How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I could probably write a book:

Forcing function - The US and west have been the the worlds hyperpower for at least 30 years.  Any conventional matchups come with so many caveats that only non-state networks have really been dumb enough to take them on in the CT/VEO space.  In fact the last time a nation state fell out of line the Gulf War happened and any great power outside of the US/western sphere took note.  So a revisionist state was trapped between the devil of nuclear warfare they could not win, and the deep blue see of being vastly overpowered in the conventional space.

Our History.  We understood our power early.  While interventions and CT work kept us busy in reality the west has not faced an existential state-based threat since the fall of the USSR.  As such, we let things slide in the famous "peace dividend days".  Everyone was counting mothballed tanks and ships, but we also mothballed the NS architecture capable of waging global scale political warfare.  Sure we kept intelligence and the like but funding went way down as we all figured "well who would mess with us".  It got a major boost after 9/11 but it was built to hunt humans in and amongst other humans, not deal with larger scale nation states.  So our ability to actually conduct counter-subversive and pre-emptive political warfare campaigns has atrophied over the last three decades.

Our reality.  Unlike autocratic societies, we lay our internal social divisions and friction-points out for everyone to see, we celebrate and fund them.  Further we have laws that enshrine freedoms and an open society based on the value of each and every citizen.  We doubled down on all of that after the Cold War ended.  What makes our nations strong a great are also some of our biggest vulnerabilities in this arena - not advocating for anything different here, this is just our reality.  Free press, free enterprise, free academia and freedoms "from and to" are what makes us the most powerful versions of humanity that ever existed; also leaves us very open to asymmetric strategies.

Their reality.  The revisionist power states, like China and Russia, were largely left out, or at least feel like they were left out of the re-writing of the global order.  They understand where they stand in the pecking order, and while it took awhile, they figured out that they 1) did not like it, and 2) had to start moving the needle to change it.  Direct confrontation with the west was impossible, so they went sideways.  They all have long histories in the subversive space, hell one could argue the Chinese invented it.  So they renewed old doctrines that leveraged energy resident within our systems to work for them - classic reflexive control.  This was done with long above-water campaigns of influence as they picked up steam.  Cyber and information space meant that societies became connected, but they also became "seeable" in extremely high resolution.  Like the invention of the microscope, this opened up new observable phenomenon, which we could not see in the Cold War.  States and corporations - often overlapping - went to town on this.  They collected data and developed theories of how humanity worked at micro-social scales that did not exists 30 years ago.  They could map those spaces and that could gauge cause and effect.  We used to sell stuff and collect "likes and subscribes", they, the other lost powers, used it to create "options".  Ones that are very hard to attribute and are aimed at what is both our greatest strengths and vulnerabilities - our open society.  These options were not legal acts of war, responses lay outside of our legalities and policies, and they were designed to hit us where they knew we would never even be able to agree at what happened - classic negative and null decision space.

Russia out front.  Russia has a very long history of playing these games and decided to flex first.  China has always been quietly waiting and watching in the background - stealing IP, buying off politicians and power brokers, colleting information and re-drawing maps.  Russia is not that nuanced, never has been really.  They were far more blunt and began act on their new theories - Gerasimov Doctrine/Russian Hybrid Warfare - whatever.  It was an ability to exercise strategic options outside of what we understood as war or peace.  Russia tried things out in Georgia and Chechnya - learned some hard lessons and then went prime time in 2014 in Ukraine.  No big conventional war, they just undecided Donbass and Crimea, and then made it too hard for us to really decide anything about it.  They pulled off wins in Syria and Africa (that no one really noticed) and kept getting free lunches while we in the west sat back and scratched our heads "how did they do that?"  Seriously, as I have told some senior people, "I am tired of admiring the other team".  China was doing all the same stuff, just much more nuanced and quietly - they called it unrestricted warfare/systems warfare but it basically amounts to the same thing; however, China appears much more adept at leveraging the rules and laws of the international order, while at the same time playing outside of them.

Unprepared and paralysis.  We really were in a kind of strategic shock in the west.  Both Russia and China had worked hard to make sure that they played out internal divisions and that groups in our own societies became indirectly invested (ignorantly in some cases) in their interests.  Our national security and defence architecture was too busy chasing "snakes" and was dislocated in dealing with state-based threats.  In many cases we had no policy or legal frameworks for what these new threat theories could do, and we sure as hell did not have counters/pushbacks.  So while we were basically strategically dislocated both Russia and China made great gains while we dithered and argued with each other - and I do not mean solely in the US.  North America, Europe and Pacific partners, all yelling and divided.  NATO was on the ropes, many nations had grown tired of GWOT, and we saw (are seeing) the rise of nationalism and isolationism.

