How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Grigb]

Rybar admits UKR are moving forward at Bridgeheads - UKR Recon reached Charivne. In reality UKR recon has been operating there for some time already, so in this case it is most probably it is UKR forward troops. 

Now Rybar admits UKR can land medical helicopters at Bridgeheads. All what you need to know about RU claims they hit hard this area. 

Edited September 15, 2022 by Grigb

[The_Capt]

41 minutes ago, Huba said:

Killing is the only allowed kind of fun I guess...

Wow, plants too?  If this guy has to include trees in the standing orders, I mean what the f#ck?!

[Huba]

3 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Rybar admits UKR are moving forward at Bridgeheads - UKR Recon reached Charivne. In reality UKR recon has been operating there for some time already, so in this case it is most probably it is UKR forward troops. 

 

In one of his updated ( I think 2 days ago) he also mentioned that UA captured the two settlements on the river, south of Blahodativka. 
I imagine it is a terrible, bloody grind for UA, but if they expand this bridghead just a little bit more, I think it will be game over for the whole sector. I give it 2 more weeks, maximum.

Edited September 15, 2022 by Huba

[dan/california]

5 hours ago, Huba said:

There's more gold in from the interview with head of DE GS. Herr General warns that if we ship too much weapons, we won't be able to defend ourselves if Russia decides to open a second front. FFS, this really isn't funny, who is this guy?

 

The onion is out Business, these people are impossible to parody.

5 hours ago, Grigb said:

Prigozhin PR campaign did something interesting. It created discussion among RU Nat (and to extend among RU public) that PMCs are better alternative to RU state forces from soldiers' point of view. Main selling point is stable payment and award system. RU state forces are notorious for stealing money and awards from troops. So, this is very big incentive given RU men have to feed their families in conditions of RU failing economy. 

But the interesting thing is that it creates a trend of increasing military power of RU PMCs. Hold your horses shouting at me that these PMCs are no threat to Western military. I am not discussing their combat capabilities (for now). What I mean is there is a possibility that in near future there will be shift of Power from State Power Actors like Governors, Police or Army Generals to however have effective PMC. 

If I am right RU splitting/Civil war will happen along the lines of PMCs. 

How it relates to us:

If I would be Intel officer, I would start tracking RU Oligarchs with capabilities to form PMCs. Most likely it will be Oligarchs from manufacturing sphere. Just having money is not enough. But if you have a plant, you surely have security service to serve as nucleus for PMC and you have manpower resource (plant workers) to tap in for expansion. Given the deteriorating situation you will have to do it anyway to protect what you have.

If I am right and the Shift will happen, the West will have option to influence events in the RU sewers without direct military intervention. 

RU PMCs are basically tribes linked to businesses that generate income. They will press each other to get control of the business. And the weakest ones will look for help. Any help. And they could get it under conditions favorable for the West.

Buffer of West friendly Oligarch PMCs or Militias formed from a plant workers at EU border will significantly decrease risk for EU while costing peanuts in money and no cost in lives of our boys. 

This plan to replace the, admittedly useless, military with a bunch of PMCs is the most perfect, most guaranteed plan for civil war ever. In the attempt to balance Wagners rise as the single most effective arm of the Russian state, which all but crowns Prigozhin CZAR, they guarantee civi war instead. Every member of the armed forces who can get the magazine in an AK variant without shooting his foot off will desert to a PMC at the earliest opportunity. Various bits of the FSB accept bids and we are into beyond bad novel territory.

 

20 minutes ago, Huba said:

He got a bit carried away in few points:

- US sends a lot of cutting edge stuff too ( GMLRS, Javelins, M777)

- all that went in up to this point was donated. Lend lease deal should only be finalized that month (and hopefully will allow UA to get the good stuff like AFVs, F16 and ATACMS)

Actually Javelin and HIMARS, and M777 are twenty year old tech. Replacements for all but the M777 are WELL underway. Insofar as I can tell the U.S. Army still has it head firmly up its rear end on developing a decent 52 caliber 155. Even as it come up with one brilliant ammo idea after another. Hopefully the evidence of this war wi get that solved. 

