to wipe out Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, is also on the decline.  At the beginning of the war Russia was leveling entire Ukrainian villages and cities all over the place, now it is limited to destroying a small portion of the Donbas (centered around Bakhmut) and occasional locations behind the front.

If you look at Ukraine in a similar way, all their plotted lines are going up (i.e. getting better).  Some not as steeply as others, but upward trend means collapse isn't happening.

Steve

[Kinophile]

59 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

That's true. Maybe just drop the name NATO and go it alone with willing partners. In 2023, Naval Blockage as a trigger for a formal declaration has far less meaning for me. In the end a blockade  might save lives all around. We want to cripple the Russian economy, a blockade would be a last resort tool if they don't stop fighting. 

Who's "we" in this particular reality? How do you enforce a Naval blockade in the Black Sea?  How do you slip through the Montreux Convention?  Whose ships do the stopping and boarding? Who thinks the Black Sea Fleet will agree for one hot second to allow NATO vessels to stop them, to fire shots across Russian bows? Do you really think a Russian frigate is not going to fire back? What about the BSF submarines,  their naval ace-in-the-hole via a vis any potential adversary? How do you blockade them?

So who's ship's will do the sinking, and be sunk? The US? So, War then. Britain? War. EU? War. Turkey? ROFL. 

All it would do is play exactly and perfectly in Putin's bull**** about "fighting NATO, not Ukraine". He'd have a supposedly existental external threat,  that was real this time and I'm pretty sure would gather far more active national support than his nasty little jaunt into Ukraine. No more molotovs at recruitment centers, for one thing. 

And bye-bye any chance of this war ending in 2023.

Yer 'avin a laff, guv' nor! 

Edited January 3, 2023 by Kinophile

[sburke]

Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov urges Russians not to fear death, claiming life is "highly overrated" (yahoo.com)

 

Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov has called on Russians not to be afraid of death, saying that "life is highly overrated" and death is inevitable anyway.

Source: Solovyov on his programme on Rossiya 1 [a Russian state-owned television channel – ed.]

Quote: "Life is highly overrated. Why fear what is inevitable? Especially when we’re going to heaven. Death is the end of one earthly path and the beginning of another. But to fear it, and let it influence your decisions..."

Details: The guests on the TV show supported Solovyov, saying that previously Russians had lived from day to day, but now they have an "intangible dream, a higher goal".

He is almost right - Life in Russia is highly overrated.

[Hapless]

Re: Naval Blockade of Russia

What are they importing by sea that isn't already sanctioned? Maybe oil etc from Venezeula, but they've got their own right?

I'd imagine supplies from Iran, China, North Korea and the other CIS members are much more important and they're not coming on ships.

[Zeleban]

35 minutes ago, Yet said:

Perekop is the most logical target, but very easy defendable and expected.

As far as I remember from history, the invasion of the Crimea through Perekop always ended in success in 1736, 1771, 1917, 1941, 2022. In 1941, Manstein broke through the defenses of the Red Army at the dig without numerical superiority, while not experiencing any difficulties here. The Russians also did not experience any difficulties here 2022. Defensive lines on a narrow isthmus are a very compact and convenient target for artillery. 

The troops on the peninsula are trapped under the condition of the destruction of the Crimean bridge. This was Manstein's main advantage - the lack of a normal supply for the Soviets

Edited January 3, 2023 by Zeleban

[Lethaface]

1 hour ago, kevinkin said:

That's true. Maybe just drop the name NATO and go it alone with willing partners. In 2023, Naval Blockage as a trigger for a formal declaration has far less meaning for me. In the end a blockade  might save lives all around. We want to cripple the Russian economy, a blockade would be a last resort tool if they don't stop fighting. 

so how are you going to enforce the blockade?

[kevinkin]

55 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Who's "we" in this particular reality? How do you enforce a Naval blockade in the Black Sea?  How do you slip through the Montreux Convention? 

Russian ships would have to go through a choke point into the Mediterranean. The reason why a navy is constructed is for sea control in the first place. Again, a blockade is a  last resort to put added pressure on Russia and dry up their cash flow as much as possible. If a blockade does not phase Russia, then they will not fight to break it. I fear this war will never end and normalcy will never return to Ukraine unless Russia's capacity and will to lob buzz bombs is ended. Closely monitoring all Russian imports and exports would help enforce a strict ceasefire if one ever comes about. Let's not kid ourselves. The US and the West is at war with Russia. Would a blockade instigate a WMD attack? If not, there really is no downside. Those accepting Russian energy or other favors are becoming more and more complicit with Ukraine's hardships. Enough is enough already. 

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, FancyCat said:

On that note, are there any deeper analysis of how hard it would be to take Crimea? I remain unconvinced that Crimea isn’t militarily infeasible for invasion, I mean historically, it’s been common for Crimea to fall. 

 

Well that is an interesting question.  If we put the whole “will Crimea see Ukrainian occupation or liberation.?” question to the side, Crimea on the map looks like a tough nut to crack without full sea control.  It has a pretty narrow corridor in and around Armiansk, about 10kms across.  And then the big bridge on the other side, and a lot of water around it.  Not the easiest conventional problem set.

