How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Offshoot]

A short article on the defence of Sumy by largely ad hoc citizen groups at the start of the war. Zelenskiy called Sumy a bone in the throat of the Russians in his New Year speech.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/02/how-sumy-residents-kept-russian-forces-out-of-their-city

[kevinkin]

There have been major concerns about the mobilized conscripts becoming a bigger liability in many ways than an advantage. This may end up being glaring proof of such sentiments.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-troop-loss-catastrophe-in-donetsk-outrages-russias-military-bloggers

[The_Capt]

26 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

There have been major concerns about the mobilized conscripts becoming a bigger liability in many ways than an advantage. This may end up being glaring proof of such sentiments.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-troop-loss-catastrophe-in-donetsk-outrages-russias-military-bloggers

I think we discussed this at length back last Fall during the “dreaded” Russian mobilization.  This is not 1941, you cannot simply put a rifle into someone’s hand and expect them to be able to fight effectively on the modern battlefield.  

Back in 1941-42 how many of those Russian conscripts were farm kids?  How many are coming from urban centres today?  I am willing to bet most of the urban conscripts do not even know how to survive under field conditions let alone fight in them.

Russia can mobilize all it wants but it is going to make things worse for them not better.  Only a total amateur would think that more poorly trained and equipped - and apparently concentrated, human mass is a good thing in this war.

[Kinophile]

5 hours ago, Offshoot said:

A short article on the defence of Sumy by largely ad hoc citizen groups at the start of the war. Zelenskiy called Sumy a bone in the throat of the Russians in his New Year speech.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/02/how-sumy-residents-kept-russian-forces-out-of-their-city

The defence forces might have felt it was chaotic but it was lead by someone, some small tight group of people. Even if your forces are inexperienced, so long as theyre in the right place at the right time then you maximise their effectiveness (true with regular troops of course). Without western ISR but very detailed and timely local ISR the coordinating group was able to receive, digest and prioritize locations at speed, making them able to be where they should be and to shift away when needed. They also struck back and hit the weakest link of the Ivan, the fuel trucks.

Very smart work, for a "civilian" force. But that HQ group must have had people with experience from 2014 onwards, no? Maybe not the top leaders but you could not mount an effective defense (with counter attacks) without some military/battle knowledge in the group.

If so, then it underscores that additional data point against the success of the invasion - while Russians were doing stupid scripted "maneuvers" for show, a percentage of the Ukrainian population was getting shelled, shot at and veteranized on the Donbass front. Not a large percentage but time and again a margin that existed and was often enough and, crucially, was spread throughout the entire population and by inference its geographic extant. So wherever the Feb 24th invasion force struck there were bound to be people with battle experience, motivation and discipline to organize, resist and fight back.

By contrast the D/LNR veterans were concentrated in the Donbass and stayed there - their experience was thus not disseminated throughout the Russian forces. The RUS MoD doesn't seem to have been remotely interested in any lessons learned and, post-ceasefire, seems to have deliberately kept its personnel back from the front lines. The rebel forces were structured similarly but kept separate and not properly integrated into the AFRF until the invasion started, and then just as cannon fodder. Their knowledge of drones and how to use them was ignored for at least two months. I think It was May that we heard of DLNR instructors training Russian forces on the use of Mavics? 

@Zeleban or @Haiduk do you know more of this episode? Do we know who lead the fight and where they are now?

Edited January 3, 2023 by Kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I think we discussed this at length back last Fall during the “dreaded” Russian mobilization.  This is not 1941, you cannot simply put a rifle into someone’s hand and expect them to be able to fight effectively on the modern battlefield.  

That and back in 1941 there was no Internet  

Actually, in some sections of the front in 1941 there's more similar to the Russians in the Donbas now than not.  Reading about those early war battles against the Red Army often sent in masses of barely trained, sometimes barely armed, cannon fodder without combined arms acting under leadership that was more concerned about pleasing the glorious leader than producing real results.  The Germans dutifully massacred them, but not without cost to momentum and a steady erosion of fighting strength.