Russia poops the bed - and modern war is in the wind.  For reasons I still do not understand Russia decides to drop its A-Game and fall back on an open conventional military power approach in Ukraine.  I have never heard a good reason why this is, and why they took this risk but here we are.  So China is sitting back watching, again as all this unfolds and what does it see?  Well first thing is that modern conventional warfare is upside down.  By our old metrics/doctrine Ukraine should have lost this, even in the face of Russian crappiness.  The war was going to be longer and grinding but eventually Ukraine would fold under the weight of a military machine that was an order of magnitude larger by some metrics. And then "boop"!  So what the hell happened? - well personally I think the 3rd offset (out of favor now) actually came into it age (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offset_strategy) in doing so it is re-writing conventional war as we know it.  Russia is running into a brick wall but China is watching and noting it. China was feeling strong, by old metrics it was catching up and rising to challenge the West - particularly when one considers our aversion to sacrifice.  Unless China is a complete idiot, and nothing I have seen suggests they are, then this war completely blew up their pre-war estimates.  Modern warfare just got insanely more lethal and expensive - harder not easier.  And once again western warfare looks like it leaped ahead, this was not the plan.

So What?  Well, despite all the sabre rattling with China over Taiwan, I suspect the Chinese are conducting a serious re-think (they should be).  Everyone in the bar is armed and sizing each other out.  A big guy draped with guns and ammo, looking like Rambo, picked a fight with a little guy who just punched Rambo's teeth in with his own ammo belts. A conventional conflict with China just got less likely, if China has been paying attention and I suspect they have.  The metrics by which China was gauging things just shifted and they are not going to pull "a Russia" blindly.

So, So what?  Well China is likely going to do a few things 1) re-set its conventional military power metrics, likely better than we will - we are going to bask in "well there you go, we win!", 2) Keep to its A-game longer and double down and what has been working - it saw what happened to Russia.  We on the other hand are likely to go back to arguing and losing the bubble, making us even more vulnerable.  That is the biggest unknown and question "how do we re-gain internal integrity in our systems, without breaking them ourselves?"  All the while China and very likely what is left of Russia will work in helping us to break us.  We are likely to see a lot more proxy actions done this way because invading is a dumb idea.  China has a decades head start on us, so we face major challenges getting better in this space - it is the one area that China's options are expanding and ours remain stagnant. 

Cold War, Hot Peace, Tepid Status Quo, it all really ends the same; more political warfare happening where the terrain favours the opponent - we need to get over ourselves and agree that in this area we are all of one mind: create equilibrium and expand options, while compressing our opponents.  And this is not all on the US, which has its own problems, we have seen pressures and threats here in Canada in ways that we do not have any response to other than "togetherness and resilience".  Every western country has a micro-social space, and it is largely lying wide open to direct influence, which in a democracy is incredibly powerful and dangerous.  I strongly suspect that this war will be a watershed moment for whatever comes next - likely a Coldish War but one where the lines are far more blurry and a significant continuing of the trend of the re-emergence of political warfare as a primary theater in pursuing national interests while blunting an opponents.     

Finally, my instincts tell me, "don't think 1960", they are telling me "think 1900".  There are a lot of similarities between now and pre WWI with respect to great power competition/conflict.  Accept now we have nukes and cyberspace - and the history of WWI to learn from.  Regardless, we need to put win this war, put Russia back in a box and then everyone sit down and have  a serious conversation on how we let this happen and how we need to close the spaces between us or someone is going to use that: one second to midnight at a time.

Run for parliament, or write a book. Better yet run for Parliament AND write a book. Not joking, yes I know you would rather help shape the future of Combat Mission in a quiet retirement. 

[A Canadian Cat]

15 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I could probably write a book:

Do it. I would read it.

[Lethaface]

On 9/14/2022 at 10:24 PM, Huba said:

Soo, more on German tanks. The lady seems to be doing a great work indeed:

So about "joint decision on MBTs", perhaps my idea of all Leopard 2 operators chipping in a battalion or so wasn't that crazy? I don't see how else would that work, unless they just want a pat on the back  

Your idea is not crazy at all imo (although a battalion per pax is perhaps a bit high on expectation).

Nobody has delivered Abrams/Leo2/Leclerc/K2/etc kind of tanks. Also many countries won't have much of them at all (for example our country, we lease 1 battalion although we had a few hundred of them one/two decades ago) and stripping your own army of the few barely operational stuff they have is... not going well with the army. Only a naïve fool would expect Germany to take the first step in delivering modern Kampf Panzer to Ukraine to fight against Russia. Not now anyway, Germany just came to grips with the new world reality / is still in the process (like many other countries, in various ways). 

But if all countries 'chip in' in some way or form I don't see Germany having a big problem to carry their weight. Between all the political stuff I think Germany has done at least the same as the average country supporting Ukraine, even from a relative perspective. 

At the same time, as has been discussed here since the beginning, don't get too much romantic thoughts about hundreds of Leo2's in service at the front in large numbers on operational scale any time soon after sending them. And keeping them operational is another thing.
A few dozen is probably more doable but tanks don't have the same 'force multipliers' as HIMARS or modern 155mm with precision munitions have. 

Anyway that's no reason to do nothing imo, so I like the idea of for example all nations somehow chipping in to provide Ukraine with a modern MBT capability. Although I expect there will already be things in motion, but it is in most countries interest to keep such things on the low. 

Edited September 15, 2022 by Lethaface

[poesel]

45 minutes ago, dan/california said:

There is also a secondary railway line running through Troitske from Voronezh to Luhansk. Useful to have, or at least to deny to the Russians.

[FancyCat]

24 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

Your idea is not crazy at all imo (although a battalion per pax is perhaps a bit high on expectation).