[fireship4]

Apologies for the repost, but I was unable to edit the one I made 2 hours ago.

A link to the video of Prigozhin speaking to inmates that @FancyCat posted yesterday, with subtitles, via @wartranslated: https://nitter.net/wartranslated/status/1570123353331011586#m

What Girkin thinks about it: https://nitter.net/wartranslated/status/1570374548914053121#m

A relevant scene from Shtrafbat:

A thread by Galeev: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1539258381243908096.html

Edited September 15, 2022 by fireship4

[kevinkin]

18 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Perhaps it's implied in the article, but Russia does not have a lot of experience with putting together SEAD/DEAD strike packages to achieve air supremacy over an IAD and supporting CAPs - even one  based on technology from the late cold war. Also, Russia was smug believing they would not need to take a week or so to conduct such a campaign since Ukraine would fall quickly to their blitz of the capitol. In contrast, the US and NATO live and breath air tasking orders and practice them routinely. And they a have a lot of stand off weapons and decoys to open the door with using saturation tactics during the early strikes waves. 

-----

"In our country, due to the lack of high-precision aviation weapons of destruction such as gliding bombs, our front-line aviation is forced to work in the enemy air defense zone of destruction."

-----

Out of the the mouth of babes ... confirms what we talked about. And to be clear, PGMs are not the solution for DEAD, They need to be dropped inside the long range/high altitude SAM engagement window. Russia never had enough cruise missiles to saturated  a bunch of S-300 batteries. A few cruise missiles can be taken out by well placed MANPADs at the terminal phase of their attack. Russia knows this since they protect the S-400 with medium range Pantsirs and some MANPADS just in case. Russia can't pay or feed their troops, so they can't be expected to defeat even a smallish IAD. 

Edited September 15, 2022 by kevinkin

[Grigb]

10 minutes ago, Huba said:

In one of his updated ( I think 2 days ago) he also mentioned that UA captured the two settlements on the river, south of Blahodativka. 
I imagine it is a terrible, bloody grind for UA, but if they expand this bridghead just a little bit more, I think it will be game over for the whole sector. I give it 2 more weeks, maximum.

Agree. Probably by beginning of October we should see another tactical feint of RU forces. 

[Offshoot]

16 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Wow, plants too?  If this guy has to include trees in the standing orders, I mean what the f#ck?!

I hear the Kherson watermelons are sweet this time of year.

[sross112]

19 minutes ago, Grigb said:

And long-range aircraft are used only for launching missiles from the waters of the Caspian and Black Seas.

Just a snippet that got me thinking.

Question for our air experts: How long until those bombers run into an air ambush? If the UA has the ISR to see when they are taxiing for take off they also probably know approximately where they will launch missiles from. The UA has shown ability to hit air defenses with HARMs and also targets at very long range with probably HRIMs so they can make a gap in air defenses if needed. I'm going out on a limb here that the RuAF is probably pretty predictable by now so the UAF should be able to make pretty good guesses about locations and timings.

Just thinking that this will be on the lines of neutering the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine was able to take that threat off the table by sinking a couple ships and making it impossible to operate within effective range without sustaining further losses. The bomber launched missiles seem to be one of the last long range "problems" that Ukraine needs to solve. Would splashing a few bombers put a real dent into their operations?

I suppose the RuAF could launch from over Belarus but I'm assuming they'd need to redeploy to different bases and it would cause logistic problems at least for a little while. So it probably wouldn't totally solve the issue but could make it more difficult while giving Russia another black eye. 

Anyways, experts, do you think air ambush is possible/probable? 

[The_Capt]

Just now, Offshoot said:

I hear the Kherson watermelons are sweet this time of year.

Great, now I can't unthink that...thanks for that one.

[chrisl]

Every time I see a reference to the Guards Tank Army by its initials I think of GTA, the game.  And it looks like the Ukrainian army had similar thoughts.

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

I hear the Kherson watermelons are sweet this time of year.