It really wasn't until the winter set in that the Soviets started to really degrade German forces, in part because Germany was so ill prepared for the harsh winter.  If winter had been mild like this one I don't know that the Soviets would have inflicted the hundreds of thousands of casualties on the Germans that they did.

Anyway, my point here is the same one we've been saying over and over again... Russia is reduced to fighting this war like the early phase of the Great Patriotic War. 

Steve

 

[Kinophile]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

That and back in 1941 there was no Internet  

Yup, put hundreds of ill-disciplined conscripts in one place and at least tens of them are going to have active phones. Any EMS surveillance unit will immediately spot the concentration and relay it. The beauty of HIMARS is that they can swiftly change intended targets and react to the opportunity.

 

Edited January 3, 2023 by Kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Yup, put hundreds of ill-disciplined conscripts in one place and at least tens of them are going to have active phones. Any EMS surveillance unit will immediately spot the concentration and relay it. The beauty of HIMARS is that they can swiftly change intended targets and react to the opportunity.

 

I meant that in 1941 the Germans slaughtered Russian troops in vastly larger numbers in one place at one time, but there was no uproar over it because nobody knew it happened.  Cripes, even the neighboring unit probably didn't know.  The Red Army was such a mess it's amazing it managed to hang on long enough to become a genuinely competent force.

But your point is also fun to consider, provided it isn't Ukrainian recruits doing it near Russian EW detectors.

Steve

[Kinophile]

31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

But your point is also fun to consider, provided it isn't Ukrainian recruits doing it near Russian EW detectors.

Steve

I believe they did during 2014, there's several accounts of RUS arty hitting UKR units based off cellular use.

The difference of course is that UKR learned from their mistakes, making cellular use and social media foot-printing deeply anathema in the defense forces. By contrast the Ivan assumed in arrogance that the same danger would never affect them, didn't absorb the reverse lesson for far too long when it did start hitting them and lacked the lower-rank discipline to maintain control.

And then they added 200,000 mobiks with even worse discipline, motivation and NCO quality.

Expect repeats, I'd say.

 

Edited January 3, 2023 by Kinophile

[kevinkin]

Another issue with these conscripts (not to belabor the point) is they weigh down the command structure so that even good enough leaders become baby sitters. Their operational/tactical thinking is stuck with supplying basic needs: water, food and shelter(that goes boom) and ammo (that goes boom in the wrong place). Russian culture where you are not a man if you can't endure hardship is a poison under these circumstances. Soon Russian women will out number men to such and extent that new equipment won't matter. 

[Battlefront.com]

20 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I believe they did during 2014, there's several accounts of RUS arty hitting UKR units based off cellular use.

Yup.  The infamous destruction of a battalion of 72nd Mech (IIRC) as it was about to cut off the main border crossing.  The first documented use of Russian artillery from its own soil.  Someone from the unit called into a live Ukrainian TV channel as it was happening and pleading for help.  The pictures of what was left of the battalion were awful.  All deployed out in open fields as if they were going on parade the next day.

Steve

[Offshoot]

47 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I believe they did during 2014, there's several accounts of RUS arty hitting UKR units based off cellular use.

The difference of course is that UKR learned from their mistakes, making cellular use and social media foot-printing deeply anathema in the defense forces.

 

Except it also possibly caused the missile strike on the foreign volunteer barracks in March. I read a personal account of a more experienced volunteer who was so appalled at what was happening there that he left before the strike.

[Kinophile]

34 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Y14up.  The infamous destruction of a battalion of 72nd Mech (IIRC) as it was about to cut off the main border crossing.  The first documented use of Russian artillery from its own soil.  Someone from the unit called into a live Ukrainian TV channel as it was happening and pleading for help.  The pictures of what was left of the battalion were awful.  All deployed out in open fields as if they were going on parade the next day.