Nobody has delivered Abrams/Leo2/Leclerc/K2/etc kind of tanks. Also many countries won't have much of them at all (for example our country, we lease 1 battalion although we had a few hundred of them one/two decades ago) and stripping your own army of the few barely operational stuff they have is... not going well with the army. Only a naïve fool would expect Germany to take the first step in delivering modern Kampf Panzer to Ukraine to fight against Russia. Not now anyway, Germany just came to grips with the new world reality / is still in the process (like many other countries, in various ways). 

But if all countries 'chip in' in some way or form I don't see Germany having a big problem to carry their weight. Between all the political stuff I think Germany has done at least the same as the average country supporting Ukraine, even from a relative perspective. 

At the same time, as has been discussed here since the beginning, don't get too much romantic thoughts about hundreds of Leo2's in service at the front in large numbers on operational scale any time soon after sending them. And keeping them operational is another thing.
A few dozen is probably more doable but tanks don't have the same 'force multipliers' as HIMARS or modern 155mm with precision munitions have. 

Anyway that's no reason to do nothing imo, so I like the idea of for example all nations somehow chipping in to provide Ukraine with a modern MBT capability. Although I expect there will already be things in motion, but it is in most countries interest to keep such things on the low. 

Leopard 1s. More important than tanks, IFVs, Ukraine needs the ability to preserve their personnel, Marders. 

[Huba]

Just now, FancyCat said:

Leopard 1s. More important than tanks, IFVs, Ukraine needs the ability to preserve their personnel, Marders. 

I heard today that Marders that Germany is fixing are going to Greece, to be exchanged for BMP1  Looking at the numbers, there's no way to sent UA any significant number of IFVs, nobody really keeps any reserves of these, except US. So this is on Uncle Sam exclusively.

27 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

At the same time, as has been discussed here since the beginning, don't get too much romantic thoughts about hundreds of Leo2's in service at the front in large numbers on operational scale any time soon after sending them. And keeping them operational is another thing.

Thing is, that unless we send enough to equip at least a few brigades, it does not make sense to send any western tanks at all. It will just be a logistical burden without any meaningful impact. So if these Leo2 (or even 1) are to be a fig leaf for US to start sending M1s, that is fine. Otherwise it's just BS. Give these Leo2 to Poland and we'll send the rest of PT-91, it would be a lot more practical.

[Cederic]

1 hour ago, Ultradave said:

When I was in the 82d, one mission we practiced over and over and over was the 2 gun raid, a fast quick hitting mission for a 105mm battery. I was the Fire Direction Officer for our battery as one of my assignments in the Army. Best job in Field Artillery (I may be biased). 

The "raid" was to move 2 guns forward by UH-60 to a position close to the front lines to fire at a lucrative target in the enemy rear. Since a 105mm is relatively short ranged compared to a 155mm, we needed to move up close, get dropped off, lay the two guns, fire the mission, pack up, call our rides and get out of dodge. In a hurry. But it was a quick strike at an important target of opportunity. These guys are firing at a leisurely pace. In a pinch, a 105mm can be fired almost as fast as a mortar. Almost. The gunner in the video is checking his sight on the aiming stakes to make sure the gun hasn't shifted with each round. We'd have a crew of 6 or so too, so the new rounds would come fast. It's cased ammo so loading is very quick, as you can see. Much more effective once we got UH-60s to replace the UH-1H choppers. 2 UH-60s could sling a gun under each with ammo strapped onto its trails, the gun crew, and me and my assistant one of us each in one of the choppers, and the "Smoke" (Chief of the Firing Battery - a SFC, the senior NCO in the battery next to the 1SG). 

As the FDO, I also had to act as XO on the spot and survey the guns while my "Computer"  (E-5 SGT who normally calculates elevation and time), set us up a temporary FDC to calculate from  - just me and him - and then after surveying in the guns run over and finish the calcs and safety check them.  The XO stayed back with the battery of 4 remaining guns, and my FDC team sergeant (a SSG), stayed there to run the full FDC back in battery. A lot of action in a real hurry, we'd be in and out in about 20 minutes after slinging 10-20 rounds per gun out. 

I don't know what these guys are doing but a M102 and this comparable UK howitzer are highly mobile and versatile. The shells don't pack the punch (about 1/3 the weight) but this is what they shine at. 

Note: No one checked the barrel between rounds. Bad form, and potentially extremely dangerous, although a little less so with cased ammo than separate. Need to check there's no obstruction in the tube.

Dave

I think the British army would expect a 7-8 man crew for the gun, so they're maintaining a good rate of fire with just five.

As long as the barrel doesn't get obstructed :(

[billbindc]

53 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I could probably write a book:

Forcing function - The US and west have been the the worlds hyperpower for at least 30 years.  Any conventional matchups come with so many caveats that only non-state networks have really been dumb enough to take them on in the CT/VEO space.  In fact the last time a nation state fell out of line the Gulf War happened and any great power outside of the US/western sphere took note.  So a revisionist state was trapped between the devil of nuclear warfare they could not win, and the deep blue see of being vastly overpowered in the conventional space.