In college I saw a pumpkin violated based on a $20 dare.  That was in peacetime conditions with far less access to alcohol than the Russians have.  Thankfully, watermelons are not sentient.  Still, it's disturbing that Prigozhin mentioned it even if in jest.  Always a bit of truth to a joke like that.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

8 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Great, now I can't unthink that...thanks for that one.

Oh, sorry about my previous post.  I hadn't seen yours.

Steve

[billbindc]

11 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well it is optimistic assessment, we can say that.  Kinda sounds like a sales pitch to be honest.  When I hear "cost neutral" or "someone else will pay" I start looking for the magic beans.  There are some significant downsides to this whole thing and some serious risks - a fully fractured Russia is one that has been discussed here a lot.  

None of what is listed here is guaranteed:

- The EU may look to the US to foot a significant portion of the reconstruction bill.  Plus the US is going to want a piece of that anyway - infrastructure equals influence.

- LNG/Energy.  Ok, Europe could also accelerate away from LNG to either renewables or coal, likely both.  Weaning them off cheap Russian LNG does not automatically equate to "buying American" with its shipping cost overhead etc.

- NATO - definitely going to get some momentum, but that is likely going to be a drain as demand goes up and every nation tries to do it as cheaply as possible, leaving hidden expansion costs to, yep the US as usual.

- China.  Don't get me started.  They have been sitting back and reaping intel rewards and LLs this whole war, plus they are likely to get access to the all that Russian cheap LNG, from a strong negotiation position. As we polarize up, the vacuum created by the collapse of the Russian Arms industry is more likely to get picked up by China.

Seriously, does anyone in that club look like they are going to cozy up to US arms imports?  India is the swing state; however, this war has rattled them energy wise as well.  I am not sure where Indian-Western relationships are going to go after this war.  This has been a major disruption.

 https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/24/business/russia-oil-china-india-ukraine-war.html

https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/04/indian-foreign-policy-and-the-russian-ukrainian-war/

We can probably count on India continuing to backstop Russia as a minimum, they will just get everything cheaper from here on out.

I mean I get the thrust here - it is pushback against the political narrative of "Ukraine is costing too much and it is X's fault, etc etc".   Ukraine is going to cost everyone in the west, most definitely but that is not the issue.  The issue is that the cost of "not doing" was much higher than the "cost of doing" in this case.  The cost of not doing were a complete destabilization of the western rules based international order, which underpin a significant amount of US global power base.  In short the whole damn scheme falls apart if a revisionist power can employ conventional warfare to re-draw the map in freaking Europe.  That is way to complicated and nuanced for the average voter - in any country - so we have to go with these sorts of polarized assessments, I get that.  However, I am also very nervous around over-subscribing to narratives that do not account for the downsides and risk.

I think the general idea is good if some of it is exaggerated. It's also important to note that this is apparently from a European's perspective and that comports with what I hear as well. Americans often don't understand the hesitation they see on the issue of Ukraine from Macron/Scholtz/etc but part of it is based on this sort of thinking. Under the former guy, they were starting to gain more elbow room geopolitically. Ukraine and Biden's response has reversed that trend and then some....a lot of then some really.

On reconstruction and arms costs, I think we are very likely to see that age old American tradition of aid given that must be paid to American firms with profits mostly heading right back to the US. So, sure...it's a "cost" up front but it's less of one than meets the eye and again, the political and strategic benefits are obvious.

On China, I certainly agree that they are picking up lots of intel. At the same time, they are realizing both the enormity of any attempt on Taiwan while those nations disinclined to accept that proposition are seeing how it can be done successfully. I think this is particularly interesting in that context:  https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3156126/gray-dragons-assessing-chinas-senior-military-leadership/

 

[A Canadian Cat]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

There is a school of thought out there that we shouldn't be congratulating Ukraine for winning the war until it has shown that it can end the war.

Feels like moving the goal posts. We don't expect you to hold out - oh you did, well it won't be for long. Wow you pushed them out of the north of the country but it will be much harder in the East. Now, they have shown they can do that too. So, the new goal post is - sure but can you win.

LOL OK we don't know with 100% certainty if they will win but you have to admit it looks much better now. Way better.