Steve

Was that hit due to "loose lips" on the UKR side, though? IIRC it was more that they were observed going into position (pretty hard to miss them) but then, as you note, not emplacing, spreading out or anything to minimize damage from potential fires.

So was it more tactical opportunism by Russia, than in-battle EMS surveillance with stand-by, on-call fire support? I think it was later, with the proper invasion by Russian forces with EMS supporting units that lead to hits on undisciplined UKR units?

11 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

Except it also possibly caused the missile strike on the foreign volunteer barracks in March. I read a personal account of a more experienced volunteer who was so appalled at what was happening there that he left before the strike.

I read that too. Makes sense, esp as the Foreign volunteers seemed to get the C-string leadership at the start (naturally - why send your best & second-best command to the rear during an invasion?).

Plus, it proves the point - the UKR regular forces had learned and enacted the lesson: GTFO your phone when on or near the line.

Also, as we all saw, the TD forces were initially more lax with their digital discipline at the start of the 2023 invasion. Thankfully that seems to have tightened up.

 

Edited January 3, 2023 by Kinophile

[Zeleban]

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

The defence forces might have felt it was chaotic but it was lead by someone, some small tight group of people. Even if your forces are inexperienced, so long as theyre in the right place at the right time then you maximise their effectiveness (true with regular troops of course). Without western ISR but very detailed and timely local ISR the coordinating group was able to receive, digest and prioritize locations at speed, making them able to be where they should be and to shift away when needed. They also struck back and hit the weakest link of the Ivan, the fuel trucks.

Very smart work, for a "civilian" force. But that HQ group must have had people with experience from 2014 onwards, no? Maybe not the top leaders but you could not mount an effective defense (with counter attacks) without some military/battle knowledge in the group.

If so, then it underscores that additional data point against the success of the invasion - while Russians were doing stupid scripted "maneuvers" for show, a percentage of the Ukrainian population was getting shelled, shot at and veteranized on the Donbass front. Not a large percentage but time and again a margin that existed and was often enough and, crucially, was spread throughout the entire population and by inference its geographic extant. So wherever the Feb 24th invasion force struck there were bound to be people with battle experience, motivation and discipline to organize, resist and fight back.

By contrast the D/LNR veterans were concentrated in the Donbass and stayed there - their experience was thus not disseminated throughout the Russian forces. The RUS MoD doesn't seem to have been remotely interested in any lessons learned and, post-ceasefire, seems to have deliberately kept its personnel back from the front lines. The rebel forces were structured similarly but kept separate and not properly integrated into the AFRF until the invasion started, and then just as cannon fodder. Their knowledge of drones and how to use them was ignored for at least two months. I think It was May that we heard of DLNR instructors training Russian forces on the use of Mavics? 

@Zeleban or @Haiduk do you know more of this episode? Do we know who lead the fight and where they are now?

At the very beginning of the war, former ATO participants were primarily taken into the territorial defense. When I tried to get there, they first of all asked me if I had combat experience, when they found out that I didn’t, they said that people with combat experience were needed now and that people without experience could only count on auxiliary positions in the rear without weapons (dig trenches , transport the wounded, deal with logistics).

When I was in hiding in Irpin, I met many men who were also not taken by the territorial defense due to lack of combat experience.

in addition, in the street battles for Irpen, the territorial defense acted in small groups, reinforcing units of the army and police special forces - these are guys who are specially trained for operations in the city.

 

I think that the territorial defense of Sumy is now located near the border with Russia and covers the border from a possible Russian invasion from the Kursk region

[Zeleban]

For example, here is what the TD fighters of the Chernihiv region are doing on the border with Belarus (unfortunately, the video has no subtitles)

[LongLeftFlank]

14 hours ago, Haiduk said:

 

 

An elegant weapon for a more civilised age?