Our History.  We understood our power early.  While interventions and CT work kept us busy in reality the west has not faced an existential state-based threat since the fall of the USSR.  As such, we let things slide in the famous "peace dividend days".  Everyone was counting mothballed tanks and ships, but we also mothballed the NS architecture capable of waging global scale political warfare.  Sure we kept intelligence and the like but funding went way down as we all figured "well who would mess with us".  It got a major boost after 9/11 but it was built to hunt humans in and amongst other humans, not deal with larger scale nation states.  So our ability to actually conduct counter-subversive and pre-emptive political warfare campaigns has atrophied over the last three decades.

Our reality.  Unlike autocratic societies, we lay our internal social divisions and friction-points out for everyone to see, we celebrate and fund them.  Further we have laws that enshrine freedoms and an open society based on the value of each and every citizen.  We doubled down on all of that after the Cold War ended.  What makes our nations strong a great are also some of our biggest vulnerabilities in this arena - not advocating for anything different here, this is just our reality.  Free press, free enterprise, free academia and freedoms "from and to" are what makes us the most powerful versions of humanity that ever existed; also leaves us very open to asymmetric strategies.

Their reality.  The revisionist power states, like China and Russia, were largely left out, or at least feel like they were left out of the re-writing of the global order.  They understand where they stand in the pecking order, and while it took awhile, they figured out that they 1) did not like it, and 2) had to start moving the needle to change it.  Direct confrontation with the west was impossible, so they went sideways.  They all have long histories in the subversive space, hell one could argue the Chinese invented it.  So they renewed old doctrines that leveraged energy resident within our systems to work for them - classic reflexive control.  This was done with long above-water campaigns of influence as they picked up steam.  Cyber and information space meant that societies became connected, but they also became "seeable" in extremely high resolution.  Like the invention of the microscope, this opened up new observable phenomenon, which we could not see in the Cold War.  States and corporations - often overlapping - went to town on this.  They collected data and developed theories of how humanity worked at micro-social scales that did not exists 30 years ago.  They could map those spaces and that could gauge cause and effect.  We used to sell stuff and collect "likes and subscribes", they, the other lost powers, used it to create "options".  Ones that are very hard to attribute and are aimed at what is both our greatest strengths and vulnerabilities - our open society.  These options were not legal acts of war, responses lay outside of our legalities and policies, and they were designed to hit us where they knew we would never even be able to agree at what happened - classic negative and null decision space.

Russia out front.  Russia has a very long history of playing these games and decided to flex first.  China has always been quietly waiting and watching in the background - stealing IP, buying off politicians and power brokers, colleting information and re-drawing maps.  Russia is not that nuanced, never has been really.  They were far more blunt and began act on their new theories - Gerasimov Doctrine/Russian Hybrid Warfare - whatever.  It was an ability to exercise strategic options outside of what we understood as war or peace.  Russia tried things out in Georgia and Chechnya - learned some hard lessons and then went prime time in 2014 in Ukraine.  No big conventional war, they just undecided Donbass and Crimea, and then made it too hard for us to really decide anything about it.  They pulled off wins in Syria and Africa (that no one really noticed) and kept getting free lunches while we in the west sat back and scratched our heads "how did they do that?"  Seriously, as I have told some senior people, "I am tired of admiring the other team".  China was doing all the same stuff, just much more nuanced and quietly - they called it unrestricted warfare/systems warfare but it basically amounts to the same thing; however, China appears much more adept at leveraging the rules and laws of the international order, while at the same time playing outside of them.

Unprepared and paralysis.  We really were in a kind of strategic shock in the west.  Both Russia and China had worked hard to make sure that they played out internal divisions and that groups in our own societies became indirectly invested (ignorantly in some cases) in their interests.  Our national security and defence architecture was too busy chasing "snakes" and was dislocated in dealing with state-based threats.  In many cases we had no policy or legal frameworks for what these new threat theories could do, and we sure as hell did not have counters/pushbacks.  So while we were basically strategically dislocated both Russia and China made great gains while we dithered and argued with each other - and I do not mean solely in the US.  North America, Europe and Pacific partners, all yelling and divided.  NATO was on the ropes, many nations had grown tired of GWOT, and we saw (are seeing) the rise of nationalism and isolationism.

Russia poops the bed - and modern war is in the wind.  For reasons I still do not understand Russia decides to drop its A-Game and fall back on an open conventional military power approach in Ukraine.  I have never heard a good reason why this is, and why they took this risk but here we are.  So China is sitting back watching, again as all this unfolds and what does it see?  Well first thing is that modern conventional warfare is upside down.  By our old metrics/doctrine Ukraine should have lost this, even in the face of Russian crappiness.  The war was going to be longer and grinding but eventually Ukraine would fold under the weight of a military machine that was an order of magnitude larger by some metrics. And then "boop"!  So what the hell happened? - well personally I think the 3rd offset (out of favor now) actually came into it age (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offset_strategy) in doing so it is re-writing conventional war as we know it.  Russia is running into a brick wall but China is watching and noting it. China was feeling strong, by old metrics it was catching up and rising to challenge the West - particularly when one considers our aversion to sacrifice.  Unless China is a complete idiot, and nothing I have seen suggests they are, then this war completely blew up their pre-war estimates.  Modern warfare just got insanely more lethal and expensive - harder not easier.  And once again western warfare looks like it leaped ahead, this was not the plan.