I have expressed my concerns before about if Ukraine can actually push back hard. My concerns have been 100% alleviated. They clearly can and that means they clearly can win. The only thing left is for time to pass and the UA to keep doing the work they are doing. I'm not even worried about the odd setback - seems unavoidable.

 

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

You have just described what we're calling "breakup", so you need to pick a date when European Russia becomes a "rump state" in order to play the game

For me the recent proof that Ukraine can shove hard against the Russian army is the tipping point that moved from Putin has a higher chance of staying on as president to he will not remain as president of Russia. I was waiting for that before trying to predict when Putin would fall. My best guess is that some time after he falls perhaps after the first attempt at replacement fails (I'm not sure they will but I think it is more than 50% chance) there will be a movement by some to break away.

So, my time line thinking out loud looks like this:

Putin leaves office: 2 months - 8 months

Whomever is next tries to make a go of it: 6 months to one year after that

First province tries to break away: 6 months to a year after that

So, first to leave is 1 - 2 years from now. More will follow so I'll go with significant break up in 3 - 4 years. Someone already took 3 so I'll go with 4 years. So, by September 2026 is my guess.

 

10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I tried to make that clear, because IMHO this war is not about territory seized in 2014/2015, it's about getting back to the pre February borders.  Once that has been achieved then a decision can be made about how to get back the rest.

I don't see it that way. If I were in charge of Ukraine I would no longer hold any special significance to the pre Feb borders. The 2008 invasion is as serious as this one IMHO. Granted there are possibly practical considerations about if you really want to invite everyone back or force them. I get that. However let us not forget that the Russian government augmented or even faked a lot of discontent and inserted their own people as if they were rebels. They totally rigged the votes in all three territories.

I would support Ukraine deciding what to do with all of their territory. If they want to take it all back and have a chance to work out a new deal for some regions or if they want to work out the new deal now with the current leaders that's their decision. Bottom line at no time do I think the Ukrainians should be trying for the Feb borders and stopping. Where the stop is totally up to them.

[A Canadian Cat]

1 hour ago, DesertFox said:

That´s some really low pass flying...

Trying to read the road signs and got a little too close I see.

[Huba]

13 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Agree. Probably by beginning of October we should see another tactical feint of RU forces. 

So another thought or two about that. 
When looking at the map, I noticed that there's a section of the main road up north that is not on causeway, but seems to be a HIMARSable bridge. Mud season just starts, in a few weeks it might be in full swing. I imagine withdrawing whole northern sector, with the only road cut off, through the mud, and probably only a few kilometers from UA lines sounds like a recipe for true disaster.

Edited September 15, 2022 by Huba

[A Canadian Cat]

5 hours ago, Grigb said:

If I am right RU splitting/Civil war will happen along the lines of PMCs. 

That is a scary thought. This trend is definitely worth watching.

[sburke]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

In college I saw a pumpkin violated based on a $20 dare.  That was in peacetime conditions with far less access to alcohol than the Russians have.  Thankfully, watermelons are not sentient.  Still, it's disturbing that Prigozhin mentioned it even if in jest.  Always a bit of truth to a joke like that.

Steve

Roberto Benigni from Night on Earth.  First time I saw this I nearly asphyxiated.  Jump to 3:25 for his confession on pumpkins

 

Edited September 15, 2022 by sburke

[Battlefront.com]

Russia going the route of private armies makes a lot of sense.  In many ways the Russian culture is still feudal in nature, which means this concept is not as detached from their history as it is in the West.  Even the interwar German Freikorps weren't exactly that and they disappeared very thoroughly before Hitler came to power.

We had a preview of this sort of thing back in 2014 when Akhmetov mobilized his steel workers to kick the crap out of the Russian "Tourists" that were attempting to take over Mariupol.  In effect he had a private army already in hand.  All he had to do was give an order and an offer of money to get a result.  In this case a very good result for Ukraine at the time, but it underscores the hidden power that oligarchs have at their disposal.

Steve

[DesertFox]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

Elsewhere I also read about 200 GMLRS to go with the package. Very well!

 

Well, it is a deception attempt to get off the hook from the MBT debate.