[pintere]

12 hours ago, Offshoot said:

A short article on the defence of Sumy by largely ad hoc citizen groups at the start of the war. Zelenskiy called Sumy a bone in the throat of the Russians in his New Year speech.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/02/how-sumy-residents-kept-russian-forces-out-of-their-city

One thing that was fascinating to read was how the Russians got spooked by the devastating outcome of their first attempt to enter the city and then just settled into siege mode after that, even though they were just up against basically armed civilians that could’ve probably been overwhelmed with a determined effort.

In Combat Mission there’ve been a number of scenarios I’ve played where I gave up a scenario due to high losses, only to find afterwards that the enemy defence was far weaker than expected and probably ready to fold if the attack had been pressed! 

So here we have a great real-life example of how aggressive probing really is key for a competent army in order to take advantage of situations that might otherwise have been passed up.

[Offshoot]

36 minutes ago, pintere said:

One thing that was fascinating to read was how the Russians got spooked by the devastating outcome of their first attempt to enter the city and then just settled into siege mode after that, even though they were just up against basically armed civilians that could’ve probably been overwhelmed with a determined effort.

In Combat Mission there’ve been a number of scenarios I’ve played where I gave up a scenario due to high losses, only to find afterwards that the enemy defence was far weaker than expected and probably ready to fold if the attack had been pressed! 

So here we have a great real-life example of how aggressive probing really is key for a competent army in order to take advantage of situations that might otherwise have been passed up.

I assume the Russian forces were also resigned to letting it be and bypassing Sumy because their focus at the time was on reaching Kyiv as fast as possible. It would be interesting to know what impact Sumy had on stalling the push on Kyiv.

Edited January 3, 2023 by Offshoot

[Holien]

The potential power of a few to hurt the many in Ukraine? 

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-64145106

Let the games begin. 

Let's hope Ukraine can push Russia back and force them to give up soon. 

However,  we have talked about how the war won't end until Ukraine says so but even if Russia is pushed back to their own borders they could continue to launch attacks on Ukraine. 

[kevinkin]

13 minutes ago, Holien said:

but even if Russia is pushed back to their own borders they could continue to launch attacks on Ukraine. 

That is one outcome for sure. But, I would hope the west could not tolerate continued buzz bomb attacks and give Ukraine the means to stop them. Perhaps oil eating nations like India would have to say enough is enough. Can I suggest a NATO naval blockade against a severely weakened Russia would be possible under those circumstances? 

[paxromana]

7 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

That is one outcome for sure. But, I would hope the west could not tolerate continued buzz bomb attacks and give Ukraine the means to stop them. Perhaps oil eating nations like India would have to say enough is enough. Can I suggest a NATO naval blockade against a severely weakened Russia would be possible under those circumstances? 

A formal Blockade requires a Declaration of War ... 

Yeah, I know, Cuban Missile Crisis and all that ... but do you really want to run that sort of risk against someone who has nothing to lose and is certainly some sort of dangerous sociopath? Kruschev, at least, and his Politburo, seemed to have been sane,

Edited January 3, 2023 by paxromana

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Was that hit due to "loose lips" on the UKR side, though?

At the time it was said that Russia triangulated the cellphones.  Which would be exceptionally easy to do given they were pinging off of Russian cell towers.

Steve

[FancyCat]

 

[billbindc]

“For the sake of the nation’s life, it was necessary to restore the army’s will to die.”

Alexander Kerensky on the June Offensive

Strelkov today: 

 

 

[Kinophile]

59 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

At the time it was said that Russia triangulated the cellphones.  Which would be exceptionally easy to do given they were pinging off of Russian cell towers.

Steve

Ah yes,  thank you 

[The_Capt]

30 minutes ago, billbindc said:

“For the sake of the nation’s life, it was necessary to restore the army’s will to die.”

Alexander Kerensky on the June Offensive

Strelkov today: 

 

 

“No dumb bastard ever won a war by going out and dying for his country. He won it by making some other dumb bastard die for his country."