So What?  Well, despite all the sabre rattling with China over Taiwan, I suspect the Chinese are conducting a serious re-think (they should be).  Everyone in the bar is armed and sizing each other out.  A big guy draped with guns and ammo, looking like Rambo, picked a fight with a little guy who just punched Rambo's teeth in with his own ammo belts. A conventional conflict with China just got less likely, if China has been paying attention and I suspect they have.  The metrics by which China was gauging things just shifted and they are not going to pull "a Russia" blindly.

So, So what?  Well China is likely going to do a few things 1) re-set its conventional military power metrics, likely better than we will - we are going to bask in "well there you go, we win!", 2) Keep to its A-game longer and double down and what has been working - it saw what happened to Russia.  We on the other hand are likely to go back to arguing and losing the bubble, making us even more vulnerable.  That is the biggest unknown and question "how do we re-gain internal integrity in our systems, without breaking them ourselves?"  All the while China and very likely what is left of Russia will work in helping us to break us.  We are likely to see a lot more proxy actions done this way because invading is a dumb idea.  China has a decades head start on us, so we face major challenges getting better in this space - it is the one area that China's options are expanding and ours remain stagnant. 

Cold War, Hot Peace, Tepid Status Quo, it all really ends the same; more political warfare happening where the terrain favours the opponent - we need to get over ourselves and agree that in this area we are all of one mind: create equilibrium and expand options, while compressing our opponents.  And this is not all on the US, which has its own problems, we have seen pressures and threats here in Canada in ways that we do not have any response to other than "togetherness and resilience".  Every western country has a micro-social space, and it is largely lying wide open to direct influence, which in a democracy is incredibly powerful and dangerous.  I strongly suspect that this war will be a watershed moment for whatever comes next - likely a Coldish War but one where the lines are far more blurry and a significant continuing of the trend of the re-emergence of political warfare as a primary theater in pursuing national interests while blunting an opponents.     

Finally, my instincts tell me, "don't think 1960", they are telling me "think 1900".  There are a lot of similarities between now and pre WWI with respect to great power competition/conflict.  Accept now we have nukes and cyberspace - and the history of WWI to learn from.  Regardless, we need to win this war, put Russia back in a box and then everyone sit down and have  a serious conversation on how we let this happen and how we need to close the spaces between us or someone is going to use that: one second to midnight at a time.

Super interesting. I think I'm less impressed than you are with the opposition and I think there are many problems with their model of conflict that will get worse over time. Not least, I think that's why Russia decided to force their hand. This, on Xi's Belt and Road is quite informative not just on that topic but also on the larger, self defeating Chinese zeitgeist. 

https://asiasociety.org/switzerland/oxford-debate-belt-and-road-initiative-china-pays-worsening-its-own-image

To be as pithy as possible, I'd say that the challenges to 'the West' since the end of the Cold War whether by AQI/Russia/PRC have been sideways because it's the only way to do it and survive its preponderance of power. Until the foundations of that power subside, our biggest worry is ourselves.   

[G.I. Joe]

1 hour ago, sburke said:

Russia Tells Pilots To Repair Their Own Planes Amid Sanctions—Report (newsweek.com)

"I've got a bad feeling about this..."

-Pretty much every Star Wars character at one time or another if we're counting the Expanded Universe.

I guess a lot of the leased (now stolen) Western aircraft in Russia must have had their maintenance contracted out to companies that are now sanctioning Russia. This makes me wonder if they're short of aircraft maintenance engineers. I know a lot of people who are qualified as both pilots and AMEs, and the skill and knowledge sets definitely complement each other, but even a pilot with good systems knowledge is not necessarily going to make a good maintainer. Knowing how something works in theory and how to operate it from the flight deck does not necessarily translate to knowing what the system looks like, much less how to fix it. I'm sure we all know (or in some of our cases no doubt are) someone who knows every trick in the book for using their laptop, smart TV or smartphone, but couldn't pull the thing apart to replace a fried component or a cracked screen to save their lives...same idea.

[danfrodo]

3 minutes ago, G.I. Joe said:

"I've got a bad feeling about this..."

-Pretty much every Star Wars character at one time or another if we're counting the Expanded Universe.

I guess a lot of the leased (now stolen) Western aircraft in Russia must have had their maintenance contracted out to companies that are now sanctioning Russia. This makes me wonder if they're short of aircraft maintenance engineers. I know a lot of people who are qualified as both pilots and AMEs, and the skill and knowledge sets definitely complement each other, but even a pilot with good systems knowledge is not necessarily going to make a good maintainer. Knowing how something works in theory and how to operate it from the flight deck does not necessarily translate to knowing what the system looks like, much less how to fix it. I'm sure we all know (or in some of our cases no doubt are) someone who knows every trick in the book for using their laptop, smart TV or smartphone, but couldn't pull the thing apart to replace a fried component or a cracked screen to save their lives...same idea.

So you're saying I could get great bargains flying Russia Air?

[Harmon Rabb]

1 minute ago, danfrodo said:

So you're saying I could get great bargains flying Russia Air?

If someones hobbies include playing Russian roulette, flying on a Russian airline sounds like a fantastic idea these days.