Ukraine. German MPs call on the government to increase military aid to Ukraine, including the supply of Leopard 2 tanks and Marder vehicles - Polish News

[Grigb]

Ru Nats noticed Foreign Policy article about them. One of them decided to formulate a manifesto to taunt the Western Press.

Quote

1. Solidarity within the Russian nation. Uniting all strata of society, supporters of any views, "good" and "bad" people in the name of common interests. Mutual respect. Mutual assistance. [Ein Volk, Ein Reich...]
2. Supremacism towards her [RU] bastards. We must be better than those who betrayed Russia. In everything, including biology. We have to be stronger, smarter, prettier, sexier, richer than them. Their existence should revolve around envy of us. [No comments]
3. The intercontinental philosophy of Novorossiya as a guarantee of the existence of Russia and the Russian people. Everything is clear here: either we get a place under the sun, or no one is warmed by the sun because the sky itself will split into parts. [We must secure the existence of our people and a future for RU children]

 

[Battlefront.com]

11 minutes ago, IanL said:

I don't see it that way. If I were in charge of Ukraine I would no longer hold any special significance to the pre Feb borders.

That would be a mistake.  While there is zero doubt that Ukraine has the right to return the borders to their pre 2014 war state, there are peculiarities to both LPR, DPR, and Crimea that might mean different approaches.  One of those approaches might be negotiation, another might be being patient to wait for other conditions to come about.

Crimea is the big one.  Unlike ALL other territory Russia has seized, directly or through proxy, Crimea is considered a part of Russia by Russians.  They considered it that way even before they seized it.  This introduces variables that do not exist for any other piece of territory Russia holds.  Bounding into Crimea militarily without thinking all this through would be a very bad idea.  Very.

It could be that Ukraine takes a wait and see approach with Crimea.  If we're so sure Russia is going to collapse, might it not be better to strike during that period of crisis instead of before?  Maybe a concentrated PSYOPS campaign against Russians in Crimea could cause things to deteriorate even further by getting them to leave.  Or maybe Ukraine's military is freed up from every place else and can apply so much threat/pressure that there's some genuine interest for compromise by the Crimeans themselves?  This isn't even touching the option of destroying the Kerch bridge and making Crimea ungovernable.

A few pages ago I put forward a theory that Ukraine might be better off peeling LPR away from Russia in exchange for some sort of enhanced autonomous rule.  No need to fight for the terrain, Russia gets a huge black eye (perhaps causing collapse in the Kremlin), and Ukraine isn't the one directly responsible for the continued misery of the people of Luhansk.  Then just wait for the inevitable time when LPR will want to renegotiate by giving up more of its autonomy in exchange for something like international redevelopment money.

Similar possibility with DPR, though I get the sense that they could strike a better deal than LPR, so maybe the best thing to do is just let it collapse along with Russia and see what comes of that.

All of these concepts are not applicable to the land seized since February.  It's far more straight forward, therefore concentrate on retaking that ground now and see how conditions might become more favorable as time goes on.

Steve

[Grigb]

13 minutes ago, Huba said:

So another thought or two about that. 
When looking at the map, I noticed that there's a section of the main road up north that is not on causeway, but seems to be a HIMARSable bridge. Mud season just starts, in a few weeks it might be in full swing. I imagine withdrawing whole northern sector, with the only road cut off, through the mud, and probably only a few kilometers from UA lines sounds like a recipe for true disaster.

Yes, yes - it is bridge near Novokari. There are two more bridges there at - Mylove and at Dutchane. And T-2207 seems to be the only normal road in the corridor between Charvine and Novokari. If Rasputiza starts in 2-3 weeks the whole eastern group of RU will be in the trap once bridges are blown. 

[Grigb]

And right on time

Quote

I would like to see a man very similar to Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin as the Minister of Defense.

[UPDATE] Prigozhin PR campaign is getting in overdrive

Quote

Prigozhin "opened fire" on everyone with [guns in] both hands "Macedonian" [style]. Now he is not Putin's cook, forget it, but the "head of a limited military contingent [group]" in Ukraine. In kind [Zek phrase].

 

Edited September 15, 2022 by Grigb