The staff college approach would be to 1) establish air control, 2) establish sea control and 3) try a multi-prong air, land and sea assault that can be mutually supported but far enough apart to keep the RA hopping.  The UA does not have the ability to do any of this…unless we totally missed a memo.

Pre-conditions would have to be to isolate the region by taking out that big bridge and hitting as much that flies and floats as possible.  So C4ISR superiority and long range Air and Maritime strike - a SOF/partisan network in Crimea would also be a really good idea.  You then normally hit internal transportation infra, comms and utilities but that will depend on how much capacity the UA has and just how badly they are willing to damage the place.  

The good news here is that the UA can establish the pre-conditions but they are going to have to rethink the follow through.  Here corrosive warfare may once again shine.  Hitting the RA logistics and C4ISR in Crimea while cutting the region off may erode the RA forces there into retreat.  Much like Kherson push and squeeze em until they just leave or collapse trying to hold on.

There is no viable option single blunt force single axis assault on that 10km corridor in the short term.  The RA will have mined the crap out of it and it forces the UA to highly concentrate which will mean brutal losses to artillery.  So you have to kill all the guns and ammo, cut off food and supplies to the troops dug in and then try pulse-pushing, with healthy dashes of amphib ops in those wetlands to crack the thing.  Nothing about it will be fast or easy.

If I were on the staff I would recommend, isolate, siege and a campaign of precision strike to be honest.  Let the HIMARs do the work, but you are going to need a lot of them.  Bottle up the place and shoot fish in the barrel until they tap out.  If the UA wants to take real estate Donbas is the better option in the shorter term.

Last point.  If this war does do WMDs, my guess it will be on that corridor in northern Crimea.  Not saying it will, but that is almost tailor made for WMD strikes to blunt a UA attack.  It would be on helluva escalation as we have discussed but that is the place to draw the final Putin line if there is one.  If Russia holds back there then the entire WMD deterrence/threat falls apart until one gets to the Russian border. 

I guess it will come down to just how much the Crimea is worth to Ukraine. They do not need it to win this war, Russia may fall apart by the time they get there regardless.  But if the Russians dig in, it is going to be a slog.

[kevinkin]

Can I add the following:

that Crimea must be threatened if Ukraine and the West make a deal with Russia that is worth making. Peace emerges not necessarily because both parties are satisfied territorially – in this case Russian and Ukrainian territorial, military, and diplomatic objectives are in direct contradiction – but because the alternative to fighting for one of the combatants is far worse than the cost of surrender. Barring an active attempt to overthrow Putin, an attempt that the United States and its allies are almost certain not to make, the only way to pressure the Russian regime is to hammer its political center of gravity, Crimea, the physical embodiment of the return of Russian greatness that Putin has leveraged to maintain power since 2014.

I often don't agree with the writer at all. But this passage does represent one possible way forward. That said, Crimea defensible if the Russian grunt is willing to die for it. The later is debatable. I would also support a siege until the door is easily kicked in. Many think the path to a long lasting peace for Ukraine has to go through Crimea at some point. 

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/01/03/winter_cold_where_the_war_is_today_873342.html

[Kinophile]

23 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Russian ships would have to go through a choke point into the Mediterranean. The reason why a navy is constructed is for sea control in the first place. Again, a blockade is a  last resort to put added pressure on Russia and dry up their cash flow as much as possible. If a blockade does not phase Russia, then they will not fight to break it. I fear this war will never end and normalcy will never return to Ukraine unless Russia's capacity and will to lob buzz bombs is ended. Closely monitoring all Russian imports and exports would help enforce a strict ceasefire if one ever comes about. Let's not kid ourselves. The US and the West is at war with Russia. Would a blockade instigate a WMD attack? If not, there really is no downside. Those accepting Russian energy or other favors are becoming more and more complicit with Ukraine's hardships. Enough is enough already. 

An economic, militarily enforced blockade on the largest country in the world? For how long?

Sanctions already blockade by proxy, attempting to impose a cut-off at source, using domestic legal threats via cheap & infinite Lawyers rather than at the destination ports, via expensive and limited Warships. Sure, closely monitoring would work -  if the Russians allow it, which they won't. If you begin stopping Russian trade ships with Western warships in the Black Sea,  Baltic, Artic and,  on the other side of the world, the northern Pacific (just to remind ourselves of the scale of the problem) then someone will press the wrong red button real quick, and then whole keyboards of red buttons will start getting mashed. 

The US and West are not at war. We're in a geopolitical struggle for influence and propaganda narratives, but last I saw on MSM there were no NATO tanks plinking Russian mobiks in Poland. 

Russia doesn't need a nuke to make a naval blockade rapidly unfeasible. It has an entire navy in the BSF,  it has very long range Islanders etc. I'm not saying it would fight very well or effectively but it could easily make any Western naval force very uncomfortable for very little gain on our part.