[The_Capt]

5 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Super interesting. I think I'm less impressed than you are with the opposition and I think there are many problems with their model of conflict that will get worse over time. Not least, I think that's why Russia decided to force their hand. This, on Xi's Belt and Road is quite informative not just on that topic but also on the larger, self defeating Chinese zeitgeist. 

https://asiasociety.org/switzerland/oxford-debate-belt-and-road-initiative-china-pays-worsening-its-own-image

To be as pithy as possible, I'd say that the challenges to 'the West' since the end of the Cold War whether by AQI/Russia/PRC have been sideways because it's the only way to do it and survive its preponderance of power. Until the foundations of that power subside, our biggest worry is ourselves.   

Well we each have different seats in all this so that is understandable.  You speak of their models of conflict, which is a very interesting conversation:

Russia - appeared to be following a Soviet expansion model of Explore, Infiltrate, Subvert, Proxy and Formal Claim - rinse and repeat.  What they have been missing is an ideology, an idea to back it up.

China - is playing with a new version of the People's War/Tso's doctrine, subvert, stalemate/exhaust, advantage - conventional gains.

Both of them rely on what I can Decision Denial - they do not need positive decisions, they need only ensure we are not able to focus and are mired in negative/null ones.  I am nor sure where this goes, we have never had this sort of conflict under these conditions.  

[Haiduk]

11 hours ago, Grigb said:

If I would be Intel officer, I would start tracking RU Oligarchs with capabilities to form PMCs.

I have imagination, that Russia hasn't real oligarchs. All real oligarchs already either escaped from Russia like Abramovich, or dead like Berezovskiy, or jailed like Khodorkovskiy. All other "oligarchs" either appointed "wallets" of Putin/FSB close to Putin like Prigozhyn, Roldugin, Rottenberg, Chaika, Miller etc, or large businessman, which "brought full loyality oath" to Putin with FSB part in their business and of course compromissing evidence and threat of window flight.

So, no any "private armies" or "oligarch armies". Prigozhyn is just "Sauron's voice", empowered by Putin. Wagner, Liga etc - all they band of merceneries, hired for state funds, which turned out in pockets of such "oligarchs".  

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Russia going the route of private armies makes a lot of sense.  In many ways the Russian culture is still feudal in nature, which means this concept is not as detached from their history as it is in the West.  

We had a preview of this sort of thing back in 2014 when Akhmetov mobilized his steel workers to kick the crap out of the Russian "Tourists" that were attempting to take over Mariupol. 

No-no! ) Russian (Moskovite) feudalism like in 14-17 centuries is nothing like Europe. This is Golden Horde type super-centralized power, where all nobles either 100 % loyal to Tsar or dead/expelled. Indeed this is Ukraine has hystorical tradition of private armies. Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth nobles (under Lithuanian also means local Ruthenian (Ukrainan) nobles), ruling in the Ukrainian landsб had own armies and contested with Polish central power for own old rights if seen attempts of kings to strenght own power. Later turmoils among Cossacks in the second part of 17th century caused that sometimes several hetmans (cossack warlords, having some state administrative power in Ukraine, when in Poland and Lithuania hetmans were just temporary warlords) could exist with own armies, and this bored known proverb in Ukraine "where are two Ukrainains there are three hetmans". So, such tradition of nobles "court hosts" and self-organized Cossack bands (when they only appeared) with frontier mentality borned in 2014 huge number of volunteer units (many of which really were micro-PMC). Even Azov was "favorite toy" of former Internal affairs minister Arsen Avakov (middle-hand oligarch).

Unlike in Russia UKR oligarchs have a parellel with 15-17 centuries nobles, opposing to central power or suporting it for some benefits, so this is one of reasons, why in Ukraine dictatorship is almost impossible.

About Akmmetov - this is not good example. Workers cooperated with DPR fighters for "joint patroling" but not for withstanding to them. Better example with Akhmetov - he as largest maphiozi had own criminal army, which was known under name "Lux". Soon he legalized this thugs as "security company Lux". He had own chiefs of local police, local SBU (Khodakovskyi was commander of Donetsk "Alfa" SBU Spetsnaz and became commander of Vostok DPR unit), Procecution Office... He could just said a word and his bandits could eliminate all pro-Russian insurgents... But... Akmetov, who had a plans to dictate own demands to Kyiv's power and made own game, at last outplayed himself.

[G.I. Joe]

2 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

So you're saying I could get great bargains flying Russia Air?

Possibly. More to the point, I wouldn't fly on a Russian airliner at this point in time if they paid me, even factoring out ethical, moral and political objections...the flight safety concerns are a big enough dealbreaker on their own.

[Lethaface]

14 minutes ago, Huba said:

Thing is, that unless we send enough to equip at least a few brigades, it does not make sense to send any western tanks at all. It will just be a logistical burden without any meaningful impact. So if these Leo2 (or even 1) are to be a fig leaf for US to start sending M1s, that is fine. Otherwise it's just BS. Give these Leo2 to Poland and we'll send the rest of PT-91, it would be a lot more practical.

FWIW I don't see anyone 'giving' Leo2s to Poland unless there's Russian tanks inside Poland. In the past surplus tanks have been practically given away but times have changed.

[FancyCat]

This is why Germany is the weak link for Ukraine to pressure on expanding deliveries from NATO. The thread keeps going, but basically the justification given last week was none to spare, needs refit, needs it to reinforce German commitment to NATO 

40 Marders to Greece, for BMP-1s 

Thank god for the Greens, and I hope Scholz is a one term Chancellor. 

 

 

 

[Huba]

41 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

FWIW I don't see anyone 'giving' Leo2s to Poland unless there's Russian tanks inside Poland. In the past surplus tanks have been practically given away but times have changed.

I meant the "ring exchange" or however this ridiculous scheme is called. But yeah, I find it unlikely too.
Also, US was very happy to backfill us with some surplus M1s ( in 3:1 ratio) for the T types we sent. so no, these times are definitely not over. It's just a matter of some countries taking actual interest in finding a solution (while making a big buck while at it...), and some not giving a crap.

Edited September 15, 2022 by Huba

[MikeyD]

About Ukraine needing more tanks, I wonder how many more tanks Ukraine has today than it did a week ago, including T90s. I mean, genuinely. I assume they've at least made up for attrition. If the Russians haven't entirely mucked up their transmissions from poor maintenance.

[Raptor341]

3 hours ago, FancyCat said:

One, Germany got itself in this position due to bad PR. Sucks but if Macron who still sticks his foot in the mouth regarding Putin skates pass you somehow, you know you screwed up.

Two, again, Scholz's coalition partners are actively stabbing him in the back (or more the front at this point). His opposition is as well.

Three, as the largest European economy and mainstay of the EU alongside France, it must lead the EU, and lead Europe. Up until now, Europe has been in crisis and stagnation, and still is, but this crisis may be a valuable turning point for Europe. Certainly this represents a point where Russian influence can be cast out for a decade.

I mentioned this earlier, a ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian forces monitored with what? UN mission? (Not NATO lol)(OSCE?) I highly doubt any monitoring mission is gonna occur, but if there isn't, Ukraine will have to regain control over customs and border control and station forces inside separatist areas to monitor the withdrawal. Once LPR and DPR lose the ability to defend their territory, even if Ukraine holds to the ceasefire (which it certainly might not), there isn't a lot for the LPR and DPR leadership to feel safe anymore from a visit by SBU.

Also...what constitutes LPR and DPR forces? Russia flooded the Donbas with personnel. Russian MoD has control over large sections of the forces of the LPR and DPR. Ukraine itself declares that all separatist forces are Russian.

I could see a ceasefire where Russian forces must leave, but Ukraine declares all armed personnel in the LPR and DPR are Russian and kicks them out.

Imo, if the LPR and DPR leadership have any sense, they will attempt to one, retain armed forces, two, establish legitimacy of separatist government, three, and most importantly, keep the borders with Russia open for resupply and personnel reinforcement.

Also, a situation where Russia can still flood in arms, supplies, personnel into the Donbas without being at war with Ukraine is absolutely a win. (Why Ukraine must regain customs and border control and alongside it, armed forces inside the Donbas)

I could totally see a situation where what I've laid out above occurs, a ceasefire with Russia is declared, Russia withdraws but the LPR and DPR can regroup, rearm and defend the remaining Donbas with Russia retaining the unique ability of having its borders and territorial control to be completely undiminished (nukes, etc) and Ukraine forced to deal with international sentiment being "ehhh". No, this is not viable. And again, any conditions where Ukrainian demands are met, are going to likely result in the LPR and DPR leadership fleeing or doubling down and holding out anyway.

Steve, I'm not sure you understand that the 2022 invasion changes everything. Pre-invasion, I would think everything you suggested is viable. Having Donbas be carved out from influencing Ukraine, (imo, carving the Donbas from influencing Ukraine is separatism btw, as the Donbas will influence Ukraine naturally as a response to Ukraine administrating the region, what your suggesting is legitimating their separatism) sure, entirely possible, something Zelensky promised to find a resolution towards.

Post-invasion, things have changed. I don't think it can be understated that Russia sought to conquer the entire country and wipe out all pro-Ukrainian sentiment with genocide. Every report we have indicates civilians in the occupied territories being "filtrated" for pro-Ukrainian sentiment and those identified being either killed, deported, or tortured or if lucky, just monitored. I'm exceedingly surprised the Ukrainians don't line up every Russian soldier and collaborator and shoot them. Everything we have in terms of evidence indicates Russia fully intended (and is carrying out in occupied regions) on lining up and executing their opposition, peaceful and violent. They fully intended on cleaning Ukraine of opposition, civilian and military in a manner that is clearly targeted towards the Ukrainian nationality. 

This is not a clean war. War is never clean, and this war has not been clean at all since 2014 but certainly 2022 marks a huge escalation in Russia attempting to seize all of Ukraine, and in attempting the same "separatist republics" filtration in Kherson as in the Donbas.

Maybe Ukraine opts along your lines, it's entirely possible. I think it's much more likely Ukraine cleanses their society, in order to safeguard from this occurring again.

Now, obviously aside from whatever I stated, the Donbas is a important economic part of Ukraine, there are millions of people who probably wish to return to their homes in the Donbas, etc, etc.

But it really comes down to whether Ukraine considers the Donbas theirs, and whether the cost in blood is worth retaking it all. I think certainly after facing their near destruction, the amount of blood Ukraine is willing to shed for regaining their land and people has certainly gone way up. Let Crimea and Lugansk and Donetsk remain free to cleanse the Ukrainians still there and sit back? Doubtful.

(Reminder, they are still there. The massive human intel, partisan action indicates this)

Out of likes but agree with this statement - there is no good long-term reason to leave the DPR/LPR intact in any shape. 

[Ultradave]

36 minutes ago, Cederic said:

I think the British army would expect a 7-8 man crew for the gun, so they're maintaining a good rate of fire with just five.

As long as the barrel doesn't get obstructed

By TOE we were supposed to have 9, one detailed to the ammo section. We usually had 7, with one to ammo sometimes. Always a bit short of TOE at the time.

Dave

[FancyCat]

If I'm not mistaken, it is also a rail line into Luhansk no? 

 

 

 

[Huba]

7 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

If I'm not mistaken, it is also a rail line into Luhansk no? 

There is indeed. Just south of town the line forks, one goes to  Kupyansk, and the other one to Starobilsk. I bet there won't be any more trains going through it anytime soon

Edited September 15, 2022 by Huba

[chuckdyke]

RIP.

 

[billbindc]

51 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well we each have different seats in all this so that is understandable.  You speak of their models of conflict, which is a very interesting conversation:

Russia - appeared to be following a Soviet expansion model of Explore, Infiltrate, Subvert, Proxy and Formal Claim - rinse and repeat.  What they have been missing is an ideology, an idea to back it up.

China - is playing with a new version of the People's War/Tso's doctrine, subvert, stalemate/exhaust, advantage - conventional gains.

Both of them rely on what I can Decision Denial - they do not need positive decisions, they need only ensure we are not able to focus and are mired in negative/null ones.  I am nor sure where this goes, we have never had this sort of conflict under these conditions.  

What's interesting to me is how much both strategies are designed to subvert the supports that maintain US hegemony and how badly they perform at it:

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/ratings-for-russia-drop-to-record-lows/

The danger for both Russia and China...that's fast becoming the reality...is that they don't provide a model that is more attractive than the US/EU because their aims are simply to install a cruder, more restrictive hegemony for themselves.  Therefore, their interactions with likeminded nations don't turn into countervailing coalitions but simply accommodations based on mutual and typically short term interest. You can see that, not all surprisingly, mostly clearly in their relations with each other.

Perforce, they must act like insurgents on the state scale. They act as spoilers, subvert the order of things, put grit in the machinery and try to inhabit (in China's case) parts of the global economy that allow them to exert control. But this has limits. Western oriented states have resilient systems, they are easy to influence but generally hard to subvert outright. And all the while, the clock ticks for China and Russia given the profound demographic problems they face.

I get your take and in many ways I'm sympathetic to it. But over all, I think the historical record comes down pretty heavily on the side of the socially and economically dynamic nations over the episodic pulses of authoritarian states.

 

[The_Capt]

30 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I get your take and in many ways I'm sympathetic to it. But over all, I think the historical record comes down pretty heavily on the side of the socially and economically dynamic nations over the episodic pulses of authoritarian states.

Heh, I guess that depends on what scale of history you are using.  Post-WW2, post WW1, maybe.  Before that almost every state on the planet was authoritarian to some extent, the democracies of the US and France were largely experimental.  On a long history look we really have a single point of data - the current era.  Democracies and societies that were more internally dynamic have always been a very small minority and many times they failed and spiralled back into authoritarian regimes (e.g. Rome).

China has sustained multiple global power empires for over 2000 years and largely on the authoritarian model.  As did Egypt, Persia and empires all over the planet.  There is far more historical evidence that humans are attracted to authoritarian power than anything else.

So I would argue we are living either in the beginning of new era (thousand points of light) or an anomaly, and it is far too soon to tell.  My sense is that we fear uncertainty more than anything else and when “dynamism” turns into uncertainty we run back into the arms of a central pack/herd leader - history does back that up.

The subversive warfare I am talking about is all about projecting uncertainty and letting it do damage to us internally.  There is plenty evidence of its success, and even strategic gains by those that employ it.  Uncertainty create confusion and chaos inside our cognitive and conative frameworks and they then leverage that vacuum to push their own interests.

You do make a solid point though, neither China or Russia has been able to offer an attractive idea that makes their gains stick - and that is probably Russias biggest loss in the war; any chance to try and make one.  My bet is that if they keep us disrupted and unstable, their idea may be “certainty we cannot offer”.  And as things have been unfolding the shine was definitely starting to fade on us in he west as well - misadventures like Iraq and Afghanistan really did not help.  I hope that Ukraine acts as a slap in the face and glass of cold water to the west - this is what happens if we remain divided, this is the result of us allowing ourselves to be divided and subverted, this is what happens if we do not push back before a war starts and thousands die, billions wasted.

I do not speak of what happens inside the wire often but I can say the needle is moving and we are starting to see things in a different light on all of this.  We will pivot to China but it will not be solely a conventional military deterrence equation on the table, that would be a major mistake.  Nor can we assume our “attractiveness” as a natural gift, this is a contest of power, ideologies and certainties, and we should never forget that.

The second we do - more Ukraines will happen.